Texas executes innocent, Gov.changes commision

[Ordie]

“It is better to risk saving a guilty man than to condemn an innocent one."


-Voltaire


October 2, 2009
Texas Governor Defends Shakeup of Commission

By JAMES C. McKINLEY Jr.
HOUSTON — Just before he was executed in 2004 for setting a fire that killed his three children, Cameron T. Willingham declared, “I am an innocent man convicted of a crime I did not commit.” Now his words seem to be echoing in the race for governor of Texas.
In what some opponents say looks like a political move and Gov. Rick Perry (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/p/rick_perry/index.html?inline=nyt-per) says was “business as usual,” the governor replaced the head of the Texas Forensic Science Commission and two other members on Wednesday, just 48 hours before the commission was to hear testimony from an arson expert who believes that Mr. Willingham was convicted on faulty testimony, a conclusion that has been supported by other experts in the field.
Mr. Perry’s decision to shake up the commission and put one of his political allies in charge has, at the least, delayed the inquiry into the Willingham case. While Mr. Perry says he has no political motive for the move, his opponents have called for the commission to finish its inquiry.
“If a mistake was made in this case, we need to know it,” Tom Schieffer, a Fort Worth businessman and a Democratic candidate for governor, said in a statement. “No one in public life should ever be afraid of the truth.”
Mr. Perry’s opponent in the Republican primary, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/h/kay_bailey_hutchison/index.html?inline=nyt-per), also questioned what harm the hearing could do. “I am for the death penalty,” Ms. Hutchison told The Dallas Morning News, “but always with the absolute assurance that you have the ability to be sure, with the technology that we have, that a person is guilty.”
Mr. Perry denied Thursday that the changes he had made at the commission were intended to quash the investigation. At a news conference for his re-election campaign, he said, “Those individuals’ terms were up, so we’re replacing them.”
He said the commission was “going to take a look at any new information that anybody has,” adding that “to make a statement now that it was not arson is a little premature.”
The governor was in office when Mr. Willingham was executed on Feb. 17, 2004. He denied the condemned man a reprieve even after a detailed report by an arson expert said the evidence that Mr. Willingham had set the fire was flimsy and inconclusive.
Last month, Mr. Perry expressed confidence that Mr. Willingham was guilty and played down reports casting doubt on the original investigation, calling the authors “supposed experts,” while making a quotes gesture with his fingers.
Mr. Perry, facing the primary challenge from Ms. Hutchison, has been working to shore up his support among conservatives, who usually decide the Republican primary here.
Mr. Willingham, an unemployed auto mechanic with a history of petty crime, was convicted of setting his house in Corsicana on fire in 1991. His three small daughters died in the blaze, and he maintained right up to his death that he had tried to save them. The police doubted his story partly because his bare feet had not been burned.
Local arson investigators testified at his trial that, judging by the charring and fracture patterns of broken glass left by the blaze, someone had poured a flammable liquid under the children’s beds, along the hallway and out the front door. The jury took less than an hour to convict Mr. Willingham.
In 2004, however, Gerald L. Hurst, an Austin scientist and fire investigator working in Mr. Willingham’s behalf, reviewed the evidence and determined the investigators had relied on several outdated and discredited methods to reach their conclusions. Most of the evidence could be explained by an accidental fire, Dr. Hurst said.
That conclusion was confirmed six weeks ago by an independent arson expert hired by the Forensic Science Commission, which was created in 2005 to investigate mistakes in crime laboratories after scandals rocked the one in Houston. The expert, Craig L. Beyler, of Baltimore, said in his August report that “the investigators had a poor understanding of fire science” and that the evidence they cited did not support a finding of arson.
Mr. Beyler was to testify before the commission in Dallas on Friday. But the newly appointed chairman, John M. Bradley, the district attorney in Williamson County, canceled the hearing, saying he did not know enough about the inquiry. “I felt I had been asked to take a final exam without having an opportunity to study for it,” he said.
Mr. Bradley said he did not know if he would continue the inquiry into the Willingham conviction that his predecessor had started. He said he wanted to consult with the lawmakers who created the commission about its mission.
The former chairman, Sam Bassett, an Austin lawyer whom Mr. Perry had twice appointed to the commission — and could have reappointed — said the governor had not told him why he was replaced. Mr. Bassett said he had hoped to produce a definitive report on the case by next spring.
“I hope they continue and complete the Willingham investigation,” he said. “It’s important for the future of criminal justice in Texas to make sure good science is being used in the courtroom.”


Source:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/us/02texas.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print

[megjur]

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=164459

Already discussed in great detail...Not quite as "innocent" as the anti death penalty folks would have you believe

Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351(Tex.Cr.App. 1995). (Direct Appeal)
Defendant was convicted of capital murder by murdering more than one person during same criminal transaction after jury trial in the 13th Judicial District Court, Navarro County, Kenneth A. Douglas, J. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals, White, J., held that: (1) jury could find that defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute continuing threat to society; (2) trial court properly denied defendant's motion for change of venue; (3) trial court properly refused to admit evidence offered by defense to impeach testimony of witness for state; and (4) trial court properly refused to charge jury on effect of parole in punishment phase. Affirmed. Clinton, J., filed opinion concurring in the result in which Maloney, J., joined and Baird, J., joined in part.
WHITE, Judge.
Appellant Cameron Todd Willingham was convicted on August 21, 1992 of capital murder by murdering more than one person during the same criminal transaction. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(6)(A). Two special issues were submitted to the jury under Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1) and § 2(e) and following the jury's verdict of guilty, the trial court sentenced appellant to death. Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.071 § 2(h). We will affirm.
Appellant brings four points of error for this Court to review. In point of error number one, appellant contends the trial court erred in refusing to grant his Motion for Change of Venue, in light of inflammatory statements made by the Navarro County District Attorney. Appellant asserts in his second point of error that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence offered by the defense to impeach the testimony of a witness for the State. In his third point of error, appellant maintains the trial court erred in its charge to the jury during the punishment phase of the trial by failing to instruct the jury on the effect of parole, as parole would qualify as a "mitigating circumstance" under the facts of this case. Appellant contends, in point of error number four, that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's answers to the special issues submitted in the punishment phase of the trial, particularly: (a) that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that appellant is a continuing threat to society, and (b) that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that mitigating circumstances would not warrant a life sentence. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction; therefore, the facts of the offense will be discussed only in reference to the error alleged in point of error number four.
Appellant contends in his fourth point of error that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's answers to the special issues submitted in the punishment phase of the trial. Although appellant does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for capital murder, a review of the facts and other evidence underlying his conviction is necessary, as this is the information which the jury considered when answering the special issues in the punishment phase of the trial. James v. State, 772 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), 493 U.S. 885, 110 S.Ct. 225, 107 L.Ed.2d 178 (vacated and remanded on other issue); James v. State, 805 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (on remand); cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2915, 115 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1991).
The evidence adduced at trial was that on December 23, 1991, appellant poured a combustible liquid on the floor throughout his home and intentionally set the house on fire, resulting in the death of his three children. Amber, age two, and twins Karmon and Kameron, age 1, died of acute carbon monoxide poisoning as a result of smoke inhalation, according to autopsy reports. Neighbors of appellant testified that as the house began smouldering, appellant was "crouched down" in the front yard, and despite the neighbors' pleas, refused to go into the house in any attempt to rescue the children. An expert witness for the State testified that the floors, front threshold, and front concrete porch were burned, which only occurs when an accelerant has been used to purposely burn these areas. This witness further testified that this igniting of the floors and thresholds is typically employed to impede firemen in their rescue attempts.
The testimony at trial demonstrates that appellant neither showed remorse for his actions nor grieved the loss of his three children. Appellant's neighbors testified that when the fire "blew out" the windows, appellant "hollered about his car" and ran to move it away from the fire to avoid its being damaged. A fire fighter also testified that appellant was upset that his dart board was burned. One of appellant's neighbors testified that the morning following the house *355 fire, Christmas Eve, appellant and his wife were at the burned house going through the debris while playing music and laughing. At the punishment phase of trial, testimony was presented that appellant has a history of violence. He has been convicted of numerous felonies and misdemeanors, both as an adult and as a juvenile, and attempts at various forms of rehabilitation have proven unsuccessful.
Maria Tassie Malowney, an Assistant District Attorney for Carter County, Oklahoma, listed the felonies and misdemeanors with which appellant has been charged and/or convicted. She explained that the synopsis of the juvenile offenses cannot be released, but that appellant has been involved in criminal activity since he was fifteen or sixteen years of age. Malowney testified that the felonies of which appellant was convicted are as follows:
1) May 1986: Second Degree Burglary Punishment: probation, placed in a Nonviolent Intermediate Offender Act
2) April 1987: Grand Larceny Punishment: two years probation and 60 days in the county jail
Additionally, misdemeanors for which appellant was convicted are as follows:
1) April 1986: Carrying a Concealed Weapon and Public Intoxication Punishment: 4 days in the county jail and ordered to pay fine and costs
2) May 1986: Entering a Building with Unlawful Intent and Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor (supplying paint for sniffing to a twelve-year- old child) Punishment: ordered to pay restitution, 15 days in the county jail and six months probation, running concurrently
3) November 1986: Two counts of Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor (supplying paint to a twelve-year-old child and an eleven-year-old child) Punishment: 60 days in the county jail
4) November 1988: Driving Under the Influence of Liquor and/or Drugs (substance was paint) Punishment: One year probation on the condition he check himself into an in-patient rehabilitation program for paint abuse.
5) February 1989: Shoplifting Punishment: Probation orders from April 1987 Grand Larceny conviction and November 1988 DUI conviction vacated, sent to a special boot camp program, then given a two year sentence with all but 74 days suspended on the condition he 1) complete a substance abuse treatment program, 2) attend at least one AA or NA meeting per week, and 3) take part in a urinalysis every week and a half.
The jury also heard evidence of appellant's character. Witnesses testified that appellant was verbally and physically abusive toward his family, and that at one time he beat his pregnant wife in an effort to cause a miscarriage. A friend of appellant's testified that appellant once bragged about brutally killing a dog. In fact, appellant openly admitted to a fellow inmate that he purposely started this fire to conceal evidence that the children had recently been abused. Dr. James Grigson testified for the State at punishment. According to his testimony, appellant fits the profile of an extremely severe sociopath whose conduct becomes more violent over time, and who lacks a conscience as to his behavior. Grigson explained that a person with this degree of sociopathy commonly has no regard for other people's property or for other human beings. He expressed his opinion that an individual demonstrating this type of behavior can not be rehabilitated in any manner, and that such a person certainly poses a continuing threat to society.
* * *
The judgment and sentence of the trial court are affirmed.
Willingham v. Johnson, (N.D.Tex. 2001). (Not Reported) (Habeas).
LINDSAY, J.
After making an independent review of the pleadings; files and records in this case; the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, filed July 25, 2000; and Petitioner's Objections to Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge ("Petitioner's Objections"), filed August 4, 2000; the court concludes that the findings and conclusions of the United States Magistrate Judge are correct, and they are therefore accepted as those of the court. Petitioner's Objections are overruled.
Petitioner made objections regarding the Magistrate Judge's findings that Petitioner did not have the right to represent himself on appeal; that no conflict of interest existed between Petitioner and his appellate counsel; that Petitioner's appellate counsel was effective, although he (counsel) chose not to raise as grounds for appeal that: 1) the trial court struck two venirewomen for cause, 2) the trial court limited Petitioner's voir dire questions, 3) the trial court allegedly failed to follow proper jury selection procedures, 4) the trial court admitted hearsay testimony, 5) a state expert was permitted to give opinion testimony, and 6) a defense witness was allegedly improperly impeached. Petitioner further objected to the Magistrate Judge's findings that evidence admitted during the punishment phase of Petitioner's trial did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, that Texas's appellate review of death penalty convictions is constitutional, and that Petitioner was not entitled to a jury instruction on parole.
Upon de novo review of the Magistrate Judge's findings and conclusions to which these objections pertain, it is fairly apparent that the objections regarding self-representation on appeal, the alleged conflict of interest, jury selection procedures, the expert's opinion testimony, the defense witness's impeachment, evidence admitted during the punishment phase of trial, Texas's death penalty appellate review, and the lack of a jury instruction on parole are without merit and should be overruled without further discussion.
The objections regarding whether Petitioner's appellate counsel was ineffective when he did not appeal the trial court's disqualification of the venirewomen, the limitations placed on Petitioner's voir dire questions, and the admission of hearsay testimony appear, at first blush, to have possible merit; however, a more detailed analysis reveals that they also lack merit.
* * *
Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right. The state court adjudication on the merits neither resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, nor resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be DENIED.

IMPORTANT from his appeal:
"Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction"

If he didn't set the fire, don't you think he'd challenge the evidence agai ns him that says he did????

From the appeal also
"front concrete porch were burned, which only occurs when an accelerant has been used to purposely burn these areas."
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