hist2004
07-12-2004, 09:26 AM
This interview is 4 years old but it has interesting points-Hist2004
War in Chechnya
24 Questions to “Venik”
Who is Venik
"Venik's Aviation Page" is one of the best sites in the web about military aviation and related issues.
In addition to this Venik's site is providing some of the most detailed and correct information about NATO intervention in Kosovo and Russian operations in Chechnya.
The author ("Venik" is a nickname) was born in Kiev in 1975 and lives in the US.
This sort of "virtual interview" is a modified version of the FAQ page on Chechnya conflict. Please note that the different sections of the document may have been written at different times (for instance, the lines about "military plans regarding Grozny" have been obviously written prior to the taking of the town by the Russian army, etc.). The text was completed before presidential elections in Russia (March 26, 2000).
Q : What kind of sources do you use for writing about the Chechen war?
A : There is a link on my War in Chechnya page listing some of the sources I use. I am using all available information sources on Chechnya, including those I criticize, such as BBC and CNN. It would be foolish to disregard any information. There are dozens of good Russian newspapers and magazines on the Net. Newswire agencies, such as Interfax and ITAR-TASS. There are discussion forums, where you talk to people who actually fought in this or in the past Chechen wars. I also have a source in the Russian Defense Ministry and in the Black Sea Fleet. However, the main reason why I write about the situation in Chechnya is because my family is from Grozny. I have dozens of friends and relatives in the area. My grandfather was the head of the railroad college in Gudermes and later a member of Grozny's administration. My grandmother was the principal of the school in central Grozny (which was recently taken by Russian troops). But it was a long time ago. Many of my relatives fled to Stavropol region years ago, when the problems begun developing in Chechnya, but some remained in the province. I haven't heard from some of them in years and many are probably already dead. I have friends and relatives in Mozdok, Vladikavkaz, Makhachkala, and Tbilisi from whom I regularly receive letters and e-mails.
Q : What caused the latest outbreak of violence in Chechnya?
A : The war started on August 3, 1999 when about 2,500 Chechen fighters under the command of Shamil Basayev invaded a neighboring republic of Dagestan. They captured several villages and attempted to take the town of Khasavyurt. The terrorists proclaimed an independent Islamic republic and had intentions to move on the city of Makhachkala, which is Russia's main Caspian Sea port an a major military base. Local residents in Dagestan did not support the Chechen fighters and actively assisted Russian troops.
At about the same time Chechen terrorists bombed several residential buildings in Moscow and other cities, killing about 300 civilians. Over 1,500 Russian civilians were killed in such attacks in 1999 alone.
Russian military deployed forces to halt Chechen fighters in Dagestan. This operation continued until the end of September. Chechen forces withdrew to Chechnya and, with assistance of the Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and his troops, attempted to re-group and launch another attack against Dagestan. On September 30 Russian troops moved into Chechnya and in a couple of weeks captured the northern part of the province, which is populated mainly by Russians. At the same time the Air Force launched aerial strikes against targets in Chechnya.
Q : What do you think about russian official information about what is happening in Chechnya? Many Russian doubt thing are going as well as you write. Many also think that - had the same happened, say, in Tulskaya oblast, the military would nou use aviation and artillery to damp down the rebellion.
A : What is happening in Chechnya would not have happened in Tulskaya oblast. So any arguments along these lines are pointless. Russian aviation, of course, is not as effective as it was 10 years ago. But one should not forget that many of the same pilots, who flew during the 1994-1996 Chechen conflict, are flying now. They have considerable experience. Also, with available fuel, ammunition, and spare parts now many more Russian pilots can get the necessary combat training, which will be many time more effective than years of regular peace-time training. Russian pilot crews are frequently rotated in Chechnya to allow as many pilots as possible to get combat experience. The Air Force could have been more effective if there was no such rotation. But then only a small group of pilots would have gained practical experience. Incidents of friendly fire are not something remarkable. During the operation Desert Storm Coalition (mainly American) pilots killed over 70 allied troops. During the operation Allied Force in Kosovo American pilots attacked KLA fighters and refugees on several occasions. During the past months Russian Air Force maintained an extremely high standard of operations. This is a pleasant surprise, considering that people are undertrained and aircraft are overworked. The fact that aircraft were produced in Soviet times means almost nothing. For comparison, most American warplanes used during the operation in Kosovo were produced in 1970s (F-15s, F-14s, B-1) and early 1980s (F-117s, F-16s). The B-52s were manufactured in 1950s-60s. The war in Chechnya is going as well as one can reasonably expect. Yes, there were some mistakes made, as I mentioned on my page, but the overall situation is stable and will be resolved in the very near future.
Q : Western media point out that Russia simply cannot afford large-scale operations in Chechnya.
A: Russia can afford large-scale military operation in Chechnya for the next 1.5 years, until oil prices begin to drop in late 2001. Currently the price per barrel is twice the normal. The same is true for natural gas and some raw materials (mostly metals). This means that Russia's export revenues are doubled since last year. Now Russia can afford to double its defense budget. Right now is the time to deal with the Chechen problem.
Q : Why Russia did not choose to solve the Chechen crisis only after ad adequate upgrade of its military equipment?
A : Military equipment upgrades is an ongoing process. It is not something that you can do in a week and then start a war. That's something you always do. The war in Chechnya is an ideal place to test new weaponry, tactics, etc. This will allow the Russian military to determine what they need the most. The war already had a number of positive results for the army: upgrades of Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters; Tu-243 UAV production; combat testing of Ka-50, Mi-28N, and Su-27IB; combat testing of new precision-guided artillery munitions, practical applications of Ka-31 with Oka radar; additional funding for the spy satellite network. There is much more to that. In case of Chechnya Russian army doesn't need high-tech weapons. It simply needs a stable source of financing and political support from Moscow. Financially, now is the best time to resolve the Chechen crisis. Nobody can say what will happen in three or ten years. Jane's and Stratfor (civilian intelligence agencies in the UK and the US) mentioned that the war in Chechnya is not nearly as expensive as it may seem: most of the ammunition used is Soviet-made and will soon expire. Chechnya was a black hole in Russian economy for ten years. Not only it was consuming Russian budget funds, it was also the cause of major economic crimes, military and police expenses, etc. A war in Chechnya may be much cheaper than the kind of "peace" that was there in the past years.
Q : The West has been obviously eager to compare the Chechen conflict and the Kosovo or Iraqi war. But Russian officials also have been making rather contradictory statements on this matter. In an article by Mr. Putin we read:"....Exactly the same tactics were deployed during Operation Desert Storm, in the bombing of the former Yugoslavia and in various United States attempts to strike back at the world's most wanted terrorist...." In an article by Mr. Ivanov we read: "...barbarian bombardments of cities and villages in the sovereign Yugoslavia.....". How do you explain it?
A : There is no contradiction between the two statements. Putin means that the US employed its military and the tactics of aerial bombardment to deal with Iraq, Yugoslavia, etc. just as Russia employs its military to deal with Chechnya. Ivanov says that bombing of Yugoslavia was barbaric. Putin compares common approaches, he does not compare particulars of military operations or the results.
Let's forget morality and talk strictly about specific military tactics vs. desired outcome.
While the US conducted what can be described only as terror bombing in Yugoslavia, doing so in Chechnya by the VVS would simply not bring the same results. In Yugoslavia NATO failed to deal with the Serb troops in the field, so instead it concentrated on terrorizing civilians. In Chechnya, Russian military absolutely has to deal with the Chechen troops in the field. Sure, Russian aircraft attack transmitters, oil refineries and some other industrial targets from time to time, but only when it directly impacts Chechen fighters. If Russian VVS set a goal of destroying Chechnya, as Gen. Kornukov, AF commander, said, it would need three days to launch about 500 missions by heavy bombers - and there will be nothing left. Obviously this is not what Russian AF is doing. Russian planes are doing what NATO aviation could not or did not want to do in Yugoslavia - they're chasing Chechen rebels across the mountains, not terrorizing civilians. Not necessarily because Russian generals are so much nicer than NATO generals, simply Russian military realizes that this is the way to win this war. NATO believed that the way to defeat Yugoslavia was by terrorizing civilians.
Government in Yugoslavia was elected by the people and it represents the people. Naturally, this government is concerned with the safety of these people, with the country's economy, political independence and security. I am not saying that this concern is wholly altruistic: naturally, preserving Yugoslavia from further destruction by NATO would also preserve the government in Yugoslavia.
Chechnya has no government. All it has is Maskhadov practically held under house arrest by Basayev's personal guards. Basayev could not care less how many Chechen civilians die in this war. Basayev has nothing to lose, unlike Milosevic and his government. Basayev will give up only when he's dead. As you can see on the examples of Gudermes and Achkhoi-Martan - two large cities taken without a shot fired, Chechen civilians are eager to accept Russian troops. The only obstacle is the Chechen fighters. Russian government also realizes that it will have to restore most of what is being destroyed, so attacking civilian / industrial sites is not an option.
Q : What about the composition of the Russian army in Chechnya - professional troops, conscripts, OMON - ? What is the rationale of sending untrained 18-year olds in Chechnya? Reports on CNN have shown Russian soldiers telling that the rebels are better trained and equipped...
A : Russian army consists of about 1.2 million servicemen, about 30% of whom serve on a contract basis, i.e. they are professional troops. There is also a large number of officers. Some services of the Russian Armed Forces have a much greater proportion of professional servicemen. This is true for the Air Force, where conscripts don't do much more than sweep runways, the Air Defense (now joint with the AF), the Strategic Missile Forces, communications troops, Spetsnaz, Marines, paratroopers. Conscripts serve mainly in the infantry, artillery and other services that do not require extended training. There are plans to reduce Russian army to 800,000 of which 50% will be "kontraktniki" (those serving under a contract).
Russian Marines are among the best-trained troops Russia has. Many of them are professional soldiers. The same is true for the paratroopers and airborne assault troops. While draft-dodging is widespread in Russia, there is actually a long list of applicants for the paratroop units and the Marines.
OMON and Spetsnaz are all-professional. OMON is equivalent to American SWAT. These are special-purpose police units. While Spetsnaz units are under the Defense Ministry command. Both OMON and Spetsnaz are widely deployed in Chechnya and they were heavily involved during the operation in Grozny. The fighting in the south is done almost exclusively by paratroopers, airborne assault units, and Marines. There are not too many conscripts. Most of the conscripts in the south of Chechnya are with border guard units, but they are not involved in regular combat operations.
Russian divisions are rarely equipped at 100% of their nominal combat strength. This is done on purpose, however. This allows to train a greater number of officers (more divisions means more commanding officers), as well as to maintain the structure of a division at a much lower cost. Some equipment is in storage, but it is periodically rotated in the active service. Various divisions often train together so that they can form one full-strength division when needed. In the time of war reservists will be called into service to complete the divisions to their full combat strength. Most of the reservists are better-trained that the conscripts currently in service (because they served longer).
Some divisions are staffed at over 100%, but these are only used in combat situations. For example, the motorized infantry division recently deployed in Chechnya is equipped at over 110% and all of the troops are professional. Such divisions are formed when they are needed and undergo extensive training for the particular type of combat situations they will encounter. Basically, the 100%-equipped division is regarded as "war-level" and, as the name suggests, are used only in war.
As to sending 18-year-olds to Chechnya, that's what happens without a professional army. However, those untrained conscripts remain mainly in the background: artillery, logistics, etc. It is not possible to resolve the situation in Chechnya without sending conscripts. While assault operations may be conducted by MVD and well-trained / professional army troops (paratroopers, marines, etc.), there's still a need for a large force to control Chechnya's territory. Interviews with Russian soldiers are interesting, but not very informative. How much does a private know about the overall situation in Chechnya? Most of what they can say is limited to their units. They are no lying, of course, but their perspective is very limited. Journalists take that limited perspective and begin building far-reaching theories.
Q : West claims that civilian casualties are high in Chechnya.
A : Civilian death toll in Chechnya may be high, especially depending on who you consider civilians. If your close relative is a rebel and you support him (maybe not willingly, but just as a member of the family, and family ties are traditionally extremely strong in Chechnya), this automatically places you on the other side of the law and you are no longer a civilian. BTW, most Chechen rebels are not dressed in camouflage or any other type of uniforms: it makes it too difficult to pose as a civilian.
Of course, Russian troops tried to avoid heavy casualties, so they relied heavily on artillery and aviation. It takes at least a year of extensive training to prepare a decent infantry soldier or a paratrooper. On the other hand, it takes only a few months to prepare good artillery personnel. Russian army relied on long-range weapons to avoid the casualties, just as the US relied on aviation during the Allied Force. The only difference is that the US has a professional army with plenty of well-trained infantry, while Russia did not have much choice in Chechnya but to use aviation and artillery as much as possible.
Q : BBC, etc. claimed that rebels withdrew from Grozny and are creating a new base.
A : Nobody has seen these rebels or their base. It is believed that Basayev and a group of his fighters were able to escape from Alkhan-Kala, but there's no proof of that either. As to the number of bodies, no sane journalist will go looking for bodies on a minefield. This is especially true for western journalists. I wonder where was BBC a year ago, when half of Chechens kidnapped the other half and were trying to find someone to pay the ransom. The BBC wasn't around to show elderly Chechens, who have not seen their pensions in years, although Chechnya was one of few Russian provinces where all pensions were regularly paid. There was no Western reporter to investigate why half of schools in Chechnya were not working and where all the money from the education fund went. It is a fact that more schools are working in Chechnya now than there was a year ago. The BBC reporters only appeared hiding behind Russian tanks in their search for "truth." Just as there weren't any BBC reporters in Kosovo, when the KLA was kidnapping people by hundreds just a couple of years ago.
Following the operation Allied Force Milosevic said that nearly 2500 Serbian civilians were killed by NATO. You say that some human rights group (and I believe that you mean Human Rights Watch) claims that 500 Serb civilians were killed. I think that's enough. I don't suppose that this human rights group said that their count is final? The 500 killed is what they managed to confirmed so far. And so far the International Court has been suspiciously quiet about the number of bodies discovered in Kosovo. They said something like 2100, wasn't it? And how many of these bodies belong to Serbs or other civilians killed by the KLA and NATO?
Q : Are Russians using cruise missiles in Chechnya? What are the Russian military's plans regarding Grozny?
A : Information about Russians using cruise missiles came only from Chechen sources. I do not believe that any such missiles were used in this conflict or will be used. Russia did use "Tochka" tactical ballistic missiles - at least four and possibly eight of them were launched.
Grozny's defenses may be weakened, but taking a defended city is an extremely difficult operation, which will inevitably result in heavy casualties among Russian troops. There is no immediate need to take Grozny and it would be especially dangerous to rush things before Russian troops managed to secure Gudermes - Chechenya's second largest city. Gudermes remains the last rebel stronghold behind the federal army's forward units. There is a good possibility that Gudermes may be taking without a fight: rival Chechen gangs are currently competing for influence there and Russian military commanders hope that this competition will result in a deal between the federal army and the Chechen rebels opposing Basayev. One way or another, taking Grozny before Gudermes would be a huge risk.
If Russian army finds a way to effectively block any foreign help from entering Chechnya, then taking Grozny would not be necessary: without a guaranteed influx of reinforcements and weapons the city's defenses will fall in a matter of a few months. Russian military commanders are likely to prefer a siege to any risky offensive in the area of Grozny. If, on the other hand, Russian troops fail to control the province's borders, then taking Grozny may be the only course of action.
Q : Why isn't Russia using cruise missiles in Chechnya if that would mean greater safety for Russian pilots?
A : NATO operations in Yugoslavia showed that nothing currently in its arsenal is more effective against small mobile targets than a human pilot. Cruise missiles, ballistic missiles simply do not have the required precision or response time.
When you are sending a reconnaissance aircraft - either manned or unmanned - in most cases it can provide you with real-time reconnaissance information. However, it takes time to relay this information to an aircraft ready to launch a cruise missile. In most cases, you will not even have such a plane already in the air, so you will have to wait until it takes off and goes within firing range. Finally, a cruise missile or a ballistic missile will take some time getting to the target. This means a delay of at least a few minutes - quite enough to miss any mobile target.
Attacking stationary targets is much easier. Russian planes in Chechnya used long-range IR or TV missiles to attack oil refineries, reinforced positions, etc. If a targets position is know and fixed, the type of weapon you would use depends on target's properties and defenses. In Yugoslavia NATO had to use cruise missiles because Serbs had long-range SAMs. In Chechnya, using TV-guided missiles is sufficient considering that the Chechens have very short-range defenses. For example, the most common Russian TV / passive IR-guided air-to-ground missile is the Kh-29 (NATO designation: AS-14 Kedge). If a target's position is known and locked by the radar or TV / IR seeker, the missile can be launched from 20-30 km away. This is well out of the range of the "Stinger" (max range 5 km) or any anti-aircraft gun. In this case using TV-guided missiles is cheaper than using cruise missiles, it is also more reliable, because shooting down a cruise missile is much easier than shooting down a supersonic missile.
Russian AF has a missile specifically designed to attack stationary ground targets with known location in heavily defended areas. The missile is Kh-59 (NATO designation: AS-13 Kingbolt). The missile can be launched from up to 115 km from the target and has an accuracy of 2-3 meters. This missile is also being used in Chechnya against stationary targets in Grozny, Urus-Martan and other heavily defended areas.
There's also the Kh-55 (NATO designation: AS-15 Kent) cruise missile, which can be launched against stationary targets with known coordinates from up to 300 km away. But this missile would be an overkill in Chechnya.
Finally, there are many more air-to-ground and anti-ship missiles in Russia's arsenal, such as: Kh-15 (AS-16 Kickback), which has a range of 160 km and a speed of Mach 5; Kh-31A (AS-12 Kegler), has a range of 50 km; Kh-35 (AS-17 Krypton), it has a speed of 1100 km/h and a range of over 100 km; Kh-41 (an air-launched version of Mosquito anti-ship missile), it has a range of 200 km and a speed of Mach 3; Kh-65 (doesn't have yet a NATO designation), it has a range of 250 km; finally, there's the Kh-101 cruise missile which has a range of 5,000 km, precision of 3-12 m. As you can see the choice of weapons is wide.
But what is the point of launching an expensive cruise missile against, say, a moving vehicle if by the time the missile reaches designated coordinates, the target will not be there. The target will still be very close, but not close enough. Also, there is a consideration of cost. A cruise missile, like American Tomahawk, costs well in excess of $1 million. A mobile target, like a truck or a tank costs 1/10 of that at most and in most cases 1/20 or even less.
So far only a pilot can quickly respond to the situation on the ground and launch an appropriate weapon. Using ballistic missiles against small targets is like shooting birds with a cannon. Russian army used tactical ballistic missiles (Tochka) in Chechnya against large concentrations of Chechen fighters. But it is not often that you can use such missiles in Chechnya, simply because there usually are no large concentrations of enemy forces. MLRS like "Grad" is a cheap and highly effective way to attack soft targets - vehicles, troops - dispersed in the field or in lightly-armored structures. Attacking such targets one by one using precision-guided weapons is too expensive, too risky, and in most cases would be completely ineffective. "Grad" can cover a large area many times over in a matter of a few minutes. And the cost of such an assault would be less than a couple of laser-guided bombs.
Satellite reconnaissance is not effective in field operations. It does not have the required resolution or response time. There are also serious weather limitations, especially in Chechnya. You cannot replace ground reconnaissance with an aircraft, let alone a satellite. Besides, reconnaissance operation using a large number of troops is called, I believe you will understand this Russian term, "razvedka boyem". The goal is not only to observe, but to provoke a response and force the enemy to reveal its hidden positions and true capability. Often such operations are used to knock the enemy off-balance and then strike with heavy artillery, MLRS or aircraft.
Q : Helicopters provide for effective defense of Russian positions and convoys. Why aren't they always available? Is Russian army planning a strictly military victory in Chechnya, or will there be negotiations?
A : The problem is that there is not enough cooperation between the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry. As you can see, Chechens attack mainly police convoys, while the Defense Ministry is hugging up all the helicopters. The fact is that there's plenty of helicopters to go around. The two Ministries just need to coordinate their actions better. For example, the last OMON convoy that was attacked was traveling without even informing the army command in the area.
Situation in Chechnya is very complex. As far as the army is concerned, the war is already over. Showdown at Komsomolskoye in early March was the last large operation conducted by the Russian military. Right now much will depend on the effectiveness of border guards, police and FSB units that are tasked with capturing Chechen rebel leaders. There is very little else that Russian tanks and planes can do in Chechnya. Now it's up to the civilian administration and police. The rebels will try to launch further attacks for as long as they have resources. But these are mainly foreign mercenaries, who will eventually go home when their money sources run dry.
Q : In the view of the recent attacks by the rebels on Russian police convoys is Russian army planning to step up its operations in Chechnya?
A : The rebels ambushed 9 vehicles with 98 OMON police troops of the Moscow police department. 18 policemen were killed and 24 wounded. This brings the total number of Russian casualties in Chechnya over the past week to 70 killed and 200 wounded. Some 40 Chechens were arrested in connection to the attack in Grozny.
When Russian troops control of Grozny, military commanders mentioned that around 300 Chechen rebels still remained in the city hiding from federal troops. Sources in the Russian command center in Chechnya say that the attack was possible because of a security leak within the command center. The rebels knew the route to be taken by the police convoy and were able to prepare well in advance. Currently the FSB (KGB) is investigating the possibility of a Chechen agent in the federal command structure in Chechnya.
Q : Will these event have any impact upon the coming presidential elections in Russia?
A : The recent attack is not likely to have any serious impact on Putin's chances in the elections. If anything, this attack gives him a good reason to implement more strict policies regarding the remaining rebels in Chechnya. During the past week Russia became a bit too soft on the rebels. The security became lax since the threat of terrorist attacks on Feb. 23 did not materialize. Russians may consider deploying a greater police force in the province on a permanent basis. Currently one division and two police battalions numbering about 25,000 troops will be stationed in Chechnya. However, many military experts believe that this is not enough. I tend to agree. The force must be maintained at 45000 at the very least, plus about 10000 border guard troops.
It is important for Putin to get over the elections. After that he can do anything in Chechnya that his generals want. There is no need in more troops than are currently deployed there. At the moment all of the fighting is confined to a 10 x 12 km territory. This is barely enough space for one division. There is already not enough space to use aviation on a large scale. It is down to mortars and machine-guns. The main problem is controlling the Chechen lowlands to the north and around Grozny. Russians need better security there and more police. Since the beginning of this year Russia deployed two reconnaissance satellites specifically to maintain constant surveillance over Chechnya. But the still need more UAVs and more ground patrols. But what Chechnya really needs is money. If the federal government finds enough finances for the new administration in the province, things will go much better.
Q : All Chechens cannot be terrorists, so who exactly is Russia fighting in Chechnya?
A : There are people in Chechnya fighting for all kinds of reasons. First, more than half of die-hard rebel fighters are mercenaries from Arabic nations, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia. They fight for money. Second, there are brainwashed and uneducated teenagers. Most of their life in the past decade they've seen nothing but poverty and war. These kids don't have any education and much of what they know about Russian and history comes from Chechen religious propaganda. Of course, there are religious fanatics, but not nearly as many as some think there are. For the past decade Chechnya was raided by all kinds of religious extremist groups trying to gain control of the province. Internal feuds between these groups have taken tens of thousands of lives. Second most significant group of Chechen "rebels" following the mercenaries are criminals.
These are people of many nationalities, without strong religious preferences, who face criminal prosecution / prison in Russia. They are the only ones who fight for freedom - freedom from laws and responsibility.
Of course there are regular Chechens who want stability. Many of them were forced to support the criminals. They have absolutely no protection from the federal government. Some fight against federal forces because they believe (for very good reasons) that they could win independence. They hope that with independence they will get stability and prosperity. Unfortunately, for the past three years Chechnya had something better than independence (at least in economical sense): the province was essentially self-governed and it also received billions of rubles of federal funds. Moreover, Chechen government was receiving substantial military aid from Russia: T-80 tanks, BMP-2 APCs, BTRs, Ka-28, Mi-8 helicopters, artillery, small arms, ammunition. Presumably, all that was given to Maskhadov to fight terrorism. Maskhadov failed to take advantage of all the opportunities he was presented with, showing political and economic sense of a Soviet artillery officer. Russia did not destroy Chechnya's hopes for prosperity or even for independence. For the source of their problems Chechens should look to Grozny and Maskhadov.
Q : Russian army is unlikely to allow the rebels to escape from Grozny, for doing so creates a risk that they will rearm and regroup.
A : Perhaps, but around 1,000 - 2,000 Chechen rebels in Grozny are tying up a huge Russian force around the city. From a military point of view, this is a waste of time and resources. Federal army can deal with the rebels much more easier once they are out of Grozny. This city is a fortress. It was built as fortress from the very start and re-built as a super fortress following the W.W.II. If I was a Russian military commander in Chechnya, I would much rather face those 2,000 Chechen rebels anywhere else but in Grozny. Also, a large number of rebels in Grozny want to surrender: they have amnesty, a guaranteed freedom. If they leave Grozny, much of them will not continue fighting.
Q : The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers affirms that the Russian army is hiding the true extent of its losses in Chechnya.
A : The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers is a group of hysterical women. I can understand them, but they have no access to any tactical information and their figures of Russian losses are little more than rumors. I don't report their figures because I don't report rumors in general, that's BBC's forte. Information coming from Russian military officials and other military sources so far proved to be the most reliable.
Russian journalists are allowed into Chechnya. There is a large base of Russian journalists in Staryye Atagi, just outside Grozny, as well as in Gudermes, Shali, Argun, etc. Russian TV regularly shows footage of frontline action. ITAR-TASS journalists regularly report from forward positions of Russian troops. The problem is not so much in the restrictions set up by the military, but in fact that after dozens of Russian journalists were kidnapped and/or killed in Chechnya, others are reluctant to follow.
Q : "Withdrawal" by the rebels from Grozny. How many killed?
A : I know that BBC had plenty of photos of dead Chechen rebels being loaded into trucks by Russian troops. I know that the Russian army's mobile crematoriums have been very busy in Chechnya in the past few days.
Chechen rebels lost over 1500 fighters during their withdrawal from Grozny beginning Feb. 1 at 2100 hrs. This was confirmed by their own "propaganda minister" Movladi Udugov, who said that about 50% of the withdrawing rebels managed to escape. He also said that the total force before the operation was over 3,000. Russian military confirmed that Basayev and his force of about 1200 fighters managed to escape.
Can you imagine how long it would have taken Russian troops to kill 1500 rebels in street-to-street fighting in Grozny with an average of about 30 dead Chechens and 6 dead Russians per day? The facts are that Grozny is now largely under Russian control, Chechens lost over half of their troops and are now running around the countryside in the area of Serzhen-Yurt (where they are sure to be met by Russian paratroopers.) The withdrawal from Grozny was a complete disaster for the Chechen fighters, President Maskhadov, and the morale of rebels in general.
Q : On the future of Chechen independence and the rebels.
A : It is unlikely that Chechnya will be granted independence. Under the Russian constitution Chechnya already has wide-ranging autonomy. This little province, that costs Russian budget billions, has it's own President, Parliament, security force, police, etc. If Dudayev and Maskhadov weren't complete idiots Chechnya could have been a prosperous province living off it's oil sales revenues. Now the entire province is in ruin and is officially declared an ecological catastrophe zone by the Russian Emergencies Ministry. This is the direct result of operation of hundreds of illegal oil refineries running without any ecological control standards for the past decade. Chechen rebels stole quantities of radioactive waste from the "Radon" radioactive waste disposal company in Grozny. Where all this stuff is now is not known. Add to that all the poisonous chemicals released by the rebels in Grozny during the war. The place is a mess. No sane Chechen living outside the province would even consider returning there. I am not even talking about Russians who previously lived in Chechnya, which includes half of my relatives.
The rebels simply don't have the strength to set anyone up anymore. Their future will be slow death in the mountains and their legacy will be murder, slave trade, and kidnappings. This doesn't mean that they are already finished. They may even try to counterattack. They still have some resources left to maintain the war effort for a while. But their eventual defeat is no longer in question.
Q : Why Russian troops are being so ruthless with the rebels, while the Americans could be so "benevolent" with the Iraqis?
A : There is a big difference between the "Desert Storm" and the Chechen war. In Iraq American soldier were dealing with Iraqi soldiers, who never attacked the US or killed American civilians. There was no reason for any particular hatred between the two sides. In Chechnya, rebel fighters live by killing and kidnapping Russian civilians. They sell kidnapped Russians (and not only Russians) into slavery, torture them, exchange and re-sell them. Chechens also invaded Dagestan, which resulted in strong anti-Chechen sentiment in this republic usually quite sympathetic toward the fellow Muslims from Chechnya. Chechen rebels bombed apartment buildings in Russia, killing around 300 innocent civilians. During the past war Basayev and his gang held hostage a maternity ward in Boudennovsk. Chechen Mafiosi are running countless drug- and kidnapping-related gangs all over Russia. Chechnya became a huge drain on the Russian economy. Russian military was felt betrayed by the government following the Khasavyurt agreement with the Chechens. That's another reason for the emotions to run high. Many of the "Chechen" rebels are actually Russians and Ukrainians - fellow Slavs. When they are caught by Russian troops they are usually hanged.
Recently Russian soldiers hanged a 21-year old Russian woman in Grozny. She was a mercenary working for the rebels as a sniper. She was also a Russian national champion in biathlon. There was an all-female sniper unit in Grozny called the "White Stockings". None of the captured members made it to the Russian police - all were either shot or hanged by the Russian soldiers. The main reason, however, why Russian troops are being so ruthless is that they know perfectly well that when a Chechen rebel surrenders, it doesn't means he is giving up. He will return to his old ways as soon as the situation permits. Thus, the only way to really deal with Chechen separatism is by killing as many separatists as possible. The "oppressive system" you are talking about has been gone since 1956. Since Khrushchev Chechens were not only not discriminated against, they were favored in every possible way. Chechen students could get into the best colleges without taking the exams. They were promoted in the military, on the job, etc. ahead of the non-minorities. When my grandparents lived in Chechnya, Soviet police was extremely lenient toward Chechen criminals. A meager percentage of the Chechens were ever employed even during the Soviet times. And not because there were no jobs, but because they simply did not want to work, knowing that the state will support them in every possible way.
Q : What about Stalin's behaviour towards Chechens? Does not that prove he hated them?
A : Yes, Stalin relocated Chechens to Kazakhstan in 1943, but not because he hated them (if he hated them, he would have killed every one of them as he killed thousands of Russian, Ukrainians, etc.). Chechen separatists cooperated with the Nazi Germany, which was eager to reach Grozny's oil fields. I know this not just from history books, but from my own grandparents, who witnessed everything firsthand during the war. It took the Chechen society just a few years since 1992 to regress to its feudal past and even beyond it - to slavery. There is almost nothing in Chechnya that wasn't built by the Russians. There is not a single town or a factory build by the Chechens. They have no educated and experienced specialists to run their oil industry or any other industry for that matter. If Russia would suddenly give them complete freedom and seal off the border, they will kill each other and whoever remains will starve to death. It is a society completely incapable of self-contained existence. Through out history Chechen society was formed around warlords and lived by robbing neighboring nations: Russians, Georgians, Dagestanis, etc. It was very naive of some Russian politicians to think that with sufficient funding Chechen society will transform itself into a civilization. No, Dudayev and Maskhadov used Russian money to transform Chechnya into an enclave of international terrorism. They took the historical role of Chechnya in the Caucasus - kidnapping and robbery - on a new high-tech level. Some 150 years ago Chechen bandits were riding around on horses with swords and robbing people. Now the ride around in SUVs with "Stingers" and AK-47s and do the same thing.
I have nothing against the Chechens. The vast majority (80%) of the Chechen population (in 1993) foreseen the future of their province as an "independent" nation ran by religious fanatics and criminals and left the province. Most Chechens now live outside of Chechnya and, according to numerous polls conducted since 1993, don't have a slightest intention of returning. You are wrong thinking that Basayev would be killed if captured by the Russians. Not at all. He will be tried in court according to all rules.
What about Afghanistan's promise of help for the Chechen rebels?
Afghanistan's official position on Chechnya is irrelevant for its unofficial position is too well known. Afghanis have been sending military help to Chechnya for years. Afghanistan will just end up being bombed again. Russia has thousands of non-nuclear ballistic missiles rusting away in storage. That should be enough to make Afghanistan change its mind. If not, there are always nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will stay away. Afghanistan is already isolated from the world by economic and diplomatic sanctions. It has nothing to lose. Pakistan and especially Saudi Arabia have everything to lose.
Q : Do you agree with the view that there is no US "interference" in Chechnya?
A : US is not doing nothing. It recently established diplomatic relations with Chechnya through its "foreign minister" Ilyas Akhmedov. The US supplied Georgia with air defense radars and helicopters, which are being used to track Russian aircraft in Chechnya. I am sure that Chechen rebels have access to this information, because anything and anyone can be bought in Georgia. I know this from personal experience. A couple of months ago Russian planes destroyed a US-made radar being delivered to Chechnya from Turkey. Shipments of uniforms and other supplies from US to Chechnya through Germany and Georgia have been intercepted by Russian customs on several occasions.
Q : Can Russia affording getting into an armed confrontation with Georgia? About Russia employing military pressure in order to favour a Russian-backed candidate alternative to Shevarnadze : does not that resemble the game that China is playing with Taiwan?
A : The situation in Georgia is very different from Taiwan. First, Georgian government is led by nationalists. But just barely. They have a shaky majority and stand a good chance of losing in the elections. Shevarnadze is a nationalist who tries to appear as a moderate. He tries to support every side, to play on everyone's team. He supports the nationalists, the moderates, the pro-Russian coalition. He offers some support to the Russian military in controlling the border, while at the same time offers limited support to the rebels by allowing them to hide in Georgia. He maintains fair relations with the US, while blocking all efforts by the US to resolve the crisis in Abkhazia or to kick out the three large Russian military bases in Georgia.
Everyone is pretty tired of him, including the US, which, despite of trying for several years and spending many millions of dollars, was not able to get any leverage in the Georgian politics. But Shevarnadze's main "enemy" is his own people. Over 75% of Georgian population lives below the poverty level (and that poverty level is one of the lowest in the world). Georgia has really nothing to offer on the international market except for its exceptional wine. But for Georgia to survive on wine exports along, everyone in the world would have to be an alcoholic. Georgia depends on American handouts and on economic relations with Russia. Georgians got used to the very easy and relatively wealthy life during the Soviet years. They suffer much more from their poverty than other former Soviet states. Pro-Russian drive in Georgia is getting progressively stronger.
People see that Shevarnadze did not resolve any problems in politics or economy. For years he has been telling the people to accept the financial hardships because this is the price of independence. If Shevarnadze drags his country into a war with Russia, it would end his political career. Georgia has nothing in terms of military power. The US won't be able to help much (it certainly did almost nothing to help Georgia's army in the past several years). At this moment Shevarnadze must take a stand - either he bets on cooperation with Russia or on cooperation with the rebels in hopes of American assistance. But taking sides and making stands is not in his nature.
My family lived in Tbilisi for a long time. I lived there for over a year when I was in 6th grade. Georgians are used to the easy life. The entire republic was one big holiday resort during the Soviet years, drawing huge funds from the budget while giving little in return. Once most Russians moved out from Georgia, the country's few industries and scientific organizations effectively ceased to exist. Most people lost their jobs. Education system in Georgia leaves a lot to be desired. While Georgians are too proud to admit it, they know perfectly well that they need Russia. They hoped (like Ukraine and others did) that the US would help. But American help is nothing more than small handouts barely enough to keep the corrupt government working.
From a financial point of view, Russia can easily afford to bomb Georgia for months. Thousands of Russian soldiers are stationed in Georgia as well as patrol the country's border's as a part of a peace-keeping force. That costs far more money than an aerial campaign would cost. Georgians don't have a chance of resisting Russia militarily. The only way out for them will be through peace talks. A pro-Russian presidential candidate who can strike a deal with Russia will be preferred to stubborn and ineffective Shevarnadze. I am saying "pro-Russian" candidate, but it doesn't mean that he runs as "pro-Russian". Simply his political platform is targeted at establishing good relations with Russia. That's something Georgia needs and wants.
Q : Could not tensions in the Gulf area imply the danger of escalating into a US-Russian war?
A : An accidental exchange of fire between Russian and American ships would not escalate into a war. This of course would depend on who is in charge in Russia and in the US. If the US is ran by somebody like Kennedy or Reagan and Russia is run by someone like Khrushchev or Stalin, I'll go right now dig myself a bunker. In one-on-one exchange of fire between a limited number of Russian and American ships in, say, the Persian Gulf, Russians would have at least the same chance of winning, especially considering that Russian anti-ship missiles and shipborne SAMs are years ahead of their American counterparts. I remember Americans had their hands full with Iranian torpedo boats in the Gulf some years ago. But if a limited exchange of fire escalates into a war, Russians will use the nuclear weapons without waiting for the US to do it first. That's what Russia's new defense doctrine is all about.
Regards,
Hist2004
War in Chechnya
24 Questions to “Venik”
Who is Venik
"Venik's Aviation Page" is one of the best sites in the web about military aviation and related issues.
In addition to this Venik's site is providing some of the most detailed and correct information about NATO intervention in Kosovo and Russian operations in Chechnya.
The author ("Venik" is a nickname) was born in Kiev in 1975 and lives in the US.
This sort of "virtual interview" is a modified version of the FAQ page on Chechnya conflict. Please note that the different sections of the document may have been written at different times (for instance, the lines about "military plans regarding Grozny" have been obviously written prior to the taking of the town by the Russian army, etc.). The text was completed before presidential elections in Russia (March 26, 2000).
Q : What kind of sources do you use for writing about the Chechen war?
A : There is a link on my War in Chechnya page listing some of the sources I use. I am using all available information sources on Chechnya, including those I criticize, such as BBC and CNN. It would be foolish to disregard any information. There are dozens of good Russian newspapers and magazines on the Net. Newswire agencies, such as Interfax and ITAR-TASS. There are discussion forums, where you talk to people who actually fought in this or in the past Chechen wars. I also have a source in the Russian Defense Ministry and in the Black Sea Fleet. However, the main reason why I write about the situation in Chechnya is because my family is from Grozny. I have dozens of friends and relatives in the area. My grandfather was the head of the railroad college in Gudermes and later a member of Grozny's administration. My grandmother was the principal of the school in central Grozny (which was recently taken by Russian troops). But it was a long time ago. Many of my relatives fled to Stavropol region years ago, when the problems begun developing in Chechnya, but some remained in the province. I haven't heard from some of them in years and many are probably already dead. I have friends and relatives in Mozdok, Vladikavkaz, Makhachkala, and Tbilisi from whom I regularly receive letters and e-mails.
Q : What caused the latest outbreak of violence in Chechnya?
A : The war started on August 3, 1999 when about 2,500 Chechen fighters under the command of Shamil Basayev invaded a neighboring republic of Dagestan. They captured several villages and attempted to take the town of Khasavyurt. The terrorists proclaimed an independent Islamic republic and had intentions to move on the city of Makhachkala, which is Russia's main Caspian Sea port an a major military base. Local residents in Dagestan did not support the Chechen fighters and actively assisted Russian troops.
At about the same time Chechen terrorists bombed several residential buildings in Moscow and other cities, killing about 300 civilians. Over 1,500 Russian civilians were killed in such attacks in 1999 alone.
Russian military deployed forces to halt Chechen fighters in Dagestan. This operation continued until the end of September. Chechen forces withdrew to Chechnya and, with assistance of the Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and his troops, attempted to re-group and launch another attack against Dagestan. On September 30 Russian troops moved into Chechnya and in a couple of weeks captured the northern part of the province, which is populated mainly by Russians. At the same time the Air Force launched aerial strikes against targets in Chechnya.
Q : What do you think about russian official information about what is happening in Chechnya? Many Russian doubt thing are going as well as you write. Many also think that - had the same happened, say, in Tulskaya oblast, the military would nou use aviation and artillery to damp down the rebellion.
A : What is happening in Chechnya would not have happened in Tulskaya oblast. So any arguments along these lines are pointless. Russian aviation, of course, is not as effective as it was 10 years ago. But one should not forget that many of the same pilots, who flew during the 1994-1996 Chechen conflict, are flying now. They have considerable experience. Also, with available fuel, ammunition, and spare parts now many more Russian pilots can get the necessary combat training, which will be many time more effective than years of regular peace-time training. Russian pilot crews are frequently rotated in Chechnya to allow as many pilots as possible to get combat experience. The Air Force could have been more effective if there was no such rotation. But then only a small group of pilots would have gained practical experience. Incidents of friendly fire are not something remarkable. During the operation Desert Storm Coalition (mainly American) pilots killed over 70 allied troops. During the operation Allied Force in Kosovo American pilots attacked KLA fighters and refugees on several occasions. During the past months Russian Air Force maintained an extremely high standard of operations. This is a pleasant surprise, considering that people are undertrained and aircraft are overworked. The fact that aircraft were produced in Soviet times means almost nothing. For comparison, most American warplanes used during the operation in Kosovo were produced in 1970s (F-15s, F-14s, B-1) and early 1980s (F-117s, F-16s). The B-52s were manufactured in 1950s-60s. The war in Chechnya is going as well as one can reasonably expect. Yes, there were some mistakes made, as I mentioned on my page, but the overall situation is stable and will be resolved in the very near future.
Q : Western media point out that Russia simply cannot afford large-scale operations in Chechnya.
A: Russia can afford large-scale military operation in Chechnya for the next 1.5 years, until oil prices begin to drop in late 2001. Currently the price per barrel is twice the normal. The same is true for natural gas and some raw materials (mostly metals). This means that Russia's export revenues are doubled since last year. Now Russia can afford to double its defense budget. Right now is the time to deal with the Chechen problem.
Q : Why Russia did not choose to solve the Chechen crisis only after ad adequate upgrade of its military equipment?
A : Military equipment upgrades is an ongoing process. It is not something that you can do in a week and then start a war. That's something you always do. The war in Chechnya is an ideal place to test new weaponry, tactics, etc. This will allow the Russian military to determine what they need the most. The war already had a number of positive results for the army: upgrades of Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters; Tu-243 UAV production; combat testing of Ka-50, Mi-28N, and Su-27IB; combat testing of new precision-guided artillery munitions, practical applications of Ka-31 with Oka radar; additional funding for the spy satellite network. There is much more to that. In case of Chechnya Russian army doesn't need high-tech weapons. It simply needs a stable source of financing and political support from Moscow. Financially, now is the best time to resolve the Chechen crisis. Nobody can say what will happen in three or ten years. Jane's and Stratfor (civilian intelligence agencies in the UK and the US) mentioned that the war in Chechnya is not nearly as expensive as it may seem: most of the ammunition used is Soviet-made and will soon expire. Chechnya was a black hole in Russian economy for ten years. Not only it was consuming Russian budget funds, it was also the cause of major economic crimes, military and police expenses, etc. A war in Chechnya may be much cheaper than the kind of "peace" that was there in the past years.
Q : The West has been obviously eager to compare the Chechen conflict and the Kosovo or Iraqi war. But Russian officials also have been making rather contradictory statements on this matter. In an article by Mr. Putin we read:"....Exactly the same tactics were deployed during Operation Desert Storm, in the bombing of the former Yugoslavia and in various United States attempts to strike back at the world's most wanted terrorist...." In an article by Mr. Ivanov we read: "...barbarian bombardments of cities and villages in the sovereign Yugoslavia.....". How do you explain it?
A : There is no contradiction between the two statements. Putin means that the US employed its military and the tactics of aerial bombardment to deal with Iraq, Yugoslavia, etc. just as Russia employs its military to deal with Chechnya. Ivanov says that bombing of Yugoslavia was barbaric. Putin compares common approaches, he does not compare particulars of military operations or the results.
Let's forget morality and talk strictly about specific military tactics vs. desired outcome.
While the US conducted what can be described only as terror bombing in Yugoslavia, doing so in Chechnya by the VVS would simply not bring the same results. In Yugoslavia NATO failed to deal with the Serb troops in the field, so instead it concentrated on terrorizing civilians. In Chechnya, Russian military absolutely has to deal with the Chechen troops in the field. Sure, Russian aircraft attack transmitters, oil refineries and some other industrial targets from time to time, but only when it directly impacts Chechen fighters. If Russian VVS set a goal of destroying Chechnya, as Gen. Kornukov, AF commander, said, it would need three days to launch about 500 missions by heavy bombers - and there will be nothing left. Obviously this is not what Russian AF is doing. Russian planes are doing what NATO aviation could not or did not want to do in Yugoslavia - they're chasing Chechen rebels across the mountains, not terrorizing civilians. Not necessarily because Russian generals are so much nicer than NATO generals, simply Russian military realizes that this is the way to win this war. NATO believed that the way to defeat Yugoslavia was by terrorizing civilians.
Government in Yugoslavia was elected by the people and it represents the people. Naturally, this government is concerned with the safety of these people, with the country's economy, political independence and security. I am not saying that this concern is wholly altruistic: naturally, preserving Yugoslavia from further destruction by NATO would also preserve the government in Yugoslavia.
Chechnya has no government. All it has is Maskhadov practically held under house arrest by Basayev's personal guards. Basayev could not care less how many Chechen civilians die in this war. Basayev has nothing to lose, unlike Milosevic and his government. Basayev will give up only when he's dead. As you can see on the examples of Gudermes and Achkhoi-Martan - two large cities taken without a shot fired, Chechen civilians are eager to accept Russian troops. The only obstacle is the Chechen fighters. Russian government also realizes that it will have to restore most of what is being destroyed, so attacking civilian / industrial sites is not an option.
Q : What about the composition of the Russian army in Chechnya - professional troops, conscripts, OMON - ? What is the rationale of sending untrained 18-year olds in Chechnya? Reports on CNN have shown Russian soldiers telling that the rebels are better trained and equipped...
A : Russian army consists of about 1.2 million servicemen, about 30% of whom serve on a contract basis, i.e. they are professional troops. There is also a large number of officers. Some services of the Russian Armed Forces have a much greater proportion of professional servicemen. This is true for the Air Force, where conscripts don't do much more than sweep runways, the Air Defense (now joint with the AF), the Strategic Missile Forces, communications troops, Spetsnaz, Marines, paratroopers. Conscripts serve mainly in the infantry, artillery and other services that do not require extended training. There are plans to reduce Russian army to 800,000 of which 50% will be "kontraktniki" (those serving under a contract).
Russian Marines are among the best-trained troops Russia has. Many of them are professional soldiers. The same is true for the paratroopers and airborne assault troops. While draft-dodging is widespread in Russia, there is actually a long list of applicants for the paratroop units and the Marines.
OMON and Spetsnaz are all-professional. OMON is equivalent to American SWAT. These are special-purpose police units. While Spetsnaz units are under the Defense Ministry command. Both OMON and Spetsnaz are widely deployed in Chechnya and they were heavily involved during the operation in Grozny. The fighting in the south is done almost exclusively by paratroopers, airborne assault units, and Marines. There are not too many conscripts. Most of the conscripts in the south of Chechnya are with border guard units, but they are not involved in regular combat operations.
Russian divisions are rarely equipped at 100% of their nominal combat strength. This is done on purpose, however. This allows to train a greater number of officers (more divisions means more commanding officers), as well as to maintain the structure of a division at a much lower cost. Some equipment is in storage, but it is periodically rotated in the active service. Various divisions often train together so that they can form one full-strength division when needed. In the time of war reservists will be called into service to complete the divisions to their full combat strength. Most of the reservists are better-trained that the conscripts currently in service (because they served longer).
Some divisions are staffed at over 100%, but these are only used in combat situations. For example, the motorized infantry division recently deployed in Chechnya is equipped at over 110% and all of the troops are professional. Such divisions are formed when they are needed and undergo extensive training for the particular type of combat situations they will encounter. Basically, the 100%-equipped division is regarded as "war-level" and, as the name suggests, are used only in war.
As to sending 18-year-olds to Chechnya, that's what happens without a professional army. However, those untrained conscripts remain mainly in the background: artillery, logistics, etc. It is not possible to resolve the situation in Chechnya without sending conscripts. While assault operations may be conducted by MVD and well-trained / professional army troops (paratroopers, marines, etc.), there's still a need for a large force to control Chechnya's territory. Interviews with Russian soldiers are interesting, but not very informative. How much does a private know about the overall situation in Chechnya? Most of what they can say is limited to their units. They are no lying, of course, but their perspective is very limited. Journalists take that limited perspective and begin building far-reaching theories.
Q : West claims that civilian casualties are high in Chechnya.
A : Civilian death toll in Chechnya may be high, especially depending on who you consider civilians. If your close relative is a rebel and you support him (maybe not willingly, but just as a member of the family, and family ties are traditionally extremely strong in Chechnya), this automatically places you on the other side of the law and you are no longer a civilian. BTW, most Chechen rebels are not dressed in camouflage or any other type of uniforms: it makes it too difficult to pose as a civilian.
Of course, Russian troops tried to avoid heavy casualties, so they relied heavily on artillery and aviation. It takes at least a year of extensive training to prepare a decent infantry soldier or a paratrooper. On the other hand, it takes only a few months to prepare good artillery personnel. Russian army relied on long-range weapons to avoid the casualties, just as the US relied on aviation during the Allied Force. The only difference is that the US has a professional army with plenty of well-trained infantry, while Russia did not have much choice in Chechnya but to use aviation and artillery as much as possible.
Q : BBC, etc. claimed that rebels withdrew from Grozny and are creating a new base.
A : Nobody has seen these rebels or their base. It is believed that Basayev and a group of his fighters were able to escape from Alkhan-Kala, but there's no proof of that either. As to the number of bodies, no sane journalist will go looking for bodies on a minefield. This is especially true for western journalists. I wonder where was BBC a year ago, when half of Chechens kidnapped the other half and were trying to find someone to pay the ransom. The BBC wasn't around to show elderly Chechens, who have not seen their pensions in years, although Chechnya was one of few Russian provinces where all pensions were regularly paid. There was no Western reporter to investigate why half of schools in Chechnya were not working and where all the money from the education fund went. It is a fact that more schools are working in Chechnya now than there was a year ago. The BBC reporters only appeared hiding behind Russian tanks in their search for "truth." Just as there weren't any BBC reporters in Kosovo, when the KLA was kidnapping people by hundreds just a couple of years ago.
Following the operation Allied Force Milosevic said that nearly 2500 Serbian civilians were killed by NATO. You say that some human rights group (and I believe that you mean Human Rights Watch) claims that 500 Serb civilians were killed. I think that's enough. I don't suppose that this human rights group said that their count is final? The 500 killed is what they managed to confirmed so far. And so far the International Court has been suspiciously quiet about the number of bodies discovered in Kosovo. They said something like 2100, wasn't it? And how many of these bodies belong to Serbs or other civilians killed by the KLA and NATO?
Q : Are Russians using cruise missiles in Chechnya? What are the Russian military's plans regarding Grozny?
A : Information about Russians using cruise missiles came only from Chechen sources. I do not believe that any such missiles were used in this conflict or will be used. Russia did use "Tochka" tactical ballistic missiles - at least four and possibly eight of them were launched.
Grozny's defenses may be weakened, but taking a defended city is an extremely difficult operation, which will inevitably result in heavy casualties among Russian troops. There is no immediate need to take Grozny and it would be especially dangerous to rush things before Russian troops managed to secure Gudermes - Chechenya's second largest city. Gudermes remains the last rebel stronghold behind the federal army's forward units. There is a good possibility that Gudermes may be taking without a fight: rival Chechen gangs are currently competing for influence there and Russian military commanders hope that this competition will result in a deal between the federal army and the Chechen rebels opposing Basayev. One way or another, taking Grozny before Gudermes would be a huge risk.
If Russian army finds a way to effectively block any foreign help from entering Chechnya, then taking Grozny would not be necessary: without a guaranteed influx of reinforcements and weapons the city's defenses will fall in a matter of a few months. Russian military commanders are likely to prefer a siege to any risky offensive in the area of Grozny. If, on the other hand, Russian troops fail to control the province's borders, then taking Grozny may be the only course of action.
Q : Why isn't Russia using cruise missiles in Chechnya if that would mean greater safety for Russian pilots?
A : NATO operations in Yugoslavia showed that nothing currently in its arsenal is more effective against small mobile targets than a human pilot. Cruise missiles, ballistic missiles simply do not have the required precision or response time.
When you are sending a reconnaissance aircraft - either manned or unmanned - in most cases it can provide you with real-time reconnaissance information. However, it takes time to relay this information to an aircraft ready to launch a cruise missile. In most cases, you will not even have such a plane already in the air, so you will have to wait until it takes off and goes within firing range. Finally, a cruise missile or a ballistic missile will take some time getting to the target. This means a delay of at least a few minutes - quite enough to miss any mobile target.
Attacking stationary targets is much easier. Russian planes in Chechnya used long-range IR or TV missiles to attack oil refineries, reinforced positions, etc. If a targets position is know and fixed, the type of weapon you would use depends on target's properties and defenses. In Yugoslavia NATO had to use cruise missiles because Serbs had long-range SAMs. In Chechnya, using TV-guided missiles is sufficient considering that the Chechens have very short-range defenses. For example, the most common Russian TV / passive IR-guided air-to-ground missile is the Kh-29 (NATO designation: AS-14 Kedge). If a target's position is known and locked by the radar or TV / IR seeker, the missile can be launched from 20-30 km away. This is well out of the range of the "Stinger" (max range 5 km) or any anti-aircraft gun. In this case using TV-guided missiles is cheaper than using cruise missiles, it is also more reliable, because shooting down a cruise missile is much easier than shooting down a supersonic missile.
Russian AF has a missile specifically designed to attack stationary ground targets with known location in heavily defended areas. The missile is Kh-59 (NATO designation: AS-13 Kingbolt). The missile can be launched from up to 115 km from the target and has an accuracy of 2-3 meters. This missile is also being used in Chechnya against stationary targets in Grozny, Urus-Martan and other heavily defended areas.
There's also the Kh-55 (NATO designation: AS-15 Kent) cruise missile, which can be launched against stationary targets with known coordinates from up to 300 km away. But this missile would be an overkill in Chechnya.
Finally, there are many more air-to-ground and anti-ship missiles in Russia's arsenal, such as: Kh-15 (AS-16 Kickback), which has a range of 160 km and a speed of Mach 5; Kh-31A (AS-12 Kegler), has a range of 50 km; Kh-35 (AS-17 Krypton), it has a speed of 1100 km/h and a range of over 100 km; Kh-41 (an air-launched version of Mosquito anti-ship missile), it has a range of 200 km and a speed of Mach 3; Kh-65 (doesn't have yet a NATO designation), it has a range of 250 km; finally, there's the Kh-101 cruise missile which has a range of 5,000 km, precision of 3-12 m. As you can see the choice of weapons is wide.
But what is the point of launching an expensive cruise missile against, say, a moving vehicle if by the time the missile reaches designated coordinates, the target will not be there. The target will still be very close, but not close enough. Also, there is a consideration of cost. A cruise missile, like American Tomahawk, costs well in excess of $1 million. A mobile target, like a truck or a tank costs 1/10 of that at most and in most cases 1/20 or even less.
So far only a pilot can quickly respond to the situation on the ground and launch an appropriate weapon. Using ballistic missiles against small targets is like shooting birds with a cannon. Russian army used tactical ballistic missiles (Tochka) in Chechnya against large concentrations of Chechen fighters. But it is not often that you can use such missiles in Chechnya, simply because there usually are no large concentrations of enemy forces. MLRS like "Grad" is a cheap and highly effective way to attack soft targets - vehicles, troops - dispersed in the field or in lightly-armored structures. Attacking such targets one by one using precision-guided weapons is too expensive, too risky, and in most cases would be completely ineffective. "Grad" can cover a large area many times over in a matter of a few minutes. And the cost of such an assault would be less than a couple of laser-guided bombs.
Satellite reconnaissance is not effective in field operations. It does not have the required resolution or response time. There are also serious weather limitations, especially in Chechnya. You cannot replace ground reconnaissance with an aircraft, let alone a satellite. Besides, reconnaissance operation using a large number of troops is called, I believe you will understand this Russian term, "razvedka boyem". The goal is not only to observe, but to provoke a response and force the enemy to reveal its hidden positions and true capability. Often such operations are used to knock the enemy off-balance and then strike with heavy artillery, MLRS or aircraft.
Q : Helicopters provide for effective defense of Russian positions and convoys. Why aren't they always available? Is Russian army planning a strictly military victory in Chechnya, or will there be negotiations?
A : The problem is that there is not enough cooperation between the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry. As you can see, Chechens attack mainly police convoys, while the Defense Ministry is hugging up all the helicopters. The fact is that there's plenty of helicopters to go around. The two Ministries just need to coordinate their actions better. For example, the last OMON convoy that was attacked was traveling without even informing the army command in the area.
Situation in Chechnya is very complex. As far as the army is concerned, the war is already over. Showdown at Komsomolskoye in early March was the last large operation conducted by the Russian military. Right now much will depend on the effectiveness of border guards, police and FSB units that are tasked with capturing Chechen rebel leaders. There is very little else that Russian tanks and planes can do in Chechnya. Now it's up to the civilian administration and police. The rebels will try to launch further attacks for as long as they have resources. But these are mainly foreign mercenaries, who will eventually go home when their money sources run dry.
Q : In the view of the recent attacks by the rebels on Russian police convoys is Russian army planning to step up its operations in Chechnya?
A : The rebels ambushed 9 vehicles with 98 OMON police troops of the Moscow police department. 18 policemen were killed and 24 wounded. This brings the total number of Russian casualties in Chechnya over the past week to 70 killed and 200 wounded. Some 40 Chechens were arrested in connection to the attack in Grozny.
When Russian troops control of Grozny, military commanders mentioned that around 300 Chechen rebels still remained in the city hiding from federal troops. Sources in the Russian command center in Chechnya say that the attack was possible because of a security leak within the command center. The rebels knew the route to be taken by the police convoy and were able to prepare well in advance. Currently the FSB (KGB) is investigating the possibility of a Chechen agent in the federal command structure in Chechnya.
Q : Will these event have any impact upon the coming presidential elections in Russia?
A : The recent attack is not likely to have any serious impact on Putin's chances in the elections. If anything, this attack gives him a good reason to implement more strict policies regarding the remaining rebels in Chechnya. During the past week Russia became a bit too soft on the rebels. The security became lax since the threat of terrorist attacks on Feb. 23 did not materialize. Russians may consider deploying a greater police force in the province on a permanent basis. Currently one division and two police battalions numbering about 25,000 troops will be stationed in Chechnya. However, many military experts believe that this is not enough. I tend to agree. The force must be maintained at 45000 at the very least, plus about 10000 border guard troops.
It is important for Putin to get over the elections. After that he can do anything in Chechnya that his generals want. There is no need in more troops than are currently deployed there. At the moment all of the fighting is confined to a 10 x 12 km territory. This is barely enough space for one division. There is already not enough space to use aviation on a large scale. It is down to mortars and machine-guns. The main problem is controlling the Chechen lowlands to the north and around Grozny. Russians need better security there and more police. Since the beginning of this year Russia deployed two reconnaissance satellites specifically to maintain constant surveillance over Chechnya. But the still need more UAVs and more ground patrols. But what Chechnya really needs is money. If the federal government finds enough finances for the new administration in the province, things will go much better.
Q : All Chechens cannot be terrorists, so who exactly is Russia fighting in Chechnya?
A : There are people in Chechnya fighting for all kinds of reasons. First, more than half of die-hard rebel fighters are mercenaries from Arabic nations, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia. They fight for money. Second, there are brainwashed and uneducated teenagers. Most of their life in the past decade they've seen nothing but poverty and war. These kids don't have any education and much of what they know about Russian and history comes from Chechen religious propaganda. Of course, there are religious fanatics, but not nearly as many as some think there are. For the past decade Chechnya was raided by all kinds of religious extremist groups trying to gain control of the province. Internal feuds between these groups have taken tens of thousands of lives. Second most significant group of Chechen "rebels" following the mercenaries are criminals.
These are people of many nationalities, without strong religious preferences, who face criminal prosecution / prison in Russia. They are the only ones who fight for freedom - freedom from laws and responsibility.
Of course there are regular Chechens who want stability. Many of them were forced to support the criminals. They have absolutely no protection from the federal government. Some fight against federal forces because they believe (for very good reasons) that they could win independence. They hope that with independence they will get stability and prosperity. Unfortunately, for the past three years Chechnya had something better than independence (at least in economical sense): the province was essentially self-governed and it also received billions of rubles of federal funds. Moreover, Chechen government was receiving substantial military aid from Russia: T-80 tanks, BMP-2 APCs, BTRs, Ka-28, Mi-8 helicopters, artillery, small arms, ammunition. Presumably, all that was given to Maskhadov to fight terrorism. Maskhadov failed to take advantage of all the opportunities he was presented with, showing political and economic sense of a Soviet artillery officer. Russia did not destroy Chechnya's hopes for prosperity or even for independence. For the source of their problems Chechens should look to Grozny and Maskhadov.
Q : Russian army is unlikely to allow the rebels to escape from Grozny, for doing so creates a risk that they will rearm and regroup.
A : Perhaps, but around 1,000 - 2,000 Chechen rebels in Grozny are tying up a huge Russian force around the city. From a military point of view, this is a waste of time and resources. Federal army can deal with the rebels much more easier once they are out of Grozny. This city is a fortress. It was built as fortress from the very start and re-built as a super fortress following the W.W.II. If I was a Russian military commander in Chechnya, I would much rather face those 2,000 Chechen rebels anywhere else but in Grozny. Also, a large number of rebels in Grozny want to surrender: they have amnesty, a guaranteed freedom. If they leave Grozny, much of them will not continue fighting.
Q : The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers affirms that the Russian army is hiding the true extent of its losses in Chechnya.
A : The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers is a group of hysterical women. I can understand them, but they have no access to any tactical information and their figures of Russian losses are little more than rumors. I don't report their figures because I don't report rumors in general, that's BBC's forte. Information coming from Russian military officials and other military sources so far proved to be the most reliable.
Russian journalists are allowed into Chechnya. There is a large base of Russian journalists in Staryye Atagi, just outside Grozny, as well as in Gudermes, Shali, Argun, etc. Russian TV regularly shows footage of frontline action. ITAR-TASS journalists regularly report from forward positions of Russian troops. The problem is not so much in the restrictions set up by the military, but in fact that after dozens of Russian journalists were kidnapped and/or killed in Chechnya, others are reluctant to follow.
Q : "Withdrawal" by the rebels from Grozny. How many killed?
A : I know that BBC had plenty of photos of dead Chechen rebels being loaded into trucks by Russian troops. I know that the Russian army's mobile crematoriums have been very busy in Chechnya in the past few days.
Chechen rebels lost over 1500 fighters during their withdrawal from Grozny beginning Feb. 1 at 2100 hrs. This was confirmed by their own "propaganda minister" Movladi Udugov, who said that about 50% of the withdrawing rebels managed to escape. He also said that the total force before the operation was over 3,000. Russian military confirmed that Basayev and his force of about 1200 fighters managed to escape.
Can you imagine how long it would have taken Russian troops to kill 1500 rebels in street-to-street fighting in Grozny with an average of about 30 dead Chechens and 6 dead Russians per day? The facts are that Grozny is now largely under Russian control, Chechens lost over half of their troops and are now running around the countryside in the area of Serzhen-Yurt (where they are sure to be met by Russian paratroopers.) The withdrawal from Grozny was a complete disaster for the Chechen fighters, President Maskhadov, and the morale of rebels in general.
Q : On the future of Chechen independence and the rebels.
A : It is unlikely that Chechnya will be granted independence. Under the Russian constitution Chechnya already has wide-ranging autonomy. This little province, that costs Russian budget billions, has it's own President, Parliament, security force, police, etc. If Dudayev and Maskhadov weren't complete idiots Chechnya could have been a prosperous province living off it's oil sales revenues. Now the entire province is in ruin and is officially declared an ecological catastrophe zone by the Russian Emergencies Ministry. This is the direct result of operation of hundreds of illegal oil refineries running without any ecological control standards for the past decade. Chechen rebels stole quantities of radioactive waste from the "Radon" radioactive waste disposal company in Grozny. Where all this stuff is now is not known. Add to that all the poisonous chemicals released by the rebels in Grozny during the war. The place is a mess. No sane Chechen living outside the province would even consider returning there. I am not even talking about Russians who previously lived in Chechnya, which includes half of my relatives.
The rebels simply don't have the strength to set anyone up anymore. Their future will be slow death in the mountains and their legacy will be murder, slave trade, and kidnappings. This doesn't mean that they are already finished. They may even try to counterattack. They still have some resources left to maintain the war effort for a while. But their eventual defeat is no longer in question.
Q : Why Russian troops are being so ruthless with the rebels, while the Americans could be so "benevolent" with the Iraqis?
A : There is a big difference between the "Desert Storm" and the Chechen war. In Iraq American soldier were dealing with Iraqi soldiers, who never attacked the US or killed American civilians. There was no reason for any particular hatred between the two sides. In Chechnya, rebel fighters live by killing and kidnapping Russian civilians. They sell kidnapped Russians (and not only Russians) into slavery, torture them, exchange and re-sell them. Chechens also invaded Dagestan, which resulted in strong anti-Chechen sentiment in this republic usually quite sympathetic toward the fellow Muslims from Chechnya. Chechen rebels bombed apartment buildings in Russia, killing around 300 innocent civilians. During the past war Basayev and his gang held hostage a maternity ward in Boudennovsk. Chechen Mafiosi are running countless drug- and kidnapping-related gangs all over Russia. Chechnya became a huge drain on the Russian economy. Russian military was felt betrayed by the government following the Khasavyurt agreement with the Chechens. That's another reason for the emotions to run high. Many of the "Chechen" rebels are actually Russians and Ukrainians - fellow Slavs. When they are caught by Russian troops they are usually hanged.
Recently Russian soldiers hanged a 21-year old Russian woman in Grozny. She was a mercenary working for the rebels as a sniper. She was also a Russian national champion in biathlon. There was an all-female sniper unit in Grozny called the "White Stockings". None of the captured members made it to the Russian police - all were either shot or hanged by the Russian soldiers. The main reason, however, why Russian troops are being so ruthless is that they know perfectly well that when a Chechen rebel surrenders, it doesn't means he is giving up. He will return to his old ways as soon as the situation permits. Thus, the only way to really deal with Chechen separatism is by killing as many separatists as possible. The "oppressive system" you are talking about has been gone since 1956. Since Khrushchev Chechens were not only not discriminated against, they were favored in every possible way. Chechen students could get into the best colleges without taking the exams. They were promoted in the military, on the job, etc. ahead of the non-minorities. When my grandparents lived in Chechnya, Soviet police was extremely lenient toward Chechen criminals. A meager percentage of the Chechens were ever employed even during the Soviet times. And not because there were no jobs, but because they simply did not want to work, knowing that the state will support them in every possible way.
Q : What about Stalin's behaviour towards Chechens? Does not that prove he hated them?
A : Yes, Stalin relocated Chechens to Kazakhstan in 1943, but not because he hated them (if he hated them, he would have killed every one of them as he killed thousands of Russian, Ukrainians, etc.). Chechen separatists cooperated with the Nazi Germany, which was eager to reach Grozny's oil fields. I know this not just from history books, but from my own grandparents, who witnessed everything firsthand during the war. It took the Chechen society just a few years since 1992 to regress to its feudal past and even beyond it - to slavery. There is almost nothing in Chechnya that wasn't built by the Russians. There is not a single town or a factory build by the Chechens. They have no educated and experienced specialists to run their oil industry or any other industry for that matter. If Russia would suddenly give them complete freedom and seal off the border, they will kill each other and whoever remains will starve to death. It is a society completely incapable of self-contained existence. Through out history Chechen society was formed around warlords and lived by robbing neighboring nations: Russians, Georgians, Dagestanis, etc. It was very naive of some Russian politicians to think that with sufficient funding Chechen society will transform itself into a civilization. No, Dudayev and Maskhadov used Russian money to transform Chechnya into an enclave of international terrorism. They took the historical role of Chechnya in the Caucasus - kidnapping and robbery - on a new high-tech level. Some 150 years ago Chechen bandits were riding around on horses with swords and robbing people. Now the ride around in SUVs with "Stingers" and AK-47s and do the same thing.
I have nothing against the Chechens. The vast majority (80%) of the Chechen population (in 1993) foreseen the future of their province as an "independent" nation ran by religious fanatics and criminals and left the province. Most Chechens now live outside of Chechnya and, according to numerous polls conducted since 1993, don't have a slightest intention of returning. You are wrong thinking that Basayev would be killed if captured by the Russians. Not at all. He will be tried in court according to all rules.
What about Afghanistan's promise of help for the Chechen rebels?
Afghanistan's official position on Chechnya is irrelevant for its unofficial position is too well known. Afghanis have been sending military help to Chechnya for years. Afghanistan will just end up being bombed again. Russia has thousands of non-nuclear ballistic missiles rusting away in storage. That should be enough to make Afghanistan change its mind. If not, there are always nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will stay away. Afghanistan is already isolated from the world by economic and diplomatic sanctions. It has nothing to lose. Pakistan and especially Saudi Arabia have everything to lose.
Q : Do you agree with the view that there is no US "interference" in Chechnya?
A : US is not doing nothing. It recently established diplomatic relations with Chechnya through its "foreign minister" Ilyas Akhmedov. The US supplied Georgia with air defense radars and helicopters, which are being used to track Russian aircraft in Chechnya. I am sure that Chechen rebels have access to this information, because anything and anyone can be bought in Georgia. I know this from personal experience. A couple of months ago Russian planes destroyed a US-made radar being delivered to Chechnya from Turkey. Shipments of uniforms and other supplies from US to Chechnya through Germany and Georgia have been intercepted by Russian customs on several occasions.
Q : Can Russia affording getting into an armed confrontation with Georgia? About Russia employing military pressure in order to favour a Russian-backed candidate alternative to Shevarnadze : does not that resemble the game that China is playing with Taiwan?
A : The situation in Georgia is very different from Taiwan. First, Georgian government is led by nationalists. But just barely. They have a shaky majority and stand a good chance of losing in the elections. Shevarnadze is a nationalist who tries to appear as a moderate. He tries to support every side, to play on everyone's team. He supports the nationalists, the moderates, the pro-Russian coalition. He offers some support to the Russian military in controlling the border, while at the same time offers limited support to the rebels by allowing them to hide in Georgia. He maintains fair relations with the US, while blocking all efforts by the US to resolve the crisis in Abkhazia or to kick out the three large Russian military bases in Georgia.
Everyone is pretty tired of him, including the US, which, despite of trying for several years and spending many millions of dollars, was not able to get any leverage in the Georgian politics. But Shevarnadze's main "enemy" is his own people. Over 75% of Georgian population lives below the poverty level (and that poverty level is one of the lowest in the world). Georgia has really nothing to offer on the international market except for its exceptional wine. But for Georgia to survive on wine exports along, everyone in the world would have to be an alcoholic. Georgia depends on American handouts and on economic relations with Russia. Georgians got used to the very easy and relatively wealthy life during the Soviet years. They suffer much more from their poverty than other former Soviet states. Pro-Russian drive in Georgia is getting progressively stronger.
People see that Shevarnadze did not resolve any problems in politics or economy. For years he has been telling the people to accept the financial hardships because this is the price of independence. If Shevarnadze drags his country into a war with Russia, it would end his political career. Georgia has nothing in terms of military power. The US won't be able to help much (it certainly did almost nothing to help Georgia's army in the past several years). At this moment Shevarnadze must take a stand - either he bets on cooperation with Russia or on cooperation with the rebels in hopes of American assistance. But taking sides and making stands is not in his nature.
My family lived in Tbilisi for a long time. I lived there for over a year when I was in 6th grade. Georgians are used to the easy life. The entire republic was one big holiday resort during the Soviet years, drawing huge funds from the budget while giving little in return. Once most Russians moved out from Georgia, the country's few industries and scientific organizations effectively ceased to exist. Most people lost their jobs. Education system in Georgia leaves a lot to be desired. While Georgians are too proud to admit it, they know perfectly well that they need Russia. They hoped (like Ukraine and others did) that the US would help. But American help is nothing more than small handouts barely enough to keep the corrupt government working.
From a financial point of view, Russia can easily afford to bomb Georgia for months. Thousands of Russian soldiers are stationed in Georgia as well as patrol the country's border's as a part of a peace-keeping force. That costs far more money than an aerial campaign would cost. Georgians don't have a chance of resisting Russia militarily. The only way out for them will be through peace talks. A pro-Russian presidential candidate who can strike a deal with Russia will be preferred to stubborn and ineffective Shevarnadze. I am saying "pro-Russian" candidate, but it doesn't mean that he runs as "pro-Russian". Simply his political platform is targeted at establishing good relations with Russia. That's something Georgia needs and wants.
Q : Could not tensions in the Gulf area imply the danger of escalating into a US-Russian war?
A : An accidental exchange of fire between Russian and American ships would not escalate into a war. This of course would depend on who is in charge in Russia and in the US. If the US is ran by somebody like Kennedy or Reagan and Russia is run by someone like Khrushchev or Stalin, I'll go right now dig myself a bunker. In one-on-one exchange of fire between a limited number of Russian and American ships in, say, the Persian Gulf, Russians would have at least the same chance of winning, especially considering that Russian anti-ship missiles and shipborne SAMs are years ahead of their American counterparts. I remember Americans had their hands full with Iranian torpedo boats in the Gulf some years ago. But if a limited exchange of fire escalates into a war, Russians will use the nuclear weapons without waiting for the US to do it first. That's what Russia's new defense doctrine is all about.
Regards,
Hist2004