What if thread #4: The Falklands War 1982

[TheKiwi]

The Falklands War of 1982 had a number of points in it that could have gone either way. In particular, the lead up to the British landings saw a number of ships sunk. Several more would have been badly damaged had the Argentine bombs that struck them detonated. There was almost certainly a minimum number of escorts deemed necessary to protect the British fleet. Would the sinking or damaging of another 3 or 4 ships have forced the fleet to return to Britain? This is probably the only way (in my opinion) that Argentina could have won. Once the British ground forces had landed, the Argentine conscripts

On the other hand, the sinking of the Belgrano could have just as easily been the sinking of the Veinticinco de Mayo, an even greater blow to both Argentina and to the Argentine navy.

Other possible what-ifs to ponder. What if the Argentine army had fewer conscripts and more regulars on the Falklands when the British landings occurred? What if the Argentine navy had more operational submarines at the time? What if the Air Force had acquired more Exocets?

[Arnie100]

What if the Brits still had the Audacious-class carriers (Ark Royal and Eagle) still in service during the Falklands War??

[TheKiwi]

Good question. Of course in part it was the scrapping of those carriers that made the Junta adventurous. The Gannet AEW system wasn't brilliant, but it was a heck of a lot better than no AEW and the Phantoms/Buccaneers would have been a highly potent combination of fighter and strike force.

[Arnie100]

Seriously. The Phantoms would have chewed up those Skyhawks before they even got within range of the Fleet. And the Bucs would've been a highly-effective ground support aircraft.

[TheKiwi]

Well maybe. Remember the poor results the US had with the Sparrow system in South East Asia. Still, they had significantly more range and firepower than the Sea Harriers. And no disagreement about the Buccaneers.

[Arnie100]

I still think that the Phantoms would've given the Brits air superiority over the Falklands.

[TheKiwi]

Quite likely, but I don't think it'd be a cake walk or anything.

[Alfacentori]

Phantoms would have certainly allowed for a much more potent CAP that much I think is certain

Alfa

[TheKiwi]

Yes, the longer range (not to mention the much greater deck capacity of Eagle/Ark Royal would have meant the RN could put up a permanent CAP.

[Arnie100]

With the Sea Harriers if any aircraft got past the Phantoms.

[TheKiwi]

All very well and good, but as we know, both Carriers were scrapped in an attack of myopia (that's fancy speak for short-sightedness). I seem to recollect that at least 4 RN ships were struck by bombs that failed to detonate. How many more escorts could the RN afford to loose before they would be unable to properly protect the Hermes, Invincible and the troop ships?

[Panchito12]

What if the UK had used its Polaris SLBM's? This thread would be done. I win!!!

[TheKiwi]

Chihuahua level fail.

[Alfacentori]

Did Britain have any capability in 1982 with cruise missiles from subs or ships, or other means, say US allowed refuel of Vulcans, to strike the Argentine airbases? That would have made an interesting scenario

As for the escorts well if all weapons had detonated and a few more losses had been taken the task force could have been forced to withdraw.

Summary of Task Force Strength




Submarines reaching the Falkland's Area, early April to MayNuclear submarines "Spartan", "Splendid", "Conqueror", "Courageous"(?), "Valiant" and conventionally powered "Onyx", with some SBS.

RAF Squadrons reaching or deploying to Ascension, early April to MayVC.10 transports of 10 Sqdn, Hercules transports of 24, 30, 47 and 70 Sqdns,
Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft of 42(TB), 51(?), 120, 201 and 206 Sqdns,
Victor tankers of 55 and 57 Sqdns,
Vulcan bombers of 44, 50 and 101 Sqdns,
Harrier GR.3 attack aircraft of 1(F),
Chinook helicopter of 18 and a
Sea King of 202,
Phantom fighters of 29(F) Sqdns,
Units of the RAF Regiment.
South Georgia recaptured ("Operation Paraquat") on 25th AprilNaval forces - Destroyer "Antrim", Frigates "Brilliant", "Plymouth", Ice patrol ship "Endurance", RFA's "Tidespring" and (earlier) "Brambleleaf" and "Fort Austin".
Land forces - M Coy 42 Cdo RM, SBS RM and D Sqdn 22nd SAS.
Carrier Battle Group starting attacks on Falklands, 1st MayNaval forces - Carriers "Hermes", "Invincible", Destroyers "Glamorgan", "COVENTRY", "Glasgow", "SHEFFIELD", Frigates "Broadsword", "Alacrity", "Arrow", "Yarmouth" and RFA's "Olmeda" and "Resource". Joined later in May by destroyer "Exeter", frigate "Ambuscade" and RFA "Regent".
Carrier aircraft - Sea Harriers of Nos.800 and 801, anti-submarine and assault Sea King helicopters of Nos.820, 826 and 846 NAS; and later, Sea Harriers of No.809 and RAF Harrier GR.3's of 1(F) Squadrons.
Land forces - SBS RM, D and G Sqdns 22nd SAS.
Amphibious Group reaching the TEZ, followed by Landings in San Carlos Water ("Operation Sutton") on 21st MayNaval forces - including Assault ships "Fearless", "Intrepid", Frigates "ARDENT", "Argonaut" and later "ANTELOPE", RFA's "Stromness", "Tidepool", LSL's "SIR GALAHAD", "Sir Geraint", "Sir Lancelot", "Sir Percivale", "Sir Tristram" and (later) "Sir Bedivere", Transports "Canberra", "Elk", "Europic Ferry", "Norland", and Aircraft and helicopter support ship "ATLANTIC CONVEYOR".
Land forces - 3 Commando Brigade RM including 40, 42 and 45 Cdo RM and 2 and 3 Para, and 3 CBAS Gazelle and Scout helicopters.
Other Ships and Helicopter Squadrons supporting the Task Force up to the End of May
At Ascension
RMAS mooring vessel "Goosander" and Tanker "Alvega"; also Detached despatch vessel "Dumbarton Castle".
Tanker Holding Areas in the South Atlantic and in Tug, Repair and Logistics Area (TRALA)
RFA tankers "Appleleaf", Pearleaf and "Plumleaf" plus Tankers "Anco Charger", "Eburna", Eight British Petroleum "British" tankers, and Water tanker "Fort Toronto".
Operating in Falklands area
Hospital ship "Uganda" and Ambulance ships "Hecla", "Herald" and "Hydra" in Red Cross Box (RCB), Repair ship "Stena Seaspread" and Tugs "Irishman", "Salvageman", "Yorkshireman" in TRALA.
Reaching South Georgia
Requisitioned minesweepers "Cordella", "Farnella", "Junella", "Northella" and "Pict", RFA tanker "Blue Rover", RMAS tug "Typhoon", Detached despatch vessels "Iris" and "Leeds Castle", Ammo ship "Lycaon" and Stores ship "Saxonia".
Other Helicopters
Sea Kings of No.824 and also 846, Wessex of Nos.737, 845 and 848, Lynx of No.815 and Wasps of No.829 NAS on warships, RFA's and merchantmen, together with one RAF Chinook of 18 Sqdn.


"Bristol" Group arriving in TEZ, late May

Destroyers "Bristol", "Cardiff", Frigates "Active", "Avenger", "Andromeda", "Minerva", "Penelope", RFA's "Bayleaf" and "Olna".
5th Infantry Brigade reaching South Atlantic late May to join Advance on Stanley, early June
Land forces - 5th Infantry Brigade including 2 Scots and 1 Welsh Guards, 1/7 Gurkha Rifles and Gazelle and Scout helicopters of 656 Sqdn AAC.
Transports - "Queen Elizabeth 2", "Baltic Ferry" and "Nordic Ferry".
Other Ships and Helicopter Squadrons arriving to support Task Force up to Surrender
RFA's "Engadine" and "Fort Grange", Merchantmen "Atlantic Causeway", "Balder London", "Contender Bezant", "Geestport", "St. Edmund", "Tor Caledonia" and "Wimpey Seahorse",
Sea Kings of No.825 and Wessex of No.847 NAS.
http://www.naval-history.net/F18taskforce.htm


Alfa

[arcadian]

How about: What if the Argentine fighter pilots had been told to "Engage the Sea Harriers at all costs" instead of...from what I have read in books...been told to "Avoid the Sea Harriers".
I think the Argentines would have still lost a lot of aircraft but numbers would have eventually won the day, even if not all of the Harriers had been destroyed if the RN had lost a significant number of these fighters and the Argentines had achieved air superiorty then it may have tipped the war

[G-AWZT]

The Argentine Army was only good for arresting and torturing it's own citizens. The Argentine 5th Marine Battalion(?) was the only worthwhile unit that gave the British a serious fight at Tumbledown.

If only the Argentines had made use of Port Stanley's airport to receive loads of food and supplies plus make it operational for their A-4Cs. But alas the junta in B.A. was too dumb.

[TheKiwi]

AlphaC, most folks think that the two Vulcan strikes on Port Stanley were intended to send a message to the Junta that their mainland airbases were not impervious to attack. I suspect that if the RN/RAF had lost enough fighters to make air control iffy, you might have seen some air strikes on the mainland bases to even up the odds a bit. Not big strikes mind you, the UK tanker fleet wouldn't support more than one or two Vulcan's at a time at that distance.

[TheKiwi]

The Argentine Army was only good for arresting and torturing it's own citizens. The Argentine 5th Marine Battalion(?) was the only worthwhile unit that gave the British a serious fight at Tumbledown.

If only the Argentines had made use of Port Stanley's airport to receive loads of food and supplies plus make it operational for their A-4Cs. But alas the junta in B.A. was too dumb.

The Argentine army had some good units, some of which were very experienced in operating in the miserable conditions of the Falklands. And they were all keeping an eye on Chile.

[martinexsquaddie]

if your going to do what ifs.
what if thatcher had decided to back chile and instead launch an attack from chile two squadrons of vulcans coming over the the andes plus buccanears and phantoms shock and awe anyone?
12 ssns off shore

[sp2c]

question is ... would the Brits have retreated back to the UK in the first place?

or would they've gone back to Ascencion building up strenght and improving on lessons learned in preperation of another go?
remember, these ships that were hit with bombs and/or missiles that did not detonate were arguably hit because of the lack of a capable close in weapon system on board of those vessels
would they have left mainland argentina alone if they had to go in a second time?
what would've happened to ARA Veinticinco de Mayo and it's 1300 or so crewmen?

imo the endresult is not in dispute, all it would've meant is more casualties on both sides and in favor of the redcoats

[ronin2172]

How about: What if the Argentine fighter pilots had been told to "Engage the Sea Harriers at all costs" instead of...from what I have read in books...been told to "Avoid the Sea Harriers".
I think the Argentines would have still lost a lot of aircraft but numbers would have eventually won the day, even if not all of the Harriers had been destroyed if the RN had lost a significant number of these fighters and the Argentines had achieved air superiorty then it may have tipped the war
It is hard to gain air superority when your fighters only have enough fuel to stay in the area for a short time.

[wotsnext]

What if the UK had used its Polaris SLBM's? This thread would be done. I win!!!
I believe HMS Conqueror would have renderd the Argentine navy impotant, given time.

[sp2c]

How about: What if the Argentine fighter pilots had been told to "Engage the Sea Harriers at all costs" instead of...from what I have read in books...been told to "Avoid the Sea Harriers".
I think the Argentines would have still lost a lot of aircraft but numbers would have eventually won the day, even if not all of the Harriers had been destroyed if the RN had lost a significant number of these fighters and the Argentines had achieved air superiorty then it may have tipped the war

would've just delayed the landings untill the Argentine airforce had been destroyed and/or more harriers had been flown in

[kalboy]

What if the UK had used its Polaris SLBM's? This thread would be done. I win!!!

And what would be the target i ask ? Seriously imagine the GLOBAL outcry against the UK ?

[baboon6]

It is hard to gain air superority when your fighters only have enough fuel to stay in the area for a short time.

Exactly. The Mirages were operating at the extreme end of their range. They did not have enough fuel to engage in air combat and any aircraft that used its afterburner would almost certainly not make it home. As it was many barely did.

[Atlantic Friend]

With more UK assets deployable/deployed, I don't think the "what if" factor is going to take us very far, it would have been easier for the Royal Navy to defend its ships, there would have been interesting Mirage III/Phantom fights, the Argentines would have had a greater need to defend their bases on the littoral I suppose, but it would have ended in an easier (if not easy) and quicker British victory. Or the Argentine junta would just have stayed put and found another way to stir up some patriotic support, since the prospects of defeat would have been crushing.

[baboon6]

With more UK assets deployable/deployed, I don't think the "what if" factor is going to take us very far, it would have been easier for the Royal Navy to defend its ships, there would have been interesting Mirage III/Phantom fights, the Argentines would have had a greater need to defend their bases on the littoral I suppose, but it would have ended in an easier (if not easy) and quicker British victory. Or the Argentine junta would just have stayed put and found another way to stir up some patriotic support, since the prospects of defeat would have been crushing.

If the Mirages didn't have enough fuel to engage the Harriers in dogfights, how would they suddenly have enough fuel to dogfight with Phantoms?

One of the options explored (and rejected) by the British in the early planning for the campaign was to establish a base for Phantoms on West Falkland before landing on East Falkland.

[Atlantic Friend]

If the Mirages didn't have enough fuel to engage the Harriers in dogfights, how would they suddenly have enough fuel to dogfight with Phantoms?

Actually, the line of thinking I was following was that with the hypothetical carriers and their Phantoms complement around, the British Phantoms might have taken the fight closer to home for the Mirages, making for some interesting engagements.

[Mordoror]

i'll ad some other what if roads ?
what if the Argentina was delivered more than 5 air launched Exocet (6 more if i remember correctly were expected in the following months and were blocked from delivery) ?

what if the french navy and air force didn't held spare training with the UK navy and harrier, leading to the readjusting of the tactics ?

what if the Argentine navy conduced more agressive ASW, freeing the 25 de mayo CV and allowing it to operate (and not to stay stuck in the harbor after the blowing of the Belgrano) ?

and finally what if the Belgrano and escort had made its way in the range of the Brit fleet ?


a lot of questions isn't it but i am curious to see the answers....

[Niall]

What if time travellers talked to the Argentine forces in the mountains surrounding Port Stanley and told them of the proposed tactics?!

What if the Argentines had developed the 1982 equivalent of a laser rifle?

EDIT for serious response:
What if the Argentines did not have the exorcet missile and Mirage III fighter jets? How would they have fared against the British task force with outdated equipment?

[Mordoror]

What if time travellers talked to the Argentine forces in the mountains surrounding Port Stanley and told them of the proposed tactics?!

What if the Argentines had developed the 1982 equivalent of a laser rifle?

EDIT for serious response:
What if the Argentines did not have the exorcet missile and Mirage III fighter jets? How would they have fared against the British task force with outdated equipment?

i'll answer because it is quite easy
of the 5 exocets available, 4 hit or near hit 2 ships (the Sheffield and the Atlantic Conveyor) one made a full miss
a sixth missile (navy variant) was adapted to be land launched and hit the HMS Glamoran
the most problematic hit was on the Atl Conv because it destroyed a crap load of needed equipment for the landing and land battle

no exocet would have meant more A4 bombing attacks (although successful they were costy to the Argentina air force) so more losses to achieve the same result or less result achieved
the outcome in that case would have not been different
the sheffield lose although dramatic didn't ampered the navy patrol and combat capability too much

concerning the Mirage III, the A4Q were as successful as them on naval attack if not more
if we assume no Mirage III but in replacement more A4Q that would not have impacted the air naval battle
on the other hand the Mirage III and Daggers provided a good air coverage against the english harriers

anyway even without that air coverage (that resulted in some downing for both sides) the A4 were able to slip through the CAP and under the navy radar view without too much problems (the attacks were often quite successful, the main losses being after the attack and on the way back)
so i don't see a lot of difference if no Mirage III but more Skyhawks

of course if you meant 0 Mirage III so a lower overall plane number that would have been something very different

[TheKiwi]

i'll ad some other what if roads ?
what if the Argentina was delivered more than 5 air launched Exocet (6 more if i remember correctly were expected in the following months and were blocked from delivery) ?

Definately this would have caused problems. As far as I know there was not a single interception of an Exocet missile by the RN's AAW systems.


what if the french navy and air force didn't held spare training with the UK navy and harrier, leading to the readjusting of the tactics ?

Not too dramatic. Remember the RN had the SSM version of the Exocet themselves and they were quite aware of the issues it would cause.


what if the Argentine navy conduced more agressive ASW, freeing the 25 de mayo CV and allowing it to operate (and not to stay stuck in the harbor after the blowing of the Belgrano) ?

I am not sure that the Argentine Navy's ASW equipment and tactics were up to hunting down a SSN. After the Belgrano was torpedoed, her escorts dropped a few depth charges at random and then left the scene in a big hurry. That's not a sign of good ASW tactics.


and finally what if the Belgrano and escort had made its way in the range of the Brit fleet ?

Interestingly enough, I gamed this one out in Harpoon (not the computer game) once. She doesn't get within range of her guns (approx 11 nautical miles from recollection) before she gets struck by the RN's SSM Exocets. And a good thing for the RN too as each round from her 8" cannon is like an Exocet strike on it's own.

[Laworkerbee]

Did the Argies use snake eye bombs to sink HMS Coventry and HMS Antelope? Ive seen footage of one attack and it looked like they were using standard iron bombs which if I remember correctly, several failed to detonate.

So what if the Argies had some stocks of snake eyes then I guess is my question.

[TheKiwi]

Supposedly, the BBC even mentioned in their news that Argentine bombs were failing to go off due to incorrect fuzing. Along with saying that British Paratroops were poised for an attack on Goose Green. Rolls Eyes!

Yes, retarded bombs would have made a difference if the problems with fuzing were known.

[Laworkerbee]

In the clip the A4's came in really low and fast, maybe so low and fast that even the tard bombs wouldn't have worked, who knows?

I remember being a kid and being amazed that aircraft could still bomb ships with all the technology that was available. It also made me wonder how such systems would have held up against a Soviet player.

[TheKiwi]

Most of the British AAW systems (like that of the US at the time) were designed to counter Soviet bombers and their ASM's from a distance. From recollection, the Sea Dark (the standard long range SAM system for the RN) had a minimum altitude that was quite a lot higher than that the A4's and Daggers were flying at. And the Argentines could practise against it as their navy had two destroyers with Sea Dart installed. The Sea Wolf on the other hand was very good against such threats but only a few RN ships were fitted with it.

[Panchito12]

Why is this thread still running. I used the UK's Polaris force to wipe out Argentina in the first page. I won!!!

[Laworkerbee]

I wonder what lessons the Ruskies took from it all.

[Panchito12]

I wonder what lessons the Ruskies took from it all.

As far as Naval forces and Naval infantry...none. They've never had that sort of power projection - not even close to the RN's then or now.

[Laworkerbee]

As far as Naval forces and Naval infantry...none. They've never had that sort of power projection - not even close to the RN's then or now.

Nah, I was thinking in terms of Soviet naval aviation, the trump card after their submarines.

[Panchito12]

Nah, I was thinking in terms of Soviet naval aviation, the trump card after their submarines.

Soviet Naval Aviation? You mean "FORGERS"?? Man, that word used to send us into hysterical laughs in the USN.

[TheKiwi]

You mean as opposed to Backfires with very large ASM's carrying very large missiles. Was that a giggle too?

[Mordoror]

In the clip the A4's came in really low and fast, maybe so low and fast that even the tard bombs wouldn't have worked, who knows?

if i remember correctly it is because the skyhawks were flying low and quick that the fuzzes were not triggering. The fuzzes were WWII leftover or worked as such : they were intended to be launched either during a diving attack or from a medium to high altitude to trigger...the speed and altitude of the Argies aircrafts were too important (speed) and not enough important (altitude) to let the time for the fuzzes to work


I wonder what lessons the Ruskies took from it all.
everybody took the following lessons : Early warning aircrafts or choppers are needed to allow efficient operation of carrier born aircrafts and to allow detection of low level high speed between hills incoming bandits (the radars of the ships even if AA ships are not efficient enough in that case)

second lesson is that a single SSN could block or at least frighten (and so be a strategical threat) to big capitalships and a high percentage of a surface fleet if this one is not correctly covered by ASW ships or aircrafts

the third lesson is that the vulnerability of modern ships to missile is confirmed (but that was already seen during 1967 war)

the last lesson is that even at the missile era ships are still vulnerable to air assault and thus that they need a efficient CAP to be protected (i wonder if this is not that lesson that leaded to the Yak 141 project in order to phase out the not very efficient Yak-38)

[Arnie100]

Panchito12, it probably still does! rofl What was the Argentine Army's armored capability back then? I used to wonder what would happen if the Argentine Army had committed some tank units.

[Panchito12]

You mean as opposed to Backfires with very large ASM's carrying very large missiles. Was that a giggle too?

Targeting requirements for succesful Backfires/Blinder/Bear strike upon a naval task force is a bitch (specially if you have to fly long distances, past easily patrolled choke points).

Targeting airfields with TLAM's is a piece of cake.

[TheKiwi]

Satellite targetting with multiple missile launches was the idea for the Backfires I seem to recollect. Those ASM's had a very long range and were damn fast. Sure F-14's with Phoenix and Aegis could take out lots of incoming missiles, but even so you'd have to worry about some leaking through. 1000kg of explosives can ruin your whole day.

[Mordoror]

Panchito12, it probably still does! rofl What was the Argentine Army's armored capability back then? I used to wonder what would happen if the Argentine Army had committed some tank units.
they had some M41 walker bulldog and TAM tanks
but it would have been very difficult to bring a significant number of any of them on the islands
and a platoon or two would have not made a big difference in front of artillery, total local airsuperiority (especially with helos) and the MILAN and some scorpions that the brits troops landed

[armored_diplomacy]

Panchito12, it probably still does! rofl What was the Argentine Army's armored capability back then? I used to wonder what would happen if the Argentine Army had committed some tank units.

There was a small number of PANHARDs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panhard_AML) but they were not extensively used. I understand that the Islands soils does not allow the use of heavy armored gear.

[armored_diplomacy]

they had some M41 walker bulldog and TAM tanks
but it would have been very difficult to bring a significant number of any of them on the islands
and a platoon or two would have not made a big difference in front of artillery, total local airsuperiority (especially with helos) and the MILAN and some scorpions that the brits troops landed

TAM was not in full production at the time of the war.
BTW: congrats for some of your previous posts here, they are really interesting !

[Mordoror]

There was a small number of PANHARDs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panhard_AML) but they were not extensively used. I understand that the Islands soils does not allow the use of heavy armored gear.

this is maybe the main problem
anyway if i remember correctly some LVT were used by the Argies during the initial assault. So at least around and in Port Stanley they could have been used
Also Scorpions Light tanks were used by the brits so it was possible but of course not to a big extend


TAM was not in full production at the time of the war.
agreed but was it not already in line in some units ??


BTW: congrats for some of your previous posts here, they are really interesting !

thank you very much

[baboon6]

this is maybe the main problem
anyway if i remember correctly some LVT were used by the Argies during the initial assault. So at least around and in Port Stanley they could have been used
Also Scorpions Light tanks were used by the brits so it was possible but of course not to a big extend


agreed but was it not already in line in some units ??





thank you very much

The Scorpion and the CVRT family of vehicles in general have very low ground pressure, less than your average tracked vehicle [0.36kg/cm2 compared to 0.79kg/cm2 for the TAM or 0.72kg/cm2 for the M41], so the fact that they were used successfully doesn't mean other tanks could have been.

[TheKiwi]

And from recollection, even the Scorpions had some problems with bogging down.

[Clockwinder]

http://books.google.com/books?id=Nq3wiTp3c8kC&printsec=frontcover&dq=falklands+war&source=bl&ots=i4fY3B2RjR&sig=QsH7tKUoMLLzgMN1s7xQ8Ox-WWw&hl=en&ei=X8JXS62MCoPYNsmP5NIE&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CBcQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=&f=false
http://www.historyofwaronline.com/Falklands.html

[baboon6]

According to Jane's the TAM was not yet in service anyway. Argentina also had some Sherman Fireflies and about 80 AMX-13s [latter has a ground pressure of 0.76kg/cm2].

[martinexsquaddie]

when I was there in 1991 we used some panhards as range targets.
apprantly they had sat in stanley during the war completely useless.
get off the one long road which was there in 1982 anything with more ground pressure tham a Bv206 or a scorpion is going to spend a lot of time being bogged in.

the island is bog with bits of bare rock think every god awful britsh army training area

[happyslapper]

i'll ad some other what if roads ?
what if the Argentina was delivered more than 5 air launched Exocet (6 more if i remember correctly were expected in the following months and were blocked from delivery) ?

what if the french navy and air force didn't held spare training with the UK navy and harrier, leading to the readjusting of the tactics ?

what if the Argentine navy conduced more agressive ASW, freeing the 25 de mayo CV and allowing it to operate (and not to stay stuck in the harbor after the blowing of the Belgrano) ?

and finally what if the Belgrano and escort had made its way in the range of the Brit fleet ?


a lot of questions isn't it but i am curious to see the answers....

The exocet question was within an inch of being answered emphatically by the SAS. They were literally at the point of boarding the herc when it was called off. The answer was not the missiles themselves, but the delivery system. The mission was to destroy the etendards and effectively assassinate their pilots. There's not alot you can do with an AM39 then.
Also, with the air threat diminished, the RN was beginning to get some control of the c130 flights to Stanley. Sporadic intel from Chile, and from submarines offshore arg airbases were beginning to make sense, but crucially new t42's were arriving which could sit up-range and just wait.

Contrary to popular opinion, the French were actually very helpful, and did share a vast amount of information about French-made weapons and aircraft in Arg use.

If the Belgrano had lauched an attack against the task force, I suspect it would have been suicide, much the same as for the carrier launched A4s. One of the many ironies of that war was the massive abundance of exocets carried on British ships, as well as helicopter and fast-jet launched anti-ship missiles. One of the greatest British failings of the war came about because Adm Woodward and his staff were still of the old mentality of massive surface engaements, rather than effective use of airpower.


if i remember correctly it is because the skyhawks were flying low and quick that the fuzzes were not triggering. The fuzzes were WWII leftover or worked as such : they were intended to be launched either during a diving attack or from a medium to high altitude to trigger...the speed and altitude of the Argies aircrafts were too important (speed) and not enough important (altitude) to let the time for the fuzzes to work


Correct. There was nothing wrong with the fuzes, except where poorly trained Arg AF technicians had not wired them properly (mostly early in the war). The problem was that the pilots were understandably too frightened to bomb from themprescribed height rather than mast-top level, which would have put them more snugly in the anti-aircraft envelope.
I dare you to tell an Argentine that they flew from mast-height because they were trying to save themselves rather than because they were the bravest pilotas in the world...


Panchito12, it probably still does! rofl What was the Argentine Army's armored capability back then? I used to wonder what would happen if the Argentine Army had committed some tank units.

Not alot. The only tanks with a low enough ground pressure were the Scimitar and Scorpians operated by the Blues and Royals. The Falklands are not good armour territory, having a thick layer of waterlogged peat. This is why you see so many pictures of argentine armoured cars and the like left abandoned in Stanley, because its one of the things they did not calculate very well in the initial invasion plans. They mostly 'requisitioned' land rovers belonging to islanders to set up essential radio relays etc on the high ground.

[armored_diplomacy]

1) Contrary to popular opinion, the French were actually very helpful, and did share a vast amount of information about French-made weapons and aircraft in Arg use.


2) There was nothing wrong with the fuzes, except where poorly trained Arg AF technicians had not wired them properly (mostly early in the war). The problem was that the pilots were understandably too frightened to bomb from themprescribed height rather than mast-top level, which would have put them more snugly in the anti-aircraft envelope. I dare you to tell an Argentine that they flew from mast-height because they were trying to save themselves rather than because they were the bravest pilotas in the world...
.

Lets see:

1) Thats absolutely true, and the reasons remain unclear. We must get rid of the "blackmail" theory of UK dropping a nuclear warhead if France didn´t help, so it´s really hard to understand that assistance, specially if we consider that France was giving away valuable info about their own weapons.
Do you have any extra data about that?

2)
a - poorly trained Arg AF technicians had not wired them properly (mostly early in the war)

Source of that, please?

b- pilots were understandably too frightened to bomb from themprescribed height

Again, Source of that, please? (this is a "What if" thread, but I assume that any theory must have a little background at least).

c- dare you to tell an Argentine that they flew from mast-height because they were trying to save themselves rather than because they were the bravest pilotas in the world...

Yes, they where trying to avoid being hit and strike at the same time !!!!! (and if we consider that they had everything against them, they did well).
What´s wrong with that?

(Mr. Happyslapper, please avoid troll-like comments ! ;-))

Regards

(and really, I´d love to read more about the French assistance)

[happyslapper]

Lets see:

1) Thats absolutely true, and the reasons remain unclear. We must get rid of the "blackmail" theory of UK dropping a nuclear warhead if France didn´t help, so it´s really hard to understand that assistance, specially if we consider that France was giving away valuable info about their own weapons.
Do you have any extra data about that?

2)
a - poorly trained Arg AF technicians had not wired them properly (mostly early in the war)

Source of that, please?

b- pilots were understandably too frightened to bomb from themprescribed height

Again, Source of that, please? (this is a "What if" thread, but I assume that any theory must have a little background at least).

c- dare you to tell an Argentine that they flew from mast-height because they were trying to save themselves rather than because they were the bravest pilotas in the world...

Yes, they where trying to avoid being hit and strike at the same time !!!!! (and if we consider that they had everything against them, they did well).
What´s wrong with that?

(Mr. Happyslapper, please avoid troll-like comments ! ;-))

Regards

(and really, I´d love to read more about the French assistance)

1. The French had/have a large network of overseas territories, so were heavily sympathetic to the British. The UK is also a major ally of France, whereas genocidal dictators were ten-a-penny and pretty bad for France's image.
Practially every book ever written about the war goes into detail on the issue.

2.a. The technicians were mostly conscripts much the same as the army. Would an expert technician miswire a bomb?

b. do you understand how bomb fuzes work? apparently not or you wouldn't have asked.

c. my point is that it is a typical misconception that flying as low as possible is the test of great skill. Any 12 year-old on MS Flight Simulator cna do that. The test is being professional and putting steel on steel.


(Mr. Happyslapper, please avoid troll-like comments ! ;-))

:roll:
Spare me. If you had done the research yourself, I wouldn't have to waste my time responding. When it's me who has to provide the specifics, you might want to reappraise who's the troll.

[Laworkerbee]

I dare you to tell an Argentine that they flew from mast-height because they were trying to save themselves rather than because they were the bravest pilotas in the world.

More likely, I'd buy him a drink.


c. my point is that it is a typical misconception that flying as low as possible is the test of great skill. Any 12 year-old on MS Flight Simulator cna do that. The test is being professional and putting steel on steel.

Any credibility you might have had just went to ****, congrats!

[happyslapper]

Buy an Argentine a drink, or an Argentine veteran pilot a drink?

I'd certainly buy the latter a drink.

[armored_diplomacy]

1. The French had/have a large network of overseas territories, so were heavily sympathetic to the British. The UK is also a major ally of France, whereas genocidal dictators were ten-a-penny and pretty bad for France's image.
Practially every book ever written about the war goes into detail on the issue.

I find that extremely interesting. In fact, it is not the first time that I hear that idea, in accordance to which French assistance to the UK was due to the actions of the military junta regarding human rights, specially in cases where french citizens where involved.

2.
a. :-| (so, no source)

b. :-| (so, no source)

c. my point is that it is a typical misconception that flying as low as possible is the test of great skill.

Thats a valid point of view, agree on that. But here that was a need, due to a series of reasons that you surely know.


Spare me. If you had done the research yourself, I wouldn't have to waste my time responding. When it's me who has to provide the specifics, you might want to reappraise who's the troll.

Sorry for wasting your time ! But if it´s you who presents an idea over here, then it is expectable that you sustain it :).

Thanks for the interesting part of your answer.

[armored_diplomacy]

Buy an Argentine a drink, or an Argentine veteran pilot a drink?

I'd certainly buy the latter a drink.

So, no beer?:slap:

[happyslapper]

1. The French had/have a large network of overseas territories, so were heavily sympathetic to the British. The UK is also a major ally of France, whereas genocidal dictators were ten-a-penny and pretty bad for France's image.
Practially every book ever written about the war goes into detail on the issue.

I find that extremely interesting. In fact, it is not the first time that I hear that idea, in accordance to which French assistance to the UK was due to the actions of the military junta regarding human rights, specially in cases where french citizens where involved.

2.
a. :-| (so, no source)

b. :-| (so, no source)

c. my point is that it is a typical misconception that flying as low as possible is the test of great skill.

Thats a valid point of view, agree on that. But here that was a need, due to a series of reasons that you surely know.


Spare me. If you had done the research yourself, I wouldn't have to waste my time responding. When it's me who has to provide the specifics, you might want to reappraise who's the troll.

Sorry for wasting your time ! But if it´s you who presents an idea over here, then it is expectable that you sustain it :).

Thanks for the interesting part of your answer.

There is a famous case of Alfredo Astiz being complicit in murdering two French nuns, but I suspect that was not the driving force behind French policy... there was far more at stake.

2a&b... I can't go coppying and pasting paper books unfortunately! The problems with the bombs being wired incorrectly are mentioned numerously. If you perform a google search, or even search in the long-standing Falklands 25 thread, you would probably find some useful information. I'm not your secretary!

c. It's the same in every war, in every theatre. You balance the need for getting the right result versus the will to get home to your family. The best result to get more hits on ships would have been to fly at a higher altitude in the terminal phase, or attempt toss-bombing or something similar. The Argentine pilots knew that, but on the occasions when they did execute an attack, they generally opted for a safer low altitude and hoped for the best. I don't blame them.


So, no beer?:slap:

You sort out the asado, i'll provide some ale.

[armored_diplomacy]

.

:hug:

Now we´re cool.
(you should look like Sienna Miller to be my secretary. Otherwise, no thanks! )

[Clockwinder]

We (Aussies) were flying Mirage IIIs and A-4s at the time, and our consensus when looking at the Argentine tactics in San Carlos was, "Crazy to the point of madness." However, they had no choice. To have any hope of a hit with an iron bomb within that threat environment (Rapiers had 16 confirmed and 6 probable kills) they had to limit the time-on-target and used the "pop-over" from the opposite ridge, giving them 2 seconds to range, select and engage targets. And they scored hits!!!! WOW. And they also had to contend with limit of range fuel management, low level (extereme) from the time of take-off and CAP by Harriers. SOF were reporting their departures to the fleet. They really didn't have a chance, but defied the odds. Any survivors deserve a lifetime supply of beer!!!

[asch]

c. my point is that it is a typical misconception that flying as low as possible is the test of great skill. Any 12 year-old on MS Flight Simulator cna do that. The test is being professional and putting steel on steel.
oh they also damn good at Modern Warfare 2. let's fire all professionals and count on teenagers!
gosh.

[G-AWZT]

The Daggers, Super Etendards, A-4C's did a fairly decent job considering they were up against a NATO member. The whole air war showed how inadequate ship defenses, construction, etc were. The Argentines had to improvise. I read an article how the windshields of Argentine fighter bombers became encrusted with salt from the ocean spray on their way to target demonstrating just how low they flew. One A-4C was lost flying too low on it's way to target.
I can only imagine the disaster that would've enveloped both NATO and the Soviet Northern Fleet had WWIII occurred.

[G-AWZT]

1.
c. my point is that it is a typical misconception that flying as low as possible is the test of great skill.


.



What? Flying so low your altimeter barely reads 50 feet takes unbelievable skill and concentration. Turbulence, waves, sea spray are obstacles only adding to a pilot's incredible stress.

[Clockwinder]

c. my point is that it is a typical misconception that flying as low as possible is the test of great skill.You are kidding, right? Where did you do your flight basic? I want to call them and get your certification rescinded. It may not take much skill on a computer. I'd like to get you in the cockpit with me at <50ft @ 400+ knots over water! ****head.

[happyslapper]

Sorry what? The task was to hit ships with basic iron bombs. Flying ''<50@400'' is not the ideal profile. I clearly referred to the terminal phase, not the transit phase which did require low-level evasive flying. I'm quite clearly not saying that Argentine pilots were unskilled.
Btw, rapier got 4 kills, not 16. The initial reports were 14+6, but like most reports were later reassessed and reduced.

[armored_diplomacy]

What? Flying so low your altimeter barely reads 50 feet takes unbelievable skill and concentration. Turbulence, waves, sea spray are obstacles only adding to a pilot's incredible stress.


You are kidding, right? Where did you do your flight basic? I want to call them and get your certification rescinded. It may not take much skill on a computer. I'd like to get you in the cockpit with me at <50ft @ 400+ knots over water! ****head.


(not my statement, actually)

[ChrisBV]

Targeting airfields with TLAM's is a piece of cake.

TLAM wasn't available at the time of the Falklands War; the first RN units to receive Tomahawk (procured in 1997) were the submarines: in 1998 , HMS Splendid became the first British SSN to fire the land attack cruise missile. First operational deployment of TLAM by the RN took place a year after when she launched her missiles at land-based targets in the Bosnian campaign.

I think Buccaneers for OCA, naval and strategic strikes in mainland Argentina and Phantoms for air defence (providing the British kept their conventional catapult-launched and arrested-landing aircraft carriers by the time of the Falklands War) could have successfully prevented the Argentine Air Force and Navy from deploying air power from the continent in support of friendly forces, knocking out airfields and providing early warning and taking out aircraft from beyond visual range with Skyflash missiles.


If the Belgrano had lauched an attack against the task force, I suspect it would have been suicide, much the same as for the carrier launched A4s.

I agree.

ARA Belgrano was an obsolete piece of naval technology that should have never set sail in the first place. She was already scheduled for decommissioning but the plans had to be postponed when the war erupted. There were serious problems with the firing control systems of her main gun turrets (meaning that she could not lock and track a target properly and her main guns could not be used in the air defence role) and because of lack of maintenance to her power plant, was unable to reach her theoretical flank speed of 32 knots (instead, her top speed was of about 18 knots). Her crew was hastily put together, many conscripts were quickly assigned (nearly half of the entire ship's company) to the ship and as one would expect, were ill-trained and not prepared to react to emergency situations. The ship sank after a few minutes of being hit, despite the fact that, as a robustly-built WWII cruiser, had safety features such as watertight compartments and bulkheads that had previously saved two akin ships in the past.

HMS Conqueror managed to track Belgrano's Task Group visually while the ship was refuelling at sea hours before the attack and even reached periscope depth to relay and receive orders from London without being detected; the attack was carried out using heavyweight Mk.8 torpedoes fired from a distance of 5km (the torpedoes' maximum effective range) with the Captain watching the whole thing from his periscope. It took Belgrano's escorts a full five minutes to realise they were under attack and by the time they began dropping depth charges, the sub was gone and the cruiser had already capsized. So it is clear that neither the surface ships nor their crews were even as close as what we could call 'fit for combat', Belgrano's commanding officer, Captain Bonzo, even though he realised the precarious situation he found himself into and also the fact that his ship lacked any sort of ASW means at her disposal, did not take the necessary precautions to ensure that no British SSN were near the Task Group during the refuelling manoeuvre...

I would have rather deployed her to the shallow waters off Port Stanley, surrounded by anti-submarine nets using her as a radar picket and anti-aircraft platform - after all, she did receive a fairly decent AAW suite back in 1968 during her refit (air search radars and fire control radars for the recently installed Sea Cat SAMs) - than sending her to sail the open waters of the South Atlantic where she proved highly vulnerable to attack.

That ship was definitely not 'combat-ready' and sending her Task Group (Belgrano's escorts being equally obsolete WWII destroyers) against the British would have been suicide. The air strike programmed to be launched from aircraft carrier ARA 25 de Mayo... I think would have had similar results: Argentine air attacks were successful primarily because of the British ships' proximity to the islands' landmass, which allowed them to mask themselves with the terrain and provide little reaction times for the British air defences to react and also because of the limitations of the British naval air search radars which, although mounted on some of the newest and latest warships, were still obsolete designs and did not have features such as MTI or clutter (sea/ground) discrimination capabilities. However, in open seas (where Sea Dart, for instance, proved deadly), they would have stood no chance.


what if the french navy and air force didn't held spare training with the UK navy and harrier, leading to the readjusting of the tactics ?

Considering the nature of the Sea Harrier (a new, subsonic, V/STOL, tiny-looking point-defence fighter that had come to replace the larger, supersonic interceptors armed with medium-range BVR missiles as defenders of the surface fleet much to the disbelief of pretty much everyone at the time) I think it would have been severely unlikely for their pilots not to train as hard as they possibly could, specially in air-to-air combat, against a previous generation of successful, combat-proven supersonic deltas highly regarded as some of the best fighters of their time. Apart of having to master the flight characteristics of this new technology, it would have seemed illogical that a professional, premiere fighting force such as the Royal Navy would have failed in training the Fleet Air Arm pilots flying the new Sea Harrier in combat against current fighters such as the ones the Soviets (or any other enemy) could have had at the moment.

The FAA SHar pilots ranked not only amongst the better trained of the UK, but of the whole NATO itself. So I don't think this would qualify as a plausible "what if". I also think that lengthening the runway at Port Stanley for stationing supersonic interceptors and strike aircraft would not have necessarily improved the chances of the Argentine pilots against the Sea Harrier in 1 vs 1 combat; I'm not saying that they (the Argentines) were mediocre or poorly-trained fighter pilots - certainly not at all - but I think it's fair to say that British pilots were better fliers because a) they flew more hours and training sorties than the Argentines ever did, b) had trained and measured their aircraft and skills against Mirage and Super Etendard aircraft much similar to the Argentine ones in NATO exercises with the French Armée de l'Air and Marine, so they knew their enemy whereas the Argentine pilots had never flown against a Sea Harrier before and c) had better technology at their disposal: the SHar had superior sensors, radar warning systems, man-machine interface and weapons (the AIM-9L being vastly superior to the older and outdated Argentine air-to-air missiles) than the Argentine fighter-bombers they had to face in the South Atlantic.

[ChrisBV]

The Argentines had to improvise.

They most certainly did not improvise, they were a professional fighting force just like any other of its kind and did train extensively as hard as they could in order to figure out the best approach and strike patterns and tactics against Task Force ships using Argentina's two Type 42 destroyers (ARA Santísima Trinidad and ARA Hércules) which, with the exception of the locally-installed MM38 Exocet canisters and fire control systems in the early 1980s, were exactly the same as their British counterparts.

They were not kamikazes; they certainly displayed extreme bravery and skills flying low in order to avoid radars and naval air defences but they did train and prepare themselves for it.

[armored_diplomacy]

The FAA SHar pilots ranked not only amongst the better trained of the UK, but of the whole NATO itself. So I don't think this would qualify as a plausible "what if". I also think that lengthening the runway at Port Stanley for stationing supersonic interceptors and strike aircraft would not have necessarily improved the chances of the Argentine pilots against the Sea Harrier in 1 vs 1 combat; I'm not saying that they (the Argentines) were mediocre or poorly-trained fighter pilots - certainly not at all - but I think it's fair to say that British pilots were better fliers because a) they flew more hours and training sorties than the Argentines ever did, b) had trained and measured their aircraft and skills against Mirage and Super Etendard aircraft much similar to the Argentine ones in NATO exercises with the French Armée de l'Air and Marine, so they knew their enemy whereas the Argentine pilots had never flown against a Sea Harrier before and c) had better technology at their disposal: the SHar had superior sensors, radar warning systems, man-machine interface and weapons (the AIM-9L being vastly superior to the older and outdated Argentine air-to-air missiles) than the Argentine fighter-bombers they had to face in the South Atlantic.

I couldn´t agree more. Very good analysis.

[Clockwinder]

In April 1982, the original Rapier was deployed during the Falklands War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falklands_War) when T Battery joined 3 Commando Brigade (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3_Commando_Brigade) as part of the Falklands Task Force, landing at San Carlos (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/San_Carlos) on 21 May. Early post-war reports were favourable, indicating 14 kills and 6 probables. Later analysis was less rosy, indicating as few as four enemy aircraft were downed.
Only One Argentine Aircraft a Dagger A (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IAI_Nesher#Operational_history) of FAA Grupo 6 can be Confirmed as a Rapier Kill when Lt Bernhardts aircraft was destroyed on the 29th May 1982, the Pilot was killed.
The other three, a A-4B Skyhawk of FAA Grupo 5 on the 23 May & two A-4C Skyhawk of FAA Grupo 4 on the 24th & 25 of May 1982 were subjected to the full force of the San Carlos Air Defences, with claims going to Sea Wolf (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_Wolf_missile#Combat_performance), Sea Cat (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_Cat#Service), Blowpipe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowpipe_missile#Combat_performance) & Small Arms (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_Arms) as well as T Battery.
“Within the total only five Argentine aircraft might have been shot down by Rapier, and, as originally noted by Ethell and Price, only one of these was certain, with two probables and two possibles. Similar discrepancies arose over other weapons systems, notably Blowpipe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowpipe_missile) (one confirmed kill as against nine confirmed and two probables in the White Paper) and Sea Cat (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_Cat_missile) (zero to one against eight confirmed and two probables in the White Paper). […] This confirmation that MoD had exaggerated, however unwittingly, the capabilities of Rapier was deemed to be political dynamite. It was observed that if this assessment became publicly known it ‘could have a serious adverse effects on sales’ prospects for Rapier, which is the staple revenue-earner for BAe’s Dynamic Group.”
The main problems were a lack of range, and the lack of a proximity fuse (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proximity_fuse), a deficiency which required the operator to strike the target aircraft directly with the missile. Rapier also suffered with problems with the IFF system. and suffered interference with RN radar.
From Wikipedia - apologies for the inaccuracies.

[ChrisBV]

There is a famous case of Alfredo Astiz being complicit in murdering two French nuns, but I suspect that was not the driving force behind French policy... there was far more at stake.

Hey, happy:

By 1986, three years after the Junta collapsed and its members were brought to trial, it was revealed that over 600 foreign citizens had been abducted, tortured and 'disappeared' (they can't say "killed" because their bodies were never found, so "officially" they can't ****ounce them 'dead') in Argentina during the National Reorganisation Process, including citizens from neighbouring countries such as Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Peru... but also from Spain, Italy, France, Germany and even Israel and the United States. At least 36 French citizens were reported and acknowledged as 'disappeared' during the military Junta trials of '86; whenever a foreign government issued a request for explanation on the whereabouts of their national citizens in Argentina, the Junta refused to reply. At least fifty governments had issued diplomatic inquiries regarding almost three thousand disappeared to the Argentine government by the end of the brutal military regime in '83.

So I have no doubt that France was aware that French citizens were being 'disappeared' in Argentina at the moment, but I agree with you in that it might have not been the decisive factor for withdrawing their support and military assistance to Argentina. After all, France was a major NATO ally and therefore, a major British ally. French President François Mitterrand offered his unconditional support to Lady Thatcher, she did not have to exercise any sort of pressure to make the French stop supplying Argentina with modern weapons as a common myth would suggest. I don't think any NATO member would have stood idly by the fact that another NATO member was being attacked and its sovereign territory invaded by a Third World military dictatorship. Even the US, who regarded Argentina as an 'ally', immediately began to supply the Brits with information and military hardware while officially, the Reagan administration remained 'neutral' and collaborated in the peace talks between Argentina and the UK; there's no way that the United States would have acted against (or even stood by) one of its oldest and most traditional allies (the UK) or even refused to support the British, even more considering the 'political affinity' between President Reagan and PM Thatcher.

I don't think that France, as a major NATO ally, would have refused helping a fellow major NATO ally whose overseas sovereign territories were being invaded and occupied by a military regime, it would have set a dangerous precedent and perhaps would have possibly encouraged any other El Presidente de Chimichanga anywhere else in the world or even the Soviet Union to think that they could rise against NATO or a major NATO member without fear of consequence. Certainly there was far more at stake than the murdering of a handful of French citizens by the Junta in Argentina at the time...

[armored_diplomacy]

Hey, happy:

By 1986, three years after the Junta collapsed and its members were brought to trial, it was revealed that over 600 foreign citizens had been abducted, tortured and 'disappeared' (they can't say "killed" because their bodies were never found, so "officially" they can't ****ounce them 'dead') in Argentina during the National Reorganisation Process, including citizens from neighbouring countries such as Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Peru... but also from Spain, Italy, France, Germany and even Israel and the United States. At least 36 French citizens were reported and acknowledged as 'disappeared' during the military Junta trials of '86; whenever a foreign government issued a request for explanation on the whereabouts of their national citizens in Argentina, the Junta refused to reply. At least fifty governments issued diplomatic inquiries regarding almost three thousand disappeared to the Argentine government by the end of the brutal military regime in '83.

So I have no doubt that France was aware that French citizens were being 'disappeared' in Argentina at the moment, but I agree with you in that it might have not been the decisive factor for withdrawing their support and military assistance to Argentina. After all, France was a major NATO ally and therefore, a major British ally. French President François Mitterrand offered his unconditional support to Lady Thatcher, she did not have to exercise any sort of pressure to make the French stop supplying Argentina with modern weapons as a common myth would suggest. I don't think any NATO member would have stood idly by the fact that another NATO member was being attacked and its sovereign territory invaded by a Third World military dictatorship. Even the US, who regarded Argentina as an 'ally', immediately began to supply the Brits with information and military hardware while officially, the Reagan administration remained 'neutral' and collaborated in the peace talks between Argentina and the UK; there's no way that the United States would have acted against (or even stood by) one of its oldest and most traditional allies (the UK) or even refused to support the British, even more considering the 'political affinity' between President Reagan and PM Thatcher.

I don't think that France, as a major NATO ally, would have refused helping a fellow major NATO ally whose overseas sovereign territories were being invaded and occupied by a military regime, it would have set a dangerous precedent and perhaps would have possibly encouraged any other El Presidente de Chimichanga anywhere else in the world or even the Soviet Union to think that they could rise against NATO or a major NATO member without fear of consequence. Certainly there was far more at stake than the murdering of a handful of French citizens by the Junta in Argentina at the time...

However, in the twisted mind of the military junta, US would be neutral or on Argentina´s side in case of war ...

Again, awesome analysis ChrisBV

[ChrisBV]

Thanks, armored_diplomacy!


However, in the twisted mind of the military junta, US would be neutral or on Argentina´s side in case of war ...

The Junta leaders were indeed rather politicians in uniform than soldiers capable of exercising strategic thought; they had ascended in their careers not by professional merit but instead, by having the right connections: General Galtieri came to power not because he was the best and brightest amongst the military leaders of the three branches of the Armed Forces, but because he gained the favour of Admiral Anaya, at the time the commander-in-chief of the Navy, the most powerful branch of the three and the one carrying out the Junta's policy of terror against its own people. They went to war for political reasons and seeking exposure for their own political agenda - they had planed to invade the Falklands but after the decommissioning of the British aircraft carriers and the withdrawal of British military forces in the South Atlantic - namely the ice patrol vessel HMS Endurace and the Royal Marines garrison at Stanley - but the incident of South Georgia precipitated the plans so that the Junta could capitalise the national fervour spurred by the "re-taking" of what the Argentines considered sovereign territory long ago occupied by force by the United Kingdom. And in their appropriately-called 'twisted minds' as you correctly put it, they even dared to think that the British would not respond. Can you imagine such a conflict hypothesis? "The British won't come". Anyway, they were too busy intimidating, torturing, incarcerating and murdering their own citizens to draw a coherent battle plan that would at least ensure the best chances of victory, I suppose (I despise the Junta and the fact that they invaded and occupied foreign territory by force and held hostage its population (cowardly, at gunpoint) for over two months, but I do agree in the fact that, if you're a commanding General and you engage in a military escapade, it shall be your duty to provide your forces - the ones that are actually going to fight and die in your war - with the best chances of success). Admiral Anaya, who supported Galtieri on the condition that he would retake the Malvinas for the Navy, devised a plan to covertly infiltrate and bomb British ships in Gibraltar, as if that would have had any impact on the operations in the South Atlantic. What a genius.

To think that Britain would not respond militarily or that the United States would stay 'neutral' and not support its older and most traditional ally were two fatal mistakes the Junta made simply for a) not picking up and reading a history book and b) for failing to analyse the geopolitical reality of the World at the time.

[ChrisBV]

if your going to do what ifs.
what if thatcher had decided to back chile and instead launch an attack from chile two squadrons of vulcans coming over the the andes plus buccanears and phantoms shock and awe anyone?
12 ssns off shore

That's highly unlikely. Chile did not wish to openly support the UK despite the fact that Argentina had threatened Chile with invasion back in '78. And the reasoning behind that decision is this: Britain could be a useful ally of Chile for the time being, but despite their differences, Argentina was going to be Chile's neighbour forever and ever. And after the Junta, Argentina would continue to be Chile's neighbour and nothing on this Earth was going to change that fact. In fact, it wasn't so much "Chile" as a nation, its government and armed forces that supported the British but instead, the Chilean Air Force high command, which did not necessarily reported back to the Chilean government (namely General Pinochet) what they were doing in the process.

Chilean Air Force commander-in-chief, General Fernando Matthei, made perfectly clear that a) the British could set up observation positions in Chilean territory, b) that Chilean air crews could fly with British ones in recce aircraft (Chile was to keep - and they kept, indeed - the Canberra PR.9 the Brits used - wearing Chilean markings - to gather ELINT flying from Chilean bases in the Patagonia as they also kept the Plessey AR3D radar installed in order to monitor Argentine strike packages bound to the Falklands, which is still in use today) and c) that British recce aircraft could operate from Punta Arenas but that no missions involving attacking targets in Argentina could be launched by the British from Chile. That was simply out of the question.

So no Bucc strike missions could have ever been launched from Chile against Argentina.

[G-AWZT]

They most certainly did not improvise, they were a professional fighting force just like any other of its kind and did train extensively as hard as they could in order to figure out the best approach and strike patterns and tactics against Task Force ships using Argentina's two Type 42 destroyers (ARA Santísima Trinidad and ARA Hércules) which, with the exception of the locally-installed MM38 Exocet canisters and fire control systems in the early 1980s, were exactly the same as their British counterparts.

They were not kamikazes; they certainly displayed extreme bravery and skills flying low in order to avoid radars and naval air defences but they did train and prepare themselves for it.



I know they weren't kamikazes. But the pilots improvized their tactics to meet the challenges of facing new terrain and an unknown enemy's anti aircraft capability under real war conditions. You can plan, theorize, and play war games, but when the crap hits the fan you have to leave room for improvization and of course pilot skill.

[ChrisBV]

G-AWZT:

I politely dare to disagree.

The Argentine pilots did have time to prepare themselves for the challenge of tackling a modern warship using conventional free-fall ordnance, they had at their disposal two Type 42 destroyers almost exactly identical to what the British had; the Argentine warships carried Exocet missiles (whereas the British ones, didn't) but had the same air surveillance radar, fire control radars and GWS30 Sea Dart missiles as primary defence systems. So they did have time to figure out the limits of the air surveillance radar, at which distance they had to drop to which altitude in order to avoid the radar lobe during a sweep of the massive Type 965 AKE double bedstead aerial, at which altitude was Sea Dart less effective or ineffective, etc. They also practised against other surface vessels designing their strategies and attack patterns. So they knew pretty well what they were doing from the very beginning, IMHO.

The terrain of the Falklands is pretty similar to the terrain the Argentine pilots are used to fly over in Tierra del Fuego and the Argentine Patagonia, in which they train over and over again. So they were pretty familiar with NOE type of flying over such geographical features.

A Falklands War Argentine veteran pilot, interviewed many years after the war, said that their bomb runs were no more different than the ones they had practised against Argentine Fleet surface vessels, time and time again before the war, with the sole exception that, in combat, they were actually getting shot at for real. A professional 'warrior', if you will, does not improvise, those pilots did not just go to war and started pulling tricks out of a hat, they knew what they were doing. And that does not take away from them the merit of their accomplishments or the bravery and flying skills they demonstrated under fire, but let's remember we're talking about professionals here, entrusted by their nation to fly some really expensive toys that require technical expertise and discipline to successfully master in combat.

Under real war conditions you perform as you have trained time and time again. If you so much as "improvise", you're dead. I had the chance and the privilege to have a chat with an actual Spanish Ejército del Aire F/A-18 Hornet pilot, a while ago. And I asked him what were the differences between training - when one would imagine the pilot feels "safe" for not being in "the real thing" - and actual combat. And he said "none". They don't think of "war" and "training" as two different situations: they train as if they were fighting the real war. He said "the way you train is the way you fight". And that is true for any fighter pilot, regardless of origin.

[Climber]

What if the UK had used its Polaris SLBM's? This thread would be done. I win!!!
I wouldn't be a farher

[ChrisBV]

What if the UK had used its Polaris SLBM's? This thread would be done. I win!!!


I wouldn't be a farher

That was never going to happen, anyway. CHECK THIS OUT (http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/4625B8A4-C533-4DAD-9FA5-0BFEE58F8D69/0/op_corporate1982_nuclear_weapons.pdf).

:) ;)

[Mordoror]

1) Thats absolutely true, and the reasons remain unclear. We must get rid of the "blackmail" theory of UK dropping a nuclear warhead if France didn´t help, so it´s really hard to understand that assistance, specially if we consider that France was giving away valuable info about their own weapons.
Do you have any extra data about that?

just as ChrisBV summed pretty well
France and UK were NATO Allies. Support was obvious as UK oversea territories were attacked by a foreign force
France and UK were both member of EU. At that time the unerlying idea was that EU could be something else that only an economic market but rather some kind of political paneuropean union. A member of the UE had to be supported. That actually stirred some problems with Italy who was more entitled to support Argentina at the PR level because of the links between both countries
France had and has a lot of overseas territories some of them looked upon by possible hostile neighbors. Had they not helped UK, that would have sent a disastrous message to any third world blitzkriegmonger wannabee
French military had extremely good links with UK forces at that time (i'd think that being bogged together in RFA and Berlin had helped to build some pretty strong "friendship" links); The same in the military industry (example are numerous at this period)
Mitterand was a very pragmatic politician. He was from the old school and had some kind of global view that may missing to the new generation. Even if you had some clashes at the private level with Tatcher, they always appeared supporting each other.

now one or two points
on the contrary to the legend, i don't think the French has given any informatical backdoor capability to the brits in order to disable the AM39; This legend comes from the fact that some of them didn't explode on impact; The reason is unknown but it is very likely that it was due to technical maintenance and stockpiling of the missiles rather than anything else

France helped not only by providing spare partners (with Mirage III) to help the RAF adjust their skills against such kind of plane but they provided also supply for the british fleet (especially at the French facility of Dakar, Senegal). This was the mark of the time and the mark of the politician of the time. Actually given the disdain between our politicians and countries, the regular bashing among us, the hollow wind stirred by our politicians in both of our countries and the concurrence at the economical/political/prestige/weapon market between our both govs, i wonder if it will be the case again

[happyslapper]

All good points, but I think you are in danger of placing too much emphasis on France's NATO allegiance. France was effectively only an associate of NATO at that time, having been feuding with the alliance since 1958. It's also worth remembering that full NATO members gave less support than France. I also think the EEC relation (the EU didn't exist then) is also marginal, being as a split between sympathetic European nations, and sympathetic Latin American nations is bad for business. The idea of pan-european military reciprocity is a modern one.
My view of the French connection is that France wanted to nip in the bud any notion that a country neighbouring one of it's OT's could take a similar action, and I suspect there was also a slight embarrassment that suddenly the world was going to have it's eyes on Agentina, where French made weapons were being used in a despicable fashion by despicable people. If Britain lost, France lost by proxy.

[ChrisBV]

and I suspect there was also a slight embarrassment that suddenly the world was going to have it's eyes on Argentina, where French made weapons were being used in a despicable fashion by despicable people.

... yet, that didn't stop French weapon manufacturers from capitalising on the success that certain French-made weapon systems used by the Argentines achieved during the war. Before the war, a single AM39 Exocet anti-ship missile's estimated value was US$ 500,000. After one of those hit HMS Sheffield (sinking afterwards), the price tag rose from half a million to a full million dollars each.

Euromissile also benefited from the fact that one of their Roland SAM batteries had downed a British Sea Harrier, as the company used that as a marketing ploy for a while.

[ChrisBV]

on the contrary to the legend, i don't think the French has given any informatical backdoor capability to the brits in order to disable the AM39; This legend comes from the fact that some of them didn't explode on impact; The reason is unknown but it is very likely that it was due to technical maintenance and stockpiling of the missiles rather than anything else

The missiles were brand new, actually. Argentina had been receiving its Super Etendard aircraft since 1981, when in 1979 placed an order for 14 aeroplanes with their 14 corresponding Exocet missiles. They were in the process of being delivered and their crews, trained in the use of the radar and the AM39 missile when the French pulled out of Argentina and refused further delivery of the remaining aircraft and missiles to the South American nation, so they were left with five aircraft and five missiles, all of which were ultimately deployed in combat. The problem for the Argentines was hardly the age and condition of the missiles, which were brand new at the time; instead, they needed to make possible the communication between the Agave radar of the aircraft and the Exocet's inertial navigation system so that the missile would receive the targeting information from the platform's radar before launch, which couldn't be done at first without French assistance. So they had to go through a process of trial and error in order to figure out on their own how to have the Super Etendard's radar "talk" to the missile. They succeeded.

Exocet achieved at least two and as much as three successful hits (one on HMS Sheffield and at least one on RFA Atlantic Conveyor which may have been hit by a second one as well) and two misses (one missed Sheffield and a the other - the last AM39 remaining in Argentine inventories - narrowly missed Type 21 frigate HMS Avenger). The one that hit Sheffield most likely didn't explode, but the one(s) that hit Atlantic Conveyor certainly did. So I think that the first Exocet not exploding was purely coincidental.

There were indeed French arms dealers trying to benefit from the situation by offering Argentina some additional missiles. The Argentines then turned to Peruvian Air Force military attachés to the Peruvian Embassy in Washington DC and asked them to purchase the missiles as if they were being acquired for the Peruvian Air Force. The Argentines didn't want to do it themselves and the Peruvians agreed, risking a diplomatic incident that could have had negative consequences for Peru and its relationship with France (as Peru was negotiating with French manufacturers and the French government the purchase of 16 - later 26 - Mirage 2000 multirrole fighters at the time and had declared its neutrality once the diplomatic strategies proposed and encouraged by President Belaúnde and UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar finally failed). In the end, no missiles were delivered to Peru or Argentina and five million dollars (that were supposed to buy 5 Exocet missiles) were lost in the process :oops: But that was a move encouraged by a private third party (an arms dealer) and not the nation/government of France.

[Mordoror]

All good points, but I think you are in danger of placing too much emphasis on France's NATO allegiance. France was effectively only an associate of NATO at that time, having been feuding with the alliance since 1958. It's also worth remembering that full NATO members gave less support than France. I also think the EEC relation (the EU didn't exist then) is also marginal, being as a split between sympathetic European nations, and sympathetic Latin American nations is bad for business. The idea of pan-european military reciprocity is a modern one.
My view of the French connection is that France wanted to nip in the bud any notion that a country neighbouring one of it's OT's could take a similar action, and I suspect there was also a slight embarrassment that suddenly the world was going to have it's eyes on Agentina, where French made weapons were being used in a despicable fashion by despicable people. If Britain lost, France lost by proxy.


hum
maybe but you are also approaching a commonly kegend among the anglosaxon world i.e : the fact that when France left the NATO integrated command, she left the whole NATO system and his duty for that institution
living the integrated command was a move by DE Gaulle to ensure an independant nuclear capability and military industry but it was obvious for the french govs that followed that they'll have to stay side by site with the North Atlantic Organization. That's funny because it raises a bipolar view of the event.
Whereas it was clear from our side that (in the case of a soviet attack against GFR) we were full NATO partners and members of the western block, anglosaxon world always wondered about our liability and trustworthyness (this is obvious when you read the litterature of the time like Sir J.Hacket III world war fiction book for example) and you example is from the same level. We had at that time two vision of the NATO alliance but we from the French side that we needed to stand by his members in the most dire event

concerning the EEC (sorry EU was a shortcut not willingly done in my post) i insist to say that the underlying idea was a political achievment which meant a political alliance thus with military links and mutual help even if you are right the structured military policy (European Defense Policy) is a more modern one (but actually is more hollow than the informal level you had in 80s)

concerning the third part Chris BV gave a part of the answer below but you should also note that some of our weapon manufacturer were labelled as black lamb for not helping a customer in need and that they paid (and the french state that owned most of them) that by a loss of trust from some customers and so some markets

[[WDW]Megaraptor]

Did the Venticinco De Mayo carry Super Etendards, or just Skyhawks?

[ChrisBV]

Super Etendards did not operate from aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo during the conflict, remember that the Argentines were just receiving and getting to know their aircraft when the war started, they were not qualified or cleared for carrier operations yet.

Only four out of five Super Etendard were deployed to the South Atlantic theatre of operations, as the fifth remained grounded and soon became a source of spare parts for the aircraft flying combat missions in the Falklands.

[TheKiwi]

Also the Venticinco De Mayo was having engineering problems that limited her top speed enough to make it unsafe to fly off a loaded Super Etendard (or Skyhawk unless the winds were high enough).

[filochard]

... yet, that didn't stop French weapon manufacturers from capitalising on the success that certain French-made weapon systems used by the Argentines achieved during the war. Before the war, a single AM39 Exocet anti-ship missile's estimated value was US$ 500,000. After one of those hit HMS Sheffield (sinking afterwards), the price tag rose from half a million to a full million dollars each.

Euromissile also benefited from the fact that one of their Roland SAM batteries had downed a British Sea Harrier, as the company used that as a marketing ploy for a while.

You're kidding right ? of course this was a disastrous blow to french reputation as arm manufacturer as was our lack of support to Saddam Hussein.
The legend that pretend that the Exocet were remotely controlled from Paris didn't helped. I would say that it's not the french weapon manufacturers that took advantage of what happenned but rather it's British manufacturers that used this argument against the french weapons. disapointing to say the least..

[stonecutter]

on the contrary to the legend, i don't think the French has given any informatical backdoor capability to the brits in order to disable the AM39; This legend comes from the fact that some of them didn't explode on impact; The reason is unknown but it is very likely that it was due to technical maintenance and stockpiling of the missiles rather than anything else

What about this?

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1387576/How-France-helped-us-win-Falklands-war-by-John-Nott.html

How France helped us win Falklands war, by John Nott

By George Jones, Political Editor
Published: 12:01AM GMT 13 Mar 2002

FRANCE was Britain's greatest ally during the Falklands war, providing secret information to enable MI6 agents to sabotage Exocet missiles which were desperately sought by Argentina, according to Sir John Nott, who was Defence Secretary during the conflict.
In his memoirs he reveals that while President Reagan was pressurising Lady Thatcher to accept a negotiated settlement France helped Britain to win the conflict.

Although Lady Thatcher clashed with President Mitterrand over the future direction of Europe, he immediately came to her aid after Argentine forces invaded the Falklands in April 1982.
"In so many ways Mitterrand and the French were our greatest allies," Sir John says. As soon as the conflict began, France made available to Britain Super-Etendard and Mirage aircraft - which it had supplied to Argentina - so Harrier pilots could train against them.
The French gave Britain information on the Exocet - which sank the Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor - showing how to tamper with it.
"A remarkable worldwide operation then ensued to prevent further Exocets being bought by Argentina," Sir John says.
"I authorised our agents to pose as bona fide purchasers of equipment on the international market, ensuring that we outbid the Argentinians, and other agents identified Exocet missiles in markets and rendered them inoperable."
He contrasts the French attitude with America's attempts to find a face-saving deal for President Galtieri, the Argentine dictator."For all Margaret Thatcher's friendship with Ronald Reagan, he remained a West Coast American looking south to Latin America and west to the Pacific. Sometimes I wondered if he even knew or cared where Europe was."
Caspar Weinberger, the US defence secretary, supported Britain but the State Department was "dominated by Latinos".
"There was incredible pressure from the White House and the State Department to negotiate. It was hugely damaging," Sir John told The Telegraph. "They couldn't understand that to us any negotiated settlement would have seemed like a defeat."
Asked if he found it irritating that the Americans expected Britain's total support in the war against terrorism, Sir John said: "I am against the Americans smashing things up with bombing raids, then letting us be the auxiliary policemen to pick up the pieces."
Sir John says he held the Foreign Office "in deep contempt" for the caution it displayed when Lady Thatcher proposed sending the Task Force to the Falklands.

[Mordoror]

i was talking about the AM39 already available to the Argies. I don't see how they could have been rendered inoperant by a troy horse informatical backdoor as a common legend going through internet says (escpecially during 80s were informatic was more crude than nowadays)
A for that :

to enable MI6 agents to sabotage Exocet missiles
other agents identified Exocet missiles in markets and rendered them inoperable." it is fully possible

[ChrisBV]

You're kidding right ?

Ehhh... no, I don't think so...

:roll:


of course this was a disastrous blow to French reputation as arm manufacturer as was our lack of support to Saddam Hussein.

That could be interpreted as 'accurate' from a certain point of view; after all, French aircraft were being systematically blown out of the sky by Sea Harriers and British naval and shore-based defences. French jets shot down in the Falklands belonged to a generation of "war-winning" aircraft, having made a name in the Arab-Israeli wars . But I don't think their performance in the South Atlantic actually had any significant impact on the public view on French aircraft and French manufacturers, I can tell you that Peru was confidently negotiating with France the purchase of 16 Mirage 2000 multirole aircraft by the time of the Falklands War - an aircraft that by the time was brand new. Peru was one of the first countries - along with Egypt - to buy the Mirage 2000 and that decision was made after evaluating and comparing the French aircraft to the American F-16 (the original intended buy); we had been flying Mirage aircraft since 1969 and were extremely pleased and satisfied with them, so we had plenty of confidence in French technology and even as French-made aircraft (belonging to a previous generation and armed with outdated missiles) were being shot down in the Falklands, Peru placed an order for an additional 10 aircraft - at the time 10 of our older Mirage 5 acquired between 1968 and 1974 were being sent to Argentina on June 1982 after the Argentines purchased them from us in December 1981 and were in desperate need for replacing their losses, therefore speeding up the delivery process. In the end we finally received only 12 aircraft in 1986 but that was due to political reasons and not because there were any problems or doubts about the aircraft.

How many foreign customers have purchased next-gen Mirage aeroplanes after 1982? The Mirage 2000 has been successful selling abroad with 8 satisfied foreign customers. On the other hand, despite the success of, say, the Sea Harrier, emerging as a supreme dogfighter with a record of 27 victories vs. zero losses, how many countries bought the aircraft? The UK, Spain and the US remained as the sole operators of aeroplanes of the Harrier family (the Italian Marina Militare has never operated 1st-gen Harriers, acquiring the much improved AV-8B Harrier II in recent years for its small carrier force). Ships are a different story, usually ships are sold to third parties after decommissioning from one's fleet (the only foreign recipients of, say, brand new Type 42 destroyers were the Argentines and that was before the war, when Argentina and Britain were friends and allies close enough for the Brits to sell them their newest and latest AAW destroyers) . But how successful were British STOVL aircraft in the foreign market after their success in the Falklands? And how successful were French supersonic deltas despite the losses sustained by Argentina in 1982?

The Falklands, a 'huge blow' to French military technology? Hardly. I personally have spoken directly to representatives of MBDA (Aérospatiale missile division, the original manufacturers of AM39 Exocet, became part of MBDA in 2001) and they still take pride on the accomplishments achieved by Exocet during the Falklands War and still use them as a marketing tool, in fact when I approached one of them in hopes of knowing more about two future missile systems that the Navy of my country is seeking to acquire for its surface fleet, the Otomat Mk.2 Block IV and the Exocet MM40 Block 3, regarding the Exocet, he began his "presentation" by stating: "as you might know, the Exocet family proved its worth in 1982 during the Falklands War...". An Argentine citizen I talked to not so long ago said to me that he had a chance to participate in conference held for Argentine Army officials and personalities by Euromissile, in Argentina , where the manufacturer was promoting its Roland SAM system after the successful destruction of a Sea Harrier in the Falklands, complete with colourful diagrams explaining how the shooting down took place (clearly a marketing tool). Roland SAM brochures also promoted the system under its accomplishments during the Iran-Iraq war (as in 'Iraq under Saddam Hussein') stating the destruction of an Iranian F-4E on July 21 1982 and, previously, an F-5E brought down by Roland on February 26 of the same year.



The legend that pretend that the Exocet were remotely controlled from Paris didn't helped.

Where did that ever come from?

[Mordoror]

Where did that ever come from?

this is a rampant rumor heard here and there and that got amplified (like a lot of rumors) on internet
as to know from where it comes from ?? good question .....

[ChrisBV]

i was talking about the AM39 already available to the Argies. I don't see how they could have been rendered inoperant by a troy horse informatical backdoor as a common legend going through internet says (escpecially during 80s were informatic was more crude than nowadays)

AFAIK, Exocet missiles already in Argentine hands by 1982 were in tip-top condition, brand new and had not been 'sabotaged' by the French in any way. The problem was that the French left Argentina before the full integration of aircraft and missiles took place and the problem for Argentine technicians was how to make the Super Etendard radar transmit its targeting information to the missile's INS before launch, without French technical assistance. The missiles scored hits in combat, one of them was a fully functional and capable AAW Type 42 destroyer, no less (however, it is important to point out that by the time Sheffield was attacked, her crew, although under combat alert, regarded a torpedo attack as a primary threat and an Exocet attack as a second - because the British thought the Argentines were unable to render operational their Exocets)... the second one was a freighter lacking any sort of countermeasures and became an easy target for the missiles, but the fifth and last Exocet missed its target because the British had already learned how to defeat the missile, by reacting quickly to the first contact picked up by their radars when the Super Etendards made their pop-up ascent in order to do a radar sweep, pick up targets and transmit targeting information to the missile for launch. That's what happened on May 30, when Type 21 frigate HMS Avenger came under attack: her crew picked up the Super Etendards popping up and immediately began manoeuvreing and loosing chaff (her RCS signature increased exponentially, appearing in the attacking aircraft radars as a much larger target - I think that's why they though they had achieved lock on an aircraft carrier and not a small frigate). Quick reaction times and effective detection saved the ship, the fruitful outcome of lessons learned after two tragic losses.

Sheffield's missile most likely didn't explode (possibly a technical malfunction that cannot be seriously attributed to sabotage or poor missile storage/handling, as they were brand new) but the one(s) that hit Atlantic Conveyor, did.

An aditional shipborne MM38 Exocet scored a hit on HMS Glamorgan launched from an improvised coastal defence platform so their missiles did work, no doubt about that.

[Mordoror]

@ChrisBV
thank you for your informed and informative input
basically i agree on the whole thing excpet one : AFAIR one of the missile that hit the Atlantic Conveyor didn't explode as well or performed only a minor explosion (not all the warhead detonated)
so that made 2 possible not exploding AM39 on 5 fired which is a lot....(40% fail)
may it is from here that comes the rumor about remote control and informatical backdoor

[ChrisBV]

You're very welcome, Mordoror.


basically i agree on the whole thing excpet one : AFAIR one of the missile that hit the Atlantic Conveyor didn't explode as well or performed only a minor explosion (not all the warhead detonated)

IIRC, the crew of the tugboat Irishman (STUFTed to take part in the Task Force) confirmed Atlantic Conveyor being hit and damaged by missile explosions, I may have to check some sources for that.

[filochard]

The Falklands, a 'huge blow' to French military technology?

of course I'm not speaking of french military technology. Isn't that obvious enough ? :roll: I was speaking of the french reputation as reliable supplier.
Anybody with a brain would easily figure that supporting the stupid Argentinian dictator on this one was absolutelly impossible (like supporting Saddam after invasion of Koweit) but still the damage was done and that's as if some were pretty satisfied with that.

[ChrisBV]

of course I'm not speaking of french military technology. Isn't that obvious enough ?

I guess not:

(...) of course this was a disastrous blow to French reputation as arm manufacturer (...).


I was speaking of the french reputation as reliable supplier.

Did France earn a worldwide reputation as an "unreliable supplier" for not delivering aircraft, missiles and spare parts to Argentina during the Falklands War?

I hardly think so. It doesn't seem the case to me, anyway...

And speaking of the Gulf War, France was part of the Coalition; French aircraft flew combat sorties and attacked Iraqi Republican Guard units and other land targets and also carried out combat air patrols in the Gulf. It would seem reasonable for France to deny support for Mirage F1EQ fighters and surface-to-air missile systems that would eventually be used against French (and the rest of the Coalition's) aircraft, wouldn't you agree?


I would say that it's not the french weapon manufacturers that took advantage of what happenned but rather it's British manufacturers that used this argument against the french weapons.

Perfidious Albion arms manufacturers welcomed (and benefited from) the unsuccessful campaign carried out by Argentina using French aircraft, weapons and technology (or the lack of French support to a paying customer) and turned that against the French... that's an "interesting" thought :roll:

Britain also denied spare parts and support for lots of British-made weapons systems in Argentine possession, during (obviously) but also, long after the war.

Again, are we talking about French weapons or French reliability as an arms supplier here?

[filochard]

Did France earn a worldwide reputation as an "unreliable supplier" for not delivering aircraft, missiles and spare parts to Argentina during the Falklands War?


yes I think so. and unjustly so, specially with this Exocet "trojan", "backdoor", etc.. bullsh:t.



Again, are we talking about French weapons or French reliability as an arms supplier here?


As a supplier of course. But enough with that, I wanted just to contradict you when you said that this Falkland war was good for french weapon business witch isn't the case imo.

[armored_diplomacy]

Let´s ad some images to this Thread (now that the "25 de Mayo" was named):

These images (that I downloaded in good faith from the internet time ago, so credits to whom it may belong) were taken after the war:

(Note the AM-39)

106302

106301

[Eoin666]

AFAIK, Exocet missiles already in Argentine hands by 1982 were in tip-top condition, brand new and had not been 'sabotaged' by the French in any way. The problem was that the French left Argentina before the full integration of aircraft and missiles took place and the problem for Argentine technicians was how to make the Super Etendard radar transmit its targeting information to the missile's INS before launch, without French technical assistance. The missiles scored hits in combat, one of them was a fully functional and capable AAW Type 42 destroyer, no less (however, it is important to point out that by the time Sheffield was attacked, her crew, although under combat alert, regarded a torpedo attack as a primary threat and an Exocet attack as a second - because the British thought the Argentines were unable to render operational their Exocets).

AFAIK, Sheffield was also in satellite comm's, or something similar as a result of which she temporarily had her long range search and/or tracking radars down

[baboon6]

AFAIK, Sheffield was also in satellite comm's, or something similar as a result of which she temporarily had her long range search and/or tracking radars down

The British were very aware that a Super Etendard/Exocet attack was possible. This excerpt from Admiral Sandy Woodward's book tells what happened that day, including the initial disbelief by the Force Anti Air Warfare Centre caused by previous false alarms, even though HMS Glasgow was absolutely certain an Exocet attack was imminent, since her anti-air warfare operators were tracking what they believed to be Super Etendards. The radar emissions corresponded with those of the Agave radar on the SEM and eventually Glasgow's anti-air warfare officer was practically screaming "Handbrake" (the codeword for Agave) over the force radio net:

http://www.mw.ua/3000/3150/32700/

[Warden]

The British were very aware that a Super Etendard/Exocet attack was possible. This excerpt from Admiral Sandy Woodward's book tells what happened that day, including the initial disbelief by the Force Anti Air Warfare Centre caused by previous false alarms, even though HMS Glasgow was absolutely certain an Exocet attack was imminent, since her anti-air warfare operators were tracking what they believed to be Super Etendards. The radar emissions corresponded with those of the Agave radar on the SEM and eventually Glasgow's anti-air warfare officer was practically screaming "Handbrake" (the codeword for Agave) over the force radio net:

http://www.mw.ua/3000/3150/32700/

The same admiral who thought SHARS should be the last line of defense for the fleet?

[ChrisBV]

As a supplier of course. But enough with that, I wanted just to contradict you when you said that this Falkland war was good for french weapon business witch isn't the case imo.

I never said that the Falklands War was "good for the French weapons business", I simply stated that certain French weapon manufacturers did use (and still use) to some extent the Falklands experience for advertising their products (namely Exocet SSM and Roland SAM).


AFAIK, Sheffield was also in satellite comm's, or something similar as a result of which she temporarily had her long range search and/or tracking radars down

As the Board of Inquiry report on the Loss of HMS Sheffield states, Sheffield's radar was indeed transmitting at the moment of the attack:

SHEFFIELD was transmitting on radar, sonar, HF, UHF and SHF.

As baboon6 correctly states, the crew of Sheffield was aware that an Exocet attack could take place, but again, as the Board of Inquiry report says, Sheffield's crew, although on alert, regarded the possibility of a torpedo attack as 'higher' whilst the threat of an air raid using Exocet missiles was considered 'lower':

On the crucial question of whether Argentinian SUPER Es had Air-to-Air Refuelling and EXOCET (AM 39) capabilities, and hence whether ships were liable to AM 39 attack on 4 May, CTG and SHEFFIELD had much the same information, showing that such an attack was quite possible. However, SHEFFIELD rated the AM 39 danger lower, and the submarine threat higher, than did CTG.

(...)

SHEFFIELD's assessment of the threat on 4 May acknowledged the possibility of SUPER E/EXOCET attacks, and that such an attack could be at low level. However other types of attack, particularly from submarines, were considered more likely.

Both Sheffield and Glasgow had been picking up both ESM and radar contacts since May 1, so both Type 42s were on the lookout for possible attacks. However, as the on-board equipment kept contradicting itself on the identity of the contacts (mistaking for instance a radar contact thought to be a Mirage III with an ESM source identified as the Super Etendard's Agave radar), operators chose to disregard some of those contacts as 'spurious' (or false contacts).

This is what the report says about the attack:

The raid was first detected on UAA1 (ESM set) by GLASGOW (...) and subsequently gained two 965 (air surveillance radar) contacts at about 40 miles. GLASGOW reported the raid on AAWC HF and AAWC UFH, released it to LINK 10, reporting "ONEX", and called the racket as "CONDOR 245" ("Condor" was ESM code for Super Etendard's Agave radar). GLASGOW went to Action Stations and fired Chaff D. Paints had been seen in INVINCIBLE at 50 and 30 miles which correlated with GLASGOW's CONDOR report. CAP were told to investigate but found nothing. The AAWC (Sheffield's Anti-Air Warfare Commander) did not accept GLASGOW's classification of the raid and declared the contacts to be spurious. ZIPPO 4 was not called by the AAWC and Air Warning remained YELLOW.

By the time the missiles had been fired, it was too late for Sheffield to react, as Glasgow was forced to watch in horror as an Exocet struck her sister ship while a second one was effectively seduced by chaff launched from Glasgow (Sheffield did not launch chaff, as the report concludes). Glasgow and Invincible agreed that the contacts were genuine and correctly identified them as Super Etendard attack aircraft, but Sheffield didn't.

The main problem was the air surveillance radar; even though the Marconi Type 965 was good at spotting contacts over long distances - and therefore useful for telling the 'big air picture' - it had its shortcomings. It could achieve long detection ranges thanks to the use of comparatively long wavelengths, which worked fine in the open ocean (as far as I know, the Type 42 class was designed as a cheaper alternative to the Type 82 class, fulfilling the same role of air defence for the task group in open waters, not in proximity of shores or landmasses) but also meant that the radar was generally ineffective in detecting low and fast sea-skimming contacts (such as a low flying aircraft or a missile, for which fire control radars use short wavelengths to pick up and track) and had poor discrimination of background clutter capabilities. The characteristic 'double bedstead' AKE antenna itself was very large, I assume that making a full sweep - and therefore, target acquisition and updating - could have taken a while (not the ideal situation when you're dealing with a .9 Mach, sea-skimming missile, IMHO). It also lacked MTI, or Moving Target Indication, which meant it could not discriminate a moving target from a background. The Abbey Hill UAA1 ESM suite also lacked significant automation (it relied heavily on crew inputs) and the lack of softkill measures (namely jammers) also meant that once the missile was airborne, all the ship could do was manoeuvre aggressively and deploy chaff in hopes of confusing the seeker and forcing it to veer away, providing detection and classification was made on time.

Using Sea Dart was out of the question, as the missile takes a full 20 seconds to 'warm up' and receive targeting information provided by the Type 909 fire control radar after being lifted all the way from the magazine and loaded on the Mk.30 twin launcher. Type 42 destroyers were not fitted with CIWS systems; because of budget reasons, original Batch 1 and 2 Type 42s had their length cut off by about 12m (30ft), leaving them with a single SAM (area) system. A point-defence SAM was available at the time, the Sea Wolf, specifically designed for dealing with sea-skimming targets such as low-flying aircraft or missiles and a VLS version was in development at the time and, if I'm not mistaking, was projected to be installed in the bow section of the Type 42 destroyer - but debuted on the newer 'Duke' class frigates, designed after the lessons learned precisely from the Falklands War (plus, unlike the Sea Dart which is exclusively guided by radar, Sea Wolf has a complementary CCTV guidance system which, in back-up mode, the operator can use for visual tracking and guidance via a Semi-Active Command Line-of-Sight transmitter) but was not done so. Consequently, after the loss of Sheffield, Type 42s had to be 'paired' with Sea Wolf-equipped Type 22 frigates and as the loss of HMS Coventry eventually demonstrated, that didn't prove to be a solution, either.

Fortunately for the Royal Navy, AM39 Exocet missiles were scarce in Argentine inventories (only 5 out of 14 originally ordered units had been received) and after the loss of Sheffield, I'm pretty sure that the British learnt how to effectively defeat these weapons, as the last victim of Exocet was a container ship lacking any sort of countermeasures (the original intended target may have been aircraft carrier HMS Hermes, which effectively deployed countermeasures) and the last Exocet did not claim any victims when on May 30, HMS Avenger became under attack and effectively detected, identified, tracked and defeated an incoming missile using chaff and manoeuvreing.

PS:

@ Mordoror: I think you're right, it would seem that only one Exocet hit Atlantic Conveyor but I'm pretty sure it did explode. The other one might have been decoyed by chaff launched by HMS Hermes (we need DW's expertise here, ASAP)...

[csqnsas]

What if....


The Argies o the ground were not using the 7.62 NATo round firing out of Fn's and MAGS ?

The UK ground forces would have had a very hard time with ammo resup. That would have had a BIG impact on the outcome of every land battle.

Remember in the close quaters the Brits were needing to resort to the Bayonet - more than a few times.

[baboon6]

What if....


The Argies o the ground were not using the 7.62 NATo round firing out of Fn's and MAGS ?

The UK ground forces would have had a very hard time with ammo resup. That would have had a BIG impact on the outcome of every land battle.

Remember in the close quaters the Brits were needing to resort to the Bayonet - more than a few times.

What alternative would the Argentines have had at the time? They were not a Soviet client state...

[TheKiwi]

5.56mm maybe? M16 vs FN-FAL Wasn't there a cut down Spanish 7.62mm round as well?

[ChrisBV]

What alternative would the Argentines have had at the time? They were not a Soviet client state...

Exactly, no chance for "exotic" ammunition to be present.

Peru for instance was a Soviet client state in the '70s but, although lots o Soviet weapons were acquired at the time (including Soviet/Warsaw Pact and East German AKM rifles, machine guns and even a handful of SVDs and PKs with their particular 7.62x54mm ammo), the standard assault rifle for the land forces remained being - and still is to some extent - the FN FAL chambered in 7.62x51mm NATO.

The Argentines not only used the FN FAL but produced it locally.

5.56x45 wasn't standarised as a "NATO round" until the late 1970s, I think. Back then, every army with Western influence used the 7.62.

[Ordie]

Exactly, no chance for "exotic" ammunition to be present.

Peru for instance was a Soviet client state in the '70s but, although lots o Soviet weapons were acquired at the time (including Soviet/Warsaw Pact and East German AKM rifles, machine guns and even a handful of SVDs and PKs with their particular 7.62x54mm ammo), the standard assault rifle for the land forces remained being - and still is to some extent - the FN FAL chambered in 7.62x51mm NATO.

The Argentines not only used the FN FAL but produced it locally.

5.56x45 wasn't standarised as a "NATO round" until the late 1970s, I think. Back then, every army with Western influence used the 7.62.

I recalled how the British forces prefered the Argentine FAL vs. their SLR due to its automatic firing feature.

[ChrisBV]

I recalled how the British forces prefered the Argentine FAL vs. their SLR due to its automatic firing feature.

I have always found that interesting; a friend of mine who did his compulsory military service in his native Uruguay told me that they used the Argie FAL and that he regarded it to be not exactly a brilliant piece of kit, like it wasn't precisely engineered or crafted as the Belgian or British (L1A1) versions were. FAL is rugged and reliable but I remember reading stories about Argentine FAL rifles in the Falklands 'falling apart' due to the actions of moisture and rust :oops: I imagine that poor maintenance was largely to be blamed.

But anyway, I suppose full auto was useful for the type of fighting in the Falklands: sort of close-quarters battle, in the dark, where 'spray-and-pray' and volume of fire and not selective, precise firing was more effective.

[armored_diplomacy]

I remember reading stories about Argentine FAL rifles in the Falklands 'falling apart' due to the actions of moisture and rust. I imagine that poor maintenance was largely to be blamed


Keep in mind that many of the Argentine conscripts had little or extremely basic training. Combined with the hard and particular conditions of the islands (mud, extreme humity), that may be the reason of those reports.

Now, What if ...

1- Argentina had more Type 209 submarines (let´s say 4), all operational?

2- one of the carriers would have being hit?

Let´s see the options.

[Ordie]

Keep in mind that many of the Argentine conscripts had little or extremely basic training. Combined with the hard and particular conditions of the islands (mud, extreme humity), that may be the reason of those reports.

Now, What if ...

1- Argentina had more Type 209 submarines (let´s say 4), all operational?

2- one of the carriers would have being hit?

Let´s see the options.

It would not matter.

The Royal Navy were willing to put ships into harms way.

[TheKiwi]

If one of the carriers was badly damaged, that would have played havoc with the CAP air cover. There are only so many Harriers you can cram onto Invincible or Hermes, and both were at the limit.

[Ordie]

If one of the carriers was badly damaged, that would have played havoc with the CAP air cover. There are only so many Harriers you can cram onto Invincible or Hermes, and both were at the limit.

The overall goal was to get the troops on the Islands.

[armored_diplomacy]

If one of the carriers was badly damaged, that would have played havoc with the CAP air cover. There are only so many Harriers you can cram onto Invincible or Hermes, and both were at the limit.


The overall goal was to get the troops on the Islands.

Correct, but as TheKiwi pointed, there could´ve being a problem covering the skies over the islands, giving the AAF a chance to score a significant strike.
Troops on land need to be supplied. IMHO, a carrier hit at the early stages of the war would have resoulted in a serios complication to the Task Force, maybe forcing to them to re-think the entire plan. A carrier hit after troops landed may have derived in a prolongation of the conflict (with a slower British march).

[baboon6]

I have always found that interesting; a friend of mine who did his compulsory military service in his native Uruguay told me that they used the Argie FAL and that he regarded it to be not exactly a brilliant piece of kit, like it wasn't precisely engineered or crafted as the Belgian or British (L1A1) versions were. FAL is rugged and reliable but I remember reading stories about Argentine FAL rifles in the Falklands 'falling apart' due to the actions of moisture and rust :oops: I imagine that poor maintenance was largely to be blamed.

But anyway, I suppose full auto was useful for the type of fighting in the Falklands: sort of close-quarters battle, in the dark, where 'spray-and-pray' and volume of fire and not selective, precise firing was more effective.

I think most of the British troops who started using captured FALs were those who had originally been armed with Sterling SMGs, signallers, medics etc, not SLRs. Certainly most of 2 PARA's medics packed away their SMGs in favour of FALs.

[Eoin666]

What if....


The Argies o the ground were not using the 7.62 NATo round firing out of Fn's and MAGS ?

The UK ground forces would have had a very hard time with ammo resup. That would have had a BIG impact on the outcome of every land battle.

Remember in the close quaters the Brits were needing to resort to the Bayonet - more than a few times.

They used the bayonet because the infantry have always been trained to use it, not because they ran out of ammo and had no recourse to anything else. The Falklands if anything is more like Afghanistan in being more suited to longer ranged, higher powered weapons. Had the Argentinians used say AK's or M16 types I think they'd have come off even worse. If you look at many of the photos you'll see that the British troops are also carrying L34 SMG for close quarters.

[Eoin666]

I think most of the British troops who started using captured FALs were those who had originally been armed with Sterling SMGs, signallers, medics etc, not SLRs. Certainly most of 2 PARA's medics packed away their SMGs in favour of FALs.

Wasn't that because of the fancy folding stocks

[armored_diplomacy]

a) They used the bayonet because the infantry have always been trained to use it, not because they ran out of ammo and had no recourse to anything else.

b) Had the Argentinians used say AK's or M16 types I think they'd have come off even worse.

a) Correct. And also because in some of the battles they got to be in such a close range that forced them to fought that way.

b) Why? :-|

[baboon6]

Wasn't that because of the fancy folding stocks

To an extent, and also because of the lethality of a 7.62mm rifle over a 9mm SMG.

[baboon6]

They used the bayonet because the infantry have always been trained to use it, not because they ran out of ammo and had no recourse to anything else. The Falklands if anything is more like Afghanistan in being more suited to longer ranged, higher powered weapons. Had the Argentinians used say AK's or M16 types I think they'd have come off even worse. If you look at many of the photos you'll see that the British troops are also carrying L34 SMG for close quarters.

L2A3 SMG I think you mean, the L34 is the suppressed version of the Sterling. Those who had Sterlings were mainly those who, as I wrote above, were issued them because a full-sized rifle was (or was thought to be) an encumbrance or unnessecary, not specifically for close quarters.

Re AK47/M16 vs. FAL/SLR- to quote Martin Windrow from his book The Last Valley, "Wars are not won or lost on such notional differences between weapons."

If they had had M16s, there would have been nothing to stop British troops using those when they ran low on ammo for their SLRs. The SAS, SBS and RM M&AW Cadre already had M16s, and a proportion of other British troops would have been familiar with the weapon from jungle warfare exercises in Belize and Brunei, where the M16 was used instead of the SLR.

[beatles101]

i was watching how close to defeat in the falklands war and i think if Britain didnt react the way they did and waited they might lost the contflict to do cutbacks in the RN the Landing ships Intrpid and Fearless were being sold off and the two carriers were i believe also being sold off and if the belgrano remaind a float then she woudl have still been a threat to Task Force, also the Royal Navy were losing alto of ships though so it have been a deafeat for Britain also the fact is The Argentine Conscripts were up agains two para batts SAS SBS and the Royal Marines of 42 Commando

[ChrisBV]

Wow, if the Argentine conscripts had problems maintaining their FAL rifles (as rugged, reliable and solid a FAL is), I don't want to imagine the problems they would have had using M16s, since the M16 requires more care, primarily due to the design of the rotating bolt and the gas operation system. The M16 is a weapon for "wealthy" armies, it has never been an option for South American Armed Forces (traditionally conscript armies) as a standard assault rifle because it is expensive and because it requires, amongst other things, high quality ammunition in order to minimise wear and risk of jamming; ammunition manufacturing standards in South America have never been regarded as 'high', our armies go to battle even as we speak carrying low quality ammunition manufactured locally or acquired via surplus US and more recently, Chinese stocks. Plus, if stories about sturdy, solid, rugged rifles such as the FAL 'falling apart' due to poor maintenance (or lack thereof) are true, I don't want to imagine what would have happened to the more delicate M16 under those conditions.

Some Argentine Special Forces operatives did use the M16, though.

[ChrisBV]

I think most of the British troops who started using captured FALs were those who had originally been armed with Sterling SMGs, signallers, medics etc, not SLRs. Certainly most of 2 PARA's medics packed away their SMGs in favour of FALs.

That makes perfect sense, I presume the 9x19mm cartridge is pretty much useless against enemies wearing thick layers of protective clothing; it would make sense for troops not issued with a more powerful 7.62 rifle or machine gun to try to acquire some extra firepower for themselves.

[Mordoror]

i was watching how close to defeat in the falklands war and i think if Britain didnt react the way they did and waited they might lost the contflict to do cutbacks in the RN the Landing ships Intrpid and Fearless were being sold off and the two carriers were i believe also being sold off and if the belgrano remaind a float then she woudl have still been a threat to Task Force, also the Royal Navy were losing alto of ships though so it have been a deafeat for Britain also the fact is The Argentine Conscripts were up agains two para batts SAS SBS and the Royal Marines of 42 Commando

makes an interesting what if
what if the Argies have waited 6 months - 12 months more which would have meant 6-10 more exocets for them and the Hermes decommisioned as it was planned in 1982 (as well as the LCPD Intrepid)

[beatles101]

makes an interesting what if
what if the Argies have waited 6 months - 12 months more which would have meant 6-10 more exocets for them and the Hermes decommisioned as it was planned in 1982 (as well as the LCPD Intrepid)

yup exactly i think if the Agies waited then the Falklands since 1982 woudl be known as the Malvinas also dont forget though the main Argentine Force the reg Force i mean was on the chilian border with the threat of Attack form chili so the only thing they could really do was to send their Marines and Conscripts to defend but i believe that the Argentine Marines left after the conscripts took control of stanley

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVDeN7iB4NE


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wLyBJivfADI&feature=related


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLrfFrSLVKM&feature=related

[happyslapper]

That's on the assumption that the British Gov't and Public would simply lay back and say ''ah well, hard luck then eh'', which is not really in the historical nature of the British people (and sometimes the British Gov't ;) ). The paradigmic shift in expeditionary capability post-82 is partial testament to that.

I hate that video so much. It's speculative, revisionist, populist history at it's very worst.

[ChrisBV]

Argentina set the original date for the Falklands invasion - codenamed 'Operación Azul' - to take place on July 9, 1982, after the withdrawal of HMS Endurance and the Royal Marines garrison at Moody Brook. The Argentine military planners also wanted to take advantage of the South Atlantic winter that was thought would eventually make a British naval response even more complicated due to the rough seas, low temperatures and poor visibility conditions, deterring Britain to respond militarily by sending warships to the Falklands.

But when in December 1981 an Argentine scrap-metal party commanded by Constantino Davidoff landed in South Georgia (in order to assess the status of an old whaling station that was to be finally scrapped) and stirred a diplomatic incident between Argentina and the UK when Davidoff refused to comply with formal entry procedures, at first by not having his and his men's passports properly stamped by British authorities and afterwards, by raising the Argentine flag and the subsequent exposure and attention the incident got in the media, Admiral Anaya pressed the Junta to rush on their invasion plans fearing a massive presence of British SSNs that were likely to be dispatched in a moment's notice as means of backing-up the British diplomatic response, would making the planned invasion later that year a lot more difficult. The invasion plan was modified and renamed 'Operación Rosario' and history went the way as we all know it.

So they had the chance to do things "right" (from a military perspective) but that all went down the drainage for political reasons, exposure and to capitalise on the nationalistic fervour spurred by Davidoff's actions in South Georgia, raising the flag and reminding the Argentine people of the Malvinas "unfinished" business. What they wanted was a show, a publicity stunt and they got it, they got the Argentine people back on their side and got their full support (it amuses me how Argie historians and politicians, 27 years after, claim that invading the Falklands was "a mistake" but provided their full support to the military Junta back in 1982 LOL) and for a moment, the entire country was reunited under a common cause and briefly forgot that their leaders were intimidating, kidnapping, torturing and murdering their fellow citizens...


That's on the assumption that the British Gov't and Public would simply lay back and say ''ah well, hard luck then eh'', which is not really in the historical nature of the British people (and sometimes the British Gov't ;) ). The paradigmic shift in expeditionary capability post-82 is partial testament to that.

I agree, I think it would have been harder for the British to retake the Falklands, yes, but I don't believe neither the British Government nor its people would have stood idly by the fact that British sovereign territory had been invaded and that British people's freedoms were being threatened by a military dictatorship. A few lines ago I said that one of the Junta's worst mistakes was assuming that the British 'would not respond'. Certainly they didn't bother picking up a history book before carrying out with their plans, thinking that they could mess with the UK without fear of consequence. If anything history has proven is the fact that you can't slap Britain in the face and get away with it unscathed. But they thought they could, so... I think the British would have found even harder re-taking the islands but that doesn't mean they would have given up or let the Argentine Junta get away with it without a fight.

The Brits knew it was going to be hard, they knew they were going to lose ships and men and that victory wasn't going to come easy... but they carried on, anyway.

[happyslapper]

This is why I don't buy into the 'if only they had delayed' fallback of many historians, Chris.
The Argentines had plently of time to reinforce the islands between Rosario and the arrival of significant elements of the task force, and to fully entrench and prepare for conflict. Yet they did not do it for the reasons you say; primarily because they were led by deluded fools. Whether the timescale was a couple of months, or a couple of years, I doubt it would have made any difference to that delusion of British apathy. If anything, it would only have exaccerbated their complacency.
Also with regard to the 'delayment factor', one can't view the Falklands invasion in isolation from Argentine internal matters. The winds of change had been blowing in Argentina for quite some time, and with or without victory against Britain, the Junta's (and by default the Fuerza Armada's) days were numbered. That changes everything in relation to Argentina's capacity and will to resist British retaliation.

[ChrisBV]

I hate that video so much. It's speculative, revisionist, populist history at it's very worst.

I think people often mistake British military leaders' sensible awareness of how bleak the situation was for their forces fighting in the Falklands or how conscious they were of the fact that they weren't precisely in the best situation and that the loss of ships, particularly supply vessels, was having most negative consequences in landing operations, the push towards the capital and such... and that if the Argies sank a carrier or sank a few more vessels or scored a lucky hit here and there, it would have been much more of a complicated situation than what already was with... let's say, a priori acceptance of failure (or the possibility of failure). I don't see it that way, I can't imagine a military commander going into battle thinking "oh boy, we might lose this one and if we do, we're done". But whenever I read people saying "the British knew how close they were to defeat"... well, yes, I assume that any intelligent commander has that possibility ringing in the back of his head but after familiarising myself with what the British forces went through and all the hardships they endured and the fact that they fought, some of them after 72 hours without sleep or food, after marching across the islands because their heavy transport helicopters and vehicles had been blown to pieces by air raids whilst still on their cargo ships and carrying their last rounds of ammunition, it's clear to me that they would have fought to the last consequences and not giving up easily.

I think that, in the end, the British won not only because they were better soldiers but also, better people. OK, I'd like to draw a small parentheses here: I'm not saying they were superior because "they were British" or that they were genetically superior to "Spics and Latinos", before anyone misquotes me :oops: :roll: but let's face it: they were a professional fighting force facing a largely regular and conscript army, they were better trained (not necessarily better equipped: for instance, some regular Argentine Army units - and I'm not even talking about Special Forces or Commandos - had more and more sophisticated night vision equipment than the British) but most importantly, they had something that the Argies mostly lacked: esprit de corps. And that is crucial for morale, it's something that you cannot come up with overnight, the British had that since basic training as an integral part of their life in the military. For instance, both officers and ranks would eat the same MREs (whereas Argentine officers received much better meals and other things such as Scotch or cigarettes), the officers would not eat until making sure that all of their men had had their meal, whether they were having their MREs or getting food out of a field kitchen, etc. As a commander in the field, one should never allow for one's troops to resort to finding food for themselves whilst the officers enjoy privileges (Argentine soldiers had to be recurrently assisted by the Falkland Islanders, which gave them food, blankets and other basic implements their own officers refused to provide them); that's 'hardwired', if you will, not in military culture alone but in culture as a society and as a people. If the British didn't eat, they knew and were very aware of the fact that it wasn't because their officers deprived them of their meals but because their supply ships were being bombed and sunk at San Carlos. But anyway, not only that made the difference, but in the end it was because, despite the odds, the British were ultimately confident in victory and the reasons for victory, whereas many Argentines by the end of hostilities, literally didn't know what they were fighting for. Brigadier General Jeremy Moore said: "the basic difference between them and us is that they were fighting for the islands (what their leaders told them to fight for, a patch of land, a symbol of national pride and self-esteem), whereas we fought for the Islanders".

Who had better equipment or who was better supplied made no difference: the Argentines spent weeks and valuable time fortifying their positions and preparing for the British assault, but despite their superiority in numbers and the fact that they held the high ground most of the time and had machine guns and mortar nests everywhere and had the British charging uphill, fighting with whatever they could bring out of the landing ships and after walking all the way from the landing spots, they lost. In the end Menéndez had fresh troops and supplies to fight the British back, soldiers posted at Stanley had not seen combat and Menéndez had fortified the Stanley positions in hopes for a British landing off its shores, so he had the troops, the equipment, the ammunition and the supplies to break the British assault... but he didn't, he surrendered after the Junta leaders back in the mainland left him alone.

The British Task Force suffered horrendous losses, but kept on fighting. The Argies lost one cruiser and pulled their surface fleet away from the theatre of operations, fearing more losses. That should help putting things into perspective.

I have no doubt that despite their shortcomings, the Argentines fought bravely; that despite the fact that a good portion of them were conscripts, ill-trained and ill-equipped, they did their best. But you can't win a war without proper leadership. There are no poor soldiers, only poor leaders. And you can't win without good leaders setting an example and actually "leading" from the front.

[armored_diplomacy]

Wow, if the Argentine conscripts had problems maintaining their FAL rifles (as rugged, reliable and solid a FAL is), I don't want to imagine the problems they would have had using M16s, since the M16 requires more care, primarily due to the design of the rotating bolt and the gas operation system. The M16 is a weapon for "wealthy" armies, it has never been an option for South American Armed Forces (traditionally conscript armies) as a standard assault rifle because it is expensive and because it requires, amongst other things, high quality ammunition in order to minimise wear and risk of jamming; ammunition manufacturing standards in South America have never been regarded as 'high', our armies go to battle even as we speak carrying low quality ammunition manufactured locally or acquired via surplus US and more recently, Chinese stocks. Plus, if stories about sturdy, solid, rugged rifles such as the FAL 'falling apart' due to poor maintenance (or lack thereof) are true, I don't want to imagine what would have happened to the more delicate M16 under those conditions.

Some Argentine Special Forces operatives did use the M16, though.


In Argentina M-16s are used by the Army (special forces) and by MArines (locally called Infantería de Marina or IMARA).

Here there´s a pic gallery from IMARA web site:

http://www.escueladeim.mil.ar/galeria1/index.htm

And here´s a picture uploaded by member Elbs on his thread (Argentina Armed Forces thread (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?168892-Argentina-Armed-Forces-thread))

106503

Now going back to the maintenance issues with FALs by Argentine concripts, that was (IMHO) due to the fact that many of the concripts sent to the islands have had poor or simply no training at all regarding how to field strip their rifles and how to clean them.

When you combine that with the island´s environment, that must have being the cause of those reports that you mentioned (I was not making a reference to the complexity of the cleaning process).

I politely disagree with this part of your statement:

"M16 is a weapon for "wealthy" armies, it has never been an option for South American Armed Forces (traditionally conscript armies) as a standard assault rifle because it is expensive and because it requires, amongst other things, high quality ammunition in order to minimise wear and risk of jamming; ammunition manufacturing standards in South America have never been regarded as 'high'"

Check the list of M-16 users and you´ll see that just a few of them could be regarded as "wealthy" countries (and even those "wealthy" countries have experiened jamming issues for sure !).
It´s all about proper training, thorough maintenance, and good ammo, regardless of where you are.
Besides, in the last 10/15 years major S. A. countires have moved away from conscritpion.
(and now that you mention it, Israel is a M-16 user, with a huge conscription system !. Of course, they put a lot of enphasis on training)

[Eoin666]

Also Chris regarding food and meals in your last post, there were many instances of the islanders killing their sheep and serving them up to the tired British troops. If nothing else, that should demonstrate that the Argentinians the had a doomed cause.


a) Correct. And also because in some of the battles they got to be in such a close range that forced them to fought that way.

b) Why? :-|

Yeah but in those close range circumstances British troops have always been trained to use the bayonet, and even more recently. Circumstances don't force them to use it, they'd have been ordered to fix bayonets, which would automatically focus the mind.

I was trying to make the comparison about open terrain, lack of cover, the accurate Nato 7.62 fire versus M16/AK in similar circumstances


L2A3 SMG I think you mean....oops, yeah my mistake

[armored_diplomacy]

I think people ... And you can't win without good leaders setting an example and actually "leading" from the front.

106504

woot
That comment was priceless. Seriously, congrats. Common sense at its best.

[ChrisBV]

Also Chris regarding food and meals in your last post, there were many instances of the islanders killing their sheep and serving them up to the tired British troops.

You said it yourself, the Islanders providing food and shelter for the British forces, willingly. But Argentine conscripts also engaged in the practice of stealing cattle, a practice that was severely punished by their officers, as the primary directive for the Argentine occupation forces in the Falklands was "not to mess with the Islanders or Islander property".


If nothing else, that should demonstrate that the Argentinians the had a doomed cause.

Well, yes, naturally the Falkland Islanders helped the British by providing intelligence information regarding Argentine positions (trenches, field artillery, AAA and SAM emplacements), troop movements, etc. Also provided places for the weary British soldiers to stay, vehicles (4x4 and pick-ups) and in no small part played a role in combat operations, evacuating and assisting the wounded using their expertise on the Falklands countryside and the use of off-road vehicles. Naturally they wanted the British to win. But they also helped Argentine soldiers moved solely by human compassion. And not only providing food for young Argentine conscripts: they also helped an Argentine Navy A-4Q Skyhawk pilot and turned him to his own forces so that he could return home safely.

When the Argentines landed, the official posture of the Argentine Government regarding the Falkland Islanders was that they were Argentine citizens (for them, the British occupation was illegal and the Falkland Islanders' government and law system was invalid: the Malvinas were Argentine territory and their inhabitants, by extension, Argentines) and had to be treated as such. And yes, there were Argentine officers such as the head of Intelligence for the Military Police in the islands, Mayor (Major) Patricio Dowling, who was deeply anti-British, despised the Islanders and was once overheard speaking about "how easier would it be for the Argentine occupation of the Malvinas if they simply got rid of all the Islanders". But there was also a campaign destined to win the 'hearts and minds' of the Islanders, as it was obvious that there was an intention, at least in paper, of "respecting the way of life of the Islanders" (which didn't go as smoothly as the Argentine propaganda put it, since official language was changed to Spanish and the Islanders were forced to drive by the right hand side of the road). Comodoro Carlos Bloomer Reeve, recognised as "the friendly face of the Argentine occupation", was a decent man and did whatever he could to make friends with the Islanders. Anyway, the occupation forces soon realised that the Falkland Islanders were never going to accept their new "Argentine" condition and it wasn't too long before they were subject to surveillance, detention for questioning, house arrest and even threat by mocking execution and other psychological torture tactics. But they did help the "enemy", nevertheless, out of sheer human compassion.

[OldCode]

ChrisBV, your comments on leadership and the espirit de corps of the British troops is right on. Once the troops were on the ground, nothing was going to stop them winning: Goose Green and the Stanley fighting would have gone the same way regardless of ship losses.

I recall a comedian (in the U.S.) at the time joking about how the Brits had said "we're coming to take back the islands, see you in a MONTH!!". And that's what they did. With a month to reinforce, the Argentinians sat back and did little, perhaps even made their defense weaker by pulling regular (Marine) forces off the island. I just don't think the Argentinians took the British will to action seriously - even with the massive, publicised send-offs from British ports.

[ChrisBV]

Hey, AD, thanks for the info on Argentine forces using the M16.


Now going back to the maintenance issues with FALs by Argentine concripts, that was (IMHO) due to the fact that many of the concripts sent to the islands have had poor or simply no training at all regarding how to field strip their rifles and how to clean them.

I agree.


Check the list of M-16 users and you´ll see that just a few of them could be regarded as "wealthy" countries (and even those "wealthy" countries have experiened jamming issues for sure !).
It´s all about proper training, thorough maintenance, and good ammo, regardless of where you are.

I'm largely ignorant about which countries use the M16 as a standard rifle for the entire army (for every average Joe or chap to have one), so I ask, how many countries whose armed forces are largely formed by conscripts use the M16 (or any other AR15 variant) as a standard assault rifle?

Ammunition quality, as I have said, has always been a problem in this part of the world.


Besides, in the last 10/15 years major S. A. countires have moved away from conscritpion.
(and now that you mention it, Israel is a M-16 user, with a huge conscription system !. Of course, they put a lot of enphasis on training)

Yes of course, but that was not the case 25 years ago. Compulsory military service was the rule back in 1982. And of course you can't compare Israel to any South American country in terms of military or defence budget. And also Israel uses the M16/M4 because it has always been cheaper and easier for the Israelis to buy rifles from the US and/or obtaining surplus stocks from the US than building their own rifles (I'm not making this up, an IWI salesperson told me that after I asked why didn't the IDF use the Galil as a standard assault rifle). Israel has an advantage in terms of access to US-made weapons not all of us enjoy.

Now, about reliability of the M16... I wouldn't say the M16 is more stoppage or jamming-****e than any other rifle providing you take proper care of it. I can tell you that Peruvian Police Special Forces fighting insurgency in the jungles of Peru love the M16 and they love it because it's lightweight (a huge advantage in hot, humid climates where your weapon and kit get heavier and heavier by the minute) and its' deadly accurate. The coolest things about the M16 is that it's designed to work linearly, so it's very controllable and you can get back to zero very easily and also the built-in iron sights are pretty good, operators favour them over the crude iron sights of, say, the AKM. And also I've been told by a Police special operator who had just returned from his previous tour of duty that, although he praised the legendary reliability of the AKM, he preferred the M16 all the way. And that the M16, in combat, jammed even less than the HK53. So it's a very good weapon, no question about it. But you have to take care of it.

They train constantly with US forces in the fight against insurgency, terrorism and drug trafficking and what they are really looking for next is getting their hands on the M4, not only because it shares ergonomics, accuracy and lightweight construction like the M16 but because it's highly customisable. And I've heard there are some discrepancies and debates on whether our soldiers should carry a 5.56x45mm or a 7.62x51mm rifle in the jungle but I can tell you that, at least these operators I had a chance to talk to, love the AR.

In the end, you have to take care of your weapons, it's just a fact of life in the battle zone. But, as you correctly put it, if you don't properly train your troops, you rush them to service and you don't have the discipline sort of 'built in' the mind of the soldier that he/she has to take care of his/her weapons, it doesn't matter how good the rifle is. And yes, the M16 is a more delicate design than the FAL, it's lighter, it has plastic parts... so yes, it is a more delicate weapon and you have to take care of it properly. So if the FAL that is a massive, solid piece of steel was damaged because of neglect and lack of care, can you imagine what would happen to the M16?

Thanks, OldCode. I completely agree with you.

[Ordie]

The Argentine Army kept its Patagonian units on the mainland.

[ChrisBV]

Yes and also some of its best Special Forces units.

The most immediate threat was Chile, so they didn't mind sending conscripts to the Falklands and keeping some of their best assets home to deter any Chilean aggression. After all, they weren't expecting the British to respond militarily, so I think they must have thought a show of force (having lots of boots in the islands) was enough.

[Eoin666]

When the Argentines landed, the official posture of the Argentine Government regarding the Falkland Islanders was that they were Argentine citizens (for them, the British occupation was illegal and the Falkland Islanders' government and law system was invalid: the Malvinas were Argentine territory and their inhabitants, by extension, Argentines) and had to be treated as such. And yes, there were Argentine officers such as the head of Intelligence for the Military Police in the islands, Mayor (Major) Patricio Dowling, who was deeply anti-British, despised the Islanders and was once overheard speaking about "how easier would it be for the Argentine occupation of the Malvinas if they simply got rid of all the Islanders". But there was also a campaign destined to win the 'hearts and minds' of the Islanders, as it was obvious that there was an intention, at least in paper, of "respecting the way of life of the Islanders" (which didn't go as smoothly as the Argentine propaganda put it, since official language was changed to Spanish and the Islanders were forced to drive by the right hand side of the road). Comodoro Carlos Bloomer Reeve, recognised as "the friendly face of the Argentine occupation", was a decent man and did whatever he could to make friends with the Islanders. Anyway, the occupation forces soon realised that the Falkland Islanders were never going to accept their new "Argentine" condition and it wasn't too long before they were subject to surveillance, detention for questioning, house arrest and even threat by mocking execution and other psychological torture tactics. But they did help the "enemy", nevertheless, out of sheer human compassion.

Thanks for the reply mate.
Both sound very Anglicised names....one good, one bad?

Regarding the Argentine defence preparations do you have any info about the 155mm artillery pieces, and why they weren't used effectively, particularly at the landing beach-heads

[Ordie]

Thanks for the reply mate.
Both sound very Anglicised names....one good, one bad?

Anglo-Argentines were active in the Argentine Armed forces. They were also instrumental in winning the peace with the UK after the war and its transition towards democracy.
The Argentine Embassy near St. James Palace was staffed with Anglo-Argentines.

[happyslapper]

Thanks for the reply mate.
Both sound very Anglicised names....one good, one bad?

Regarding the Argentine defence preparations do you have any info about the 155mm artillery pieces, and why they weren't used effectively, particularly at the landing beach-heads

They were well out of range of the San Carlos, being as they were stationed in Stanley (remember the attack was expected to be a frontal one against Stanley itself).

Dowling was of Irish descent. Like alot of plastic paddies, he had no understanding of Anglo-Irish matters and simply despised everything British with a rare and completely illogical passion. He was the least appropriate person to be installed as Chief of Police, and ran the Islands like a Stazi officer. Alot of intelligence reached the British about Dowling, to the point he was considered such a danger to the Islanders the Royal Navy made a surgical strike against the Police Office using an AS-12 missile lauched from a rather daring Lynx. Unfortunately he wasn't home at the time.
He was eventually removed by a couple of very decent Argentine officers, Carlos Bloomer Reeve, and Capt Barry Hussey, who saw the inhuman acts of barbarism against the Islanders for what they were.

There's a great book called Falkland Islanders at War, which goes into considerable depth about the antics of various Argentines (good and bad) and how the islanders did everything possible to disrupt the Arg war effort. A cfew nice little extracts here:
http://www.falklands.info/history/hist82article19.html

[reydelcastillo]

Thanks for the reply mate.
Both sound very Anglicised names....one good, one bad?

Regarding the Argentine defence preparations do you have any info about the 155mm artillery pieces, and why they weren't used effectively, particularly at the landing beach-heads

Mobility , they were so heavy that they had to constantly be digging them out of the mud -
They were brought in on C 130 flights with it's amo - Very hard to move them arround becouse of it's weight -

http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/falklands/argentine-artillery-1.jpg

[[WDW]Megaraptor]

Could they not move them by Chinook and set up firebases on mountaintops to sweep the approaches to Stanley?

[ChrisBV]

There's a great book called Falkland Islanders at War, which goes into considerable depth about the antics of various Argentines (good and bad) and how the islanders did everything possible to disrupt the Arg war effort. A cfew nice little extracts here:
http://www.falklands.info/history/hist82article19.html

There's also a great documentary called "Falklands: The Islanders' War" in which several Falkland Islanders recall their lives under the occupation. Some of them actively assisted the British not only by providing intelligence information that ultimately played a major part in British victory, providing shelter, a place to stay and food but were there, in the frontlines, under fire, helping the wounded, ferrying ammunition and even fighting side by side with the British forces. Worth watching.

[reydelcastillo]

[WDW]Megaraptor;4724030
Megaraptor;4724030']Could they not move them by Chinook and set up firebases on mountaintops to sweep the approaches to Stanley?

Hi Mr Megaraptor , the 155 mm were brought into the Islands after the conflict began , initially the Ground Artillery was supposed to be with Otto Mellara 105 mm only - By request of whom was Commander of Artillery Group 3 , one by one a total of 3 , 155 mm guns were brought in by C 130 -
I have my doubts that a Chinook can lift a 155 mm , if I rememmber correctly it weights about 7 or 8 Tn , plus amo plus the soldiers to operate them.-

Think it this way : Saddly the theory was :

1- Great Britain will not put together a task forth and make all that long trip just to recover the Islands -
2- Britain will not get any support from USA

Which proof to be a Totaly Wrong Thinking -

Based on this theory , the defense was established , suppriesly a Task Force headed south to recover the Islands , so with a blocade in place , what ever could be put together was send to the islands - This is the case with the 155 mm , and many other elements and Units moved in a hurry to the Islands -

Regards Enrique

Note: It was planed to keep the 155 mm with in the umbrela of the Triple A -
Remmeber Great Britain had Air Supperiority

[Mordoror]

I think people often mistake British military leaders' sensible awareness of how bleak the situation was for their forces fighting in the Falklands or how conscious they were of the fact that they weren't precisely in the best situation and that the loss of ships, particularly supply vessels, was having most negative consequences in landing operations, the push towards the capital and such... and that if the Argies sank a carrier or sank a few more vessels or scored a lucky hit here and there, it would have been much more of a complicated situation than what already was with...................................snip.................

I have no doubt that despite their shortcomings, the Argentines fought bravely; that despite the fact that a good portion of them were conscripts, ill-trained and ill-equipped, they did their best. But you can't win a war without proper leadership. There are no poor soldiers, only poor leaders. And you can't win without good leaders setting an example and actually "leading" from the front.

very very good post ChrisBV
my respect for the way it is constructed and the respect you show for both sides as well the human way you write

[beatles101]

i think that the sinking of the Belgrano was a very smart choice by the Royal Navy Because of several reasons
A. since the Belgrano wasnt in the 200 exclude zone or the EZ as you folks say it she was still a threat to the Royal Navy task force
B. she had a few of the Deadly Excocet Missles
C. if she had the chance to take out the flag ship she would have
so i think that it was a smart move the British Royal Navy to sink bud sadly in war lives are lost and so on May 4th HMS Sheffield D80 (Shinny Shef) struck by an Argentine Excocet Anti-ship misssle resulting in 20 crew losing their lives with 26 more badly wounded
R.I.P.

[reydelcastillo]

i think that the sinking of the Belgrano was a very smart choice by the Royal Navy Because of several reasons
A. since the Belgrano wasnt in the 200 exclude zone or the EZ as you folks say it she was still a threat to the Royal Navy task force
B. she had a few of the Deadly Excocet Missles
C. if she had the chance to take out the flag ship she would have
so i think that it was a smart move the British Royal Navy to sink bud sadly in war lives are lost and so on May 4th HMS Sheffield D80 (Shinny Shef) struck by an Argentine Excocet Anti-ship misssle resulting in 20 crew losing their lives with 26 more badly wounded
R.I.P.

In or out of the zone , close or not close , it was war time - Said by it's own Captain - Which I Respect a lot and admire -

Mr Beatles: as Captain Bonzo ( Captain of the Belgrano ) said before his death ( in year 2009) it was a strict act of Combat - It was war time - RIP to all who have been killed during the Conflict -

[beatles101]

Mr Beatles: as Captain Bonzo ( Captain of the Belgrano ) said before his death ( in year 2009) it was a strict act of Combat - It was war time - RIP to all who have been killed during the Conflict -
yes but yet some Argentines believe it was unjustified attack against a ship that according to them wasnt even a threat to RN inwhich in reality she was a threat to Royal Navy but some Argentines just dont seem to get that they invaded the Falklands in 1982 which caused that conflict between them and Britain and Britain defeated them and yet they are still sour about :roll: give me a break
i also give the man respect for him to say that the british had the right to sink the warship and plus after the Sinking the Argentine Navy didnt leave port for the rest of the conflict
some people just dont get that they made the mistake

on another note i did this video a while back and i thought i would share these two with you guyz
first one is on HMS Coventry D118

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BPUE15ZYxYU&feature=channel

The Falklands war tribute

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lGp4upe-CO8&feature=channel

my Royal Marine tribute

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O84LKbpDIQs&feature=channel

to those that fought and didnt make it home Rest In Peace

[ChrisBV]

Thank you very much, Mordoror ;)


In or out of the zone , close or not close , it was war time - Said by it's own Captain - Which I Respect a lot and admire -

Mr Beatles: as Captain Bonzo ( Captain of the Belgrano ) said before his death ( in year 2009) it was a strict act of Combat - It was war time - RIP to all who have been killed during the Conflict -

Well said. Nothing much to add here.

Loss of life is always sad. But that ship was indeed a warship (not a freighter or a pleasure cruise) and therefore, a legitimate military target. The Argentine Navy High Command was very much aware of the situation and, after receiving a communique via the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires (representing British interests) whereby the British expressly and clearly stated their intentions of regarding any warship "in, around or in proximity of the Falklands Total Exclusion Zone" as "hostile", Argentine naval officials de facto assumed that, despite no formal declaration of hostilities had been made, their ships were in danger of attack by British surface warships, aircraft or SSNs from that moment on.

As Enrique correctly mentioned, Captain Bonzo himself said that the sinking of his ship was a legitimate act of war; I don't think there's any evidence out there to contradict such statement.

[beatles101]

Thank you very much, Mordoror ;)



Well said. Nothing much to add here.

Loss of life is always sad. But that ship was indeed a warship (not a freighter or a pleasure cruise) and therefore, a legitimate military target. The Argentine Navy High Command was very much aware of the situation and, after receiving a communique via the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires (representing British interests) whereby the British expressly and clearly stated their intentions of regarding any warship "in, around or in proximity of the Falklands Total Exclusion Zone" as "hostile", Argentine naval officials de facto assumed that, despite no formal declaration of hostilities had been made, their ships were in danger of attack by British surface warships, aircraft or SSNs from that moment on.

As Enrique correctly mentioned, Captain Bonzo himself said that the sinking of his ship was a legitimate act of war; I don't think there's any evidence out there to contradict such statement.

Well some Argentines would Disagree with you on that one mate the thing that gets me is that they cant take the deafeat of the war with pride really they have to be sour about it honestly think about though they still claim that the Islands are still legally theirs when infact since the 1800's it has been British why cant they just say "yes we lost but we still have pride" why do they have to say like " oh the islands were and are ours
man it jsut makes me annoyed

[Eoin666]

They were well out of range of the San Carlos, being as they were stationed in Stanley (remember the attack was expected to be a frontal one against Stanley itself).

Dowling was of Irish descent. Like alot of plastic paddies, he had no understanding of Anglo-Irish matters and simply despised everything British with a rare and completely illogical passion. He was the least appropriate person to be installed as Chief of Police, and ran the Islands like a Stazi officer. Alot of intelligence reached the British about Dowling, to the point he was considered such a danger to the Islanders the Royal Navy made a surgical strike against the Police Office using an AS-12 missile lauched from a rather daring Lynx. Unfortunately he wasn't home at the time.
He was eventually removed by a couple of very decent Argentine officers, Carlos Bloomer Reeve, and Capt Barry Hussey, who saw the inhuman acts of barbarism against the Islanders for what they were.

There's a great book called Falkland Islanders at War, which goes into considerable depth about the antics of various Argentines (good and bad) and how the islanders did everything possible to disrupt the Arg war effort. A cfew nice little extracts here:
http://www.falklands.info/history/hist82article19.html


Thanks for that reply mate, good read. And thanks to all for keeping this thread both educational and informative..........nice one fellas



Well some Argentines would Disagree with you on that one mate the thing that gets me is that they cant take the deafeat of the war with pride really they have to be sour about it honestly think about though they still claim that the Islands are still legally theirs when infact since the 1800's it has been British why cant they just say "yes we lost but we still have pride" why do they have to say like " oh the islands were and are ours
man it jsut makes me annoyed


There were many here in the UK who also thought the same, attempting to brand both members of the government and I think HMS Conqueror's crew as virtual war criminals, simply because at the precise moment of attack the Belgrano, was or wasn't, sailing towards or away, from the exclusion zone, :roll:

[filochard]

Hi,
Yes there is little chance the Brits would have lost the war. But there was a lot of possibility they would have lost the battle. Had they lost it at there first attempt, it would have taken years to try another one.
During this time Argentina could have prepared better, improved the airport, put mines, entrenched, installed better air defense, etc.. even with some Brits attack sub marauding around. Let alone some diplomatic consequences like the US, uncomfortable between there Brits and Argentinian alliance, that could have imposed a diplomatic solution.
In fact this first battle was indeed of great importance and yes that was a close thing.
I know it's easier to make history *after* it hapened than *before* but there seems to be so many obvious mistakes Argentinian side: not waiting for more Exocet missiles, not waiting for winter, not preparing, *before* the attack, everything it take to improve the Falkland airport very fast, not preparing enough mines, and so on.

As a side note: from my memory, the extra Exocet delivery was stopped at the last time while they were about to be shipped. And that it wasn't six more pieces but two dozen. So it seemed to me that it wasn't a question of month but a question of weeks.
My questions are: is my memory wrong ? or is it that it take several month to put new Exocet into service ? and how many exactly were ordered and about to be delivered ?

[beatles101]

@ Eoin666

i guess it doesnt matter though if she wasn't in the zone or not that is beside the point the point is though she was still a threat, the British had the right way to do that attack if they had not then the Royal Navy might have lost their Flag ship and then the British people would Have given the Thachter government flak for losing an aircraft carrier the mainf flag ship HMS Hermes on a different not though if the Argentines Forces at Stanely had not surrended there would have been more blood shed on both sides fo the front and there woud have been more civilians killed in the crossfire

[martinexsquaddie]

to be honest belgrano was a lot less of a threat than it first appears on paper.
it was old worn out and crewed by consripts.
Its main guns would be devastating if in range and accurate much harder to do in practice than in theory.
even with out subs by the time your in range of the carriers your old ww2 crusier is going to be trading shell and exocet with royal navy warships that do know how to shoot.

[Mordoror]

to be honest belgrano was a lot less of a threat than it first appears on paper.
it was old worn out and crewed by consripts.
Its main guns would be devastating if in range and accurate much harder to do in practice than in theory.
even with out subs by the time your in range of the carriers your old ww2 crusier is going to be trading shell and exocet with royal navy warships that do know how to shoot.

you are right and may be wrong at the same time
don't want to focus on the Belgrano. I agree that it wouldn't have changed the outcome of the war
but a massive cruiser in a vicissinity of any fleet always make fleet commanders a litlle warry
by its sheer presence it would have diverted some significant UK surface elements, leading to a decrease in the cover of the beach-heads, in the radar coverage and escort of the supply ships (much like the Bismarck and graf von Spee led to a divertion of a significative part of the Atlantic fleet to hunt them down)

moreover the Belgrano was a WWII design meaning a strong armored belt that may have sustained missile damage (the exocet is a sea skimming missile, not a diving missile, the first bacth didn't have a rise and strike capability) whereas modern ships are more vulnerable to missile and artillery damage

well anyway it was hit by torpedoes so that doesn't matter anymore but that would have been an interesting challenge for the UK fleet

[[WDW]Megaraptor]

It's not like Belgrano was attacking the British fleet by itself.

It was part of a carrier battle group, including the carrier Venticinco De Mayo and the Belgrano's sister ship as well as smaller escorts.

Was a CVBAG a threat to the Royal Navy task force? You bet it was.

The rest of the CVBAG went back to port when they realized they couldn't protect themselves against British submarines.

[ChrisBV]

to be honest belgrano was a lot less of a threat than it first appears on paper.

Yes, we know that now, 27 years later and the Argentines did know that at the time... but did also the British?

If you had a warship in your sights, would you think twice and take the risk of assuming that ship's fighting capabilities are negligible? "Oh no, I shall let this one pass because I think it's an old cruiser manned by conscripts"... I don't think so.

That's a risky presumption, if you ask me.

Argentine submarines posed little threat to the Task Force as well. I posted this in the Falklands 25 topic:


The performance of the ARA in the Falklands campaign was appalling, to say the least. For instance, Argentina had a decent submarine force that could have caused significant damage to the Task Force had it been properly fit for duty, but the military planners chose to commit their submarines to the transport of troops and supplies (such was the case, for example, of ARA Santa Fé, whose presence did deter HMS Endurance from approaching the combat zone in the first stages of the Argentine invasion but later on served exclusively as a target for depth charges, missiles and machine gun fire) instead of sending them out to hunt British supply vessels. The British did consider the Argentine submarine force to be a very serious threat - in the Board of Inquiry report on the loss of HMS Sheffield, one can read how the concern for being attacked by submarines had an adverse effect on rescue operations; also, the Queen Elizabeth 2, carrying loads of troops, had to be diverted to South Georgia in order to keep her away from potential Argentine submarines on patrol - but the Argentines didn't use their submarines in the way they were supposed to and when they did, they achieved little or no good in favour of the Argentine war effort: their 'U209' class submarine San Luis did launch a few attacks but without results as their SST-4 torpedoes failed each and every time to hit their marks. The Argentines claim that such failures were induced by a poor maintenance routine that had inverted the polarity of the on-board gyros (LOL) and a further failure of the platform's fire control system; furthermore, San Luis had to set sail with only 3 of her 4 diesel engines operational, because there wasn't enough time for an engine change when the war broke out so it is clear that the vessel wasn't even remotely fit for combat by the time it was deployed to the South Atlantic.

I'm surprised they weren't sunk by the British! The Argentines in other forums regard as a 'victory' the fact that the San Luis could evade the British sensors and their (alleged) counter-attacks but it was sheer luck what saved that boat and her crew from spending eternity in the bottom of the South Atlantic and nothing else.

I might add that ARA San Luis' crew was not prepared to command and take into battle a U209 class submarine - as Argentine U209 crews were at the time in Germany supervising the development of the new TR-1700 diesel-electric patrol submarine project commissioned by Argentina in the late 1970s - and that none of the two U209 submarines (ARA San Luis and ARA Salta) had never fired a SST-4 torpedo in exercises before.

So Argentine subs in reality posed little threat to the British Task Force; nevertheless, they did influence the battlefield. And the fact is that you have to assume the enemy is as ready, fit and motivated for combat as you are, even though that might not be the case. You can't take chances because if you do that, you risk your own troops, ships and perhaps even the outcome of the entire military campaign.


It's not like Belgrano was attacking the British fleet by itself.

It was part of a carrier battle group, including the carrier Venticinco De Mayo and the Belgrano's sister ship as well as smaller escorts.

Was a CVBAG a threat to the Royal Navy task force? You bet it was.

I agree. Belgrano's Task Group (Grupo de Tareas 79.3) was at the time participating in manoeuvres involving a coordinated 'pincer' attack against the British fleet with aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo and her escorts (Grupo de Tareas 79.2). After the attack was cancelled, Belgrano was ordered to move out West of the TEZ and await further orders. So she was a fighting ship involved in combat operations against the British Task Force and therefore, a threat.

[martinexsquaddie]

yes sorryjust pointing out the theoritical pince attack by the 25th of may and the belgranos task force was more a pipe dream than a realistic threat if the sub had found the 25th of may before the belgrano the argetininans would have lost a lot more aicraft before the air war really began.

[happyslapper]

yes sorryjust pointing out the theoritical pince attack by the 25th of may and the belgranos task force was more a pipe dream than a realistic threat if the sub had found the 25th of may before the belgrano the argetininans would have lost a lot more aicraft before the air war really began.

There were several A-4Q's onboard the 25Mayo, as well as Trackers, and crucially... the most experienced and professional aviators/support crews Argentina had.
If the 25Mayo had been sunk i've no doubt it would have had a massive influence on Arg's ability to wage air war, and British units would have survived. As discussed earlier, I think the chances of success with the planned 1st May attack were minimal... and the outcome of a high seas engagement between the ARA and the RN was (at the risk of historical arrogance) inevitable.
On a humanitarian level, and if the SAR efforts following the Belgrano's sinking are anything to go by... the death toll of such an engagement would far outweigh the British lives lost as a result of the 25Mayo's airgoup being flown from land.

Hindsight is 20/20, and I completely concur with Adm Woodward's recommendation ''in the strongest possible terms to the Commander-in-Chief Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse that we take them both out this night''.
I think all sides could truly smell blood by that stage.

[Auzaider]

Megaraptor;4728753']It's not like Belgrano was attacking the British fleet by itself.

It was part of a carrier battle group, including the carrier Venticinco De Mayo and the Belgrano's sister ship as well as smaller escorts.

Was a CVBAG a threat to the Royal Navy task force? You bet it was.

The rest of the CVBAG went back to port when they realized they couldn't protect themselves against British submarines.

Belgrano's sister ship? On the Armada Argentina? We only had one cruiser.

[[WDW]Megaraptor]

Belgrano's sister ship? On the Armada Argentina? We only had one cruiser.

Ah my mistake it appears the Belgrano's sister ship in Argentine service the ARA Nueve de Julio (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARA_Nueve_de_Julio) was retired in 1978.

There were several task forces operating south of the Falklands, 79.1 which was the carrier Venticinco De Mayo plus two destroyers, and 79.3 which was the Belgrano and two destroyers, and 79.4 made up of three corvettes, plus submarines.

Might not have been able to defeat the British task force, but could have done some serious damage if not for the extreme vulnerability to submarine attack.

[afreu]

Just had a few cups of tea and read through the whole thread. Excellent stuff!

[TheKiwi]

Megaraptor;5163920']Ah my mistake it appears the Belgrano's sister ship in Argentine service the ARA Nueve de Julio (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARA_Nueve_de_Julio) was retired in 1978.

There were several task forces operating south of the Falklands, 79.1 which was the carrier Venticinco De Mayo plus two destroyers, and 79.3 which was the Belgrano and two destroyers, and 79.4 made up of three corvettes, plus submarines.

Might not have been able to defeat the British task force, but could have done some serious damage if not for the extreme vulnerability to submarine attack.

Yes, every shell from the Belgrano's 15 x 6" canon's would have been like an Exocet strike, only with more chance of detonation. The RN most certainly did not want her to get within range.

[martinexsquaddie]

The Belgranos guns would have been devastating if the gun crews were good enough. Naval gunnery is an art and an expensive art to master I doubt argentinan naval consripts got to shoot enough ammo to make taking the ship against the royal navy a viable plan. Royal navy was right to sink here just the idea that the belgrano crewed by consripts was up to the task appointed reality was more like the mythical irish invasion of london derry it was a sucide mission
the falklands was a disaster started by idiots who
A thought the UK would'nt react
B the US would back them or at least not back the UK
So when it came to shooting regardless of the bravery of argentine pilots and others decisons made already doomed argentine forces.

[Auzaider]

Yes they were dumb, but it was not just extending the runway (that was perfectly possible and engineers had the materials to do it)... there are a lot of logistics to consider if you are to operate combat jets on the islands... it's not like you can leave them on the runway.

The only things that would have made a difference (and that's only maybe prolonging the conflict some months until summer) are more Exocets (we only had 5 out of 14 requested, then an operation via Peru was frustrated by british intelligence), more KC-130 (we only had two and this limited how many planes could attack at the same time) and someone on the junta that hadn't bought the idea that the british would not fight (so maybe some more prepared units were sent to the islands, not many but enough to make some difference, remember that most of the army units were conscripts from the north of the country with no more than two months of training. My uncle was a conscript at the Infantería de Marina and was left on the mainland to defend Puerto Belgrano, he had been trained for two years like all conscripts on the Armada Argentina (Argentinian Navy)).

Another thing guys mentioning nuclear weapons seem to forget... there was still a cold war there, using nuclear weapons was not a simple thing to do.

[Royal]

Megaraptor;4728753']Was a CVBAG a threat to the Royal Navy task force? You bet it was.

....is rather contradicted by....


Megaraptor;4728753']The rest of the CVBAG went back to port when they realized they couldn't protect themselves against British submarines.

[sp2c]

well it was a threat but not without risks and after the Belgrano the Argentines decided not to take the risk

smart imo because once the Brittish decided to fight over the islands the Argentines were going to lose anyways

[ChrisBV]

Megaraptor]The rest of the CVBAG went back to port when they realized they couldn't protect themselves against British submarines.

Not really.

ARA 25 de Mayo remained on station after Belgrano was sunk and returned to port on 12 May, 10 days after the sinking of the old cruiser. That task group, unlike Belgrano's, was well protected against ASW threats - 25 de Mayo's S-2E Trackers operated from the mainland against British submarines and did launch several sonobuoys, Mk44 acoustic torpedoes and depth charges against suspected contacts on a handful of occasions. Her escorts, the two Type 42 destroyers in Argentine service, had a decent sonar suite and ASW capabilities on their own as well.

By the 2nd of May and after the planned assault against the British Task Force was cancelled due to adverse weather conditions (lack of proper winds for successful launch of A-4Q jets with a full combat load) it was decided that the aircraft carrier's air wing would be transferred to the mainland; from there, it would launch attacks against UK ships. Greater endurance with heavier payloads was guaranteed thanks to the use of air-to-air refuelling from Air Force KC-130H tankers - which rules out the need for an aircraft carrier in the first place, doesn't it? What's the point of having an aircraft carrier if a) you can't launch aircraft with full combat loads and b) you get greater range and endurance deploying them from the mainland? :roll:

Undoubtedly, the presence of British SSNs in the area was a credible deterrent but not necessarily the primary cause for the Argentine Navy's withdrawal from the theatre of operations.

[happyslapper]

Greater endurance with heavier payloads was guaranteed thanks to the use of air-to-air refuelling from Air Force KC-130H tankers - which rules out the need for an aircraft carrier in the first place, doesn't it? What's the point of having an aircraft carrier if a) you can't launch aircraft with full combat loads and b) you get greater range and endurance deploying them from the mainland?

Because it creates a gigantic headache for commanders who have to spread their limited assets to protect from an all-aspect attack, rather than pointing everything westwards, and waiting for it to come.
It's certainly not without historical precedent, when you consider RN operations in the North Sea and Med during WWII, or Anglo-French operations during Suez (for example). I agree with the bulk of your post, but carriers are often a compliment, rather than alternative to land-based aviation.
Certainly a prolonged 25Mayo involvement would have thrown open a few more options to the Argentines, just as it would have forced the British to deploy their precious resources even more thinly at the point in the war when they were most lacking in airframes. The downside is that I am highly confident that the 25Mayo would have gone the same way as the Belgrano.

[Flagg]

I'm no navy guru......but I wouldn't rate the chances of the 25Mayo battle group living long staying in the AO with even a rough SIGINT blood trail for a pack of Perisher Course qualified/led UK SSNs to hunt down.