Maginot Line

[WestCoastG's]

The Maginot (however you spell it ) line was and still is the pinnacle in french tactics and thinking. The french thought a line of fortresses connected through underground roads would be effective against the highly mobile Nazi war machine. They were wrong. With all those centuries of military experience this was the best they could build. And just recently i read a report from the french defense minisrty saying they were going to repair and man the aging fortress. What do you think?

[fantassin]

That it's a lot of balls and that fortifications are things of the past.

[Vance]

^

http://img1.photobucket.com/albums/1003/MariaCaramela/maginot.jpg

[Ria]

Le WTF??
rofl rofl

[WestCoastG's]

Going to war without france is like going hunting without an accordian, you leaving a loud useless peice of inadequency behind

[fantassin]

Want to talk about the bright defence of Corregidor for a change ?

[Tane Angle]

I don't really know what'd they plan on doing with the line, considering it only protected about 3/4s of the border, that the sea is the new Belgium (in terms of ways into places like France), and that I wasn't aware Germany and France didn't like one another that much.

Have a good one, and just some thoughts...

[Fintin]

well...i think vancy pants has it right...thats pritty much exactly what happend...the line got bypassed then attacked from behind...many of the gun implacements wer not made to rotate a full 360...in theory the line would have worked...if it had been attacked through germany...but france put too much faith in other countrys to stand up to an attack...which in theory they could have...if the germans had not developed blitzkreg...



btw...vancy pants...best explination i have seen so far...

[Tane Angle]

That is a really good explaination. Especially the "haha suckas." :D

[Kilgor]

To be fair, the mentality of the French wasnt uncommon in post ww1 times. Many military planners thought the next war would be exactly like the last, built around naval and solider to soldier combat. People with foresite like billy mitchell were ignored and ridiculed, and lessions learned in blood were forgotten.

The French however were pioneers in such important weapons like tanks and aircraft, but failed to take advantage of this. So when the german army came knocking, they were prepared for the same old war. And the rest they say is history.

[mack pl]

The french thought a line of fortresses connected through underground roads would be effective against the highly mobile Nazi war machine.
hmmm, well , all countrys in Europe had this kind of fortress lines. Maybe not such big, but it was normal thing- Stalin line in Soviet Russia, Manerheim line in Finland, German Gustav and Zigfrid lines, etc etc.

[perdurabo]

but lets go back to topic
is "maginot line" thinking still strong in frence?

[Lt_Crooks]

If that is true then the french are by far the most tacticly challenged people. Because the wars of the future have no frontlines. (but maybe they will use them just as military bases, not lines of defence)

[MEGR]

I watched the History Channel special on this thing. It was simply amazing, but what they did was underestimate the Germans capabilities which lead to its downfall.

[Navy]

West Coast: What do you mean about the maginot line still being used? To me, your "piece of information" only sounds like this never ending french bashing.


Get a life. :roll:

[MEGR]

Isn't it true though, that even though it was a series of Ground defenses, in no way shape or form could it stope the Air and land Blitzkrieg?

[Navy]

Ofcourse its true, but thats not my point. Read my post again.

[MEGR]

Ofcourse its true, but thats not my point. Read my post again.

If you think I was bashing the French, well your wrong. One was an unbiased historical question, and one was something I learned from the History Channel.

[Navy]

But plz!!!!!!!!!

Did I EVER mentioned your name? I say it again. Go back and READ my initial POST.
;)

[-=TFN=-Karab]

It was stupid...

"The French never die!!!


They just surrender..."

[Navy]

I think that you people (over there), who dont know jack about modern european history, should stfu.

WE ALL KNOW THAT THE MAGINOT LINE FAILED! WHATS YOUR POINT?

:cantbeli:

[Flagg]

I think the best and simplest way to define the Maginot Line that I've heard is:

"Preparing to fight the LAST war."

[David Lehmann]

Hello,

Maginot Line websites :
http://www.lignemaginot.com/index10.htm
http://www.maginot.org/
http://www.maginot67.com/
http://www.thissen-laboratories.com/casso/index.php3?p=23
http://www.sfdauphine.org/

Maginot Line books :
"Hommes et ouvrages de la ligne Maginot" , Jean-Yves Mary and Alain Hohnadel, Histoire & collections
- Tome I
- Tome II
- Tome III
- Tome IV (is coming)

Roger Bruge's books (Fayard) :
- "Faites sauter la ligne Maginot"
- "Offensive sur le Rhin"
- "On a livré la ligne Maginot"



The Maginot line :

The choice of building fortifications on the Maginot line had several goals :

- Avoid a surprise attack like in Belgium, Netherlands ... and give alert

- Cover the mobilization period (2-3 weeks)

- Economize forces (France had 39 millions citizens against 70 millions for Germany)

- Protect Alsace/Lorraine and all the industry there

- Be the basis for a counter-attack

- Force the Germans to attack by the flanks (Belgium or Switzerland)


Only after Dunkirk Hitler decided to attack the Maginot Line. The German crossed the Rhine and destroyed several small bunkers (new constructions) but the whole big forts, even attacked by heavy support (420 mm guns, Stuka ...) resisted to all assaults and inflicted heavy losses to the enemy. About 22,000 encircled men in Alsace/Lorraine mobilized 240,000 Germans and in the Alps 175,000 alpine troops encountered 312,500 Italians (in fact only 60,000 men directly facing the Italians). The army of general Olry (France) had only 175,000 men and the country was already deadly hurt by the Wehrmacht who attacked this army on its rears but was blocked by the Groupement Cartier (23,000 men). Armistice of June 25, 1940 arrived and no important French position was lost in this sector. Only 3 forts/advanced posts were seized by the Italians. The numeric superiority of the Italians was limited because of the terrain which limited the use of motorized elements. The French fortifications constructed in the XIXth century and improved in the '30s was really efficient in this sector, the mountainous area was really adapted for defensive positions. At the end the Italian had lost 642 KIAs, 2691 WIAs, 2151 frozen men, and 616 POWs. The French Army had lost only 20 KIAs, 84 WIAs and 152 MIAs.

Oddly enough, the Maginot line was rather a success ; it accomplished exactly what it was intended to do. It wasn't designed to fully protect France from an attack from the east, though the Maginot line mentality fostered the idea that it would.

It was designed to compensate for France's inferiority in troops, versus Germany, by reducing the area that the field army had to cover, and by freeing up personnel for that field army's manoeuvre divisions. It did exactly that. It wasn't the Maginot line's fault that the French High Command wasn't able to use the field army effectively.

Concerning the Maginot line in Alsace for example, the German did attack across the Rhine in June 40 (operation Kleiner Bär) with the VII Army (25th Korps, 27th Korps, 33rd Höh. Kdo, 213rd ID, 6th Gebirgsdivision ; more than 5 artillery regiments and strong air support. The French had to fight 1 vs 10 with second line troops and they had less than 10 field howitzers (a few 75mm and several 155mm) for a front of more or less 200 km.

The German massed heavy AA guns (88 mm) to fire directly at the bunkers at less than 200m and to destroy them while lower calibers (37mm AA and 37mm Pak) had to destroy the weapon slits (MG, mortars) and observation posts of the same bunker. In front of each French bunker there were about 4 to 6 Pak or Flak guns.

Armistice came on June 25, 1940 but only 1 week later did the fortifications surrender. Looking at these facts the Maginot Line did play a good part of its role. It avoided an immediate surprise attack like in Poland, Belgium, Norway etc. It covered the mobilization period and no enemy incursion occurred during this period, it efficiently protected the industries in Alsace/Lorraine and forced Hitler to attack the neutral Belgium where elite troops were send to stop them. Every now knows that they did not manage to stop them and that they were only attracted in Belgium.

Defeat was not a fatality and the Maginot line was not the reason of that defeat but became often the scapegoat.



Reasons of the quick fall of France ?


1) Political :


The French government was clearly weak.

From 1931 to 1939 Gamelin modelled a new army and made several errors :

- instead of unifying the command he diluted it in several intermediate command, what complicated the chain of command

- on the eve of war he created two TO : North East and the Alps

- He planned operation Dyle/Breda but against the opinion of the general Georges in charge of it on the field

- he did not understand the role of aviation in a modern war and was opposed to the creation of big armored formations

- in 1939 his collaborators and the army and no trust and no respect for him

- entrenched in the Vincennes castle he communicated only by phone and didn't want to yse modern radio equipment.


2) Strategically / Military :


- The French army was not able to lead a modern movement war

- Bad coordination between the infantry/tanks/artillery/aviation in comparison to the Germans who trained in that way.

- Grossly no reserves

- No serious counter-attack could be launched except operation in the Warndt (Sarre area) in 1939 but this is mainly due to High Command and political reasons. In May / June 1940 the single important counter-attacks took place in Abbeville and in Arras. Montcornet and Crécy-sur-Serre were rather probes.

- Lack in radios, most of the communication means were telephones, flags or men on motorcycles ... very slow when you have to make a quick decision against a quick advancing foe.

- A very important point is the lack in AA artillery compared to the German one (not enough pieces but also not enough AA ammunitions). The Stukas and Hs-123s had it easy while most of the French aircrafts were not destroyed by German fighters but by the very dense Flak the German had.

- The communists often claimed that there were numerous in the resistance but they forgot to mention that it is because they were already well organized since the dissolution of their political movement in September 1939. Because of the German-Soviet agreement they were in favour of the Germans and were responsible for many strikes and sabotages. Farman factory had been damaged by a bomb in June and it is well known that many of the tanks/armament coming out from the Satory factory were sabotaged and that some tanks had mechanical breakdowns due to that. That does not explain at all the total defeat but it puts into light the general atmosphere in the country. Already before WW2 they led a subversive pacifist/internationalist campaign in the country and hindered the French armament program.

- The Germans had always armor superiority because they concentrated it and French did that only in several battles. France, as well as Great Britain, used tank tactics very different from Germany's ones. Where Germany deployed their Panzers in concentration, France and Great Britain deployed their tanks spread out among the infantry or sometimes concentrated but only as a shock element working for the infantry, never as a decisive weapon by itself, they had nothing really comparable to the Panzer Divisionen, the closest was the French DLM which had been in fact copied to give rise to the Leichten Divisionen (transformed in Panzer Divisionen after Poland). The big allied armored units didn't show as good combined arms efficiency and were all weaker in tank numbers. This meant that it was easy for the German forces to take out the few tanks used at a time and the otherwise superior French tanks (armor and armament) were no real threat towards Germany's superior Blitzkrieg tactics. Except for some battles (Hannut/Gembloux, Abbeville ...) the French tanks were never concentrated and as a French general said, the tanks were used in 1000 groups of 3 instead of 3 groups of 1000. The French tanks were all better armored than the best German tanks, the armament of several tanks (Renault B1bis, Somua S35 etc.) was better (the 47mm SA35 L/34 gun is far better than the German 3.7cm KwK36 L/46.5), but they lacked communication and were slower. The German tanks were lighter and were spreading like water, they poured in every breakthrough and attacked the rear lines, disorganizing the whole defense. Thanks to their more numerous radios they were able to quickly change the direction of a movement/attack and they were continuously supported by attack and reconnaissance aircrafts.



3) Psychological :


- France declared war to Germany with a civil population deeply pacifist after the WWI slaughter (France had about 6 millions losses that meant 10% of the active male population of the country - 1,400,000 KIA - and only in the late 50's the French population could reach again the number of before WW1).

- Communists' strikes and sabotages in the armament industries (because of the pact between Germany and Russia).
- The political power was weak.

- The defeat was already there, no real will to fight in the high spheres of decision.



-------------------------


France in 1940 must be seen as the best example of Blitzkrieg carried out, it couldn't work anymore in Russia which was too big. In Poland it was much more a classical Kesselschlacht and the too weak Leichten-Divisionen where after that transformed in Panzer-Divisionen. A large faked attack was undertaken in Belgium and Holland where paratroopers and airborne troops were used to secure important points. France sent its best forces in this area. Later, the main forces attacked in an unexpected place where only second-rate divisions resisted them. Here, Panzers pushed on almost without concern for their flanks, leaving the cleaning up to the infantry. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe attacked as support for the Panzers and the infantry.

The French fought very well as companies and battalions but poorly as divisions and horribly as armies ... doctrine (conception and use of tanks), communication issues etc. The French Army didn't loose because of a lack of material (though a high lack of radios, bombers, AA weapons and AA ammunitions) and its armament was as good as the German one, the reasons are both the doctrine at the military level and several political decisions.

In 1940, in 45 days, the French army lost 120,000 KIA on the battlefield. In the same time the Germans lost 45,218 KIA. Despite lacks of high command the French soldiers did resist to the enemy each time they were well commanded on the front.


German losses (whole western campaign until the end of the battle of France) :
- 156,492 losses (27,074 KIA, 111,034 WIA, 18,384 MIA) (+ 6000 Italian losses in the French Alps). This first figure established on June 25, 1940 has been corrected later to 45,218 German KIA (with the MIAs).
- 1236 planes + 323 damaged (about 500 victories for the French air force fighters alone, not counting here the losses due to AA fire etc. and many gliders and Ju-52 destroyed in the Netherlands).
- 839 tanks definitively destroyed (33% of the 2542 tanks engaged) and 157 armored cars destroyed.


Allied losses according to Karl-Heinz Frieser (Oberst Bundeswehr, MFGA) in his book "Blitzkrieg Legende" and Gérard Saint-Martin "L'arme blindée française" :
Belgian losses in 19 days : 7500 KIA, 15850 WIA
Luxembourg : no fightings
Dutch losses in 6 days : 2890 KIA, 6889 WIA
British losses in 26 days : 3457 KIA, 13602 WIA, 3267 MIA
French losses in 45 days : 120,000 KIA.


The Swiss historian Eddy Bauer says also that the Germans lost much more men in the second part of the western campaign, in France the resistance was harder when time advanced.
156,492 German losses (KIA, MIA, WIA) in 45 days, that's 3477 losses per day but in fact the French resistance was all days harder : 2499 losses per day between the 10th May and the 3rd June but 4762 losses per day between the 5th and the 24th June. You can compare that to the 4506 losses/day during operation Barbarossa from June 22 to December 10, 1941.


Regards,


David

[Royal]

but lets go back to topic
is "maginot line" thinking still strong in frence?

France?

Don't know about France, but it's certainly pretty prevalent in UK and US thinking.

The Baghdad 'Green Zone', Airport perimeters and armed gurads, The chain link along the Rio Grande...


If that is true then the french are by far the most tacticly challenged people.

Hmmmmm

Hello pot this is kettle...

[Uncle Chô]

1- David, your post is one of the most impressive I have read on the subject. Simply facts. Bravo!

2- about the current use of the Maginot Line. The French Army already used some of the concrete buildings and underground tunnels for housing vital equipments like early warning radars and ELINT units. This was during the Cold War when the threat was coming from the East. Some of the remaining bunkers have been accuratly restored to their 1940 configuration and are now open for public display (like the "Ouvrage du Neuehof"). If you have the opportunity to visit it, take the chance. This is very interesting.

What about the future? I have never heard of a new use for the Ligne Maginot. In contrary, the MoD is selling a lot of real estate that are useless since the end of conscription and the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Why don't you provide us with the link?

[Vance]

Guys guys guys, just study my image for the best explination on the Maginot Line. :D

[Operation Ivy]

Le WTF :lol:

[moughoun]

If they were to bring the Maginot line back into service :roll: , it would only serve to (borrowing Vancy pant's line) ;) Le bomb magnet nothing more

[OB Kenobi]

Le WTF??
rofl rofl

Que Le ****e!?

[Miles Teg]

Hi old friends !

I'm back, and I'm so happy to see again so much interesting topics. :D

Stay tuned, I'm on the air.


...
After the war "le WTF" was called "la chienlit".