hist2004
06-30-2004, 11:46 PM
Britain's plan to bomb the Soviet oil fields at Baku illustrated Winston Churchill's lack of faith in the Soviet Union's ability to defeat Adolf Hitler--and the suspicion and subterfuge that would eventually lead to the Cold War.
by Patrick R. Osborn
One clear day during the early stages of World War II, a solitary aircraft appeared in the skies over the great petroleum production center of Baku, capital of Azerbaijan and one of the most important cities in the Soviet Union. Incredibly, the plane lingered over the city for a full hour before returning to base. No attempt was made to intercept the intruder, and anti-aircraft batteries ringing the city remained silent. By the time the aircraft left Soviet airspace, it had taken dozens of photographs of oil refineries, pipelines, pumping stations, and power plants--all prime targets for strategic bombers.
A few days later the same aircraft appeared in the skies over the vital Black Sea port of Batum. This time, however, the Soviets responded, opening fire with anti-aircraft guns and scrambling fighters in a vain attempt to intercept the high-flying invader.
This brief scenario will have a familiar ring to students of World War II. On dozens of occasions before Adolf Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa--the German invasion of the Soviet Union--in June 1941, the Luftwaffe carried out reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. In this case, though, the flights were undertaken in March and April 1940, and the intruder was not German, but British.
Under the terms of the German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Demarcation signed in September 1939, Soviet leader Josef Stalin had agreed to deliver petroleum to fuel-deficient Nazi Germany. The British and their French allies were determined to hinder these shipments. One way to do this, they decided, was to attack oil production facilities located throughout the Soviet Caucasus. By April 1940, after obtaining reconnaissance photographs of the most important targets in the area, the Royal Air Force had developed a plan, dubbed "Operation Pike," to cripple the Soviet oil industry. The plan was to conduct a strategic bombing campaign lasting up to three months to destroy Soviet oil production. The operation had advanced to the point that the Royal Air Force was in the process of transferring several squadrons of Bristol Blenheim Mk.IV bombers to the Middle East to launch Pike when the Germans conquered France and the Low Countries in May.
Operation Pike was relegated to the back burner while the RAF fought and won the Battle of Britain. The British then gained a bit of breathing space in early 1941 as the Wehrmacht invaded Yugoslavia and Greece and Hitler readied his own attack on the Soviet Union. London was aware of these preparations but was unsure if Hitler intended to force concessions from Stalin (possibly including German control of the Caucasian oil fields), or if he was preparing a surprise attack without making any prior demands. Many British diplomats believed Stalin would submit to Hitler rather than take on the German army. To prevent this, the Foreign Office's permanent under-secretary, Sir Alexander Cadogan, said the British "must consider how we can use [the] threat or fact of bombing Baku" as a tool to force Stalin to resist Hitler.
Air Vice Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the RAF's highest-ranking officer, told Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that "our bomber position in the Middle East is such that we could make 'the biggest blaze ever' in the Russian oilfields." Soon thereafter, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, senior air officer in the Middle East, was instructed to see if the attacks on the Soviet oil industry could "be implemented as early as possible."
On June 14, the Chiefs of Staff ordered the establishment of a military mission to depart for Moscow if the Germans attacked. Designated "Thirty Mission," the envoys included petroleum expert Eric Berthoud, who prepared a report on attacking the Soviet oil industry. Officially attached to the British Embassy in Cairo, Berthoud was actually working for the Special Operations Executive, an organization created by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1940 to undertake covert operations in Europe. Berthoud recommended that the RAF bomb oil-refinery employees' housing in the northern Caucasus and mine the Black Sea. He also said that "the question of the landing of parachute or Commando troops on the railway and pipeline systems will be considered."
On June 22 Operation Barbarossa began. Although Churchill and others had warned Stalin, the German attack took the Red Army completely by surprise; its front-line units were quickly smashed. Many observers predicted that the Soviet Union would soon collapse, after which, Churchill feared, Hitler would attempt to invade Britain. The Caucasian oil fields might also fall into German hands, thus immeasurably strengthening Germany's economic and military position.
Consequently, on June 23, British military planners gathered to discuss various means of destroying Soviet oil facilities before the Germans could capture them. Among their conclusions was that the "[SOE] should be invited, as a matter of urgency, to arrange for the infiltration of agents and the machinery for sabotage into the Caucasus via Afghanistan, Iran (Persia) and Turkey....We should be prepared to bomb the Caucasian oilfields from Mosul [in northern Iraq]. Preliminary action to enable this to be done has already been set on foot."
The director of military operations, Maj. Gen. John Kennedy, was anxious to launch bombing operations "before the Germans have been able to install AA [anti-aircraft] guns and fighter protection." He added: "We should also be certain that the Foreign Office will raise no objections to flying over either Turkish or Iranian territory. Germany never allows such barriers to hinder her air attacks, and it would be absurd, at this stage of the war, if we were to have such scruples." He also wanted the Foreign Office to pressure the Soviets to prepare for the demolition of the oil fields themselves.
General Archibald Wavell, commander in chief Middle East, predicted that Stalin was unlikely to cooperate with British efforts to deny the Caucasus to the Germans "owing to the influence of oil on food production." Still, Wavell was determined to prevent the Nazis from seizing Soviet oil plants and equipment intact. He therefore sought to form covert demolition teams, which would be called G(R) Sixteen. Because of the secret nature of the operation, including guerrilla-style action in Stalin's homeland of Georgia, two disguised SOE officers would be assigned to Thirty Mission.
The Chiefs of Staff tried to exclude the SOE from Thirty Mission, since "the Russians will be suspicious from the outset," but for some reason, their advice was not followed. Later, it was even recommended to attach James Bond creator Ian Fleming to the group, but the commanding officer of Thirty Mission refused because the swashbuckling Fleming might do something rash and antagonize the Soviets. Fleming's model for James Bond, Fitzroy Maclean (later to be decorated by the Soviets for his work with Josef Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia), was actually proposed to be one of the men who would secretly parachute into the Caucasus and sabotage Soviet oil facilities.
Meanwhile, on July 4 the British proposed to Moscow that the RAF destroy the oil fields before the Germans could reach them. In return, the British would provide the Soviets with heavy machinery and oil. Stalin rejected the offer. Two days later the SOE set up a two-****ged organization responsible for overseeing the demolition of Soviet oil facilities. Berthoud would attempt to work with the Soviets in Moscow while planning for covert operations in the Caucasus would continue in London.
Longmore now informed London that the bombing of the Soviet oil fields could begin in two weeks. However, there were then only four squadrons of Blenheim bombers in Iraq and enough ordnance for a two-week offensive. Longmore requested eight squadrons of newer, more capable, Wellington Mk.III bombers, although they probably would not be ready for action until October. The proposed bomber offensive was now renamed Operation Raspberry.
To the British, time seemed to be running out. By the middle of July German troops were well on their way to Moscow and Leningrad and had driven deep into Ukraine. The Soviet Union's demise seemed inevitable.
With this in mind, Berthoud rushed back to London in early August to discuss the situation with General Kennedy. Although told by Stalin that the British would be consulted if the destruction of the Caucasian oil fields became necessary, Berthoud urged that preparations should begin immediately. After the meeting Kennedy implored the Foreign Office to pressure Stalin to engage in meaningful discussions on this topic with Berthoud, but the general was not confident that the Soviets would approve his return to Moscow, or that he would be successful if he did return. "A second string (though rather a forlorn hope) mission, known as G(R)16," Kennedy wrote on August 13, "[is] also preparing in the Middle East, to fly in to the Caucasus without Russian knowledge, in the event of Berthoud failing and this Mission will be able to work only in the conditions of chaos which may exist between Russian control breaking down and the Germans taking over." Kennedy advocated bombing the Soviet oil fields if "it appears that the Russians have lost control."
By the middle of August, German armies were advancing toward the Crimea and encircling Kiev, the Ukrainian capital. Churchill, although loath to "condemn large sections of the Russian people to starvation" by depriving Soviet agricultural machinery of fuel, now appealed to Stalin to expedite demolition of the oil fields, even though the Germans were still hundreds of miles away from the nearest Caucasian oil refineries at Armavir and Maikop. In return, Britain would provide the Soviet Union with one hundred million pounds to import petroleum. Privately, he believed that "[we] must be ready to bomb the oilfields ourselves if the Russians did not destroy them."
By now the RAF had produced the most detailed plan yet for the destruction of the Soviet petroleum industry. The RAF's "Outline Plan for the Denial of Russian Oil to German Controlled Europe by Air Action" aimed at the total annihilation of oil pumping, refining, and transportation facilities in the Caucasus.
The RAF plan ranked sixteen principal targets. Near the top of the list were Baku's White Town and Black Town refinery areas. The Red Star power station in White Town was identified as the most important objective. Another vital target was the refinery complex and Soyuzneft oil storage area in Batum. Destroying the latter would drastically reduce the amount of oil that could be refined in the city. After these targets had been neutralized, destruction of the remaining ten targets would be left to the discretion of the air officer commanding in Iraq, John D'Albiac.
The primitive state of the Soviet petroleum industry, along with the knowledge that large pools of oil were scattered throughout the area, made the targeting of oil fields irresistible. Thus, Baku's Bibi Eibat area was identified as a major target, owing to what the RAF Middle East referred to as "numerous wooden derricks, pools of oil and a maze of pipelines" in the immediate vicinity. An earthen wall, or bund, protected Bibi Eibat, which, like much of the area around Baku, is below sea level. RAF planners hoped "a lucky hit might burst the bund" and submerge the area in sea water.
The British believed that it would take the Soviets nine months or longer to repair a bombed refinery, and they identified power stations as "perhaps the most important target in a refinery area." Bombers would have difficulty hitting narrow pipelines and railways, but knocking out bridges or the electrical system supplying power to the railways might prove effective. Destruction of the large railway station and marshaling yard at Baku "will tend to cause an accumulation of oil and rolling stock at this target," the British predicted.
The RAF agreed with Berthoud that a viable method of decreasing Soviet petroleum production would be to attack the dwellings of workers employed in the Caucasian oil industry. Worker housing complexes at Baku and Batum were ranked seventh and eighth on the priority list. The planners thought it so important to attack these areas that they made an extra notation on the topic: "Political or other conditions may introduce the temptation to relegate attacks on workers' dwellings to a lower category. But every attempt should be made to keep the priority of (7) and (8) above that of (10) [the Grozny refinery area] below."
Other targets identified were port facilities and oil storage tanks at Poti, the Tuapse refinery area, specific locations along the Grozny-Armavir and Baku-Batum railways, the Sabunchi and Surakhani refineries at Baku, and the Krasnovodsk refinery on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, which was within range of Wellington bombers operating with a reduced bombload from Mosul. Air bases were even then being prepared at Mosul, Qiyara and Ain Zalah in Iraq. Other bases recently seized from hostile Vichy French forces in Syria could also be utilized.
Launching an air offensive against the Soviet Union from Iraq or Syria, of course, begs the question of violating Turkish and Iranian airspace. In 1940, when Operation Pike had been under consideration, this subject had been handled with kid gloves (Neville Chamberlain, then the prime minister, had been particularly sensitive to the issue). But now, with the Soviet Union on the verge of collapse, most British planners were prepared to ignore the territorial integrity of the two neutral nations.
The planning staff was certain that the Germans intended to occupy northeastern Syria and northern Iraq as a corollary to the conquest of the Caucasus in order to provide some defensive depth to their valuable prize. Given the grave situation, the RAF believed that British bombers "should fly on the direct routes to their objectives; violating Turkish and/or Iranian territory as necessary." Except during the summer, Wellington Mk.I bombers (whose engines were ****e to overheating) could reach all of the projected targets except Krasnovodsk on a direct route. Similarly, Blenheim Mk.IV aircraft could reach every objective but Tuapse, Poti, Krasnovodsk, and Armavir. An indirect route would prevent Wellingtons from reaching Tuapse and the Grozny-Armavir railroad, but other targets on the list would still be within range from Mosul. The nearly obsolete Blenheims could not reach any of these targets if forced to fly a circuitous course.
A detailed list of altered priorities was formulated based on what aircraft would be available under what conditions. Given the short range of Hawker Hurricanes and Gloster Gladiators, no single-engine fighter escort could be provided to the striking force. RAF planners proposed to use Bristol Beaufighters as fighter escorts. The planes had enjoyed success during anti-shipping operations in the Atlantic and North Sea, but superior numbers of Soviet fighters might be able to draw them away from the bombers. Therefore, no long-range escort could be provided.
The Germans had already destroyed a good portion of Soviet air power, so it is difficult to say exactly how the Red Air Force would have fared against unescorted British bombers over the Caucasus. Still, the British proposed to attack their targets during the day at low altitude to compensate for the lack of fighter protection. Soviet defenses likely would improve over time, so night attacks would probably be necessary. Night operations would provide attacking bombers with three advantages: Large oil fires started by bombs from daylight raids would be clearly visible targets, coastal cities would be fairly easy to locate, and Soviet defenses would be less effective.
In the summer of 1941 no Wellington Mk.III bombers were available, but Blenheim Mk.IV squadrons already stationed in Iraq would be ready to begin Operation Raspberry by October 1. Operation planners estimated that thirty-three direct hits by 500-pound semi-armor-piercing bombs with delayed fuses would be adequate to destroy or permanently disable the Red Star power station at Baku, and for tank farms or refineries, a single 250-pound bomb would be sufficient per twenty-five hundred square yards of target area. It was believed that even near misses would do considerable damage. "The target areas under consideration are so vast," the planning report noted, "that it is unlikely any bombs would miss them completely under the conditions of attack and bomb aiming obtaining [its target]." Each bomber would carry both incendiary and general-purpose bombs with delayed fuses in addition to armor-piercing munitions. A total of 943,000 pounds of ordnance was deemed sufficient to knock out the principal refineries at Baku, Batum, Grozny, and Tuapse. Of this total, all but a few thousand incendiary and general-purpose bombs were now either in place or en route to Iraq from Egypt.
That such a formidable stockpile of munitions was either in Iraq or in the process of shipment to the Near East at a time when the British were desperate to expel General Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps illustrates that these plans were taken seriously, as does the removal of more than one million pounds of ordnance from the United Kingdom in mid-July so it would be available for operations in the Near East.
Only a month earlier there had been only enough ordnance in Iraq for a two-week air campaign. The RAF was now prepared to begin a bomber offensive against the Caucasian oil industry on fairly short notice, under less-than-ideal circumstances, should it be deemed necessary. The second phase of the campaign, assuming the first phase began on October 1, was scheduled to commence on April 1, 1942. By that date, it was hoped, there would be five heavy bomber squadrons, six medium bomber squadrons, nine short-range fighter squadrons, one Beaufighter squadron, two army cooperation squadrons, and two bomber transport squadrons in Iraq. Each heavy bomber squadron would be expected to undertake a total of ninety sorties per month, each medium bomber squadron 150.
It remained to be seen, however, if Operation Raspberry would be necessary, although the events of the summer and fall of 1941 could hardly have encouraged the British as to the chances of the Red Army holding out against the Germans for long. By mid-September the German army had encircled Kiev, taking more than half a million prisoners. The disintegration of Soviet defenses in southern Russia seemed certain.
On September 18, the same day that the Germans completed their envelopment of the Ukrainian capital, the Foreign Office turned down an appeal from Stalin to send twenty to thirty British army divisions to the Soviet Union, either through Archangel or through Iran. Sir John Dill, chief of the Imperial General Staff, had refused Stalin's request owing to a lack of shipping and a shortage of trained divisions. He was willing, however, to send limited assistance to the Caucasus to block a German advance there. "We should thus increase our chances of destroying the vital oil fields at Baku if necessary," he said.
It is unlikely that a few British divisions would have made much of a contribution to the Soviet war effort, especially since the British were still woefully short of tanks and anti-tank weapons. Still, on September 21, Churchill authorized Wavell to begin preparation for Operation Velvet, the deployment of British land and air forces on the Soviet southern front.
A few days later the Germans began Operation Typhoon, an all-out effort to capture Moscow, advancing to within 140 miles of the capital city by October 9. Five days later, the Red Army evacuated the Black Sea port of Odessa, opening the way for a German advance on Rostov and the route into the northern Caucasus.
The British ambassador to Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, now informed London that the delivery of petroleum and heavy machinery should not be conditional upon Soviet acceptance of British destruction of the Caucasian oil industry. This should wait until the fall of the Caucasus was imminent. Otherwise, he wrote, "it would do more harm than good." It would be unwise, he concluded, to discuss exchanging information on this topic until the Canadian press magnate, Lord William Beaverbrook, recently sent by Churchill to discuss Soviet military supply requirements with Stalin, had left Moscow.
By October 20, the Germans were within sixty-five miles of the Soviet capital. A few days later Beaverbrook told Stalin that the British were increasing their presence in Iran, which had been occupied by British and Soviet forces in August. This was being done, he said, to eliminate German influence in Persia, to protect supply routes to the Soviet Union, and to prepare for the dispatch of British forces to the Caucasus. Stalin, justifiably suspicious of British intentions, both in the Caucasus and in Iran, chafed at this last explanation and icily replied that "there is no war in the Caucasus but there is in the Ukraine."
Although partly responsible for creating Stalin's fear of British intentions in the Near East, Churchill grumbled that the Soviets "certainly have no right to reproach us. They brought their own fate upon themselves when by their Pact with [Nazi Foreign Minister] Joachim von Ribbentrop they let Hitler loose on Poland and so started the war." Furthermore, the prime minister continued, "We did not...know until Hitler attacked them whether they would fight or what side they would be on. That a Government with this record should accuse us of trying to gain advantages in Persia at their expense, or being willing to fight to the last Russian soldier, leaves me quite cool."
Angered by the Kremlin's accusatory tone, Churchill informed the Chiefs of Staff that they should be prepared to send fighters and bombers to the Caucasus to blunt a German advance on Baku, whether Stalin wanted them there or not. Wavell's successor, General Claude Auchinleck, was ordered to ready the transfer of several bomber squadrons, along with fighters and anti-aircraft guns, to northern Iran. If sent, the bombers would attack German lines of communication in the southern Soviet Union. If that failed to blunt the German onslaught, Auchinleck's orders continued, the bombers were to inflict the "greatest possible damage to Baku oil resources should they fall undestroyed into German hands." The War Office reported that the Middle East command could not spare the required forces until the "effect of 'Crusader' [the British counter-offensive against Axis forces in North Africa] can be judged," but they were anxious to begin preparations, both in Egypt and in Iran.
Churchill now considered transferring two divisions from Africa to the Soviet southern front as soon as Crusader was over. He, like the War Office, had misgivings that if the Germans captured the Caucasus, the petroleum industry would not be sufficiently damaged by the withdrawing Russians to deprive Hitler of an invaluable prize. Churchill was frustrated at Thirty Mission's inability to persuade the Soviets to discuss demolishing the facilities well before the Germans arrived. As he wrote to his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay, "The Russians tell us nothing, and view with great suspicion any inquiries we make on this subject."
If Stalin would not agree to the deployment of British ground forces in the Caucasus region, then, as the War Office had suggested, squadrons of heavy bombers might be sent to northern Iran to stiffen the Soviet defense. "If the worst happens," Churchill told Ismay, then the aircraft would be employed "to bomb the Baku oilfields and try to set the ground alight."
After some deliberation, the Chiefs of Staff decided on November 11 that they "were not satisfied that it was necessary or desirable to move infantry divisions to the Caucasus rather than 'Special [sabotage] Units' suggested by the Commander in Chief." General Kennedy, however, was dismayed by what he considered to be a shortsighted and defensive attitude on the part of the Chiefs of Staff, and he complained that the Kremlin would reject any proposal that did not involve the deployment of British forces directly into combat against the Germans. More important, Kennedy wanted to be in a position to take action independently of what the Soviets were doing in the region:
If the Russians were to collapse, or to give up serious fighting, even two divisions (provided they had reasonable air support) might do a great deal to delay the German advance through the very difficult routes through the Caucasus [mountain] range, or between the Caucasus and the entrance to the Caspian Sea. Should this occur, we might be able to do substantial destruction to the oil wells....If, on the other hand, we have no British formations in the area, our chances for doing such destruction are nil.
Four days later the German drive on Moscow was renewed. Fears of a sudden Soviet collapse were revived when their Ninth Army was shattered on the very first day. Less than two weeks after the assault began, the Germans reached the suburbs of Moscow. The world looked on with bated breath.
Fortuitously, the German assault on Moscow stalled in early December with the timely arrival of reinforcements from Siberia and the coming of winter. Then, with German troops and weaponry immobilized by the numbing cold, the Red Army launched a massive counterattack, sending the invaders into a frantic retreat. By January 1942, the Red Army had driven the Germans back to the positions from which they had begun Typhoon. To the south, the Germans were also driven out of Rostov.
The success of the Soviet counteroffensive brought a sense of relief to the British. With Moscow saved and Rostov recaptured, the idea of sending British land forces to the Eastern Front was abandoned and the G(R) Sixteen sabotage operation permanently suspended. Had the Soviet capital fallen, however, British bombers and saboteurs may well have appeared in the Caucasus in the hopes of inflicting as much damage as possible before the Germans could redeploy their forces for a drive on Baku, which Ismay predicted would occur when winter was over.
While it may seem foolish--perhaps even insane--for the British to seriously have considered launching an air offensive against the Soviet Union in 1940 or 1941, one of the excuses that Hitler had used to justify his invasion of the Soviet Union to his military chiefs was to eliminate the British threat to the Caucasus. As evidenced by Britain's plans, this threat was quite real. Hitler's failure to accomplish his goal contributed to Germany's ultimate defeat, for had the Caucasus been captured, the Soviets would have been more apt to sue for peace, which in turn would have left Britain alone to resist the Nazis.
As Ismay had foreseen, Hitler concentrated his efforts on capturing southern Russia and the Caucasus in the summer of 1942. Despite fanatical Soviet resistance, Armavir and Maikop fell to the Nazis in August. Naturally, the British were alarmed by these events, but by then they were more occupied with fending off Rommel's invasion of Egypt and were reeling from the Japanese seizure of Singapore and Burma. Under these circumstances, they were in no position to intervene unilaterally in the Soviet Union, although Churchill did approach President Franklin D. Roosevelt about the possibility of sending substantial American air forces to the Soviet southern front to defend the Caucasus. Hitler, however, soon became obsessed with capturing Stalingrad farther to the north, diverting forces away from the drive toward Baku. In February 1943 the Germans suffered a catastrophic defeat at Stalingrad, and by April they were all but driven out of the Caucasus. Despite the worst fears of the British and the Soviets, the Germans never crossed the Caucasus mountain range, and Baku was never again threatened seriously.
It must be noted, however, that friction between Moscow and London over the Caucasian oil fields continued, and it cost the British dearly in the long run, as it did the United States. That price was paid in gold expended after Hitler's eventual defeat. It is no accident that the Cold War began in earnest with a crisis over Soviet expansionist claims on Turkish and Iranian territory in 1945 and 1946. The purpose of Stalin's territorial demands was to gain depth for the defense of the oil fields of Baku and the Caucasus against potential air attack or sabotage.
Regards,
Hist2004
by Patrick R. Osborn
One clear day during the early stages of World War II, a solitary aircraft appeared in the skies over the great petroleum production center of Baku, capital of Azerbaijan and one of the most important cities in the Soviet Union. Incredibly, the plane lingered over the city for a full hour before returning to base. No attempt was made to intercept the intruder, and anti-aircraft batteries ringing the city remained silent. By the time the aircraft left Soviet airspace, it had taken dozens of photographs of oil refineries, pipelines, pumping stations, and power plants--all prime targets for strategic bombers.
A few days later the same aircraft appeared in the skies over the vital Black Sea port of Batum. This time, however, the Soviets responded, opening fire with anti-aircraft guns and scrambling fighters in a vain attempt to intercept the high-flying invader.
This brief scenario will have a familiar ring to students of World War II. On dozens of occasions before Adolf Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa--the German invasion of the Soviet Union--in June 1941, the Luftwaffe carried out reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. In this case, though, the flights were undertaken in March and April 1940, and the intruder was not German, but British.
Under the terms of the German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Demarcation signed in September 1939, Soviet leader Josef Stalin had agreed to deliver petroleum to fuel-deficient Nazi Germany. The British and their French allies were determined to hinder these shipments. One way to do this, they decided, was to attack oil production facilities located throughout the Soviet Caucasus. By April 1940, after obtaining reconnaissance photographs of the most important targets in the area, the Royal Air Force had developed a plan, dubbed "Operation Pike," to cripple the Soviet oil industry. The plan was to conduct a strategic bombing campaign lasting up to three months to destroy Soviet oil production. The operation had advanced to the point that the Royal Air Force was in the process of transferring several squadrons of Bristol Blenheim Mk.IV bombers to the Middle East to launch Pike when the Germans conquered France and the Low Countries in May.
Operation Pike was relegated to the back burner while the RAF fought and won the Battle of Britain. The British then gained a bit of breathing space in early 1941 as the Wehrmacht invaded Yugoslavia and Greece and Hitler readied his own attack on the Soviet Union. London was aware of these preparations but was unsure if Hitler intended to force concessions from Stalin (possibly including German control of the Caucasian oil fields), or if he was preparing a surprise attack without making any prior demands. Many British diplomats believed Stalin would submit to Hitler rather than take on the German army. To prevent this, the Foreign Office's permanent under-secretary, Sir Alexander Cadogan, said the British "must consider how we can use [the] threat or fact of bombing Baku" as a tool to force Stalin to resist Hitler.
Air Vice Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the RAF's highest-ranking officer, told Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that "our bomber position in the Middle East is such that we could make 'the biggest blaze ever' in the Russian oilfields." Soon thereafter, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, senior air officer in the Middle East, was instructed to see if the attacks on the Soviet oil industry could "be implemented as early as possible."
On June 14, the Chiefs of Staff ordered the establishment of a military mission to depart for Moscow if the Germans attacked. Designated "Thirty Mission," the envoys included petroleum expert Eric Berthoud, who prepared a report on attacking the Soviet oil industry. Officially attached to the British Embassy in Cairo, Berthoud was actually working for the Special Operations Executive, an organization created by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1940 to undertake covert operations in Europe. Berthoud recommended that the RAF bomb oil-refinery employees' housing in the northern Caucasus and mine the Black Sea. He also said that "the question of the landing of parachute or Commando troops on the railway and pipeline systems will be considered."
On June 22 Operation Barbarossa began. Although Churchill and others had warned Stalin, the German attack took the Red Army completely by surprise; its front-line units were quickly smashed. Many observers predicted that the Soviet Union would soon collapse, after which, Churchill feared, Hitler would attempt to invade Britain. The Caucasian oil fields might also fall into German hands, thus immeasurably strengthening Germany's economic and military position.
Consequently, on June 23, British military planners gathered to discuss various means of destroying Soviet oil facilities before the Germans could capture them. Among their conclusions was that the "[SOE] should be invited, as a matter of urgency, to arrange for the infiltration of agents and the machinery for sabotage into the Caucasus via Afghanistan, Iran (Persia) and Turkey....We should be prepared to bomb the Caucasian oilfields from Mosul [in northern Iraq]. Preliminary action to enable this to be done has already been set on foot."
The director of military operations, Maj. Gen. John Kennedy, was anxious to launch bombing operations "before the Germans have been able to install AA [anti-aircraft] guns and fighter protection." He added: "We should also be certain that the Foreign Office will raise no objections to flying over either Turkish or Iranian territory. Germany never allows such barriers to hinder her air attacks, and it would be absurd, at this stage of the war, if we were to have such scruples." He also wanted the Foreign Office to pressure the Soviets to prepare for the demolition of the oil fields themselves.
General Archibald Wavell, commander in chief Middle East, predicted that Stalin was unlikely to cooperate with British efforts to deny the Caucasus to the Germans "owing to the influence of oil on food production." Still, Wavell was determined to prevent the Nazis from seizing Soviet oil plants and equipment intact. He therefore sought to form covert demolition teams, which would be called G(R) Sixteen. Because of the secret nature of the operation, including guerrilla-style action in Stalin's homeland of Georgia, two disguised SOE officers would be assigned to Thirty Mission.
The Chiefs of Staff tried to exclude the SOE from Thirty Mission, since "the Russians will be suspicious from the outset," but for some reason, their advice was not followed. Later, it was even recommended to attach James Bond creator Ian Fleming to the group, but the commanding officer of Thirty Mission refused because the swashbuckling Fleming might do something rash and antagonize the Soviets. Fleming's model for James Bond, Fitzroy Maclean (later to be decorated by the Soviets for his work with Josef Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia), was actually proposed to be one of the men who would secretly parachute into the Caucasus and sabotage Soviet oil facilities.
Meanwhile, on July 4 the British proposed to Moscow that the RAF destroy the oil fields before the Germans could reach them. In return, the British would provide the Soviets with heavy machinery and oil. Stalin rejected the offer. Two days later the SOE set up a two-****ged organization responsible for overseeing the demolition of Soviet oil facilities. Berthoud would attempt to work with the Soviets in Moscow while planning for covert operations in the Caucasus would continue in London.
Longmore now informed London that the bombing of the Soviet oil fields could begin in two weeks. However, there were then only four squadrons of Blenheim bombers in Iraq and enough ordnance for a two-week offensive. Longmore requested eight squadrons of newer, more capable, Wellington Mk.III bombers, although they probably would not be ready for action until October. The proposed bomber offensive was now renamed Operation Raspberry.
To the British, time seemed to be running out. By the middle of July German troops were well on their way to Moscow and Leningrad and had driven deep into Ukraine. The Soviet Union's demise seemed inevitable.
With this in mind, Berthoud rushed back to London in early August to discuss the situation with General Kennedy. Although told by Stalin that the British would be consulted if the destruction of the Caucasian oil fields became necessary, Berthoud urged that preparations should begin immediately. After the meeting Kennedy implored the Foreign Office to pressure Stalin to engage in meaningful discussions on this topic with Berthoud, but the general was not confident that the Soviets would approve his return to Moscow, or that he would be successful if he did return. "A second string (though rather a forlorn hope) mission, known as G(R)16," Kennedy wrote on August 13, "[is] also preparing in the Middle East, to fly in to the Caucasus without Russian knowledge, in the event of Berthoud failing and this Mission will be able to work only in the conditions of chaos which may exist between Russian control breaking down and the Germans taking over." Kennedy advocated bombing the Soviet oil fields if "it appears that the Russians have lost control."
By the middle of August, German armies were advancing toward the Crimea and encircling Kiev, the Ukrainian capital. Churchill, although loath to "condemn large sections of the Russian people to starvation" by depriving Soviet agricultural machinery of fuel, now appealed to Stalin to expedite demolition of the oil fields, even though the Germans were still hundreds of miles away from the nearest Caucasian oil refineries at Armavir and Maikop. In return, Britain would provide the Soviet Union with one hundred million pounds to import petroleum. Privately, he believed that "[we] must be ready to bomb the oilfields ourselves if the Russians did not destroy them."
By now the RAF had produced the most detailed plan yet for the destruction of the Soviet petroleum industry. The RAF's "Outline Plan for the Denial of Russian Oil to German Controlled Europe by Air Action" aimed at the total annihilation of oil pumping, refining, and transportation facilities in the Caucasus.
The RAF plan ranked sixteen principal targets. Near the top of the list were Baku's White Town and Black Town refinery areas. The Red Star power station in White Town was identified as the most important objective. Another vital target was the refinery complex and Soyuzneft oil storage area in Batum. Destroying the latter would drastically reduce the amount of oil that could be refined in the city. After these targets had been neutralized, destruction of the remaining ten targets would be left to the discretion of the air officer commanding in Iraq, John D'Albiac.
The primitive state of the Soviet petroleum industry, along with the knowledge that large pools of oil were scattered throughout the area, made the targeting of oil fields irresistible. Thus, Baku's Bibi Eibat area was identified as a major target, owing to what the RAF Middle East referred to as "numerous wooden derricks, pools of oil and a maze of pipelines" in the immediate vicinity. An earthen wall, or bund, protected Bibi Eibat, which, like much of the area around Baku, is below sea level. RAF planners hoped "a lucky hit might burst the bund" and submerge the area in sea water.
The British believed that it would take the Soviets nine months or longer to repair a bombed refinery, and they identified power stations as "perhaps the most important target in a refinery area." Bombers would have difficulty hitting narrow pipelines and railways, but knocking out bridges or the electrical system supplying power to the railways might prove effective. Destruction of the large railway station and marshaling yard at Baku "will tend to cause an accumulation of oil and rolling stock at this target," the British predicted.
The RAF agreed with Berthoud that a viable method of decreasing Soviet petroleum production would be to attack the dwellings of workers employed in the Caucasian oil industry. Worker housing complexes at Baku and Batum were ranked seventh and eighth on the priority list. The planners thought it so important to attack these areas that they made an extra notation on the topic: "Political or other conditions may introduce the temptation to relegate attacks on workers' dwellings to a lower category. But every attempt should be made to keep the priority of (7) and (8) above that of (10) [the Grozny refinery area] below."
Other targets identified were port facilities and oil storage tanks at Poti, the Tuapse refinery area, specific locations along the Grozny-Armavir and Baku-Batum railways, the Sabunchi and Surakhani refineries at Baku, and the Krasnovodsk refinery on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, which was within range of Wellington bombers operating with a reduced bombload from Mosul. Air bases were even then being prepared at Mosul, Qiyara and Ain Zalah in Iraq. Other bases recently seized from hostile Vichy French forces in Syria could also be utilized.
Launching an air offensive against the Soviet Union from Iraq or Syria, of course, begs the question of violating Turkish and Iranian airspace. In 1940, when Operation Pike had been under consideration, this subject had been handled with kid gloves (Neville Chamberlain, then the prime minister, had been particularly sensitive to the issue). But now, with the Soviet Union on the verge of collapse, most British planners were prepared to ignore the territorial integrity of the two neutral nations.
The planning staff was certain that the Germans intended to occupy northeastern Syria and northern Iraq as a corollary to the conquest of the Caucasus in order to provide some defensive depth to their valuable prize. Given the grave situation, the RAF believed that British bombers "should fly on the direct routes to their objectives; violating Turkish and/or Iranian territory as necessary." Except during the summer, Wellington Mk.I bombers (whose engines were ****e to overheating) could reach all of the projected targets except Krasnovodsk on a direct route. Similarly, Blenheim Mk.IV aircraft could reach every objective but Tuapse, Poti, Krasnovodsk, and Armavir. An indirect route would prevent Wellingtons from reaching Tuapse and the Grozny-Armavir railroad, but other targets on the list would still be within range from Mosul. The nearly obsolete Blenheims could not reach any of these targets if forced to fly a circuitous course.
A detailed list of altered priorities was formulated based on what aircraft would be available under what conditions. Given the short range of Hawker Hurricanes and Gloster Gladiators, no single-engine fighter escort could be provided to the striking force. RAF planners proposed to use Bristol Beaufighters as fighter escorts. The planes had enjoyed success during anti-shipping operations in the Atlantic and North Sea, but superior numbers of Soviet fighters might be able to draw them away from the bombers. Therefore, no long-range escort could be provided.
The Germans had already destroyed a good portion of Soviet air power, so it is difficult to say exactly how the Red Air Force would have fared against unescorted British bombers over the Caucasus. Still, the British proposed to attack their targets during the day at low altitude to compensate for the lack of fighter protection. Soviet defenses likely would improve over time, so night attacks would probably be necessary. Night operations would provide attacking bombers with three advantages: Large oil fires started by bombs from daylight raids would be clearly visible targets, coastal cities would be fairly easy to locate, and Soviet defenses would be less effective.
In the summer of 1941 no Wellington Mk.III bombers were available, but Blenheim Mk.IV squadrons already stationed in Iraq would be ready to begin Operation Raspberry by October 1. Operation planners estimated that thirty-three direct hits by 500-pound semi-armor-piercing bombs with delayed fuses would be adequate to destroy or permanently disable the Red Star power station at Baku, and for tank farms or refineries, a single 250-pound bomb would be sufficient per twenty-five hundred square yards of target area. It was believed that even near misses would do considerable damage. "The target areas under consideration are so vast," the planning report noted, "that it is unlikely any bombs would miss them completely under the conditions of attack and bomb aiming obtaining [its target]." Each bomber would carry both incendiary and general-purpose bombs with delayed fuses in addition to armor-piercing munitions. A total of 943,000 pounds of ordnance was deemed sufficient to knock out the principal refineries at Baku, Batum, Grozny, and Tuapse. Of this total, all but a few thousand incendiary and general-purpose bombs were now either in place or en route to Iraq from Egypt.
That such a formidable stockpile of munitions was either in Iraq or in the process of shipment to the Near East at a time when the British were desperate to expel General Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps illustrates that these plans were taken seriously, as does the removal of more than one million pounds of ordnance from the United Kingdom in mid-July so it would be available for operations in the Near East.
Only a month earlier there had been only enough ordnance in Iraq for a two-week air campaign. The RAF was now prepared to begin a bomber offensive against the Caucasian oil industry on fairly short notice, under less-than-ideal circumstances, should it be deemed necessary. The second phase of the campaign, assuming the first phase began on October 1, was scheduled to commence on April 1, 1942. By that date, it was hoped, there would be five heavy bomber squadrons, six medium bomber squadrons, nine short-range fighter squadrons, one Beaufighter squadron, two army cooperation squadrons, and two bomber transport squadrons in Iraq. Each heavy bomber squadron would be expected to undertake a total of ninety sorties per month, each medium bomber squadron 150.
It remained to be seen, however, if Operation Raspberry would be necessary, although the events of the summer and fall of 1941 could hardly have encouraged the British as to the chances of the Red Army holding out against the Germans for long. By mid-September the German army had encircled Kiev, taking more than half a million prisoners. The disintegration of Soviet defenses in southern Russia seemed certain.
On September 18, the same day that the Germans completed their envelopment of the Ukrainian capital, the Foreign Office turned down an appeal from Stalin to send twenty to thirty British army divisions to the Soviet Union, either through Archangel or through Iran. Sir John Dill, chief of the Imperial General Staff, had refused Stalin's request owing to a lack of shipping and a shortage of trained divisions. He was willing, however, to send limited assistance to the Caucasus to block a German advance there. "We should thus increase our chances of destroying the vital oil fields at Baku if necessary," he said.
It is unlikely that a few British divisions would have made much of a contribution to the Soviet war effort, especially since the British were still woefully short of tanks and anti-tank weapons. Still, on September 21, Churchill authorized Wavell to begin preparation for Operation Velvet, the deployment of British land and air forces on the Soviet southern front.
A few days later the Germans began Operation Typhoon, an all-out effort to capture Moscow, advancing to within 140 miles of the capital city by October 9. Five days later, the Red Army evacuated the Black Sea port of Odessa, opening the way for a German advance on Rostov and the route into the northern Caucasus.
The British ambassador to Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, now informed London that the delivery of petroleum and heavy machinery should not be conditional upon Soviet acceptance of British destruction of the Caucasian oil industry. This should wait until the fall of the Caucasus was imminent. Otherwise, he wrote, "it would do more harm than good." It would be unwise, he concluded, to discuss exchanging information on this topic until the Canadian press magnate, Lord William Beaverbrook, recently sent by Churchill to discuss Soviet military supply requirements with Stalin, had left Moscow.
By October 20, the Germans were within sixty-five miles of the Soviet capital. A few days later Beaverbrook told Stalin that the British were increasing their presence in Iran, which had been occupied by British and Soviet forces in August. This was being done, he said, to eliminate German influence in Persia, to protect supply routes to the Soviet Union, and to prepare for the dispatch of British forces to the Caucasus. Stalin, justifiably suspicious of British intentions, both in the Caucasus and in Iran, chafed at this last explanation and icily replied that "there is no war in the Caucasus but there is in the Ukraine."
Although partly responsible for creating Stalin's fear of British intentions in the Near East, Churchill grumbled that the Soviets "certainly have no right to reproach us. They brought their own fate upon themselves when by their Pact with [Nazi Foreign Minister] Joachim von Ribbentrop they let Hitler loose on Poland and so started the war." Furthermore, the prime minister continued, "We did not...know until Hitler attacked them whether they would fight or what side they would be on. That a Government with this record should accuse us of trying to gain advantages in Persia at their expense, or being willing to fight to the last Russian soldier, leaves me quite cool."
Angered by the Kremlin's accusatory tone, Churchill informed the Chiefs of Staff that they should be prepared to send fighters and bombers to the Caucasus to blunt a German advance on Baku, whether Stalin wanted them there or not. Wavell's successor, General Claude Auchinleck, was ordered to ready the transfer of several bomber squadrons, along with fighters and anti-aircraft guns, to northern Iran. If sent, the bombers would attack German lines of communication in the southern Soviet Union. If that failed to blunt the German onslaught, Auchinleck's orders continued, the bombers were to inflict the "greatest possible damage to Baku oil resources should they fall undestroyed into German hands." The War Office reported that the Middle East command could not spare the required forces until the "effect of 'Crusader' [the British counter-offensive against Axis forces in North Africa] can be judged," but they were anxious to begin preparations, both in Egypt and in Iran.
Churchill now considered transferring two divisions from Africa to the Soviet southern front as soon as Crusader was over. He, like the War Office, had misgivings that if the Germans captured the Caucasus, the petroleum industry would not be sufficiently damaged by the withdrawing Russians to deprive Hitler of an invaluable prize. Churchill was frustrated at Thirty Mission's inability to persuade the Soviets to discuss demolishing the facilities well before the Germans arrived. As he wrote to his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay, "The Russians tell us nothing, and view with great suspicion any inquiries we make on this subject."
If Stalin would not agree to the deployment of British ground forces in the Caucasus region, then, as the War Office had suggested, squadrons of heavy bombers might be sent to northern Iran to stiffen the Soviet defense. "If the worst happens," Churchill told Ismay, then the aircraft would be employed "to bomb the Baku oilfields and try to set the ground alight."
After some deliberation, the Chiefs of Staff decided on November 11 that they "were not satisfied that it was necessary or desirable to move infantry divisions to the Caucasus rather than 'Special [sabotage] Units' suggested by the Commander in Chief." General Kennedy, however, was dismayed by what he considered to be a shortsighted and defensive attitude on the part of the Chiefs of Staff, and he complained that the Kremlin would reject any proposal that did not involve the deployment of British forces directly into combat against the Germans. More important, Kennedy wanted to be in a position to take action independently of what the Soviets were doing in the region:
If the Russians were to collapse, or to give up serious fighting, even two divisions (provided they had reasonable air support) might do a great deal to delay the German advance through the very difficult routes through the Caucasus [mountain] range, or between the Caucasus and the entrance to the Caspian Sea. Should this occur, we might be able to do substantial destruction to the oil wells....If, on the other hand, we have no British formations in the area, our chances for doing such destruction are nil.
Four days later the German drive on Moscow was renewed. Fears of a sudden Soviet collapse were revived when their Ninth Army was shattered on the very first day. Less than two weeks after the assault began, the Germans reached the suburbs of Moscow. The world looked on with bated breath.
Fortuitously, the German assault on Moscow stalled in early December with the timely arrival of reinforcements from Siberia and the coming of winter. Then, with German troops and weaponry immobilized by the numbing cold, the Red Army launched a massive counterattack, sending the invaders into a frantic retreat. By January 1942, the Red Army had driven the Germans back to the positions from which they had begun Typhoon. To the south, the Germans were also driven out of Rostov.
The success of the Soviet counteroffensive brought a sense of relief to the British. With Moscow saved and Rostov recaptured, the idea of sending British land forces to the Eastern Front was abandoned and the G(R) Sixteen sabotage operation permanently suspended. Had the Soviet capital fallen, however, British bombers and saboteurs may well have appeared in the Caucasus in the hopes of inflicting as much damage as possible before the Germans could redeploy their forces for a drive on Baku, which Ismay predicted would occur when winter was over.
While it may seem foolish--perhaps even insane--for the British to seriously have considered launching an air offensive against the Soviet Union in 1940 or 1941, one of the excuses that Hitler had used to justify his invasion of the Soviet Union to his military chiefs was to eliminate the British threat to the Caucasus. As evidenced by Britain's plans, this threat was quite real. Hitler's failure to accomplish his goal contributed to Germany's ultimate defeat, for had the Caucasus been captured, the Soviets would have been more apt to sue for peace, which in turn would have left Britain alone to resist the Nazis.
As Ismay had foreseen, Hitler concentrated his efforts on capturing southern Russia and the Caucasus in the summer of 1942. Despite fanatical Soviet resistance, Armavir and Maikop fell to the Nazis in August. Naturally, the British were alarmed by these events, but by then they were more occupied with fending off Rommel's invasion of Egypt and were reeling from the Japanese seizure of Singapore and Burma. Under these circumstances, they were in no position to intervene unilaterally in the Soviet Union, although Churchill did approach President Franklin D. Roosevelt about the possibility of sending substantial American air forces to the Soviet southern front to defend the Caucasus. Hitler, however, soon became obsessed with capturing Stalingrad farther to the north, diverting forces away from the drive toward Baku. In February 1943 the Germans suffered a catastrophic defeat at Stalingrad, and by April they were all but driven out of the Caucasus. Despite the worst fears of the British and the Soviets, the Germans never crossed the Caucasus mountain range, and Baku was never again threatened seriously.
It must be noted, however, that friction between Moscow and London over the Caucasian oil fields continued, and it cost the British dearly in the long run, as it did the United States. That price was paid in gold expended after Hitler's eventual defeat. It is no accident that the Cold War began in earnest with a crisis over Soviet expansionist claims on Turkish and Iranian territory in 1945 and 1946. The purpose of Stalin's territorial demands was to gain depth for the defense of the oil fields of Baku and the Caucasus against potential air attack or sabotage.
Regards,
Hist2004