hist2004
07-14-2004, 11:08 AM
Air Assault Comes to Afghanistan
In 1984, the Soviets began to modify their air and ground strategy in an effort to more effectively employ their assets against the insurgents.
Stephen Blank described this shift in strategy and tactics as “moving in the direction of greater reliance upon mobility, long-range ordnance from air
power, vertical rather than tank-led encirclement, [and the] use of specially assigned forces.” The Soviet lessons drawn from the first three years
of the war involving the necessity for rapid mobility and massive, responsive fire support in essence constituted a restatement of traditional Soviet
doctrinal precepts. The focus on “vertical envelopment,” however, established a new emphasis for Soviet operations involving the massed use of
heliborne operations by specially trained airborne and air assault forces.
Soviet airborne operations involving actual parachute drops were relatively rare in Afghanistan. Still, airborne forces (VDV) had proved vital in
conducting operations to secure key installations throughout the country during the initial invasion. As the war progressed, VDV forces pioneered
many of the Soviet irregular warfare tactics, and, in turn, these forces became a primary element for conducting counterinsurgency operations either
as dismounted infantry or by helicopter insertion. The following eyewitness account by a former mujahid aptly described the special capabilities of
VDV forces in unconventional warfare:
We had taken positions close to the top of a mountain overlooking a valley and were shooting at the Soviets with BM-12s [rockets] and mortars. . . .
Then all of a sudden a VDV company of about 90 men appeared and attacked us from behind. They had climbed straight up the mountain during the
night. . . . We fought for two days there, and many people were killed. Before that I had thought that the Soviet soldiers are not worth anything . . .
These were really tough guys.
This story not only illustrates the capabilities of the VDV, but it also points to a shift in Soviet strategy toward night operations during this period. As
late as November 1982, one senior Soviet military leader, Guards Major General F. Kuz’min, had criticized the performance of Soviet forces in night
operations. Soviet planners responded to the need for a more effective night fighting capability, and by 1984 VDV (airborne), DShB (air assault),
and specially trained reconnaissance troops constituted the primary forces for conducting night attacks and ambushes. Still, the lack of an
effective night-capable aircraft restricted support to these ambushes and limited other aerial operations during the hours of darkness.
By 1984, helicopters, and the mobility they provided, began to play a much-expanded role in the war against the insurgents. Both VDV and DShB
forces counted on helicopters to provide them with increased mobility and firepower support in contrast to the vulnerable and slow-moving
mechanized convoys. One veteran of the desant forces, Vladislav Tamarov, stated “It was a lot easier on us when the helicopters took us into the
mountains: you went to the airfield, boarded the copter, and in an hour you were there.” Desant forces conducted four major types of military
actions in Afghanistan, including: large-scale operations using artillery and aviation support to destroy concentrated pockets of mujahideen;
small-scale operations by regiments with artillery and aviation support aimed at destroying a specific group of mujahideen; the “combing” of villages
to identify weapons stores and field hospitals; and company-sized ambushes near roads, major trails or villages. Tamarov remarked that the Soviet
counterinsurgency forces relied heavily on dismounted operations in contrast to their motorized rifle counterparts. His description of Soviet
operations also illustrated the desant forces’ reliance on air support as well as the routine use of these forces in counterinsurgency roles. In fact,
DShB forces began to conduct surprise heliborne attacks against both villages and suspected mujahideen way stations (chaikhana, literally “tea
house”). In one example, two helicopters landed approximately two dozen troops at a chaikhana. They surprised and, in about ten minutes, killed 30
insurgents before departing by helicopter.
An operation in October 1984 in the area of the Pizgoran ravine demonstrated the increasing Soviet reliance on large-scale air landings involving
motorized rifle and counterinsurgency forces. On 25 October, 24 Mi-8 Hip helicopters airlifted 1,280 men into the area. During the operation, Mi-24
Hinds, MiG-23 Floggers, and Su-25s provided fire support for the landing force. Sarin and Dvoretsky stated that this type of operation allowed Soviet
forces to inflict losses on insurgents holding defensive positions while projecting “concentrated fire at distant operational locations beyond the front
line.” Main force units subsequently accomplished a link-up with the airhead forces in this operation prior to a further advance against the
insurgent positions. In this instance, the air assault landing had essentially acted as the force with which first to outflank, and then to crack the
mujahideen defensive line.
The relative success of this new combined arms strategy employing air assault techniques led to a growing optimism among the Soviet leadership
concerning their ability to eventually defeat the insurgency. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail S. Kapitsa stated in 1986 that the war would be
over in five years. Kapitsa’s assertion proved prophetic, but not in the intended sense of a Soviet victory. Prior to 1984, Soviet control of the skies
was largely uncontested. The mujahideen lacked the armaments with which to construct an effective air defense system, and achieved their
greatest successes against Soviet air units in mortar and rocket attacks against their airfields. However, this situation began to change as the
insurgents acquired a greater number of heavy machine guns and manportable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
Prior to 1986, the mujahideen’s most effective anti-aircraft weapon proved to be the “Dashka” 12.7 mm and the “Zigriat” 14.5 mm heavy
machine-guns. A Soviet defector, Alexander Zuyev, noted that the mujahideen air defense tactics were “relatively primitive” in 1984, “[but] their
12.7 mm and 14.5 mm antiaircraft guns could be dangerous below an altitude of about 4,500 feet.” These heavy machine-guns began arriving in
greater numbers as a result of increasing Chinese deliveries. For example, there were only 13 mujahideen heavy machine-guns in the Panjshir Valley
in 1982, but, by the end of 1984, there were almost 250. The mujahideen became quite proficient in the use of these weapons to conduct “lateral
ambushes.” They situated gun sites at positions along opposing ridgelines in order to provide enfilade fire of Soviet aircraft operating in the area
below the ridge or along the valley floor. A chagrined Soviet veteran described his unit’s capture of several “Dashka” heavy machine-guns which
had found their way from the Soviet Union to China, and on to Afghanistan, where they were now being used to kill Russian soldiers.
Mujahideen air defense initiatives were not only confined to the battlefield. In fact, the insurgents achieved some dramatic results by infiltrating
areas in the vicinity of Soviet airfields in order to attack Russian aircraft. Military Transport Aviation (VTA) continued to play a key role in resupplying
Russian forces in Afghanistan. According to one analyst, from the early stages of the war the Soviets relied “heavily on the VTA for the routine
introduction of military materiel ordinarily transported by road. . . . [and] helicopters were being used extensively to move supplies within the
country.” However, the VTA was not able to escape the effects associated with the mujahideen’s increased number of SA-7s. On 28 October
1984, the insurgents shot down a Soviet An-22 **** heavy transport using a SA-7 as it took off from the Kabul airport. In another example, an
Afghan Airline DC-10 with 300 passengers aboard was hit by a SA-7, but managed to land safely. Surrounded by a series of low hills, the airport at
Kabul remained particularly vulnerable to the SAM threat throughout the remainder of the war. Kabul was not the only airfield put at risk by the
mujahideen’s manportable SAMs. In September 1984, the insurgents shot down a Bakhtar Airlines aircraft with a SA-7 just after it took off from the
Kandahar airfield. The Soviets countered the growing SAM threat with on-board decoy flare systems as well as helicopter flare ships orbiting the
airport prior to take-offs and landings. The increasing SAM threat throughout the theater resulted in the redeployment of Soviet electronic
intelligence (ELINT) aircraft and long-range bombers based at Shindand back to the Soviet Union. Bases inside the Soviet Union, such as Termez,
provided greater security for these assets, and still allowed for their effective employment within Afghanistan.
The acquisition of SA-7s allowed the mujahideen to achieve limited success in blunting the Soviet aerial advantage. The impact of the weapon should
not be measured in the numbers of aircraft shot down alone. The missiles forced Soviet and DRA aircraft and helicopters to adjust their mission
profiles and tactical procedures. The introduction of the SA-7 not only increased the threat experienced by the aircrews, but it also demonstrated
the disproportionate impact that can occur when insurgencies obtain modest technological upgrades to their weapons arsenals. In the
unconventional warfare environment, insurgents do not need to control the air, but only to dictate the way in which airpower can be employed by a
technologically advanced adversary.
By the end of 1984, Soviet airpower, in all its various forms, carried the lion’s share of the burden in prosecuting the war against the mujahideen.
Operations ranged from the use of 36 Tu-16 Badger bombers in a mini “ARC LIGHT” campaign against the Panjshir Valley in April 1984 to the
employment of VTA An-12 Cubs and An-26 Curls as master bombers. Transport aircraft acting as flare ships for battlefield illumination also played
an important role in discouraging or combating mujahideen night attacks. In addition, the use of helicopters in support of air assault, CAS and
interdiction operations formed a crucial element in the Soviet air strategy to defeat the insurgents. Stephen Blank correctly argued that “Between
1980 and 1986 Soviet strategy in Afghanistan gradually came to rely almost exclusively on airpower, staking everything on airpower’s capabilities to
deliver ordnance, interdict supplies and reserves, isolate the battlefield from the rear, destroy the agricultural basis . . . and rapidly move troops from
point to point.”
By 1985, barring a massive influx of Soviet forces, it was clear that Soviet airpower would have to play an even greater role in order to win the
battle against the mujahideen. The relatively small size of the Soviet contingent, estimated at 115,000 troops by early 1985, precluded a ground
solution to the campaign. By the end of the year, Soviet strategy mirrored the proverb “live by the sword, die by the sword.” A survey in 1985 by
Swedish relief workers illustrated the continued willingness of the Russians to employ the sword of airpower as a punitive weapon. The survey
indicated that the fields of over half the farmers who remained in Afghanistan were bombed, and over a quarter of these same farmers had their
irrigation systems destroyed and livestock shot by Soviet and DRA forces. The Soviets were in fact living to a great degree by the airpower sword,
but the mujahideen were becoming increasingly adept at blunting the blows of the Soviet aerial cutlass.
By the beginning of 1986, the mujahideen had clearly demonstrated an increased ability to combat Soviet airpower, and had forced Russian jets to
operate at higher altitudes thereby decreasing their accuracy. The greater number of heavy machine-guns among the insurgents also led to an
increasing capability to threaten the mainstay of Soviet aviation in Afghanistan, their helicopters. The Mi-24 Hind, almost impervious to small arms
fire, was vulnerable to concentrated fire from both heavy machine-guns and the SA-7. In the end, the numbers tell the story. One Afghan defector
estimated DRA aircraft losses between December 1979 and early 1984 at 164 aircraft (both fixed-wing and helicopter). Joseph J. Collins, a former
US army officer, estimated that by the end of 1984 Soviet losses totaled 600 aircraft. The balance of power began to shift in favor of the
insurgents as the mujahideen achieved their first successes in contesting Soviet dominance of the skies over Afghanistan in 1984 and 1985.
Mujahideen Ascendant
The offensives of 1984 and 1985 had proved costly to Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Western intelligence reports estimated that 2,343 Soviet
personnel were killed in action (KIA) in 1984 and another 1,868 KIA in 1985. The ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of General
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the spring of 1985 coincided with what would become the third costliest year of the
war for the Soviets. Soviet frustration with the war was becoming increasingly apparent. From the platform of the 27th Party Congress in February
1986, Gorbachev described Afghanistan as a “bloody stump.” In addition to the cost in lives, the Soviet Union was spending an estimated 5 billion
dollars a year in prosecuting the war. In fact, 1986 was destined to be the year of decision for Soviet policy makers concerning their continued
involvement in the Afghan quagmire.
British defense correspondent Mark Urban stated that “From early 1986 the Soviet Army switched to a more defensive strategy. Rural operations
were reduced and defences around towns increased . . .” Urban estimated that there were six offensives involving more than 5,000 Soviet troops
each in 1984-85 while there was only one such operation during the last three years of the war. Urban’s argument is correct with respect to the
involvement of Soviet ground forces, as the burden of large-scale ground fighting began to shift to DRA forces. In fact, Soviet casualties in 1986
dropped to their lowest levels since 1981. The Soviets did not, however, completely abandon offensive operations. In February 1986, Soviet forces
conducted a large-scale operation into the Charikar valley, approximately 40 miles north of Kabul, which demonstrated the increasing proficiency of
Soviet forces in the conduct of desant-type combined arms operations. For example, on the first day alone, helicopters conducted a tactical
insertion of three airborne battalions and three motor rifle companies. Later, an additional 17 battalions were landed in support of the operation.
The Charikar valley operation illustrated the increased proficiency achieved by Soviet forces in massed air assault operations by 1986.
In early April, Soviet and DRA forces launched a joint operation aimed at capturing the major mujahideen stronghold at Zhawar, a mere three
kilometers from the Pakistani border. The attacking force consisted of 12,000 troops of which only 2,200 were Soviet. Soviet airpower played a
critical role in assembling forces for the attack by airlifting 4,200 DRA and Russian troops into the airport at Khost just prior to the start of the
operation. During the initial stages of the operation, DRA mechanized and ground forces pushing south from Khost encountered heavy resistance that
slowed their advance to between two and three kilometers per day. In attempting to break the mujahideen resistance, the offensive on the road to
Zhawar relied heavily on large-scale heliborne operations in order to provide the anvil for the hammer of the advancing mechanized forces. Brigadier
Abdol Gafur, the DRA commander for the operation, employed elite Soviet and DRA battalions in air assault landings behind the mujahideen lines.
Soviet aircraft also supported the DRA forces by conducting strikes on mujahideen positions. For example, Soviet Su-25 Frogfoot ground attack
aircraft with laser-guided bombs successfully struck the insurgents’ cave/storage complex at Zhawar. After almost three weeks of fighting, Zhawar
fell to the DRA and Soviet forces. Although modest in terms of Soviet ground participation, the campaign clearly indicated the continuing importance
of Soviet airpower in all its forms. The Zhawar campaign provided an example of Soviet airpower’s effectiveness when the mujahideen chose to stand
and fight a fixed battle.
During this period, the Soviets also adapted their tactics to better suit the nature of unconventional warfare by employing small groups of specially
trained commando forces (spetsnaz) to conduct hit-and-run raids against the mujahideen. Edward Girardet, a journalist with extensive experience
traveling with the mujahideen, stated “The special troops are swift, silent and deadly. Swooping down in a single December [1985] raid, they
slaughtered 82 guerrillas and wounded 60 more.” A mujahideen commander, Amin Wardak described the ambush: “They attacked at night in a
narrow gorge. At first, we didn’t know we were being shot at because of the silencers. Then our people began falling.” These ambushes were
effective, but relied on small numbers of specially trained forces. In addition, these forces relied largely on the mobility provided by helicopters for
insertion and exfiltration. Still, these isolated successes could not break the mujahideen’s hold on the countryside.
If Soviet ground operations were reduced in 1986, the nature of Soviet air operations remained essentially the same. One estimate of Soviet aircraft
in Afghanistan in 1986 included 80 MiG-21 Fishbeds, 40 MiG-23 Floggers, 80 Su-17 Fitters, 30 Su-25s, and 27 reconnaissance aircraft. However,
the number of helicopters in the country dramatically declined between 1985 and 1988. Compared to a high of approximately 600 aircraft in 1982, the
number of helicopters fell from 350 in 1985 to 325 in 1986, and, finally to 275 by February 1988.91 The greatly reduced number of helicopters was in
part tied to the restricted size and nature of Soviet ground operations. More importantly, the growing vulnerability of rotary-wing assets to the
increasing missile threat undoubtedly played a role in the decision to reduce these forces.
Regards,
Hist2004
In 1984, the Soviets began to modify their air and ground strategy in an effort to more effectively employ their assets against the insurgents.
Stephen Blank described this shift in strategy and tactics as “moving in the direction of greater reliance upon mobility, long-range ordnance from air
power, vertical rather than tank-led encirclement, [and the] use of specially assigned forces.” The Soviet lessons drawn from the first three years
of the war involving the necessity for rapid mobility and massive, responsive fire support in essence constituted a restatement of traditional Soviet
doctrinal precepts. The focus on “vertical envelopment,” however, established a new emphasis for Soviet operations involving the massed use of
heliborne operations by specially trained airborne and air assault forces.
Soviet airborne operations involving actual parachute drops were relatively rare in Afghanistan. Still, airborne forces (VDV) had proved vital in
conducting operations to secure key installations throughout the country during the initial invasion. As the war progressed, VDV forces pioneered
many of the Soviet irregular warfare tactics, and, in turn, these forces became a primary element for conducting counterinsurgency operations either
as dismounted infantry or by helicopter insertion. The following eyewitness account by a former mujahid aptly described the special capabilities of
VDV forces in unconventional warfare:
We had taken positions close to the top of a mountain overlooking a valley and were shooting at the Soviets with BM-12s [rockets] and mortars. . . .
Then all of a sudden a VDV company of about 90 men appeared and attacked us from behind. They had climbed straight up the mountain during the
night. . . . We fought for two days there, and many people were killed. Before that I had thought that the Soviet soldiers are not worth anything . . .
These were really tough guys.
This story not only illustrates the capabilities of the VDV, but it also points to a shift in Soviet strategy toward night operations during this period. As
late as November 1982, one senior Soviet military leader, Guards Major General F. Kuz’min, had criticized the performance of Soviet forces in night
operations. Soviet planners responded to the need for a more effective night fighting capability, and by 1984 VDV (airborne), DShB (air assault),
and specially trained reconnaissance troops constituted the primary forces for conducting night attacks and ambushes. Still, the lack of an
effective night-capable aircraft restricted support to these ambushes and limited other aerial operations during the hours of darkness.
By 1984, helicopters, and the mobility they provided, began to play a much-expanded role in the war against the insurgents. Both VDV and DShB
forces counted on helicopters to provide them with increased mobility and firepower support in contrast to the vulnerable and slow-moving
mechanized convoys. One veteran of the desant forces, Vladislav Tamarov, stated “It was a lot easier on us when the helicopters took us into the
mountains: you went to the airfield, boarded the copter, and in an hour you were there.” Desant forces conducted four major types of military
actions in Afghanistan, including: large-scale operations using artillery and aviation support to destroy concentrated pockets of mujahideen;
small-scale operations by regiments with artillery and aviation support aimed at destroying a specific group of mujahideen; the “combing” of villages
to identify weapons stores and field hospitals; and company-sized ambushes near roads, major trails or villages. Tamarov remarked that the Soviet
counterinsurgency forces relied heavily on dismounted operations in contrast to their motorized rifle counterparts. His description of Soviet
operations also illustrated the desant forces’ reliance on air support as well as the routine use of these forces in counterinsurgency roles. In fact,
DShB forces began to conduct surprise heliborne attacks against both villages and suspected mujahideen way stations (chaikhana, literally “tea
house”). In one example, two helicopters landed approximately two dozen troops at a chaikhana. They surprised and, in about ten minutes, killed 30
insurgents before departing by helicopter.
An operation in October 1984 in the area of the Pizgoran ravine demonstrated the increasing Soviet reliance on large-scale air landings involving
motorized rifle and counterinsurgency forces. On 25 October, 24 Mi-8 Hip helicopters airlifted 1,280 men into the area. During the operation, Mi-24
Hinds, MiG-23 Floggers, and Su-25s provided fire support for the landing force. Sarin and Dvoretsky stated that this type of operation allowed Soviet
forces to inflict losses on insurgents holding defensive positions while projecting “concentrated fire at distant operational locations beyond the front
line.” Main force units subsequently accomplished a link-up with the airhead forces in this operation prior to a further advance against the
insurgent positions. In this instance, the air assault landing had essentially acted as the force with which first to outflank, and then to crack the
mujahideen defensive line.
The relative success of this new combined arms strategy employing air assault techniques led to a growing optimism among the Soviet leadership
concerning their ability to eventually defeat the insurgency. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail S. Kapitsa stated in 1986 that the war would be
over in five years. Kapitsa’s assertion proved prophetic, but not in the intended sense of a Soviet victory. Prior to 1984, Soviet control of the skies
was largely uncontested. The mujahideen lacked the armaments with which to construct an effective air defense system, and achieved their
greatest successes against Soviet air units in mortar and rocket attacks against their airfields. However, this situation began to change as the
insurgents acquired a greater number of heavy machine guns and manportable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
Prior to 1986, the mujahideen’s most effective anti-aircraft weapon proved to be the “Dashka” 12.7 mm and the “Zigriat” 14.5 mm heavy
machine-guns. A Soviet defector, Alexander Zuyev, noted that the mujahideen air defense tactics were “relatively primitive” in 1984, “[but] their
12.7 mm and 14.5 mm antiaircraft guns could be dangerous below an altitude of about 4,500 feet.” These heavy machine-guns began arriving in
greater numbers as a result of increasing Chinese deliveries. For example, there were only 13 mujahideen heavy machine-guns in the Panjshir Valley
in 1982, but, by the end of 1984, there were almost 250. The mujahideen became quite proficient in the use of these weapons to conduct “lateral
ambushes.” They situated gun sites at positions along opposing ridgelines in order to provide enfilade fire of Soviet aircraft operating in the area
below the ridge or along the valley floor. A chagrined Soviet veteran described his unit’s capture of several “Dashka” heavy machine-guns which
had found their way from the Soviet Union to China, and on to Afghanistan, where they were now being used to kill Russian soldiers.
Mujahideen air defense initiatives were not only confined to the battlefield. In fact, the insurgents achieved some dramatic results by infiltrating
areas in the vicinity of Soviet airfields in order to attack Russian aircraft. Military Transport Aviation (VTA) continued to play a key role in resupplying
Russian forces in Afghanistan. According to one analyst, from the early stages of the war the Soviets relied “heavily on the VTA for the routine
introduction of military materiel ordinarily transported by road. . . . [and] helicopters were being used extensively to move supplies within the
country.” However, the VTA was not able to escape the effects associated with the mujahideen’s increased number of SA-7s. On 28 October
1984, the insurgents shot down a Soviet An-22 **** heavy transport using a SA-7 as it took off from the Kabul airport. In another example, an
Afghan Airline DC-10 with 300 passengers aboard was hit by a SA-7, but managed to land safely. Surrounded by a series of low hills, the airport at
Kabul remained particularly vulnerable to the SAM threat throughout the remainder of the war. Kabul was not the only airfield put at risk by the
mujahideen’s manportable SAMs. In September 1984, the insurgents shot down a Bakhtar Airlines aircraft with a SA-7 just after it took off from the
Kandahar airfield. The Soviets countered the growing SAM threat with on-board decoy flare systems as well as helicopter flare ships orbiting the
airport prior to take-offs and landings. The increasing SAM threat throughout the theater resulted in the redeployment of Soviet electronic
intelligence (ELINT) aircraft and long-range bombers based at Shindand back to the Soviet Union. Bases inside the Soviet Union, such as Termez,
provided greater security for these assets, and still allowed for their effective employment within Afghanistan.
The acquisition of SA-7s allowed the mujahideen to achieve limited success in blunting the Soviet aerial advantage. The impact of the weapon should
not be measured in the numbers of aircraft shot down alone. The missiles forced Soviet and DRA aircraft and helicopters to adjust their mission
profiles and tactical procedures. The introduction of the SA-7 not only increased the threat experienced by the aircrews, but it also demonstrated
the disproportionate impact that can occur when insurgencies obtain modest technological upgrades to their weapons arsenals. In the
unconventional warfare environment, insurgents do not need to control the air, but only to dictate the way in which airpower can be employed by a
technologically advanced adversary.
By the end of 1984, Soviet airpower, in all its various forms, carried the lion’s share of the burden in prosecuting the war against the mujahideen.
Operations ranged from the use of 36 Tu-16 Badger bombers in a mini “ARC LIGHT” campaign against the Panjshir Valley in April 1984 to the
employment of VTA An-12 Cubs and An-26 Curls as master bombers. Transport aircraft acting as flare ships for battlefield illumination also played
an important role in discouraging or combating mujahideen night attacks. In addition, the use of helicopters in support of air assault, CAS and
interdiction operations formed a crucial element in the Soviet air strategy to defeat the insurgents. Stephen Blank correctly argued that “Between
1980 and 1986 Soviet strategy in Afghanistan gradually came to rely almost exclusively on airpower, staking everything on airpower’s capabilities to
deliver ordnance, interdict supplies and reserves, isolate the battlefield from the rear, destroy the agricultural basis . . . and rapidly move troops from
point to point.”
By 1985, barring a massive influx of Soviet forces, it was clear that Soviet airpower would have to play an even greater role in order to win the
battle against the mujahideen. The relatively small size of the Soviet contingent, estimated at 115,000 troops by early 1985, precluded a ground
solution to the campaign. By the end of the year, Soviet strategy mirrored the proverb “live by the sword, die by the sword.” A survey in 1985 by
Swedish relief workers illustrated the continued willingness of the Russians to employ the sword of airpower as a punitive weapon. The survey
indicated that the fields of over half the farmers who remained in Afghanistan were bombed, and over a quarter of these same farmers had their
irrigation systems destroyed and livestock shot by Soviet and DRA forces. The Soviets were in fact living to a great degree by the airpower sword,
but the mujahideen were becoming increasingly adept at blunting the blows of the Soviet aerial cutlass.
By the beginning of 1986, the mujahideen had clearly demonstrated an increased ability to combat Soviet airpower, and had forced Russian jets to
operate at higher altitudes thereby decreasing their accuracy. The greater number of heavy machine-guns among the insurgents also led to an
increasing capability to threaten the mainstay of Soviet aviation in Afghanistan, their helicopters. The Mi-24 Hind, almost impervious to small arms
fire, was vulnerable to concentrated fire from both heavy machine-guns and the SA-7. In the end, the numbers tell the story. One Afghan defector
estimated DRA aircraft losses between December 1979 and early 1984 at 164 aircraft (both fixed-wing and helicopter). Joseph J. Collins, a former
US army officer, estimated that by the end of 1984 Soviet losses totaled 600 aircraft. The balance of power began to shift in favor of the
insurgents as the mujahideen achieved their first successes in contesting Soviet dominance of the skies over Afghanistan in 1984 and 1985.
Mujahideen Ascendant
The offensives of 1984 and 1985 had proved costly to Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Western intelligence reports estimated that 2,343 Soviet
personnel were killed in action (KIA) in 1984 and another 1,868 KIA in 1985. The ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of General
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the spring of 1985 coincided with what would become the third costliest year of the
war for the Soviets. Soviet frustration with the war was becoming increasingly apparent. From the platform of the 27th Party Congress in February
1986, Gorbachev described Afghanistan as a “bloody stump.” In addition to the cost in lives, the Soviet Union was spending an estimated 5 billion
dollars a year in prosecuting the war. In fact, 1986 was destined to be the year of decision for Soviet policy makers concerning their continued
involvement in the Afghan quagmire.
British defense correspondent Mark Urban stated that “From early 1986 the Soviet Army switched to a more defensive strategy. Rural operations
were reduced and defences around towns increased . . .” Urban estimated that there were six offensives involving more than 5,000 Soviet troops
each in 1984-85 while there was only one such operation during the last three years of the war. Urban’s argument is correct with respect to the
involvement of Soviet ground forces, as the burden of large-scale ground fighting began to shift to DRA forces. In fact, Soviet casualties in 1986
dropped to their lowest levels since 1981. The Soviets did not, however, completely abandon offensive operations. In February 1986, Soviet forces
conducted a large-scale operation into the Charikar valley, approximately 40 miles north of Kabul, which demonstrated the increasing proficiency of
Soviet forces in the conduct of desant-type combined arms operations. For example, on the first day alone, helicopters conducted a tactical
insertion of three airborne battalions and three motor rifle companies. Later, an additional 17 battalions were landed in support of the operation.
The Charikar valley operation illustrated the increased proficiency achieved by Soviet forces in massed air assault operations by 1986.
In early April, Soviet and DRA forces launched a joint operation aimed at capturing the major mujahideen stronghold at Zhawar, a mere three
kilometers from the Pakistani border. The attacking force consisted of 12,000 troops of which only 2,200 were Soviet. Soviet airpower played a
critical role in assembling forces for the attack by airlifting 4,200 DRA and Russian troops into the airport at Khost just prior to the start of the
operation. During the initial stages of the operation, DRA mechanized and ground forces pushing south from Khost encountered heavy resistance that
slowed their advance to between two and three kilometers per day. In attempting to break the mujahideen resistance, the offensive on the road to
Zhawar relied heavily on large-scale heliborne operations in order to provide the anvil for the hammer of the advancing mechanized forces. Brigadier
Abdol Gafur, the DRA commander for the operation, employed elite Soviet and DRA battalions in air assault landings behind the mujahideen lines.
Soviet aircraft also supported the DRA forces by conducting strikes on mujahideen positions. For example, Soviet Su-25 Frogfoot ground attack
aircraft with laser-guided bombs successfully struck the insurgents’ cave/storage complex at Zhawar. After almost three weeks of fighting, Zhawar
fell to the DRA and Soviet forces. Although modest in terms of Soviet ground participation, the campaign clearly indicated the continuing importance
of Soviet airpower in all its forms. The Zhawar campaign provided an example of Soviet airpower’s effectiveness when the mujahideen chose to stand
and fight a fixed battle.
During this period, the Soviets also adapted their tactics to better suit the nature of unconventional warfare by employing small groups of specially
trained commando forces (spetsnaz) to conduct hit-and-run raids against the mujahideen. Edward Girardet, a journalist with extensive experience
traveling with the mujahideen, stated “The special troops are swift, silent and deadly. Swooping down in a single December [1985] raid, they
slaughtered 82 guerrillas and wounded 60 more.” A mujahideen commander, Amin Wardak described the ambush: “They attacked at night in a
narrow gorge. At first, we didn’t know we were being shot at because of the silencers. Then our people began falling.” These ambushes were
effective, but relied on small numbers of specially trained forces. In addition, these forces relied largely on the mobility provided by helicopters for
insertion and exfiltration. Still, these isolated successes could not break the mujahideen’s hold on the countryside.
If Soviet ground operations were reduced in 1986, the nature of Soviet air operations remained essentially the same. One estimate of Soviet aircraft
in Afghanistan in 1986 included 80 MiG-21 Fishbeds, 40 MiG-23 Floggers, 80 Su-17 Fitters, 30 Su-25s, and 27 reconnaissance aircraft. However,
the number of helicopters in the country dramatically declined between 1985 and 1988. Compared to a high of approximately 600 aircraft in 1982, the
number of helicopters fell from 350 in 1985 to 325 in 1986, and, finally to 275 by February 1988.91 The greatly reduced number of helicopters was in
part tied to the restricted size and nature of Soviet ground operations. More importantly, the growing vulnerability of rotary-wing assets to the
increasing missile threat undoubtedly played a role in the decision to reduce these forces.
Regards,
Hist2004