2RHPZ
06-28-2004, 04:57 AM
An Airborne Battalion Searches Sherkhankhel Village By Major S. N. Petrov
Introduction
Major S. N. Petrov served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan (OKSVA) from 1981 to 1983 as the commander of an airborne company.
The Soviet Union’s Frunze Military Academy compiled the information contained
in this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers in order
to capture the lessons of Soviet tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to
explain the change in tactics that followed.
An Airborne Battalion Searches Sherkhankhel Village
In the spring of 1982, guerrilla forces began combat activities in Parvan
Province. Guerrillas hit our convoys, outposts and separate groups of soldiers.
They regularly shelled the Bagram airport and the base camp of our airborne
regiment. Intelligence reports indicated that a well-armed group of
approximately 40 Mujahideen were operating out of Sherkankhel Village.
The airborne regimental commander received orders to destroy this guerilla
force. Preparations for combat were rapidly completed. Sufficient ammunition for
three days was issued to every paratrooper and two combat loads of ammunition
were loaded onto the combat vehicles. The regimental commander personally
inspected the battalion’s readiness.
The 3rd Airborne Battalion commander planned to move his battalion secretly to
the Sherkhankhel region and seal it off with two companies of paratroopers while
a third company would search the village. One airborne company would remain in
reserve. An artillery battalion and four Mi-24 helicopters would provide support
with the initiation of combat.
In the predawn hours of 20 March, the battalion moved out from Bagram to
Sherkhankhel. A reconnaissance patrol moved 300 meters in front of the column.
The approach march moved on a wide, straight road. Along the left side of the
road stretched a thick, high, long adobe wall while on the right side lay a
concrete lined canal. The canal was five meters wide and two-and-a-half meters
deep. Suddenly, through an embrasure cut in the adobe wall, and practically at
point-blank range, the enemy opened fire on the reconnaissance patrol. The
survivors scrambled for safety into the canal. A machine gun opened fire from a
house 150 meters further north from the ambush site. The battalion column halted
and the battalion commander called in artillery and helicopter support.
The battalion finally began to maneuver its reserve company in an effort to
encircle the enemy, but only after the Mujahideen ceased fire. But even this
attempt was stopped by a veritable hurricane of enemy fire. The Mujahideen used
the system of karez to successfully break contact and withdraw. A karez is a
system of underground tunnels used for the collection of ground water and for
carrying water for surface irrigation. There was no thought of conducting a
pursuit or continuing the action. The 3rd Airborne Battalion lost eight men
killed and six wounded. Two of the dead were officers. The battalion did not
search the village since the Mujahideen were already gone. Instead, the
battalion returned to its base camp.
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Searching a Populated Area in the Charikar Valley By LTC A. L. Makkoveev
Introduction
LTC A. L. Makkoveev commanded at motorized rifle company in the Limited
Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from December 1979 to
November 1981. He was decorated with the Military Order "For Service to the
Fatherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" Third Class.
Searching a Populated Area in the Charikar Valley
Throughout the winter of 1980, Kabul and the surrounding provinces were quiet
and there was no combat in this region. However, with the arrival of spring,
organized guerrilla groups initiated an active campaign.
I commanded the 7th Motorized Rifle Company (evidently part of the 108th
Motorized Rifle Division) which was mounted on BMPs. On the morning of 21 July,
I was given the mission to conduct a road march from Kabul to Charikar and then
reinforce one of the mountain rifle battalions which would conduct a deep raid
and search.
Preparations for combat began in garrison. The company had a 100 percent fill in
personnel, weapons and equipment. We carried three days worth of dry rations and
the vehicles were topped-off with POL. Editor note: Dry rations are similar to
the old C-ration. There were three types of dry rations. The first contained a
can of meat, some crackers or toast, some jam and a tea bag. The second
contained two cans of meat mixed with oatmeal. The third contained a can of meat
and a van of vegetables - endnote. After a thorough inspection, I reported to my
battalion commander that we were ready for combat.
We completed our road march to the area of operations (AO) of the 3rd Mountain
Rifle Battalion. That evening, the battalion commander - Captain Yu. P. Leventas
- explained the 3rd Battalion mission and instructed me to prepare my company to
move in the main body of the battalion along a designated route and search all
the nearby villages.
At 0500 hours on 22 July, the 3rd Mountain Rifle Battalion, reinforced by my 7th
Motorized Rifle Company, moved out. Riding on our combat vehicles allowed us to
overcome many natural obstacles. At one stage of our advance, I dismounted my
company. While we were dismounted, I received the order to search a nearby
village and, following the search, to take the road (which ran through the
village) to rejoin the battalion main body. I dispatched a squad-sized patrol to
establish a defensive position at the entrance to the village. I wanted the
squad to cover the company as it deployed. On the outskirts of the village, I
established firing positions for the machine gun-grenade launcher platoon.
Editor note: The machine gun-grenade launcher platoon was the fourth platoon of
a motorized rifle company and provided suppressive fire from PKS or Utes machine
guns and AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers. This platoon disappeared during
force reorganization in the mid-1980s - endnote. The company then descended from
the heights, formed into a line and combed the village, searching the houses and
basements. After two hours, we finished the search and the company assembled on
the road to exit the village.
At that moment, the enemy suddenly opened up on us with heavy fire from hill
number two. The company went to the defense and took up positions behind the
adobe walls on the south and southwest edges of the village. I decided to send
two squads from the first platoon to envelop hill number two and then destroy
the enemy by an attack from the front and rear. I also decided to dispatch a
patrol squad to the top of hill number one. However, just as the platoon started
to move to carry out its tasks, the Mujahideen opened fire from hills one, two
and three. My forces had to stay in place and return fire. After 30 minutes, I
received orders to withdraw my company to the hill from which we started (number
four). During the withdrawal from the village, my company was pinned down by
fire from hill number three. After we destroyed the enemy on hills number two
and three with small arms fire and helicopter gun-ship strikes, I moved my
company to the designated area.
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Combing the City of Bamian and its Outlying Towns During the Course
of a Raid By Major A. P. Pivovarenko
Introduction
Major A. P. Pivovarenko served as a reconnaissance platoon leader in the Limited
Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from January 1980 to December
1980.
Combing the City of Bamian and its Outlying Towns During the Course of a Raid
During the winter of 1980, the situation along the roads between Termez and
Kabul worsened. Enemy activity was particularly heavy in the area of the Salang
pass leading to the critical Salang tunnel. Guerrilla forces struck convoys of
military vehicles and trucks. Our motorized rifle regiment, composed of three
reinforced motorized rifle battalions, was tasked to secure this sector from
February until May of 1980. By May, the situation along this section of road had
become even more acute. Consequently, one of our battalions was structured as a
raiding detachment. The battalion was reinforced with a tank company, a self-propelled
artillery battery from division artillery, the regiment’s reconnaissance
company, a platoon of ZSU-23-4s, and a squad of sappers. Editor’s note: The
ZSU-23-4 is a self-propelled air defense weapon, which fires four 23mm machine
guns simultaneously. The weapon proved extremely effective in counter-ambushes
and in the destruction of ground targets - endnote.
The reconnaissance company carried out its first raid in the area of Ghorband
during the pre-dawn hours of 20- 21 May and arrived at the village at daybreak.
The detachment quickly broke into Ghorband and killed up to 10 Mujahideen. After
this, we began a thorough search of all the houses in the village. During the
search, we only found some Mujahideen small arms, for the bulk of the guerrilla
force had secretly withdrawn to the north. On the following day, the entire
raiding detachment finally began to move onto the city of Bamian. The detachment
moved by road and fell into a Mujahideen ambush, losing one BMP and one ZSU-23-4.
The detachment seized the city. Our companies assaulted and searched the city’s
blocks. Our search showed that the Mujahideen had abandoned the city. Our
detachment stayed in the city for several days. During that time we searched the
nearby villages but found no Mujahideen. The enemy had temporarily abandoned the
populated areas. My reconnaissance company received information from our Afghan
agent network, which was located in that city and, from that information, we
were able to seize 63 weapons. The rest of the battalion was only able to
capture two weapons - both of them antiques.
The detachment conducted further raids, which combed outlying villages and
canyons. But again, the Mujahideen had successfully withdrawn and the battalion
swept empty blocks and areas.
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Sweeping Villages with Afghani and Soviet Sub-units By Major S. G. Davydenko
Introduction
Major S. G. Davydenko served with the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan (OKSVA) from September 1984 to September 1986 as the adviser to an
Afghan battalion commander.
Sweeping Villages With Afghani and Soviet Sub-units
Throughout the time that Soviet forces operated in Afghanistan, the Panjsher
Valley was the site of the sharpest ideological and military struggles between
the government of Afghanistan and the armed opposition led by Ahmed Shah
Massoud. Editor’s note: Ahmed Shah Massoud is one of the best-known guerrilla
leaders in the West. He is a minority Tadjik who assembled the largest single
guerrilla army in Afghanistan. This army, put at 11,000 regulars by the Soviets,
may have numbered 50,000 when part-time partisans are added. Massoud was born
around 1950, studied engineering in Kabul and is fluent in French. His control
of the 70- mile-long Panjsher Valley was frequently challenged by the Soviets,
yet in the end Massoud dominated the valley. Massoud became the West’s favorite
Afghan when Ken Follett based his best seller, Lie Down With Lions on this tough
guerrilla commander - endnote. Operations, which had been conducted in this
valley earlier, had resulted I heavy casualties. The mountain massif (located
high above sea level) and the severe climate limited the capabilities of
machines and men.
I was an adviser to a battalion of the Afghan Army’s "Commando" Brigade (the
212th Separate Assault Brigade) garrisoned in the Barak fortress. We received an
order to sweep the villages of Tal’khana, Dashtak, Kalatak and Chislak to
capture or destroy Mujahideen operating in the area. In addition, we were to
find and destroy prepared firing positions and supply caches of ammunition,
equipment and food.
Preparations for the operation began upon receipt of the mission. However, due
to the massive disaffection and desertions of Afghan brigade officers and men to
the Mujahideen, the enemy almost immediately knew the Afghan concept of the
operation. On the morning of 28 October 1984, I received the order to start the
mission. The concept for the battalion was as follows: Move out of the fortress
and proceed on foot to conduct a sweep of the designated villages. In the event
that the enemy offered any resistance, call in artillery fire from the artillery
battalion that belongs to the “Commando” Brigade. Plan to operate with the
Soviet motorized rifle regiment that is located in the Rukha fortress (probably
the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division).
Due to the security leaks during the course of preparation for the operation,
some combat missions had to be amplified and changed. The new concept required
that the 2nd Afghan Battalion would exit the fortress and occupy the heights
around Post 21. From there if necessary, they could support the Soviet motorized
rifle company which would independently sweep the villages of Tal’khana and
Dashtak. Following this, the two units would switch roles while the Afghan
battalion swept Turkha.
At the designated time, the 150-man Afghan battalion exited the fortress. It
reached Post 21 in an hour and a half. The Soviet company swept the villages of
Tal’khana and Dashtak. No Mujahideen were discovered during the sweep, but a
hidden Mujahideen rest station with a small supply of food and anti-Soviet
leaflets was discovered.
The battalion reached the village of Turkha on the evening of 29 October.
Observers at Post 20 had seen Mujahideen moving through Turkha the day before.
On the morning of 30 October, the battalion searched the village. There, they
found a few flintlock muskets and an AK-74. That evening, the battalion returned
to the Bazarak fortress where they rested.
On the morning of 31 October, following joint planning between the Afghan
battalion commander and Soviet motorized rifle regimental commander, the forces
set out to reach the villages of Sata, Kalatak, and Kishlak. The plan was that
the Afghan battalion would enter the canyon and search the villages
sequentially. The canyon was controlled by two ridges, which rimmed the canyon.
It was necessary to put a Soviet battalion onto each of these ridges. Once they
reached the crest of the ridge, the Soviet battalions would dominate the high
ground and could support the Afghan battalion. The artillery was ready to open
fire from protected positions within the fortresses.
At noon, the Afghan battalion began to sweep the canyon as the Soviet battalions
began to mount the ridges. Combat engineers moved in front of the sweeping
Afghan forces. As the Afghan battalion attempted to enter Kishlak to search it,
they were met with strong small arms, mortar and heavy machine gun fire.
Simultaneously, both the Soviet battalions became trapped in minefields. The
enemy opened fire on the Soviet battalions from ambush and inflicted heavy
casualties on them. Neither battalion was able to get into a position to support
the Afghan battalion. The Afghan battalion also took heavy casualties and by
nightfall was forced to withdrawal to Bazarak village.
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Blocking and Sweeping an Inhabited Region By LTC V. V. Shubin
Introduction
LTC V. V. Shubin served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan (OKSVA) from 1986 to 1988. He was decorated with the “Medal for
Merit in Combat”, the “Medal for Personal Bravery”< and the “Order of
Glory”.
Blocking and Sweeping an Inhabited Region
Divisions (formations) and regiments (units) of the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan (DRA) conducted operations in the province of Kandahar (Qandahar)
from March to the first days of September 1986. They inflicted such appreciable
casualties on the guerrilla forces that the majority of them left for the safe
haven of Pakistan.
By the beginning of September, active combat had ceased. The Afghan command
decided to allow its forces the time to conduct training and to rest in their
base camps. Consequently, on 6 September, the regiments of the 9th Infantry
Division began moving out in march column to their camps in the Ghazni Province.
The march took the division through Zabol Province, where five of six guerilla
forces with a total of approximately 500 men were located. The local guerrilla
leader Pahlawan commanded these Mujahideen. They were well armed with recoilless
rifles, mortars, rocket launchers and antiaircraft guided missile systems. They
knew the local terrain very well and could quickly and secretly maneuver their
forces and equipment throughout the area.
The terrain in this area is mountainous and semi-desert in places. The guerillas
used the extensive Karez underground irrigation system for ambushes. (MOUT
Homepage Note: The subterranean aspects of an area of operations when conducting
MOUT cannot be overlooked nor overemphasized – unfortunately this is one of the
urban areas that we lack training in and may lack detailed information on when
deployed). The enemy knew about the movement of the 9th Infantry Division. Since
the road network in this area was poorly developed, the enemy knew at what time
which forces would pass through the narrow sections on the Kandahar-Ghazni
route.
At 0500 hours on 7 September, two explosions ripped apart the roadbed close to
the village of Shingali-Kalay. Simultaneously, a Mujahideen ambush opened fire
with every weapon at its disposal. Within the first few minutes, they destroyed
four tanks, three BTRs, and seven trucks. (Editor’s Note: The BTR is an eight-
wheeled armored personnel carrier that can carry up to an 11-man squad. It
mounts 14.4mm and 7.62mm machine guns and can carry antitank weapons as well.
The BTR and BMP were the most common infantry carriers of the Soviet forces in
Afghanistan).
A part of the division column, including the division commander, was able to
force its way through the blocked passage and escape to the province center of
Kalat. It arrived at 0520 hours. The division commander requested assistance
from the commander of the provincial “Sarandoy”. (Editor’s Note: The Sarandoy
were Ministry of Interior armed forces – a heavily armed police force. They
were organized into six brigades or regiments and numbered about 6,000 men. They
were based in Kandahar, Badakhstan, Baglan, and Parvan Provinces plus two in
Kabul. The Sarandoy had an additional 6,000 men in operational and mountain
battalions). The province authority agreed to dispatch the 35th Operational
Battalion reinforced with a company from the KHAD (DRA secret police) to aid the
trapped sub-units.
The province’s plan was to draw the guerrilla main force into the battle, hit
them with aviation and artillery fire, and then simultaneously attack them from
the flank and rear to destroy them. The battalion commander formed his force
into two columns. The first column consisted of the 1st and 3rd Companies of the
35th Battalion plus the KHAD Company. The second column was the 2nd Battalion of
the 35th Battalion. The columns moved out at 0600 hours.
Artillery strikes and helicopter gun-ships fired preparatory fires from 0610 to
0625 hours. At 0630 hours, the flanking detachment (2nd Company) radioed in that
it was in its designated position. A battalion sub-unit then gave the signal and
the battalion hit the enemy in the flank and rear. The enemy abandoned their
casualties, weapons and ammunition and withdrew. Enemy losses were 27 KIA and 36
WIA. The Afghan government forces captured two recoilless rifles, six mortars,
two DShK 12.7mm heavy machine guns, three RPG antitank grenade launchers, two
crates of grenades, and six AKM assault rifles. Losses of the 35th Operational
Battalion were two killed and six wounded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Blocking the Enemy in an Area of Villages and then Destroying them
During the Sweep By Major S. S. Gazaryan
Introduction
Major S. S. Gazaryan served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan (OKSVA) from August 1984 to September 1986 as the Chief of Staff of
a Motorized Rifle Battalion (MRB).
Blocking the Enemy in an Area of Villages and then Destroying them During the
Sweep
In February 1985, an intelligence agent brought us information that a guerrilla
force of 100-120 men, armed with small arms, was located in the village of
Karamagul.
Our regimental commander decided to destroy this force by sealing off the area
and then sweeping it to find and destroy the enemy. My battalion, the 2nd MRB,
was given this mission and reinforced with the regiment’s reconnaissance
company and two artillery batteries. Six helicopter gun-ships from army aviation
would be in support.
All the forces would be used for the initial action blocking action. On the
night of 11-12 February, two Motorized Rifle Companies (MRCs), moving out on
foot, by morning had to occupy the dominant terrain (hills 1864.4 and 1973.0)
along the southern and eastern combat sectors. At 0600 hours on 12 February, our
4th MRC and the reconnaissance company had to land and secure the dominant
terrain to the north and west of Karamagul’ Village by tactical air assaults.
The 5th MRC was to establish a platoon-sized ambush to cover any attempted
Mujahideen withdrawal from Karamagul’ to Batash.
Our plan was to begin the sweep at dawn only after we had seized and occupied
the dominant terrain and had surrounded the enemy.
Following a 10-minute artillery and helicopter gun-ship preparation, the
reconnaissance company moved forward and began sweeping the area. The enemy
tried to break out of the encirclement through various gullies and ravines. A
group of Mujahideen attempted to break out to the southwest. Then another group
tried to break out of the encirclement. But the entire enemy attempt was futile.
Only a small part of the enemy’s force was able to break out through a ravine
in the direction of the village of Batash.
In the course of the combat, the enemy lost up to 60 killed or wounded and we
captured 12. We also captured 25 weapons. The battalion’s losses were
negligible.
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Assault on the Outskirts of Heart By Major V. M. Bogdashkin
Introduction
Major V. M. Bogdashkin served in the Republic of Afghanistan from June 1983
through June 1985 as a platoon leader and company commander in a motorized rifle
battalion. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”.
Assault on the Outskirts of Herat
The situation in Herat Province was very serious in the fall of 1984. Guerrilla
forces, led b Captain Ismail, received trained reinforcements as well as new
weapons from Iran. They launched raids on Soviet and Afghan convoys and struck
the Kushka-Shindand pipeline. They constituted a threat to the Herat airfield
and grain elevators.
The operational group of the regiment with field post number (FPN) 51883 was
ordered to: block part of the southern edge of Herat City with the 2nd MRB
(minus a company) and fragment the Mujahideen force. Further, in conjunction
with the 2nd MRB of FPN 83260 regiment and the 3rd MRB of FPN 51931 regiment,
destroy the enemy.
Editor’s Note: FPNs were postal numbers assigned to a division and higher
headquarters, regiments and separate battalions and companies. A compilation of
field post numbers was considered classified. The field post numbers referred to
here are probably of the 12th, 101st, and 371st Motorized Rifle Regiments of the
5th Motorized Rifle Division – endnote.
Preparation for this action was conducted in base camp. All company commanders
and above, plus all the attached company commanders conduced coordination on a
terrain model. Enemy courses of action and the sequencing of his destruction
were also worked out on the terrain model. Personnel who would be physically
close with the Mujahideen conducted training in a deserted village where they
became familiar with the specific make-up of an assault group and gained
practical experience.
At the end of October, my company (the 7th MRC) was designated part of the
operational group of regiment FPN 51883, which assembled outside Herat. At 0400
hours on 4 November, our sub-units were ordered into the city. By 0540 hours,
the force blocked off the eastern section of the city. The east side was held by
FPN 83260, the north and west sides were held by FPN 51931 and the south side by
my regiment - FPN 51883.
At 0600 hours, FPN 51883 regiment committed its mountain motorized rifle
battalion to battle and it managed to cut off and surround a group of
Mujahideen. (Editor’s Note: The mountain motorized rifle battalions retained
most of their regular MRB TO&E, but had special training, and additional
equipment for mountain warfare – endnote). However, other Mujahideen pounded
this battalion with small arms, rocket launchers, cannon and mortars. The
battalion had stumbled into a Mujahideen fire sack. In the course of 40 minutes,
the battalion lost nine killed or wounded and was forced to stop and go over to
the defense.
Regiment ordered my 7th MRC to turn over our portion of the southern block to a
bronegruppa and move to the command post of FPN 51883 regiment. My regimental
commander was LTC A. M. Budeyev. He ordered my company commander, Senior
Lieutenant S. N. Bogrov, to advance along a city street to fragment the
defending Mujahideen force. My MRC had two BMP-2s and a tank as part of our
assault group.
Following a five-minute artillery strike, the 7th MRC went into battle at 0730
hours. It advanced 150-200 meters when heavy small arms fire as well as the fire
from two recoilless rifles, a grenade launcher and a mortar stopped it. The
small arms fire came from was close range from a grape arbor and through
embrasures cut in the adobe walls. One of our soldiers was wounded. The company
commander was ordered to break contact and withdraw. After his professional,
organized withdrawal (there were no more casualties), the company deployed along
the edges of a village.
Afghan intelligence reported that there were some 800 men in the guerrilla force
that operated in this immediate territory (25 square kilometers) but we had no
idea how many we were facing now. We called in ground attack aircraft (Su-25s)
and artillery fire on the encircled Mujahideen. Three artillery battalions from
division artillery fired in our support.
The company commander asked for two 152mm self-propelled (SP) howitzers and
another tank. He received these plus a sapper squad with 75 kilograms of
explosives. The 1st and 2nd platoon leaders (Captain P. P. Rozhkov and
Lieutenant V. I. Nikitenko) were ordered to advance from the company flanks
through the grape arbor and blow up the adobe walls.
LTC A. M. Budeyev, the regimental commander, requested two BM-21 122mm multiple
rocket launchers (MRLs) to conduct direct fire as needed by the company
commander. Following an air strike, the BM-21s opened fire. Supporting artillery
simultaneously began a 10-minute artillery preparation. The company moved
forward to the attack under this protective fire.
The BM-21 direct-fire salvos did not inflict heavy casualties on the enemy, but
did have a tremendous effect on their morale. The company advanced 300 meters
before the first Mujahideen fired, and this fire was very weak. On signals from
the company and platoon commanders, the two SP 152mm howitzers, two tanks and
four BMPs opened direct suppressive fire on the enemy. The flanking platoons
were able to move at the same tempo as the center and signaled their progress
with signal rockets. The assault group hit a mine filed at a street
intersection. They defused seven mines as well as a 250-kilogram bomb rigged as
a mine. The assault detachment advanced 1.5 kilometers when it was stopped by
strong fire from a village. The fire came from dugouts cut in earth dikes of
irrigation canals. Tank and BMP-2 fire suppressed the enemy fire. The company
had two more men wounded during this advance.
In all, the company accomplished its mission in an hour and a half at the cost
of three wounded. They killed seven Mujahideen in close combat. By 1130 hours,
the opposing guerrilla force was shattered. However, at 1400 our attempts to
destroy another guerrilla force failed. We made a second unsuccessful attempt at
dusk. With nightfall, the Mujahideen managed to slip out of the blockade.
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Storming Spinakalacha Village By LTC V. D. Vlasyan
Introduction
LTC V. D. Vlasyan served in the Republic of Afghanistan from October 1986
through June 1988 first as a deputy commander and then as the commander of a
motorized rifle battalion (MRB). He was decorated with the “Order of the Red
Banner” and the “Order of the Red Star”>
Storming Spinakalacha Village
From 21-26 December 1987, a strong enemy force overran a series of security
outposts in the Daman region. This area was the responsibility of an Afghan Army
Corps of the Army of the Republic of Afghanistan (the Afghan 2nd Army Corps
headquartered in Kandahar). My battalion had to be in the Spinakalacha combat
area by the morning of 31 December. I was to seal off the Spinakalacha village
from the major supply bases and create conditions, which would allow the
Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade to recapture lost positions. In the course of
preparing for our road march and ensuing combat, I added extra ammunition,
water, fuel and rations to what we usually carried and picked up some
reinforcing sub-units. At 0400 hours on 29 December, my battalion moved out to
accomplish its mission.
At 1600 hours, 30 December, we arrived in Kandahar. There, General-Major R. K.
Pishchev, the deputy commander of the 40th Army, met me. He gave me specific
orders. We were to enter the contested area at 100 hours, 31 December, and
assault and capture Spinakalacha Village by 1500 hours. We were to then seal off
the canyon and hold this area until 7 January 1988. During that time, an Afghan
regiment would fortify the area and assume responsibility for the area defended
by my 2nd MRB.
Editor’s Note: The Afghan Army had both a brigade and a regiment force
structure. The Afghan regiment mentioned here was either from the Afghan 7th
Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) or 15th MRD stationed in Kandahar - endnote.
At 1100 hours, I put my battalion on the road flanked by security patrols. As we
entered the area, we began battle and I post two killed and three wounded. By
1210 hours, I assembled the bulk of my battalion 1.5 kilometers south of
Spinakalacha. From 1220 until 1240, I conducted a personal reconnaissance,
finalized my plans for the assault groups and finalized air and artillery
coordination. I reported my plan to the senior commander at 1240.
Ten minutes later, my reconnaissance platoon began to climb a mountain ridge
from the west to destroy enemy security outposts on dominant terrain and on the
canyon approaches and the approaches to Spinakalacha Village. During their
advance, the reconnaissance patrol uncovered a launch-bomb cache with 150 launch
bombs and two launchers. The patrol rigged the cache for detonation and
proceeded up the hill where they could secure the left flank of the assault
detachment. At 1320 hours, the patrol attacked and destroyed an enemy outpost
and established solid communications with me.
At 1320 hours, I signaled the start of an artillery preparation. A 152mm self-propelled
(SP) howitzer battalion, a separate 122mm SP howitzer battalion and a multiple
rocket launcher (MRL) battalion participated in a 10-minute artillery
preparation. This was immediately followed by a bombing and strafing attack by
two squadrons of Su-25 FROGFOOT ground-attack aircraft.
At 1335 hours, my 5th Motorized Rifle Company (MRC) moved out to its jumping off
point some 250 meters from the village. The 5th MRC was commanded by Captain B.
M. Mikul’skiy. The 5th MRC was configured as Assault Group Number 1. It had 46
men, including a squad of sappers and eight BMP-2s. I added a tank with a mine
plow and an Afghan infantry company of 40 men to this company. As the 5th MRC
moved out, I covered its movement with the fires of a sniper squad, a flame-thrower
platoon, an AGS-17 platoon and a mortar battery. At 1340 hours, I had the MRL
battalion lay down a smoke screen to blind the enemy.
At 1340 hours, my sub-units attacked Spinakalacha. We met strong resistance on
the right flank and the Afghan Army company withdrew to the jumping off area. I
was not able to get them to come back and they did nothing further towards
accomplishing our mission. The enemy began to shift his forces to his left flank
in order to put flanking fire on the 5th MRC. For awhile, we were held back by
the thick adobe walls of the village. Then, however, my troops were able to blow
gaps in the adobe walls and my platoons burst through these gaps in three-man
groups on the attack. My 5th MRC faced the enemy main force.
At 1355 hours, my 4th MRC (Assault Group Number 2) attacked on the battalion’s
left flank. The 4th MRC - commanded by Captain Yu. A. Shalkin - broke the enemy
defense and destroyed his covering forces guarding the entrance to the canyon.
One of his platoons was able to hit the enemy in the rear, which helped the 5th
MRC’s fight. Two more 4th MRC platoons grabbed the western edge of the village
and established blocking positions. At 1500 hours, these platoons got into a
fire fight with Mujahideen who were retreating into the mountains.
By 1600 hours, the 5th MRC completed the destruction of the enemy in the eastern
part of the village and established blocking positions against the access points
from the neighboring green zone. The surviving enemy had fled into the green
zone. At 1800 hours, I organized the defense of Spinakalacha and provided fire
support to an Afghan infantry regiment which attacked north to seize the
southern slope of Grakalacha.
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Tactical Air Assaults in Nangarhar and Laghman Provinces By Major S. A. Urban
Introduction
Major S. A. Urban served in the Republic of Afghanistan from December 1981
through April 1984 as a platoon leader and then a company commander in an air
assault battalion. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”.
Tactical Air Assaults in Nangarhar and Laghman Provinces
In February 1983, the brigade intelligence section reported that approximately
150 enemy were operating as groups within in the brigade’s area of
responsibility (AOR) of the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade. They were
shelling security outposts and civilian facilities with 81mm mortar fire and
were mining roads.
The brigade commander decided to eradicate these groups in our AOR. He planned
to attack the enemy in the village of Kama (located in Nangarhar Province about
12 kilometers from our base camp) and the village of Ghaziabad. The bronegruppa
of the participating motorized rifle battalion and airborne company would move
out from Jalalabad to Ghaziabad in support. The air landing would be preceded
with a 10-minute artillery preparation. Captain Kostenko, the acting battalion
commander would command the air landing. Major Ermolaev, the deputy commander
for technical support, would command the bronegruppa. The first lift would
consist of an air assault platoon, an engineer squad and a flame-thrower squad.
On 12 February, the air landing took place near Kama. The 2nd Air Assault
Company swept through the green zone, but did not find any enemy. The
bronegruppa moved toward the village of Ghaziabad.
On 13 February, we conducted an air landing with the 1st Air Assault Company,
this time near Ghaziabad to seize the crest of the southern mountain and block
the enemy withdrawal. However, before the bronegruppa reached Ghaziabad from the
north, the enemy withdrew into the mountains. On the morning of 14 February, the
battalion commander decided to pick up the two air-assault companies and air
land them near the village of Charbagh (in Laghman Province). From there, they
would advance across the mountains to Bailam Village. According to preliminary
intelligence, the Mujahideen stored ammunition and had a hospital in Bailam. The
advancing companies would work with the bronegruppa to seal off Bailam and
destroy the enemy inside it. We had 24 hours to accomplish our mission.
The area around Bailam was well fortified and had reinforced security. The enemy
observed our air landing and the battalion lost the element of surprise. We
lacked the necessary combat power to take the village. Finally, toward the end
of 17 February, our brigade commander gave us the necessary air and artillery
support to take the village. The battalion lost 25-30 men.
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Organizing a Security Outpost in the Suburbs of Kabul By Major S. V. Mos'kin
Introduction
Major S. V. Mos’kin served in the Limited Soviet Contingent in Afghanistan
(OKSVA) from September 1980 through November 1982 as a platoon leader.
Organizing a Security Outpost in the Suburbs of Kabul
At the end of May 1982, enemy diversionary/reconnaissance groups conducted
actions against Soviet Army base camps. In particular, they fired directly on
the 40th Army Headquarters. The leadership of the guerilla forces announced that
they would destroy the headquarters in the near future. Therefore, the high
command decided to upgrade the defense and security of the army headquarters.
As a result, Major Avramenko, my battalion commander, decided to establish a new
security post, which would be manned by my motorized rifle platoon, which had
three BTR-70s and 28 men. (Editor’s Note: The 2nd Platoon, 2nd Company, 1st
Motorized Rifle Battalion, 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 108th Motorized
Rifle Division. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were mounted on BTRs while the 3rd
Battalion was mounted on BMPs – endnote). My platoon was reinforced with two
AGS-17s and three PK machine guns with night sights. We also received some night
vision devices for night observation. An engineer excavator came to the site and
within 72 hours, dug the primary and reserve fighting positions for my BTRs and
men and then connected all the positions with deep fighting trenches. We dug
secret forward redoubts on the flanks of the security outposts for our machine
gun crews.
We also built an observation post for a long-range field of vision over our
area. We established visual communications between the secret dugouts and the
observation post to assist in coordinating fires. We built two barbed wire
fences all around the security perimeter. Between the two rows of barbed wire
fence, we put in an antipersonnel minefield (pressure and tension-release
mines). On the far side of the wire, we laid in trip flares. A landline was
installed to give us telephone communications with the battalion commander, a
neighboring tank platoon and the duty officer at army headquarters. I organized
my post to have two-thirds of my men manning their posts at night and one third
during the day. Every soldier had his combat crew assignment and instructions in
case of an alert.
In September 1982, we intercepted an attempt by an enemy reconnaissance/diversionary
group to penetrate the army headquarters. The Mujahideen preceded this
provocation by shelling our positions with mortars and launch bombs. On the day
before the attempt, they did a reconnaissance of our obstacles by driving a
large flock of sheep into our minefield. On the next night, the Mujahideen
attempted to penetrate to the army headquarters using a dry river bed and
irrigation canal. We killed two of these who wandered into our mines. We
recovered weapons and documents from their bodies.
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Repelling a Raid on Security Post By Major I. A. Egiazarov
Introduction
Major I. A. Egiazarov served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan (OKSVA) from 1982 through 1984 as the commander of a SPETSNAZ group.
The term SPETSNAZ means -Troops of Special Designation. For his book, Lester
Grau used the term SPETSNAZ for Soviet forces trained for long- range
reconnaissance, commando and special forces type combat. A SPETSNAZ detachment
is equivalent to a battalion command, although its personnel strength was less
than 100. They are sometimes called SPETSNAZ companies. SPETSNAZ groups were
equivalent to company commands, but had a personnel strength of 15-16 men or
less. Some were four-man groups. They were sometimes called SPETSNAZ platoons.
Repelling a Raid on a Security Post
During the second half of June 1982, the high command decided to strengthen and
expand Afghan government power around the city of Rukha in the Panjsher valley.
They decided to do this during the course of an operation in the Panjsher
valley, which involved Afghan government troops and a SPETSNAZ detachment. The
Afghan Army had a series of security outposts on the dominant heights
surrounding Rukha. These posts were poorly fortified, there were not enough
soldiers and heavy weapons to hold them and the Afghan soldier’s morale was
low. The high command decided to reinforce the existing force and to add
additional outposts by assigning men from a SPETSNAZ detachment to man them (the
31st SPETSNAZ Group of the 177th SPETSNAZ Detachment).
Thus on the 13th of June, I received orders to take my 31st SPETSNAZ Group and
occupy the heights opposite the rest of the force across the Panjsher River. I
was a lieutenant at the time. My commander wanted me to establish an observation
post and look for Mujahideen activity in the area of the hamlet of Marishtan.
This would also deny the enemy the opportunity to conduct his own reconnaissance
and launch a surprise attack on our battalion.
There were 15 men in my 31st SPETSNAZ Reconnaissance Group. Besides small arms,
we had two AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers, one DShK heavy machine gun and
one 82mm "tray" mortar. An artillery battery that belonged to the SPETSNAZ
detachment supported us. We expected enemy action in the region on 15 or 16
July, and that action might include an assault on the security outposts.
We occupied our assigned peak on 15 July and began fortifying the position. This
was our order of work. First, prepare firing positions and establish an
integrated, comprehensive firing plan. Second, fortify the positions with local
materials to blend in with the natural terrain and build covered shelters for
the troops. Third, build tiered observation posts out of stone and clay. Fourth,
mine the approaches to the post. Fifth, on a nearby terrace, build a hidden
tanglefoot obstacle. Sixth, organize an uninterrupted schedule of observation
and security. Three men were always on guard during the day and seven men were
always on guard at night. The detachment resupplied us with ammunition and food
every three days.
About 1830 hours on 18 July, we were eating dinner and observation was lax -
probably my lookouts had also decided to eat without my authorization. During
this time of relaxed vigilance, the enemy sneaked onto our high terrace, climbed
to within 10 meters of our defensive position and simultaneously opened fire
with three DShK heavy machine guns from "Black Hill" and "Fang Mountain". My
men, with the exception of two lookouts, dove behind the walls and in the
dugouts for shelter. The guerrillas had resolutely seized the initiative and
pushed their attack forward, throwing grenades as they came. The Mujahideen
having climbed onto our high terrace ran toward our defenses, but were caught in
our tanglefoot. This broke their attack and we were able to destroy them with
fire from our dugouts. The enemy left four corpses on the terrace. The rest
withdrew under the cover of DShK fire. We had o casualties.
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Securing a Base Camp By LTC A. Yunakov
Introduction
This and the following vignette are not part of the Frunze book. They are
extracts from P. Alexseev’s “Okhranenie” (Security), Voyenny Vestnik
(Military Herald), April 1994, p. 42-46. Colonel Alexseev is on the faculty of
the Frunze Department of the History of Military Art. He apparently used LTC
Yunakov’s report that was in the Frunze Afghanistan archives. Although both
examples lack the element of combat, they show how base camps and lines of
communications (LOC) security were organized.
Securing a Base Camp
My battalion was part of a separate brigade based in Kandahar and Helmand
provinces (Editor’s Note: Probably the 5th Motorized Rifle Battalion, 70th
Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade – endnote). The brigade had three motorized
rifle battalions, an air assault battalion, a signal company, a radio-electronic
warfare company, an artillery battalion, a helicopter squadron and a brigade
headquarters. The battalion’s mission was three- fold: first, to provide
security to a base camp near Lashkargah in Helmand Province, second, to escort
convoys two or three times a week along and 80-kilometer stretch of road, and
finally to fight guerrilla forces in the immediate vicinity. My battalion was
reinforced with a battery of D-30 122mm howitzers and two tank platoons. A 12-kilometer
perimeter encompassed our base camp. I had seven fighting positions spaced
around the perimeter. Each position was occupied by one or two motorized rifle
platoons. When providing convoy security, I usually dispatched one or two
motorized rifle platoons with one or two 82mm mortars. When fighting guerrillas,
I usually dispatched a motorized rifle company, with the artillery battery,
reconnaissance platoon, and two mortar platoons.
The guerrillas began firing launch bombs at my base camp shortly after we
created a security zone. These attacks were launched from the green zone along
the Helmand River. In early 1987, we conducted an operation, in conjunction with
the Afghan Army to clean out the guerrilla forces from Lashkargah and to
establish observation posts in the green zone for a Sarandoy battalion. After
the operation, we established another security outpost in the Qala-Bust fort in
order to control the green zone adjacent to the observation posts. We garrisoned
this outpost with another Sarandoy battalion. We maintained close coordination
with Sarandoy through a liaison officer.
In order to protect my men from mortar and light machine gun fire, I paid a lot
of attention to digging in and fortifying the positions. Every squad was
completely dug in. Every firing position was linked to its platoon positions by
communications trenches. Each fighting position has a dug in sleeping quarters
(where possible), ammunition point, platoon command post, dining room, water
point, wash room and latrine. In order to improve observation, I established
forward security posts, which consisted of a BTR machine gunner, a driver, and a
rifleman. These were placed in position at 1800 hours following the issuance of
the combat order and challenge and password. They were checked every two hours
and changed every four hours by the platoon leader or his assistant. During the
night, these posts were only allowed to fire on semi-automatic as a warning or
probe. If they fired a burst on full automatic, the entire force would occupy
its fighting positions. Artillery fired scheduled harassing and interdicting
fires and had fires planned throughout the area. We were also able to open fire
without warning when a target appeared in my area of responsibility (AOR) at
night. At daybreak, I pulled all my forward posts back and fired on any person,
convoy or caravan that we discovered in the Registan Desert within four
kilometers of my camp. None of my personnel were allowed to withdraw from a
fighting position.
Every six months, the battalion commander ordered a rotation of sub-units. The
rotation occurred during daylight. Sub-units coming off base camp defense were
assigned to convoy security duties. In preparation for these duties, we trained
the sub-units in procedures for clearing roads of mines, checking and clearing
bridges, defeating enemy attacks and evacuating vehicles under fire.
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LOC Security By LTC M. Tubeev
Lines of Communications (LOC) Security
The first priority of Mujahideen commanders was to disrupt the movement of
convoys travelling on the main roads of Afghanistan. Motorized rifle sub-units
were usually responsible for route security. Normally, a motorized rifle
battalion would be responsible for a 40- to 150-kilometer stretch of road,
whereas a company would cover from two- to 10-kilometers. In February 1986, my
3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion, reinforced with a tank company and two artillery
batteries, was responsible for the security of a 102-kilometer stretch of road
along the Puli-Charkhi to Jalalabad highway as well as the security of the
Naghlu power dam site. I could field 11 tanks, 42 BMPs, twelve self-propelled
howitzers, 27 82mm mortars, nine twin-barreled anti-aircraft guns, and 23 AGS-17
automatic grenade launchers. I decided to split the area into three sections. My
7th MRC had a 32-kilometer section, my 8th MRC had a 40-kilometer section and my
9th MRC had a 30-kilomter section. I determined the length of each section after
considering the terrain, key sites, enemy activity and the line of strength of
my sub-units. I considered several solutions before I selected the one which
seemed to best concentrate combat power in critical sectors.
My LOC security was based on a series of security outposts running the length of
the road. A motorized rifle platoon, one or two AGS-17 automatic grenade
launchers, one or two heavy "Utes" or DShK machine guns, one or two 82mm mortars
and a tank usually occupied an outpost. These could be combined into a security
detachment (a motorized rifle company or battalion reinforced with artillery,
tanks, and engineers).
The security outposts functioned around the clock. During the day, one man per
squad was on watch while a two-man patrol worked the area. At night, every
security outpost would send out one or two security points. These four-man
points were located 500 to 900 meters from the security outpost and had wire and
visual communications with the outpost. The outpost could cover the point with
fire.
Each security outpost had a full perimeter defense in order to defeat a
Mujahideen attack from any direction. Each platoon had a primary and alternate
sector of fire. Artillery fire planning was carefully done. Artillery sub-units
were usually collocated in the security outposts with the motorized rifle sub-units.
The artillery was positioned in order to effectively support all the security
outposts. Artillery fires were planned on all likely axes on which the
Mujahideen could move. Targets were registered and numbered. The targets, and
their coordinates were maintained by the security outposts, artillery gun crews
and by the battalion headquarters. Fires could be adjusted from pre-planned
targets by the security outpost commander or, if he could not communicate
directly with the artillery sub-unit, through the battalion commander. Normally,
it took not more than two to four minutes to bring artillery fire onto a group
of Mujahideen.
We selected the position for the outposts carefully and fortified them
thoroughly. We piled up earth and stones to make complete trench-works, bunkers;
and ammunition, food and water points. We ran two rows of barbed wire around
each outpost and put antipersonnel mines between the fences. We put trip flares
and sensors at remote and concealed approaches to the outposts. The entrance and
exit to the security outposts were closed and mined at night. Rules of conduct
were posted at the perimeter of the security zone and outside the security
outposts. The signs were in the Afghan, Russian and English languages. Editor’s
Note: There is no single Afghan language. Pushtu and Dari are the official
languages, while Tadjik, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Baluchi, Turkmen, and Arabic are also
spoken - endnote.
Every security outpost had five combat loads of ammunition and ten days worth of
food, water, and fuel. (Editor’s Note: The combat load is a logistic planning
term, which differs from the U.S. "basic load". Five combat loads is a
significant amount - probably enough for six good fights - endnote). Night-vision
devices, "Blik" binoculars, night scopes, parachute flares, and tracer
ammunition were available for night-time employment.
Each security outpost maintained the following documents and maps:
1. The combat mission of the outpost and the sequence of mission fulfillment.
2. The commander’s map marked with positions, fire plans and known enemy
situation.
3. A diagram of the strongpoint.
4. Orders from the battalion commander.
5. Combat orders of the security outpost commander.
6. An observation schedule.
7. A patrol schedule.
8. A duty weapon schedule and sectors of fire.
9. Signal tables.
10. Observer’s journals, combat journals and journals of enemy activity.
Editor’s Note: Duty weapons were manned, crew-served weapons in temporary
positions. Only these weapons would engage enemy reconnaissance or probing
elements while the rest of the force moved to battle positions. The duty weapons
would then move to battle positions. Enemy return fire would be on the temporary
position and enemy knowledge of the locations of defending Soviet crew-served
weapons would be faulty – endnote.
The battalion produces the security plan which shows the number and composition
of each security outpost, the quantity of vehicles, weapons and ammunition at
each security outpost, the security belt at each outpost, the defensive plan for
key sites, the coordination measures between elements, the defensive fire plan,
the signal plan for communications between garrisons, convoys, dispatch posts
and the fire support elements. In addition, the battalion had a shift schedule
for its sub-units and also the battalion commander’s order for organization of
the security zone. Sub-units had their TO&E plus additional radios, telephones
and cable communications gear for command and control.
Radio is the primary means of communications in LOC security. All armored
vehicles, TO&E and attached sub-units, as well as passing convoys, monitor a
common channel. The battalion reconnaissance platoon is located close to the
battalion command post. Its function is to cut off and destroy any groups of
Mujahideen in the battalion AOR. They usually do this by setting up ambushes on
sites where Mujahideen could approach the highway. Their ambush site is
coordinated with the regiment’s ambush plan and usually lasts one night. There
have been times, however, when the ambush party has stayed on site for three
days.
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Convoy Escort and Combat in the Village of Daulatabad By LTC A. A. Agzamov
Introduction
LTC A. A. Agzamov served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan (OKSVA) from 1981 through 1083 as the commander of a reconnaissance
group of a reconnaissance company. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”.
Convoy Escort and Combat in the Village of Daulatabad
At the end of 1981, the enemy mounted attacks against convoys along the Termez,
Shebegan, Andkhoy, and Maimana route. I was particularly difficult in the region
of Daulatabad. Intelligence reports indicated that a guerrilla force of 25-30
men armed with rifles operated in this area. Acting secretly, the enemy would
attack a single vehicle or column. Their goal was to paralyze resupply into the
area.
On 2 December 1981, the 2nd Reconnaissance Company, which was garrisoned in
Maimana, was ordered to escort a 120-vehicle convoy loaded with supplies from
Andkhoy to Maimana. The distance was 110 kilometers. The company reinforcements
included a sapper squad, a flame-thrower squad armed with RPO flame-throwers, a
ZSU-23-4 self-propelled air defense gun, and a BTS-4 towing vehicle. The BTS-4
is a turretless T-55 tank equipped for towing tracked vehicles.
We had two days to prepare for the mission. During this time we studied data
which we received from the high command and resolved issues of rear support and
maintenance support. We paid particular attention to readying the vehicles for
the march and to preparing our weapons for combat. The troops drew rations and
ammunition.
The convoy commander, N. Beksultanov, was the deputy commander of a SPETSNAZ
detachment. He decided to conduct the march from Maimana to Andkhoy on a single
route and precede this with a forward security patrol. At 0500 hours on 4
December, the column moved out and 11 hours later closed into the assembly area
some three kilometers northeast of Andkhoy. The truck convoy, already loaded
with supplies, joined us. We then had to arrange the march column, distribute
our combat power throughout the convoy, agree on control measures, and arrange
for our night rest stop. We planned to leave on the morning of 5 December, move
for five or six hours covering 80 kilometers with one rest stop. Following an
overnight rest, we would close into Maimana the following day. The company had a
platoon serve as the forward patrol.
The column moved out at 0500 on the morning of 5 December. By 0900, the forward
patrol reached the village of Daulatabad. They reported back that the village
was deserted. This report put us on our guard, and the company commander ordered
us to increase our observation. When the lead vehicles of the convoy began to
exit Daulatabad village, the enemy opened fire with a grenade launcher and
destroyed a BMP-2KSH and a fuel tanker. The BMP-2KSH is the command version of
the BMP-2 series. A fire broke out and the vehicles immediately behind the
conflagration were stuck in the narrow streets.
The enemy opened up with small arms fire. Two more BMPs were knocked out and, as
a result, the convoy was split into three sections. We returned fire, but it was
not controlled or directed. The convoy commander lost control over his sub-units,
as his communications were gone. Individual vehicles independently tried to
break out of the kill zones. The forward air controller (FAC) called in
helicopter gunships and directed their fires. The helicopters began gun runs on
the enemy in the village. In the meantime, the trail platoon received the
mission to sweep the western part of the village. The dismounted troopers moved
under the cover of BMP and helicopter fire to carry out their mission. The enemy
withdrew when faced with this decisive action.
In the course of this three-hour battle, four of our soldiers were killed (all
drivers), six were wounded, three BMPs were destroyed and five trucks were
burned up.
Introduction
Major S. N. Petrov served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan (OKSVA) from 1981 to 1983 as the commander of an airborne company.
The Soviet Union’s Frunze Military Academy compiled the information contained
in this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers in order
to capture the lessons of Soviet tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to
explain the change in tactics that followed.
An Airborne Battalion Searches Sherkhankhel Village
In the spring of 1982, guerrilla forces began combat activities in Parvan
Province. Guerrillas hit our convoys, outposts and separate groups of soldiers.
They regularly shelled the Bagram airport and the base camp of our airborne
regiment. Intelligence reports indicated that a well-armed group of
approximately 40 Mujahideen were operating out of Sherkankhel Village.
The airborne regimental commander received orders to destroy this guerilla
force. Preparations for combat were rapidly completed. Sufficient ammunition for
three days was issued to every paratrooper and two combat loads of ammunition
were loaded onto the combat vehicles. The regimental commander personally
inspected the battalion’s readiness.
The 3rd Airborne Battalion commander planned to move his battalion secretly to
the Sherkhankhel region and seal it off with two companies of paratroopers while
a third company would search the village. One airborne company would remain in
reserve. An artillery battalion and four Mi-24 helicopters would provide support
with the initiation of combat.
In the predawn hours of 20 March, the battalion moved out from Bagram to
Sherkhankhel. A reconnaissance patrol moved 300 meters in front of the column.
The approach march moved on a wide, straight road. Along the left side of the
road stretched a thick, high, long adobe wall while on the right side lay a
concrete lined canal. The canal was five meters wide and two-and-a-half meters
deep. Suddenly, through an embrasure cut in the adobe wall, and practically at
point-blank range, the enemy opened fire on the reconnaissance patrol. The
survivors scrambled for safety into the canal. A machine gun opened fire from a
house 150 meters further north from the ambush site. The battalion column halted
and the battalion commander called in artillery and helicopter support.
The battalion finally began to maneuver its reserve company in an effort to
encircle the enemy, but only after the Mujahideen ceased fire. But even this
attempt was stopped by a veritable hurricane of enemy fire. The Mujahideen used
the system of karez to successfully break contact and withdraw. A karez is a
system of underground tunnels used for the collection of ground water and for
carrying water for surface irrigation. There was no thought of conducting a
pursuit or continuing the action. The 3rd Airborne Battalion lost eight men
killed and six wounded. Two of the dead were officers. The battalion did not
search the village since the Mujahideen were already gone. Instead, the
battalion returned to its base camp.
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Searching a Populated Area in the Charikar Valley By LTC A. L. Makkoveev
Introduction
LTC A. L. Makkoveev commanded at motorized rifle company in the Limited
Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from December 1979 to
November 1981. He was decorated with the Military Order "For Service to the
Fatherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" Third Class.
Searching a Populated Area in the Charikar Valley
Throughout the winter of 1980, Kabul and the surrounding provinces were quiet
and there was no combat in this region. However, with the arrival of spring,
organized guerrilla groups initiated an active campaign.
I commanded the 7th Motorized Rifle Company (evidently part of the 108th
Motorized Rifle Division) which was mounted on BMPs. On the morning of 21 July,
I was given the mission to conduct a road march from Kabul to Charikar and then
reinforce one of the mountain rifle battalions which would conduct a deep raid
and search.
Preparations for combat began in garrison. The company had a 100 percent fill in
personnel, weapons and equipment. We carried three days worth of dry rations and
the vehicles were topped-off with POL. Editor note: Dry rations are similar to
the old C-ration. There were three types of dry rations. The first contained a
can of meat, some crackers or toast, some jam and a tea bag. The second
contained two cans of meat mixed with oatmeal. The third contained a can of meat
and a van of vegetables - endnote. After a thorough inspection, I reported to my
battalion commander that we were ready for combat.
We completed our road march to the area of operations (AO) of the 3rd Mountain
Rifle Battalion. That evening, the battalion commander - Captain Yu. P. Leventas
- explained the 3rd Battalion mission and instructed me to prepare my company to
move in the main body of the battalion along a designated route and search all
the nearby villages.
At 0500 hours on 22 July, the 3rd Mountain Rifle Battalion, reinforced by my 7th
Motorized Rifle Company, moved out. Riding on our combat vehicles allowed us to
overcome many natural obstacles. At one stage of our advance, I dismounted my
company. While we were dismounted, I received the order to search a nearby
village and, following the search, to take the road (which ran through the
village) to rejoin the battalion main body. I dispatched a squad-sized patrol to
establish a defensive position at the entrance to the village. I wanted the
squad to cover the company as it deployed. On the outskirts of the village, I
established firing positions for the machine gun-grenade launcher platoon.
Editor note: The machine gun-grenade launcher platoon was the fourth platoon of
a motorized rifle company and provided suppressive fire from PKS or Utes machine
guns and AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers. This platoon disappeared during
force reorganization in the mid-1980s - endnote. The company then descended from
the heights, formed into a line and combed the village, searching the houses and
basements. After two hours, we finished the search and the company assembled on
the road to exit the village.
At that moment, the enemy suddenly opened up on us with heavy fire from hill
number two. The company went to the defense and took up positions behind the
adobe walls on the south and southwest edges of the village. I decided to send
two squads from the first platoon to envelop hill number two and then destroy
the enemy by an attack from the front and rear. I also decided to dispatch a
patrol squad to the top of hill number one. However, just as the platoon started
to move to carry out its tasks, the Mujahideen opened fire from hills one, two
and three. My forces had to stay in place and return fire. After 30 minutes, I
received orders to withdraw my company to the hill from which we started (number
four). During the withdrawal from the village, my company was pinned down by
fire from hill number three. After we destroyed the enemy on hills number two
and three with small arms fire and helicopter gun-ship strikes, I moved my
company to the designated area.
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Combing the City of Bamian and its Outlying Towns During the Course
of a Raid By Major A. P. Pivovarenko
Introduction
Major A. P. Pivovarenko served as a reconnaissance platoon leader in the Limited
Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from January 1980 to December
1980.
Combing the City of Bamian and its Outlying Towns During the Course of a Raid
During the winter of 1980, the situation along the roads between Termez and
Kabul worsened. Enemy activity was particularly heavy in the area of the Salang
pass leading to the critical Salang tunnel. Guerrilla forces struck convoys of
military vehicles and trucks. Our motorized rifle regiment, composed of three
reinforced motorized rifle battalions, was tasked to secure this sector from
February until May of 1980. By May, the situation along this section of road had
become even more acute. Consequently, one of our battalions was structured as a
raiding detachment. The battalion was reinforced with a tank company, a self-propelled
artillery battery from division artillery, the regiment’s reconnaissance
company, a platoon of ZSU-23-4s, and a squad of sappers. Editor’s note: The
ZSU-23-4 is a self-propelled air defense weapon, which fires four 23mm machine
guns simultaneously. The weapon proved extremely effective in counter-ambushes
and in the destruction of ground targets - endnote.
The reconnaissance company carried out its first raid in the area of Ghorband
during the pre-dawn hours of 20- 21 May and arrived at the village at daybreak.
The detachment quickly broke into Ghorband and killed up to 10 Mujahideen. After
this, we began a thorough search of all the houses in the village. During the
search, we only found some Mujahideen small arms, for the bulk of the guerrilla
force had secretly withdrawn to the north. On the following day, the entire
raiding detachment finally began to move onto the city of Bamian. The detachment
moved by road and fell into a Mujahideen ambush, losing one BMP and one ZSU-23-4.
The detachment seized the city. Our companies assaulted and searched the city’s
blocks. Our search showed that the Mujahideen had abandoned the city. Our
detachment stayed in the city for several days. During that time we searched the
nearby villages but found no Mujahideen. The enemy had temporarily abandoned the
populated areas. My reconnaissance company received information from our Afghan
agent network, which was located in that city and, from that information, we
were able to seize 63 weapons. The rest of the battalion was only able to
capture two weapons - both of them antiques.
The detachment conducted further raids, which combed outlying villages and
canyons. But again, the Mujahideen had successfully withdrawn and the battalion
swept empty blocks and areas.
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Sweeping Villages with Afghani and Soviet Sub-units By Major S. G. Davydenko
Introduction
Major S. G. Davydenko served with the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan (OKSVA) from September 1984 to September 1986 as the adviser to an
Afghan battalion commander.
Sweeping Villages With Afghani and Soviet Sub-units
Throughout the time that Soviet forces operated in Afghanistan, the Panjsher
Valley was the site of the sharpest ideological and military struggles between
the government of Afghanistan and the armed opposition led by Ahmed Shah
Massoud. Editor’s note: Ahmed Shah Massoud is one of the best-known guerrilla
leaders in the West. He is a minority Tadjik who assembled the largest single
guerrilla army in Afghanistan. This army, put at 11,000 regulars by the Soviets,
may have numbered 50,000 when part-time partisans are added. Massoud was born
around 1950, studied engineering in Kabul and is fluent in French. His control
of the 70- mile-long Panjsher Valley was frequently challenged by the Soviets,
yet in the end Massoud dominated the valley. Massoud became the West’s favorite
Afghan when Ken Follett based his best seller, Lie Down With Lions on this tough
guerrilla commander - endnote. Operations, which had been conducted in this
valley earlier, had resulted I heavy casualties. The mountain massif (located
high above sea level) and the severe climate limited the capabilities of
machines and men.
I was an adviser to a battalion of the Afghan Army’s "Commando" Brigade (the
212th Separate Assault Brigade) garrisoned in the Barak fortress. We received an
order to sweep the villages of Tal’khana, Dashtak, Kalatak and Chislak to
capture or destroy Mujahideen operating in the area. In addition, we were to
find and destroy prepared firing positions and supply caches of ammunition,
equipment and food.
Preparations for the operation began upon receipt of the mission. However, due
to the massive disaffection and desertions of Afghan brigade officers and men to
the Mujahideen, the enemy almost immediately knew the Afghan concept of the
operation. On the morning of 28 October 1984, I received the order to start the
mission. The concept for the battalion was as follows: Move out of the fortress
and proceed on foot to conduct a sweep of the designated villages. In the event
that the enemy offered any resistance, call in artillery fire from the artillery
battalion that belongs to the “Commando” Brigade. Plan to operate with the
Soviet motorized rifle regiment that is located in the Rukha fortress (probably
the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division).
Due to the security leaks during the course of preparation for the operation,
some combat missions had to be amplified and changed. The new concept required
that the 2nd Afghan Battalion would exit the fortress and occupy the heights
around Post 21. From there if necessary, they could support the Soviet motorized
rifle company which would independently sweep the villages of Tal’khana and
Dashtak. Following this, the two units would switch roles while the Afghan
battalion swept Turkha.
At the designated time, the 150-man Afghan battalion exited the fortress. It
reached Post 21 in an hour and a half. The Soviet company swept the villages of
Tal’khana and Dashtak. No Mujahideen were discovered during the sweep, but a
hidden Mujahideen rest station with a small supply of food and anti-Soviet
leaflets was discovered.
The battalion reached the village of Turkha on the evening of 29 October.
Observers at Post 20 had seen Mujahideen moving through Turkha the day before.
On the morning of 30 October, the battalion searched the village. There, they
found a few flintlock muskets and an AK-74. That evening, the battalion returned
to the Bazarak fortress where they rested.
On the morning of 31 October, following joint planning between the Afghan
battalion commander and Soviet motorized rifle regimental commander, the forces
set out to reach the villages of Sata, Kalatak, and Kishlak. The plan was that
the Afghan battalion would enter the canyon and search the villages
sequentially. The canyon was controlled by two ridges, which rimmed the canyon.
It was necessary to put a Soviet battalion onto each of these ridges. Once they
reached the crest of the ridge, the Soviet battalions would dominate the high
ground and could support the Afghan battalion. The artillery was ready to open
fire from protected positions within the fortresses.
At noon, the Afghan battalion began to sweep the canyon as the Soviet battalions
began to mount the ridges. Combat engineers moved in front of the sweeping
Afghan forces. As the Afghan battalion attempted to enter Kishlak to search it,
they were met with strong small arms, mortar and heavy machine gun fire.
Simultaneously, both the Soviet battalions became trapped in minefields. The
enemy opened fire on the Soviet battalions from ambush and inflicted heavy
casualties on them. Neither battalion was able to get into a position to support
the Afghan battalion. The Afghan battalion also took heavy casualties and by
nightfall was forced to withdrawal to Bazarak village.
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Blocking and Sweeping an Inhabited Region By LTC V. V. Shubin
Introduction
LTC V. V. Shubin served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan (OKSVA) from 1986 to 1988. He was decorated with the “Medal for
Merit in Combat”, the “Medal for Personal Bravery”< and the “Order of
Glory”.
Blocking and Sweeping an Inhabited Region
Divisions (formations) and regiments (units) of the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan (DRA) conducted operations in the province of Kandahar (Qandahar)
from March to the first days of September 1986. They inflicted such appreciable
casualties on the guerrilla forces that the majority of them left for the safe
haven of Pakistan.
By the beginning of September, active combat had ceased. The Afghan command
decided to allow its forces the time to conduct training and to rest in their
base camps. Consequently, on 6 September, the regiments of the 9th Infantry
Division began moving out in march column to their camps in the Ghazni Province.
The march took the division through Zabol Province, where five of six guerilla
forces with a total of approximately 500 men were located. The local guerrilla
leader Pahlawan commanded these Mujahideen. They were well armed with recoilless
rifles, mortars, rocket launchers and antiaircraft guided missile systems. They
knew the local terrain very well and could quickly and secretly maneuver their
forces and equipment throughout the area.
The terrain in this area is mountainous and semi-desert in places. The guerillas
used the extensive Karez underground irrigation system for ambushes. (MOUT
Homepage Note: The subterranean aspects of an area of operations when conducting
MOUT cannot be overlooked nor overemphasized – unfortunately this is one of the
urban areas that we lack training in and may lack detailed information on when
deployed). The enemy knew about the movement of the 9th Infantry Division. Since
the road network in this area was poorly developed, the enemy knew at what time
which forces would pass through the narrow sections on the Kandahar-Ghazni
route.
At 0500 hours on 7 September, two explosions ripped apart the roadbed close to
the village of Shingali-Kalay. Simultaneously, a Mujahideen ambush opened fire
with every weapon at its disposal. Within the first few minutes, they destroyed
four tanks, three BTRs, and seven trucks. (Editor’s Note: The BTR is an eight-
wheeled armored personnel carrier that can carry up to an 11-man squad. It
mounts 14.4mm and 7.62mm machine guns and can carry antitank weapons as well.
The BTR and BMP were the most common infantry carriers of the Soviet forces in
Afghanistan).
A part of the division column, including the division commander, was able to
force its way through the blocked passage and escape to the province center of
Kalat. It arrived at 0520 hours. The division commander requested assistance
from the commander of the provincial “Sarandoy”. (Editor’s Note: The Sarandoy
were Ministry of Interior armed forces – a heavily armed police force. They
were organized into six brigades or regiments and numbered about 6,000 men. They
were based in Kandahar, Badakhstan, Baglan, and Parvan Provinces plus two in
Kabul. The Sarandoy had an additional 6,000 men in operational and mountain
battalions). The province authority agreed to dispatch the 35th Operational
Battalion reinforced with a company from the KHAD (DRA secret police) to aid the
trapped sub-units.
The province’s plan was to draw the guerrilla main force into the battle, hit
them with aviation and artillery fire, and then simultaneously attack them from
the flank and rear to destroy them. The battalion commander formed his force
into two columns. The first column consisted of the 1st and 3rd Companies of the
35th Battalion plus the KHAD Company. The second column was the 2nd Battalion of
the 35th Battalion. The columns moved out at 0600 hours.
Artillery strikes and helicopter gun-ships fired preparatory fires from 0610 to
0625 hours. At 0630 hours, the flanking detachment (2nd Company) radioed in that
it was in its designated position. A battalion sub-unit then gave the signal and
the battalion hit the enemy in the flank and rear. The enemy abandoned their
casualties, weapons and ammunition and withdrew. Enemy losses were 27 KIA and 36
WIA. The Afghan government forces captured two recoilless rifles, six mortars,
two DShK 12.7mm heavy machine guns, three RPG antitank grenade launchers, two
crates of grenades, and six AKM assault rifles. Losses of the 35th Operational
Battalion were two killed and six wounded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Blocking the Enemy in an Area of Villages and then Destroying them
During the Sweep By Major S. S. Gazaryan
Introduction
Major S. S. Gazaryan served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan (OKSVA) from August 1984 to September 1986 as the Chief of Staff of
a Motorized Rifle Battalion (MRB).
Blocking the Enemy in an Area of Villages and then Destroying them During the
Sweep
In February 1985, an intelligence agent brought us information that a guerrilla
force of 100-120 men, armed with small arms, was located in the village of
Karamagul.
Our regimental commander decided to destroy this force by sealing off the area
and then sweeping it to find and destroy the enemy. My battalion, the 2nd MRB,
was given this mission and reinforced with the regiment’s reconnaissance
company and two artillery batteries. Six helicopter gun-ships from army aviation
would be in support.
All the forces would be used for the initial action blocking action. On the
night of 11-12 February, two Motorized Rifle Companies (MRCs), moving out on
foot, by morning had to occupy the dominant terrain (hills 1864.4 and 1973.0)
along the southern and eastern combat sectors. At 0600 hours on 12 February, our
4th MRC and the reconnaissance company had to land and secure the dominant
terrain to the north and west of Karamagul’ Village by tactical air assaults.
The 5th MRC was to establish a platoon-sized ambush to cover any attempted
Mujahideen withdrawal from Karamagul’ to Batash.
Our plan was to begin the sweep at dawn only after we had seized and occupied
the dominant terrain and had surrounded the enemy.
Following a 10-minute artillery and helicopter gun-ship preparation, the
reconnaissance company moved forward and began sweeping the area. The enemy
tried to break out of the encirclement through various gullies and ravines. A
group of Mujahideen attempted to break out to the southwest. Then another group
tried to break out of the encirclement. But the entire enemy attempt was futile.
Only a small part of the enemy’s force was able to break out through a ravine
in the direction of the village of Batash.
In the course of the combat, the enemy lost up to 60 killed or wounded and we
captured 12. We also captured 25 weapons. The battalion’s losses were
negligible.
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Assault on the Outskirts of Heart By Major V. M. Bogdashkin
Introduction
Major V. M. Bogdashkin served in the Republic of Afghanistan from June 1983
through June 1985 as a platoon leader and company commander in a motorized rifle
battalion. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”.
Assault on the Outskirts of Herat
The situation in Herat Province was very serious in the fall of 1984. Guerrilla
forces, led b Captain Ismail, received trained reinforcements as well as new
weapons from Iran. They launched raids on Soviet and Afghan convoys and struck
the Kushka-Shindand pipeline. They constituted a threat to the Herat airfield
and grain elevators.
The operational group of the regiment with field post number (FPN) 51883 was
ordered to: block part of the southern edge of Herat City with the 2nd MRB
(minus a company) and fragment the Mujahideen force. Further, in conjunction
with the 2nd MRB of FPN 83260 regiment and the 3rd MRB of FPN 51931 regiment,
destroy the enemy.
Editor’s Note: FPNs were postal numbers assigned to a division and higher
headquarters, regiments and separate battalions and companies. A compilation of
field post numbers was considered classified. The field post numbers referred to
here are probably of the 12th, 101st, and 371st Motorized Rifle Regiments of the
5th Motorized Rifle Division – endnote.
Preparation for this action was conducted in base camp. All company commanders
and above, plus all the attached company commanders conduced coordination on a
terrain model. Enemy courses of action and the sequencing of his destruction
were also worked out on the terrain model. Personnel who would be physically
close with the Mujahideen conducted training in a deserted village where they
became familiar with the specific make-up of an assault group and gained
practical experience.
At the end of October, my company (the 7th MRC) was designated part of the
operational group of regiment FPN 51883, which assembled outside Herat. At 0400
hours on 4 November, our sub-units were ordered into the city. By 0540 hours,
the force blocked off the eastern section of the city. The east side was held by
FPN 83260, the north and west sides were held by FPN 51931 and the south side by
my regiment - FPN 51883.
At 0600 hours, FPN 51883 regiment committed its mountain motorized rifle
battalion to battle and it managed to cut off and surround a group of
Mujahideen. (Editor’s Note: The mountain motorized rifle battalions retained
most of their regular MRB TO&E, but had special training, and additional
equipment for mountain warfare – endnote). However, other Mujahideen pounded
this battalion with small arms, rocket launchers, cannon and mortars. The
battalion had stumbled into a Mujahideen fire sack. In the course of 40 minutes,
the battalion lost nine killed or wounded and was forced to stop and go over to
the defense.
Regiment ordered my 7th MRC to turn over our portion of the southern block to a
bronegruppa and move to the command post of FPN 51883 regiment. My regimental
commander was LTC A. M. Budeyev. He ordered my company commander, Senior
Lieutenant S. N. Bogrov, to advance along a city street to fragment the
defending Mujahideen force. My MRC had two BMP-2s and a tank as part of our
assault group.
Following a five-minute artillery strike, the 7th MRC went into battle at 0730
hours. It advanced 150-200 meters when heavy small arms fire as well as the fire
from two recoilless rifles, a grenade launcher and a mortar stopped it. The
small arms fire came from was close range from a grape arbor and through
embrasures cut in the adobe walls. One of our soldiers was wounded. The company
commander was ordered to break contact and withdraw. After his professional,
organized withdrawal (there were no more casualties), the company deployed along
the edges of a village.
Afghan intelligence reported that there were some 800 men in the guerrilla force
that operated in this immediate territory (25 square kilometers) but we had no
idea how many we were facing now. We called in ground attack aircraft (Su-25s)
and artillery fire on the encircled Mujahideen. Three artillery battalions from
division artillery fired in our support.
The company commander asked for two 152mm self-propelled (SP) howitzers and
another tank. He received these plus a sapper squad with 75 kilograms of
explosives. The 1st and 2nd platoon leaders (Captain P. P. Rozhkov and
Lieutenant V. I. Nikitenko) were ordered to advance from the company flanks
through the grape arbor and blow up the adobe walls.
LTC A. M. Budeyev, the regimental commander, requested two BM-21 122mm multiple
rocket launchers (MRLs) to conduct direct fire as needed by the company
commander. Following an air strike, the BM-21s opened fire. Supporting artillery
simultaneously began a 10-minute artillery preparation. The company moved
forward to the attack under this protective fire.
The BM-21 direct-fire salvos did not inflict heavy casualties on the enemy, but
did have a tremendous effect on their morale. The company advanced 300 meters
before the first Mujahideen fired, and this fire was very weak. On signals from
the company and platoon commanders, the two SP 152mm howitzers, two tanks and
four BMPs opened direct suppressive fire on the enemy. The flanking platoons
were able to move at the same tempo as the center and signaled their progress
with signal rockets. The assault group hit a mine filed at a street
intersection. They defused seven mines as well as a 250-kilogram bomb rigged as
a mine. The assault detachment advanced 1.5 kilometers when it was stopped by
strong fire from a village. The fire came from dugouts cut in earth dikes of
irrigation canals. Tank and BMP-2 fire suppressed the enemy fire. The company
had two more men wounded during this advance.
In all, the company accomplished its mission in an hour and a half at the cost
of three wounded. They killed seven Mujahideen in close combat. By 1130 hours,
the opposing guerrilla force was shattered. However, at 1400 our attempts to
destroy another guerrilla force failed. We made a second unsuccessful attempt at
dusk. With nightfall, the Mujahideen managed to slip out of the blockade.
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Storming Spinakalacha Village By LTC V. D. Vlasyan
Introduction
LTC V. D. Vlasyan served in the Republic of Afghanistan from October 1986
through June 1988 first as a deputy commander and then as the commander of a
motorized rifle battalion (MRB). He was decorated with the “Order of the Red
Banner” and the “Order of the Red Star”>
Storming Spinakalacha Village
From 21-26 December 1987, a strong enemy force overran a series of security
outposts in the Daman region. This area was the responsibility of an Afghan Army
Corps of the Army of the Republic of Afghanistan (the Afghan 2nd Army Corps
headquartered in Kandahar). My battalion had to be in the Spinakalacha combat
area by the morning of 31 December. I was to seal off the Spinakalacha village
from the major supply bases and create conditions, which would allow the
Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade to recapture lost positions. In the course of
preparing for our road march and ensuing combat, I added extra ammunition,
water, fuel and rations to what we usually carried and picked up some
reinforcing sub-units. At 0400 hours on 29 December, my battalion moved out to
accomplish its mission.
At 1600 hours, 30 December, we arrived in Kandahar. There, General-Major R. K.
Pishchev, the deputy commander of the 40th Army, met me. He gave me specific
orders. We were to enter the contested area at 100 hours, 31 December, and
assault and capture Spinakalacha Village by 1500 hours. We were to then seal off
the canyon and hold this area until 7 January 1988. During that time, an Afghan
regiment would fortify the area and assume responsibility for the area defended
by my 2nd MRB.
Editor’s Note: The Afghan Army had both a brigade and a regiment force
structure. The Afghan regiment mentioned here was either from the Afghan 7th
Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) or 15th MRD stationed in Kandahar - endnote.
At 1100 hours, I put my battalion on the road flanked by security patrols. As we
entered the area, we began battle and I post two killed and three wounded. By
1210 hours, I assembled the bulk of my battalion 1.5 kilometers south of
Spinakalacha. From 1220 until 1240, I conducted a personal reconnaissance,
finalized my plans for the assault groups and finalized air and artillery
coordination. I reported my plan to the senior commander at 1240.
Ten minutes later, my reconnaissance platoon began to climb a mountain ridge
from the west to destroy enemy security outposts on dominant terrain and on the
canyon approaches and the approaches to Spinakalacha Village. During their
advance, the reconnaissance patrol uncovered a launch-bomb cache with 150 launch
bombs and two launchers. The patrol rigged the cache for detonation and
proceeded up the hill where they could secure the left flank of the assault
detachment. At 1320 hours, the patrol attacked and destroyed an enemy outpost
and established solid communications with me.
At 1320 hours, I signaled the start of an artillery preparation. A 152mm self-propelled
(SP) howitzer battalion, a separate 122mm SP howitzer battalion and a multiple
rocket launcher (MRL) battalion participated in a 10-minute artillery
preparation. This was immediately followed by a bombing and strafing attack by
two squadrons of Su-25 FROGFOOT ground-attack aircraft.
At 1335 hours, my 5th Motorized Rifle Company (MRC) moved out to its jumping off
point some 250 meters from the village. The 5th MRC was commanded by Captain B.
M. Mikul’skiy. The 5th MRC was configured as Assault Group Number 1. It had 46
men, including a squad of sappers and eight BMP-2s. I added a tank with a mine
plow and an Afghan infantry company of 40 men to this company. As the 5th MRC
moved out, I covered its movement with the fires of a sniper squad, a flame-thrower
platoon, an AGS-17 platoon and a mortar battery. At 1340 hours, I had the MRL
battalion lay down a smoke screen to blind the enemy.
At 1340 hours, my sub-units attacked Spinakalacha. We met strong resistance on
the right flank and the Afghan Army company withdrew to the jumping off area. I
was not able to get them to come back and they did nothing further towards
accomplishing our mission. The enemy began to shift his forces to his left flank
in order to put flanking fire on the 5th MRC. For awhile, we were held back by
the thick adobe walls of the village. Then, however, my troops were able to blow
gaps in the adobe walls and my platoons burst through these gaps in three-man
groups on the attack. My 5th MRC faced the enemy main force.
At 1355 hours, my 4th MRC (Assault Group Number 2) attacked on the battalion’s
left flank. The 4th MRC - commanded by Captain Yu. A. Shalkin - broke the enemy
defense and destroyed his covering forces guarding the entrance to the canyon.
One of his platoons was able to hit the enemy in the rear, which helped the 5th
MRC’s fight. Two more 4th MRC platoons grabbed the western edge of the village
and established blocking positions. At 1500 hours, these platoons got into a
fire fight with Mujahideen who were retreating into the mountains.
By 1600 hours, the 5th MRC completed the destruction of the enemy in the eastern
part of the village and established blocking positions against the access points
from the neighboring green zone. The surviving enemy had fled into the green
zone. At 1800 hours, I organized the defense of Spinakalacha and provided fire
support to an Afghan infantry regiment which attacked north to seize the
southern slope of Grakalacha.
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Tactical Air Assaults in Nangarhar and Laghman Provinces By Major S. A. Urban
Introduction
Major S. A. Urban served in the Republic of Afghanistan from December 1981
through April 1984 as a platoon leader and then a company commander in an air
assault battalion. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”.
Tactical Air Assaults in Nangarhar and Laghman Provinces
In February 1983, the brigade intelligence section reported that approximately
150 enemy were operating as groups within in the brigade’s area of
responsibility (AOR) of the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade. They were
shelling security outposts and civilian facilities with 81mm mortar fire and
were mining roads.
The brigade commander decided to eradicate these groups in our AOR. He planned
to attack the enemy in the village of Kama (located in Nangarhar Province about
12 kilometers from our base camp) and the village of Ghaziabad. The bronegruppa
of the participating motorized rifle battalion and airborne company would move
out from Jalalabad to Ghaziabad in support. The air landing would be preceded
with a 10-minute artillery preparation. Captain Kostenko, the acting battalion
commander would command the air landing. Major Ermolaev, the deputy commander
for technical support, would command the bronegruppa. The first lift would
consist of an air assault platoon, an engineer squad and a flame-thrower squad.
On 12 February, the air landing took place near Kama. The 2nd Air Assault
Company swept through the green zone, but did not find any enemy. The
bronegruppa moved toward the village of Ghaziabad.
On 13 February, we conducted an air landing with the 1st Air Assault Company,
this time near Ghaziabad to seize the crest of the southern mountain and block
the enemy withdrawal. However, before the bronegruppa reached Ghaziabad from the
north, the enemy withdrew into the mountains. On the morning of 14 February, the
battalion commander decided to pick up the two air-assault companies and air
land them near the village of Charbagh (in Laghman Province). From there, they
would advance across the mountains to Bailam Village. According to preliminary
intelligence, the Mujahideen stored ammunition and had a hospital in Bailam. The
advancing companies would work with the bronegruppa to seal off Bailam and
destroy the enemy inside it. We had 24 hours to accomplish our mission.
The area around Bailam was well fortified and had reinforced security. The enemy
observed our air landing and the battalion lost the element of surprise. We
lacked the necessary combat power to take the village. Finally, toward the end
of 17 February, our brigade commander gave us the necessary air and artillery
support to take the village. The battalion lost 25-30 men.
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Organizing a Security Outpost in the Suburbs of Kabul By Major S. V. Mos'kin
Introduction
Major S. V. Mos’kin served in the Limited Soviet Contingent in Afghanistan
(OKSVA) from September 1980 through November 1982 as a platoon leader.
Organizing a Security Outpost in the Suburbs of Kabul
At the end of May 1982, enemy diversionary/reconnaissance groups conducted
actions against Soviet Army base camps. In particular, they fired directly on
the 40th Army Headquarters. The leadership of the guerilla forces announced that
they would destroy the headquarters in the near future. Therefore, the high
command decided to upgrade the defense and security of the army headquarters.
As a result, Major Avramenko, my battalion commander, decided to establish a new
security post, which would be manned by my motorized rifle platoon, which had
three BTR-70s and 28 men. (Editor’s Note: The 2nd Platoon, 2nd Company, 1st
Motorized Rifle Battalion, 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 108th Motorized
Rifle Division. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were mounted on BTRs while the 3rd
Battalion was mounted on BMPs – endnote). My platoon was reinforced with two
AGS-17s and three PK machine guns with night sights. We also received some night
vision devices for night observation. An engineer excavator came to the site and
within 72 hours, dug the primary and reserve fighting positions for my BTRs and
men and then connected all the positions with deep fighting trenches. We dug
secret forward redoubts on the flanks of the security outposts for our machine
gun crews.
We also built an observation post for a long-range field of vision over our
area. We established visual communications between the secret dugouts and the
observation post to assist in coordinating fires. We built two barbed wire
fences all around the security perimeter. Between the two rows of barbed wire
fence, we put in an antipersonnel minefield (pressure and tension-release
mines). On the far side of the wire, we laid in trip flares. A landline was
installed to give us telephone communications with the battalion commander, a
neighboring tank platoon and the duty officer at army headquarters. I organized
my post to have two-thirds of my men manning their posts at night and one third
during the day. Every soldier had his combat crew assignment and instructions in
case of an alert.
In September 1982, we intercepted an attempt by an enemy reconnaissance/diversionary
group to penetrate the army headquarters. The Mujahideen preceded this
provocation by shelling our positions with mortars and launch bombs. On the day
before the attempt, they did a reconnaissance of our obstacles by driving a
large flock of sheep into our minefield. On the next night, the Mujahideen
attempted to penetrate to the army headquarters using a dry river bed and
irrigation canal. We killed two of these who wandered into our mines. We
recovered weapons and documents from their bodies.
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Repelling a Raid on Security Post By Major I. A. Egiazarov
Introduction
Major I. A. Egiazarov served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan (OKSVA) from 1982 through 1984 as the commander of a SPETSNAZ group.
The term SPETSNAZ means -Troops of Special Designation. For his book, Lester
Grau used the term SPETSNAZ for Soviet forces trained for long- range
reconnaissance, commando and special forces type combat. A SPETSNAZ detachment
is equivalent to a battalion command, although its personnel strength was less
than 100. They are sometimes called SPETSNAZ companies. SPETSNAZ groups were
equivalent to company commands, but had a personnel strength of 15-16 men or
less. Some were four-man groups. They were sometimes called SPETSNAZ platoons.
Repelling a Raid on a Security Post
During the second half of June 1982, the high command decided to strengthen and
expand Afghan government power around the city of Rukha in the Panjsher valley.
They decided to do this during the course of an operation in the Panjsher
valley, which involved Afghan government troops and a SPETSNAZ detachment. The
Afghan Army had a series of security outposts on the dominant heights
surrounding Rukha. These posts were poorly fortified, there were not enough
soldiers and heavy weapons to hold them and the Afghan soldier’s morale was
low. The high command decided to reinforce the existing force and to add
additional outposts by assigning men from a SPETSNAZ detachment to man them (the
31st SPETSNAZ Group of the 177th SPETSNAZ Detachment).
Thus on the 13th of June, I received orders to take my 31st SPETSNAZ Group and
occupy the heights opposite the rest of the force across the Panjsher River. I
was a lieutenant at the time. My commander wanted me to establish an observation
post and look for Mujahideen activity in the area of the hamlet of Marishtan.
This would also deny the enemy the opportunity to conduct his own reconnaissance
and launch a surprise attack on our battalion.
There were 15 men in my 31st SPETSNAZ Reconnaissance Group. Besides small arms,
we had two AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers, one DShK heavy machine gun and
one 82mm "tray" mortar. An artillery battery that belonged to the SPETSNAZ
detachment supported us. We expected enemy action in the region on 15 or 16
July, and that action might include an assault on the security outposts.
We occupied our assigned peak on 15 July and began fortifying the position. This
was our order of work. First, prepare firing positions and establish an
integrated, comprehensive firing plan. Second, fortify the positions with local
materials to blend in with the natural terrain and build covered shelters for
the troops. Third, build tiered observation posts out of stone and clay. Fourth,
mine the approaches to the post. Fifth, on a nearby terrace, build a hidden
tanglefoot obstacle. Sixth, organize an uninterrupted schedule of observation
and security. Three men were always on guard during the day and seven men were
always on guard at night. The detachment resupplied us with ammunition and food
every three days.
About 1830 hours on 18 July, we were eating dinner and observation was lax -
probably my lookouts had also decided to eat without my authorization. During
this time of relaxed vigilance, the enemy sneaked onto our high terrace, climbed
to within 10 meters of our defensive position and simultaneously opened fire
with three DShK heavy machine guns from "Black Hill" and "Fang Mountain". My
men, with the exception of two lookouts, dove behind the walls and in the
dugouts for shelter. The guerrillas had resolutely seized the initiative and
pushed their attack forward, throwing grenades as they came. The Mujahideen
having climbed onto our high terrace ran toward our defenses, but were caught in
our tanglefoot. This broke their attack and we were able to destroy them with
fire from our dugouts. The enemy left four corpses on the terrace. The rest
withdrew under the cover of DShK fire. We had o casualties.
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Securing a Base Camp By LTC A. Yunakov
Introduction
This and the following vignette are not part of the Frunze book. They are
extracts from P. Alexseev’s “Okhranenie” (Security), Voyenny Vestnik
(Military Herald), April 1994, p. 42-46. Colonel Alexseev is on the faculty of
the Frunze Department of the History of Military Art. He apparently used LTC
Yunakov’s report that was in the Frunze Afghanistan archives. Although both
examples lack the element of combat, they show how base camps and lines of
communications (LOC) security were organized.
Securing a Base Camp
My battalion was part of a separate brigade based in Kandahar and Helmand
provinces (Editor’s Note: Probably the 5th Motorized Rifle Battalion, 70th
Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade – endnote). The brigade had three motorized
rifle battalions, an air assault battalion, a signal company, a radio-electronic
warfare company, an artillery battalion, a helicopter squadron and a brigade
headquarters. The battalion’s mission was three- fold: first, to provide
security to a base camp near Lashkargah in Helmand Province, second, to escort
convoys two or three times a week along and 80-kilometer stretch of road, and
finally to fight guerrilla forces in the immediate vicinity. My battalion was
reinforced with a battery of D-30 122mm howitzers and two tank platoons. A 12-kilometer
perimeter encompassed our base camp. I had seven fighting positions spaced
around the perimeter. Each position was occupied by one or two motorized rifle
platoons. When providing convoy security, I usually dispatched one or two
motorized rifle platoons with one or two 82mm mortars. When fighting guerrillas,
I usually dispatched a motorized rifle company, with the artillery battery,
reconnaissance platoon, and two mortar platoons.
The guerrillas began firing launch bombs at my base camp shortly after we
created a security zone. These attacks were launched from the green zone along
the Helmand River. In early 1987, we conducted an operation, in conjunction with
the Afghan Army to clean out the guerrilla forces from Lashkargah and to
establish observation posts in the green zone for a Sarandoy battalion. After
the operation, we established another security outpost in the Qala-Bust fort in
order to control the green zone adjacent to the observation posts. We garrisoned
this outpost with another Sarandoy battalion. We maintained close coordination
with Sarandoy through a liaison officer.
In order to protect my men from mortar and light machine gun fire, I paid a lot
of attention to digging in and fortifying the positions. Every squad was
completely dug in. Every firing position was linked to its platoon positions by
communications trenches. Each fighting position has a dug in sleeping quarters
(where possible), ammunition point, platoon command post, dining room, water
point, wash room and latrine. In order to improve observation, I established
forward security posts, which consisted of a BTR machine gunner, a driver, and a
rifleman. These were placed in position at 1800 hours following the issuance of
the combat order and challenge and password. They were checked every two hours
and changed every four hours by the platoon leader or his assistant. During the
night, these posts were only allowed to fire on semi-automatic as a warning or
probe. If they fired a burst on full automatic, the entire force would occupy
its fighting positions. Artillery fired scheduled harassing and interdicting
fires and had fires planned throughout the area. We were also able to open fire
without warning when a target appeared in my area of responsibility (AOR) at
night. At daybreak, I pulled all my forward posts back and fired on any person,
convoy or caravan that we discovered in the Registan Desert within four
kilometers of my camp. None of my personnel were allowed to withdraw from a
fighting position.
Every six months, the battalion commander ordered a rotation of sub-units. The
rotation occurred during daylight. Sub-units coming off base camp defense were
assigned to convoy security duties. In preparation for these duties, we trained
the sub-units in procedures for clearing roads of mines, checking and clearing
bridges, defeating enemy attacks and evacuating vehicles under fire.
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LOC Security By LTC M. Tubeev
Lines of Communications (LOC) Security
The first priority of Mujahideen commanders was to disrupt the movement of
convoys travelling on the main roads of Afghanistan. Motorized rifle sub-units
were usually responsible for route security. Normally, a motorized rifle
battalion would be responsible for a 40- to 150-kilometer stretch of road,
whereas a company would cover from two- to 10-kilometers. In February 1986, my
3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion, reinforced with a tank company and two artillery
batteries, was responsible for the security of a 102-kilometer stretch of road
along the Puli-Charkhi to Jalalabad highway as well as the security of the
Naghlu power dam site. I could field 11 tanks, 42 BMPs, twelve self-propelled
howitzers, 27 82mm mortars, nine twin-barreled anti-aircraft guns, and 23 AGS-17
automatic grenade launchers. I decided to split the area into three sections. My
7th MRC had a 32-kilometer section, my 8th MRC had a 40-kilometer section and my
9th MRC had a 30-kilomter section. I determined the length of each section after
considering the terrain, key sites, enemy activity and the line of strength of
my sub-units. I considered several solutions before I selected the one which
seemed to best concentrate combat power in critical sectors.
My LOC security was based on a series of security outposts running the length of
the road. A motorized rifle platoon, one or two AGS-17 automatic grenade
launchers, one or two heavy "Utes" or DShK machine guns, one or two 82mm mortars
and a tank usually occupied an outpost. These could be combined into a security
detachment (a motorized rifle company or battalion reinforced with artillery,
tanks, and engineers).
The security outposts functioned around the clock. During the day, one man per
squad was on watch while a two-man patrol worked the area. At night, every
security outpost would send out one or two security points. These four-man
points were located 500 to 900 meters from the security outpost and had wire and
visual communications with the outpost. The outpost could cover the point with
fire.
Each security outpost had a full perimeter defense in order to defeat a
Mujahideen attack from any direction. Each platoon had a primary and alternate
sector of fire. Artillery fire planning was carefully done. Artillery sub-units
were usually collocated in the security outposts with the motorized rifle sub-units.
The artillery was positioned in order to effectively support all the security
outposts. Artillery fires were planned on all likely axes on which the
Mujahideen could move. Targets were registered and numbered. The targets, and
their coordinates were maintained by the security outposts, artillery gun crews
and by the battalion headquarters. Fires could be adjusted from pre-planned
targets by the security outpost commander or, if he could not communicate
directly with the artillery sub-unit, through the battalion commander. Normally,
it took not more than two to four minutes to bring artillery fire onto a group
of Mujahideen.
We selected the position for the outposts carefully and fortified them
thoroughly. We piled up earth and stones to make complete trench-works, bunkers;
and ammunition, food and water points. We ran two rows of barbed wire around
each outpost and put antipersonnel mines between the fences. We put trip flares
and sensors at remote and concealed approaches to the outposts. The entrance and
exit to the security outposts were closed and mined at night. Rules of conduct
were posted at the perimeter of the security zone and outside the security
outposts. The signs were in the Afghan, Russian and English languages. Editor’s
Note: There is no single Afghan language. Pushtu and Dari are the official
languages, while Tadjik, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Baluchi, Turkmen, and Arabic are also
spoken - endnote.
Every security outpost had five combat loads of ammunition and ten days worth of
food, water, and fuel. (Editor’s Note: The combat load is a logistic planning
term, which differs from the U.S. "basic load". Five combat loads is a
significant amount - probably enough for six good fights - endnote). Night-vision
devices, "Blik" binoculars, night scopes, parachute flares, and tracer
ammunition were available for night-time employment.
Each security outpost maintained the following documents and maps:
1. The combat mission of the outpost and the sequence of mission fulfillment.
2. The commander’s map marked with positions, fire plans and known enemy
situation.
3. A diagram of the strongpoint.
4. Orders from the battalion commander.
5. Combat orders of the security outpost commander.
6. An observation schedule.
7. A patrol schedule.
8. A duty weapon schedule and sectors of fire.
9. Signal tables.
10. Observer’s journals, combat journals and journals of enemy activity.
Editor’s Note: Duty weapons were manned, crew-served weapons in temporary
positions. Only these weapons would engage enemy reconnaissance or probing
elements while the rest of the force moved to battle positions. The duty weapons
would then move to battle positions. Enemy return fire would be on the temporary
position and enemy knowledge of the locations of defending Soviet crew-served
weapons would be faulty – endnote.
The battalion produces the security plan which shows the number and composition
of each security outpost, the quantity of vehicles, weapons and ammunition at
each security outpost, the security belt at each outpost, the defensive plan for
key sites, the coordination measures between elements, the defensive fire plan,
the signal plan for communications between garrisons, convoys, dispatch posts
and the fire support elements. In addition, the battalion had a shift schedule
for its sub-units and also the battalion commander’s order for organization of
the security zone. Sub-units had their TO&E plus additional radios, telephones
and cable communications gear for command and control.
Radio is the primary means of communications in LOC security. All armored
vehicles, TO&E and attached sub-units, as well as passing convoys, monitor a
common channel. The battalion reconnaissance platoon is located close to the
battalion command post. Its function is to cut off and destroy any groups of
Mujahideen in the battalion AOR. They usually do this by setting up ambushes on
sites where Mujahideen could approach the highway. Their ambush site is
coordinated with the regiment’s ambush plan and usually lasts one night. There
have been times, however, when the ambush party has stayed on site for three
days.
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Convoy Escort and Combat in the Village of Daulatabad By LTC A. A. Agzamov
Introduction
LTC A. A. Agzamov served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan (OKSVA) from 1981 through 1083 as the commander of a reconnaissance
group of a reconnaissance company. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”.
Convoy Escort and Combat in the Village of Daulatabad
At the end of 1981, the enemy mounted attacks against convoys along the Termez,
Shebegan, Andkhoy, and Maimana route. I was particularly difficult in the region
of Daulatabad. Intelligence reports indicated that a guerrilla force of 25-30
men armed with rifles operated in this area. Acting secretly, the enemy would
attack a single vehicle or column. Their goal was to paralyze resupply into the
area.
On 2 December 1981, the 2nd Reconnaissance Company, which was garrisoned in
Maimana, was ordered to escort a 120-vehicle convoy loaded with supplies from
Andkhoy to Maimana. The distance was 110 kilometers. The company reinforcements
included a sapper squad, a flame-thrower squad armed with RPO flame-throwers, a
ZSU-23-4 self-propelled air defense gun, and a BTS-4 towing vehicle. The BTS-4
is a turretless T-55 tank equipped for towing tracked vehicles.
We had two days to prepare for the mission. During this time we studied data
which we received from the high command and resolved issues of rear support and
maintenance support. We paid particular attention to readying the vehicles for
the march and to preparing our weapons for combat. The troops drew rations and
ammunition.
The convoy commander, N. Beksultanov, was the deputy commander of a SPETSNAZ
detachment. He decided to conduct the march from Maimana to Andkhoy on a single
route and precede this with a forward security patrol. At 0500 hours on 4
December, the column moved out and 11 hours later closed into the assembly area
some three kilometers northeast of Andkhoy. The truck convoy, already loaded
with supplies, joined us. We then had to arrange the march column, distribute
our combat power throughout the convoy, agree on control measures, and arrange
for our night rest stop. We planned to leave on the morning of 5 December, move
for five or six hours covering 80 kilometers with one rest stop. Following an
overnight rest, we would close into Maimana the following day. The company had a
platoon serve as the forward patrol.
The column moved out at 0500 on the morning of 5 December. By 0900, the forward
patrol reached the village of Daulatabad. They reported back that the village
was deserted. This report put us on our guard, and the company commander ordered
us to increase our observation. When the lead vehicles of the convoy began to
exit Daulatabad village, the enemy opened fire with a grenade launcher and
destroyed a BMP-2KSH and a fuel tanker. The BMP-2KSH is the command version of
the BMP-2 series. A fire broke out and the vehicles immediately behind the
conflagration were stuck in the narrow streets.
The enemy opened up with small arms fire. Two more BMPs were knocked out and, as
a result, the convoy was split into three sections. We returned fire, but it was
not controlled or directed. The convoy commander lost control over his sub-units,
as his communications were gone. Individual vehicles independently tried to
break out of the kill zones. The forward air controller (FAC) called in
helicopter gunships and directed their fires. The helicopters began gun runs on
the enemy in the village. In the meantime, the trail platoon received the
mission to sweep the western part of the village. The dismounted troopers moved
under the cover of BMP and helicopter fire to carry out their mission. The enemy
withdrew when faced with this decisive action.
In the course of this three-hour battle, four of our soldiers were killed (all
drivers), six were wounded, three BMPs were destroyed and five trucks were
burned up.