The Dane
12-19-2009, 04:07 PM
Good read.
Infantry Magazine, May-June 2004
I developed the following article from notes taken during a series of personal interviews conducted in Baghdad. I have done my best to make this account as historically accurate as possible, but there may be minor discrepancies. Such is the nature of war with all its fog, emotions, and confusion. It is my intention to tell the story of the incredible dedication, the hardships, the courage, and the professionalism of the American Soldiers in this battle. Unfortunately, my writing can't do them justice. I have left out much, but I have their story in my notes, in my head, and in my heart. I was never in my life more proud of the American Soldier than I was of those on that battlefield. I stand humbled before these men--Art Durante, 23 May 2003, Baghdad.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_3_93/ai_n6366543/?tag=content;col1
LineDoggie
12-19-2009, 05:52 PM
In 2005, there still was a BRDM turret under the On ramp at Obj. Moe and empty ammo cans everywhere under the highway near Spaghetti Junction
The Dane
12-19-2009, 06:00 PM
I like how the 120mm mortars have performed throughout the Iraqi war, a very effective weapon..
There was a large building on the northwest corner of the intersection and from it rained a hail of rifle and machine gun fire. At some times, there were so many enemy firing from that building that it appeared to the U.S. Soldiers that the whole structure was "twinkling and blinking" (LTC Twitty). Repeated attempts by the gunners of Bradley fighting vehicles to suppress these fires were not successful.
Although the fire would decrease for a while, it would soon build again.
CSM Gallagher recommended that the mortar platoon fire direct lay missions against the building, something CPT Zan readily agreed to. The mortar platoon initiated what would be the first of many direct lay missions in support of the defense of Objective Curley.
The fighting at Objective Curley was fierce and continuous from the moment the U.S. forces halted and dismounted their vehicles. The small U.S. force on Objective Curley was hard-pressed. The enemy attacked with a fanaticism unknown since the screaming Japanese kamikaze charges in the Pacific or the fierce night assaults of the North Vietnamese Army in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. The Americans fought back just as hard, pounding the enemy with everything they had.
The mortar platoon was firing indirect fire in support of the forces at Objectives Moe and Larry, firing direct lay missions against the attackers at Objective Curley, and defending its portion of the perimeter with its heavy machine guns and small arms, all the time under a hail of fire from RPGs, AK-47s, and enemy indirect fire.
This battle proved the wisdom of the American Army's decision to replace the aged 107 mm mortar with the newer, more powerful 120mm. The newer mortar's ability to fire at very close-range targets, along with its faster rate of fire and more lethal ammunition, was the difference between life and death several times that day.
The actions of the mortar platoon of TF 3-15 Infantry deserve special attention. Not only did it defend a sector of the Team ZAN perimeter, but also its indirect fires played a large role in the successful actions at all three objectives.
LTC Twitty discovered early on in the fight that his mortars would play a key role. The battles leading up to this one had not presented many opportunities to bring his mortars to play against the Iraqis, but this fight made up for all that. "The mortars were my artillery! I could clear my own fires, and that made a big difference. It took the mortar platoon about one to two minutes to fire a mission for us" (LTC Twitty).
The mortar platoon was not the only unit firing in support of the defenders of Objective Curley. The supporting field artillery battalion had been called up for several missions. Four or five hours into the fight, the artillery had fired a "danger close" mission against a building on the northeastern portion of the perimeter that was being used by Iraqi snipers and RPG gunners. The mission was successful in suppressing the fire for a while, but it eventually started again.
The battalion FSO called for a repeat of the original mission. According to him, the artillery battalion FDC passed the mission to a different battery than the one that had fired the original mission. When this battery fired the mission, a single round landed short of the target and wounded two Team ZAN Soldiers. The FSO called an immediate check-fire.
After that, the FSO decided that it was better to use the mortars rather than the artillery for the missions around Objective Curley. He used his mortar platoon exclusively for the next 24 hours. The mortar platoon did not have any short rounds during the battle. The mortar platoon was in constant action. It fired at seven targets in support of the most northern objective, Moe. Six of these were "danger close."
It fired one mission against a heavily wooded area in which an estimated Iraqi platoon was gathered. The FDC called for a combination of high explosive (HE)-Delay, HE-Quick, and white phosphorus (WP) rounds. The platoon fired a series of missions, each on a slightly different range and deflection, in effect a search-and-traverse mission, using more than 40 rounds. The observer reported the entire Iraqi platoon destroyed.
Another time, an observer sent a grid location of a target, reporting a force of 40 to 50 Iraqis with at least one pickup truck mounting a machine gun moving north up an alley towards the U.S. position. The mortars fired an immediate suppression mission, without any adjusting rounds, and hit the truck with the first volley. The survivors of the Iraqi attack force were dispersed.
The battalion FSO was not the only person calling for and adjusting the mortar fires. At one time or another, company FSOs, forward observers, company commanders, squad leaders, platoon leaders, and even a company executive officer all called for mortar fires. It just depended on who was in the best position to observe the fire.
Although the mortar platoon leader, Captain Woodruff, used the aiming circle at least once during the war to lay the mortars for direction, normally the squad leaders would lay the individual mortars using their M2 compasses. The unit had trained extensively for this, and had practiced occupying firing positions on roads. The platoon leader trusted his mortar squad leaders, even though several of them were relatively junior Soldiers. He and the platoon sergeant had trained them well, and they did not have any problems because of mistakes in lay for direction.
During the fighting on Objective Curley, the mortar platoon had two misfires--rounds that dropped, but did not fire. The crews executed by-the-book drills to reduce the misfires and get back into action. The only modification they made was that they did not exit the mortar track and wait for the tube to cool; they reduced the misfire immediately and returned to firing missions.
The 120ram rounds proved to be deadly to both exposed attackers and to buildings. Several missions during this battle were against buildings occupied by Iraqi forces. The mortar platoon would engage a building using HE-Delay. The U.S. troops were always impressed by the amount of damage the heavy mortars would cause, even against substantial buildings.
CPT Woodruff had several good things to say about the training he received at the Infantry Mortar Leader's Course (IMLC). He said that it had thoroughly prepared him to train and lead a mortar platoon in combat. He stated, "1 kept a copy of FM 7-90, Tactical Employment of Mortars, with me at all times." He said that the doctrine contained in that manual was very useful to him in this war.
The mortar platoon tracks were equipped with what the troops called "ACAV kits." These were heavy metal gun-shields that protected the normally exposed gunners of the heavy machine guns.
It's been a while since I read it but this is one of the incidents recounted in David Zucchino's Thunder Run?
The Dane
12-21-2009, 02:40 PM
It's been a while since I read it but this is one of the incidents recounted in David Zucchino's Thunder Run?
Yup ......
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