PDA

View Full Version : The Warsaw uprising



mack pl
06-29-2004, 05:45 AM
Tadeusz Kondracki

The Red Army entered Poland in January 1944, in pursuit of the Germans. The Soviets refused to recognise the legitimate Polish authorities loyal to the Polish Government-in-Exile based in London. Thus, as they progressed, they disarmed the Home Army (AK) detachments they met along the way which remained loyal to their government. This persuaded the Polish authorities to return to a concept that had been shelved earlier, of staging an uprising in the capital – Warsaw. The Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army, General Tadeusz Komorowski (pseudonym “Bór”) was to explain later: “Fighting everywhere, we could not remain passive on our own land… The nation that wants to live in freedom, cannot be passive at moments when its fate is being decided.”

On July 26, 1944, the Polish Government-in-Exile authorized General Bór-Komorowski and its Home Delegate – J S Jankowski, to commence armed action with the aim of liberating Warsaw. Soviet radio-stations were also calling for an uprising. With news of the Soviet forces approaching the city, on July 31, 1944, General Bór-Komorowski gave the order to rise up. This order was given to Colonel Antoni Chrusciel (pseudonym: “Monter’) who issued an order setting the time of the uprising to commence at 17.00 hours on August 1, 1944.

The Home Army forces of the Warsaw District numbered about 50,000 soldiers of whom 23,000 were combat-ready. Their state of arms on August 1 was as follows: one thousand rifles, 300 automatic pistols, 60 sub-machine guns, 7 machine guns, 35 anti-tank guns and PIAT bazookas, 1700 pistols, and 25,000 grenades. In the course of the fighting further arms were obtained through air drops and by capture from the enemy (including several armoured vehicles). Also, the insurgents’ workshops were busy all the while producing: 300 automatic pistols, 150 flame-throwers, 40,000 grenades, a number of mortars and bazookas, and even an armoured car.

In the course of the fighting against the Germans, detachments from smaller Polish resistance formations joined in. Mostly, these were detachments from the Peoples’ Army, the Polish Peoples’ Army, the Security Corps and the National Armed Forces, numbering some 1700 people all told.

The German forces on the left bank of the river Vistula initially numbered about 15 to 16,000 men, including the garrison of 10 to 11,000 men under the command of General Stahel. On the first day of the Uprising, the Poles managed to take a significant part of the left bank of Warsaw but the attempts to take the bridges proved unsuccessful. Fighting on the right bank died down on August 2. The maximum territorial hold of the Uprising was attained on August 5, 1944, just as the German reinforcements were arriving.

Large German reinforcements already arrived on August 3 and 4 (several thousand policemen and SS-men). SS Reichsfuehrer Himmler issued the order: “Every inhabitant should be killed, no prisoners are to be taken. Warsaw is to be razed to the ground and in this way the whole of Europe shall have a terrifying example.”

The basic aim of the Germans was to drive east-west thoroughfares through the city towards the bridges on the Vistula, and subsequently, to close off and destroy the insurgent areas. In the first place it was to be those which were alongside to the river. A German strike was delivered from the direction of the Wola district on August 5 – 6, towards Kierbedz bridge. This divided the areas controlled by the Home Army forces. In the occupied areas, particularly in the Wola district, the German forces perpetrated crimes of a massive scale on the civilian population (about 25 to 30,000 people executed by firing squad). The areas controlled by the insurgents were split into three as the run of the battle took its course:

The northern area including the cemeteries, the former Jewish ghetto, the Old Town, the district of Zoliborz and the forests to the north of Warsaw

The region of the city centre (Sródmiescie) together with two riverside areas - Powiśle and Czerniaków

The southern region – the district of Mokotów together with the sub-district of Sadyba and the Home Army detachments in the forests to the south of Warsaw


From the first days of the Uprising, a surrogate form of normality informed everyday life - with a food distribution system, and a postal service run by scouts. The insurgent radio station Blyskawica (“Lightening”) made its inaugural broadcast on August 8.

Meanwhile, the Germans systematically reinforced their armies in Warsaw. SS General Erich von dem Bach Zalewski took charge of quelling the rising. By August 20, his forces increased to about 25,000 men. Periodically, detachments from three panzer divisions – the 25th, the 19th and the “Hermann Goering” divisions – were drafted into action. Besides bomber aircraft, the Germans used numerous sub-units of sappers, self-propelled “Goliath” mines and exploding tanks used for demolishing fortifications, rocket launchers and the heaviest artillery (including the 600mm “Karl” mortars).

The last point of resistance in the Ochota district fell on August 11, with the Home Army forces being simultaneously pushed out of the Wola district. On August 19, the Germans launched a mass assault on the Old Town. The Home Army made two unsuccessful attempts, on August 20 and 22, at breaking through the German redoubts, in the open terrain separating the Old Town from Zoliborz district. This cost 400 dead and wounded. The insurgent detachments were a lot more effective in built up areas which to some extent compensated for the German superiority in weapons and equipment. The biggest successes of the Uprising in the latter part of August were the taking of the German stronghold entrenched in the building of the Polish Telephone Company (PAST-a) on Zielna Street on August 20, and the police centre in Krakowskie Przedmiescie Street and the telephone station on Piusa XI Street on August 23.

Already in August, the insurgents were widely exploiting the network of sewer canals to communicate beneath enemy-controlled areas. Thus, as the fighting for the Old Town abated to August 2, most of the defenders fled via these canals – 4,500 to the City Centre and 800 to Zoliborz.

The insurgent forces were conspicuously supported by air dropped supplies which commenced on the night of August 4 to 5, 1944. The RAF were to make a total 116 sorties, the Polish Air Force – 97. Losses during these missions were considerable: the RAF lost 19 aircraft, the Poles 15, which was just over 16% and 15% respectively. Plans of there-and-back flights by American Flying Fortresses with stopovers for refuelling and reloading at Soviet bases behind the Eastern Front, were torpedoed by the Soviets.

Up to September 10, 1944, the Soviet armies, which were massed barely a few kilometres outside Warsaw, remained completely impassive, giving the Luftwaffe freedom of the skies to destroy the city with impunity. Soviet propaganda described the uprising as a fracas obstructing Red Army operations.

Between September 3 and 6, the Germans pushed the insurgents out of Powisle, and the struggle for Czerniaków commenced on September 12. It was only on September 10 that the Russians began to move into action against the Germans in the Warsaw region. Some supplies were air dropped and Soviet fighter planes began to chase German bombers from the skies above Warsaw. This persuaded the Home Army leadership to discontinue the initiated capitulation negotiations. In the prevailing circumstances, the half-hearted Soviet aid to the Uprising helped to extend the struggle which was only weakening both the Germans and the Poles to Soviet advantage. In the period September 13 to 15, the Soviet armies and detachments of the 1st Polish Army subordinated to the Soviets, pushed the Germans out of the right bank of the city. After a long period of waiting for Soviet acquiescence, an air drop operation mounted by 107 American Flying Fortresses which then landed in the Ukraine, took place on September 18. Between September 16 and 19, 1st Polish Army detachments made landings in several points of left bank Warsaw (in Czerniaków, Powisle and Zoliborz) but due to inadequate Russian support, these bridgeheads were unsustainable. The last groups of Home Army insurgents and Ist Polish Army soldiers fought on in Czerniaków to September 23 (some of these managed to escape via the sewers or back across the Vistula. The Germans, upon gaining control of the sub-districts of Sadyba and Sielce in the southern part of the city, went onto the offensive on September 24, to quell the insurgents in the Upper Mokotów area. Its evacuation via the sewers was ordered on September 26. A day later, the last defenders capitulated. A strong German attack against Żoliborz commenced on September 29 (mainly the 19th Panzer Division), leading to that district’s capitulation the following day.

The two-months’ fighting for Warsaw was a tremendous ordeal for the city’s inhabitants, especially for the hundreds of thousands of civilians seeking refuge in the cellars. Tens of thousands dead and wounded, illnesses, lack of water, hunger – these were the realities of the last weeks of insurgent Warsaw. On October 1, 1944, in the face of unavoidable defeat, the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army, General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, who as from September 30 was also the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces as such, nominated General Leopold Okulicki (pseudonym “Niedzwiadek”) as his successor in the Polish underground.

A ceasefire agreement was signed on the night of 2 to 3 October in Ozarów near Warsaw. Over 15,000 insurgents went into captivity together with General Bór Komorowski. About 18,000 insurgents were killed and 6,000 were seriously wounded during the fighting. Also, over 150,000 civilians perished in consequence of the fighting. The Germans lost about 10,000 in dead and wounded. After the capitulation, the Germans proceeded to systematically destroy the surviving buildings in the city. By January 1945, when the Red Army resumed its offensive, they had demolished 70 percent of the city.

Stalin’s vetoing of Allied help for Warsaw tore off his mask to reveal to the world the true nature of his policy towards Poland. At the same time, the 63 day battle for Warsaw – despite the military defeat – proved the will of the Poles to fight for their own sovereign state. This theme was given expression in the address of the Council of National Unity (RJN) and the Domestic Council of Ministers .(KRM) to the Polish nation of October 3, 1944: “The Warsaw Uprising has again put the Polish question before the world in the final phase of the war, not as a problem for diplomatic behind-the-scenes haggling, but as an issue relating to a great nation, fighting bloodily and unremittingly for freedom, unity and social justice in the lives of peoples and nations, for the noble principles of the Atlantic Charter, for everything that the better part of the world is fighting for today.’

.........
Regards
mack pl

Brzeczyszczykiewicz
06-29-2004, 07:55 AM
If this thread won't turn into flamewar, I'll buy everyone a beer ;) :D

mack pl
06-29-2004, 07:58 AM
If this thread won't turn into flamewar, I'll buy everyone a beer ;) :D

Warka strong plz ;) :lol:

tony6
06-29-2004, 09:30 AM
Warka is ****!
Buy us new "green" Lech!
:D

perdurabo
06-29-2004, 09:33 AM
Warka is ****!
Buy us new "green" Lech!
:D
you commie!
Warka is good Warka rulz!
p-)

Herrmannek
06-29-2004, 09:49 AM
Anybody want to buy me orengade?

mack pl
06-29-2004, 09:50 AM
Warka is ****!
Buy us new "green" Lech!
:D
you commie!
Warka is good Warka rulz!
p-)
huh, Im commie an Im drinking Warka ;)

orangade :roll: :cantbeli: Herman-you are weird ;) rofl

Brzeczyszczykiewicz
06-29-2004, 10:04 AM
orangade :roll: :cantbeli: Herman-you are weird ;) rofl

not weird, ORIGINAL :bash: :D

tony6
06-29-2004, 10:05 AM
Anybody want to buy me orengade?
WTF?
:D

perdurabo
06-29-2004, 10:08 AM
Herman is excentric he dont drink alchochol

mack pl
06-29-2004, 10:14 AM
Herman is excentric he dont drink alchochol
:cantbeli: Dobra, jestem w takim szoku, że ide sie upić.....za nas dwóch.......pierwszy toast za Hermana........nie wie co traci ;) rofl

Herrmannek
06-29-2004, 10:17 AM
.....nie wie co traci ;) rofl
At least I dont loose consciousness....

tony6
06-29-2004, 11:08 AM
...but it doesn't change the fact that You're weird :D

tyovan
06-29-2004, 11:15 AM
If this thread won't turn into flamewar, I'll buy everyone a beer ;) :D

Guinness prosze ;)

perdurabo
06-29-2004, 02:45 PM
Only Polish beer! We support our factories :lol: :lol:

2RHPZ
06-30-2004, 11:45 AM
http://edition.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/presents/index.warsaw.html

mack pl
07-02-2004, 10:23 AM
In late 1943 the Russian Army crossed the Dnieper River and created a wedge between the German Armies in the Ukraine and Baltic. ‘The Warsaw Rising of August 1944 was but the last performance of a drama which was also enacted in 1733, 1767, 1794, 1830 1846, 1848, 1863, 1905, and 1920. On each occasion, if asked what they were fighting for, their [Poles] reply might well have been the same: for a few ideas…. Which is nothing new’ (Davis, 1981:37). This view almost demeans the careful planning and courage of the Home Army and related activities associated with one of the largest secret armies in Occupied Europe.
The self-less courage and massive losses inflicted upon the Home Army makes it one of the largest battles fought by ill-equipped combatants whose inspiration has kept future generations awe inspired. It lasted two months and saw 200,000 die and a city left in ruins while a complacent Russian Army watched from the banks of the Vistula.

Prelude to the Warsaw Rising
Strategically, the German High Command had been expecting an attempt to breakout of Soviet held territory and Hitler ordered a stand to defend Warsaw at all costs (Iranek-Osmecki, 1954; Bor-Komorowski, 1951; Ciechanowski, 1975). The possibility of a Soviet attack on the city had been foreseen by the Home Army and the Government-in-Exile. Sikorski’s failure to settle the frontier problem had left a political stalemate steeped in deep recrimination in Soviet-Polish relations (Ciechanowski, 1975). The inability to cooperate also stemmed from Stalin’s refusal to release details of the whereabouts of Polish officers until the discovery of the Katyn Massacre in April 1943. Anders constant complaints about release of Polish personnel from the Gulags and non-recognition of citizenship during the formation of the Second Polish Corps in the Middle East added to the impasse (Bor-Komorowski, 1951; Ciechanowski, 1975; Davis, 1981). The constant debate about frontiers and the adoption of the ‘Curzon Line’ dragged on despite efforts by Churchill and Roosevelt. In the autumn 1943 Bor-Komorowski was desperate for the Home Army to have diplomatic contact with the Soviets and was being pressurized by Eden to accept the Curzon Line. Mikolajczyk’s saw this as an opportunity to co-operate and establish the recognition of the Home Army to secure weapons and administrate the undisputed territories (Ciechanowski, 1975). Most political leaders saw the dispute as a major block to post war settlement and the Government in Exile remained intransient to any agreement or rapprochement with the Soviets who remained suspicious of Stalin. Sosnkowski remained concerned over Bor-Komorowski independence and the strategic value Operation Burza and its impact upon disputed territory. In addition he was more concerned over the scope and free-range Churchill and Roosevelt had given the Soviets in Central and Eastern Europe (Ciechanowski, 1975).
Operation Burza (Storm also sometimes called Tempest)
The Home Army issued orders to implement Operation Burza to harass the retreating Germans in almost all districts despite not being granted combatant rights. The plans for the Warsaw Rising were amended according to a constant updating by field intelligence. The Soviets supported the AL and there were conflicts in numerous operational districts, which forced Bor-Komorowski to concentrate operations in an area bordered by the Rivers Bug and Stochod and centred on the town of Kowel (Iranek-Osmecki, 1954; Bor-Komorowski, 1951; Ciechanowski, 1975).

District Home Army Divisions
Vilna and Nowogrodek 1st, 19th and 20th
Brest - Litovsk 30th
Volhynia 27th
Lvov 5th
Lublin 3rd, 9th and 13th
Bialystok 18th and 29th
Radom and Kielce 2nd and 7th
Warsaw 8th, 10th and 28th
Krakow 6th, 22nd and 24th
(Source: Iranek-Osmecki, 1954:173)
The Soviets supported by the AL were not to be trusted. Local contact with the Soviet army often resulted in liquidation of leading field operatives, particularly the Cichociemni or whole units disarmed and imprisoned in former concentration camps (Majdanek) or deported to the gulags in Russia once action was completed. In operational districts like Volhynia the contact was in two fronts - harassing the Germans and avoiding the Soviets. In some operational districts the Home Army were so successful that they controlled the area apart from some major towns. Arms dumps were captured and prisoners released and in some cases members of the AK released from serving.

Members of the Home Army despite spearheading many battles in the run up to the liberation of Warsaw were barred from entering captured towns and cities as this reduced the impact of Soviet propaganda. Those who did manage to escape and return to their secret camps were eventually surrounded and liquidated (Iranek-Osmecki, 1954).

The Warsaw Rising
When the Soviet army reached the eastern outskirts of Warsaw and entered the district of Praga, the final stages of operation Burza were implemented. On the 26th July the Government in Exile had formally asked the British Government for support (Foot, 1990). Churchill and Gubbins watched the unfolding tragedy in an almost powerless state. The AK had remained throughout the war as an independent army with little support from the SOE. The Government in Exile remained fiercely independent of British and American interference and the Polish section of the SOE (known as MP) was run by Colonel Perkins also had need of special liaison group (EU/P) headed by Major Hazell to avoid duplication or strategic clashes (Marks, 2000). The complex relationship within the Polish community caused frustration for all. The geographic distance made operations almost impossible to support even at the fall of Italy.
Many as a commander saw Count Bor-Komorowski out of his depth both politically and strategically (Foot, 1990). On the 1st August 1944 the order for the Rising was made and Moscow Radio called for support. Soviet tanks were less than 12 miles away and Berling’s army was on the opposite bank of the Vistula and gave limited support due to the orders of Soviet High Command. Berling was dismissed for sending over patrols to assist the heroic AK actions against the Germans. Appeals for arms were made and the SOE and the RAF did what little they could, but the flight was 900 miles from base and on the edge of operational limits with dropping zones close to city limits and only a few miles from the Soviets. Requests for the Polish Airforce to fly to Poland together with an airborne drop of the Polish Brigade were also out of the question (Garlinski, 1969). Specialist paratroopers who had been trained for operations in Northern France (Operation Bardsea and Monica) were also withheld and kept at their base just outside Peterborough (Foot, 1990; Marks, 2000) such was the risk.

When 15 out of 16 Polish manned Halifax’s loaded with arms and munitions were shot down, Sir John Slessor, Commander of the Mediterranean forbade any further flights (Foot, 1990). Weather, low drop altitude, constantly changing city territory and Anti Aircraft fire made it an extremely hazardous mission and could not be compared to supplying the French Resistance prior to D-Day where the sites were in remote rural areas. Some surviving crew members actually walked and hitched from crash sites back to Brindisi in Italy through Soviet and German lines. The Soviets under pressure from Roosevelt allowed just one flight, a group of 110 B-17 US bombers to refuel at Poltava on Soviet held territory for a drop on 18th September 1944 (Garlinski, 1969).

The ground battle was desperate with selfless valour being displayed in street-to-street fighting (Davies, 1981). It is estimated there were between 12 - 20,000 AK soldiers (up to another 75,000 people involved in auxiliary roles) committed to the fight against a well-armed and trained German Army of 20,000 battle-hardened troops made up of SS and Wehrmacht units. Although some units of the AL were involved in the action, the lack of tanks, armoured cars and heavy calibre weapons meant their role made little impact upon the outcome. Bor-Komorowski’s hope that the AK could take and hold Warsaw for the return of the Government in Exile was politically ill conceived. The Soviets had no intention of recognising the AK and its leaders. The Warsaw rising and the annihilation of the resistance by the Germans sped up the ‘removal’ of a political obstacle for post war settlement. After 63 days of savage fighting the city was rubble and the reprisals brutal. The RONA brigade led by Kaminski specialized in anti-partisan action was made up of the scum and deserters of the Soviet army supported Oskar Dirlanger’s Brigade and other units in vile retribution. Mass shootings in reprisal together with the burning of hospitals with staff and patients was typical of the ‘clean-up’ operations. Women and children were tied too tanks as protection against ambushes. Approximately 550,000 inhabitants were sent to a concentration camp at Pruszkow and another 150,000 used as slave labour while over 245,000 died. 93% of the city was uninhabitable and featureless of landmarks. Wehrmacht sappers systematically demolished the city. The Warsaw Rising gave Stalin the opportunity to remove a well-organized army and paved the way for the imposition of a post-war puppet government. Those who did survive would be dealt with at the infamous trials and tribunals where long-term imprisonment or execution was guaranteed.


Air-bridge Statistics
1st August - 2nd October 1944
Flights 306 91 Polish
50 British
55 South African
110 American
Drops 192 149 over Warsaw
43 over Kampinos and Kabacki woods
Dropped 2154 containers

557 Packages 1711 over Warsaw
443 over Kampinos and Kabacki woods

Total 239 Tons
Success Rate 742 Containers

381 Packages 463 over Warsaw
279 over Kampinos and Kabacki woods
182 over Warsaw
199 over Kampinos and Kabacki woods
Total 88 Tons (36.8%)
(Source: Garlinski, 1969)

..........
regards
mack pl

mack pl
07-03-2004, 05:25 AM
If this thread won't turn into flamewar, I'll buy everyone a beer ;) :D

So, Warka plz ;) :D