War in Afghanistan 1979-1989 Funding of the Mujaheddin (need some advice)

[intelligenzija]

Dear all,

I am doing some research for the university on how the Mujaheddin were funded by various individuals from Saudi Arabia and other countries, as well as the USA.
Can anyone give some advice on books or documents or other sources on that topic?

I already have 'The Bear Trap' by the Pakistani ISI officer Mohammed Yousaf.

I would appreciate your help very much!

[mshnell]

Charlie Wilson's War by George Crile.

It's worth every penny.

[bryanleu2002]

Jihad!: The SAS Secret War In Afghanistan

113599

Whether its fiction or not, this book was very good, fast, and enjoyable to read. I believe He does discuss in the book about AA missile procurement and funding for the muj. Even if this book is totally fake, by a fake, it might be still worth reading as part of your research..

http://www.amazon.ca/Jihad-SAS-Secret-War-Afghanistan/dp/1840183268

[bryanleu2002]

Ok! from what i have gatherd "The Bear Trap"by - Mohemmed yousaf"
and the book- "jihad" by tom carew are by the same man>Philip Sessarego. A SAS FAKE! Originally I was inclined to think that this was the real thing. however, this may not be true.

[JBH22]

Though its off-topic can someone tell me where i can download the film Afganskiy Izlom (afghan breakdown) with english subtitles thxss in advance

[Difool]

This is more about arms deals in general, but interesting reading and you may find some hints for further research:
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1987/02/16/68671/index.htm
http://www.spectrezine.org/war/Mpri.htm

[intelligenzija]

Ok! from what i have gatherd "The Bear Trap"by - Mohemmed yousaf"
and the book- "jihad" by tom carew are by the same man>Philip Sessarego. A SAS FAKE! Originally I was inclined to think that this was the real thing. however, this may not be true.

where did you get that from? If "The Bear Trap" by Mohammad Yousaf is fake then it's a really professional one.. There are even photos of (alleged) Mohammad Yousaf in the book

[[WDW]Megaraptor]

Ghost Wars by Steve Coll is very good:

http://www.amazon.com/Ghost-Wars-Afghanistan-Invasion-September/dp/0143034669/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1268572701&sr=8-1

[bryanleu2002]

where did you get that from? If "The Bear Trap" by Mohammad Yousaf is fake then it's a really professional one.. There are even photos of (alleged) Mohammad Yousaf in the book

My bad, i must have read something wrong somewhere on another thread.

[intelligenzija]

Thank you very much so far, does anyone know how I can find documents released under the freedom of information act?

[bryanleu2002]

here is another book i read which has a little tid bit about astan by a Cuban during that time, nothing about financial procurement, but a first hand account anyways. good luck in your research!

113892

[intelligenzija]

here is another book i read which has a little tid bit about astan by a Cuban during that time, nothing about financial procurement, but a first hand account anyways. good luck in your research!

113892

sounds interestings, but probably suits a different topic better :)

[Holycrusader]

Though its off-topic can someone tell me where i can download the film Afganskiy Izlom (afghan breakdown) with english subtitles thxss in advance



I saw it on Youtube. Many parts...

[Laworkerbee]

Dear all,

I am doing some research for the university on how the Mujaheddin were funded by various individuals from Saudi Arabia and other countries, as well as the USA.
Can anyone give some advice on books or documents or other sources on that topic?

I already have 'The Bear Trap' by the Pakistani ISI officer Mohammed Yousaf.

I would appreciate your help very much!

If you come across something better than The Bear Trap be sure to post it here, I doubt you will if you do please post it here.

[Chairborne Ranger]

Ghost Wars by Steve Coll is very good:

http://www.amazon.com/Ghost-Wars-Afghanistan-Invasion-September/dp/0143034669/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1268572701&sr=8-1

X2
A good read with lots of detail concerning the funding of the muj.

[intelligenzija]

I will try to pick it up tomorrow

[intelligenzija]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A5O_bQ0OMIk



not sure if this is real

[intelligenzija]

Megaraptor;4818540']Ghost Wars by Steve Coll is very good:

http://www.amazon.com/Ghost-Wars-Afghanistan-Invasion-September/dp/0143034669/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1268572701&sr=8-1

For those who are still interested in the topic, I can really recommend the book by Steve Coll ! He has done some excellent research.

Furthermore I can recommend some other books/sources for general information:

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.browse&sort=Collection&item=Soviet%20Invasion%20of%20Afghanistan
(documents from cold war period, incl. records of meetings between soviet officials)

and Diego Cordovez, Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawl

[intelligenzija]

from wikileaks, report from the Bilderberg conference 1980 in Aachen, Germany



Afghanistan

A British participant likened the three major current international crises to "three plays being performed by different actors on the same stage at the same time," which had led to substantial intellectual confusion: the Afghanistan play, the Iranian play, and the Arab-Israeli play. While the most dramatic of these was the hostage play -- which one hoped would be only one act -- the Afghanistan play was perhaps more important in the long run, pointing up the need for an effective counter to Soviet pressure, not as a means of punishing the Russians, but of deterring them.

The governing party in Britain -- before being elected -- had completed and published an analysis of Soviet policy which had prepared them to issue, after the Afghanistan invasion, a reaction which was sharper than either their French or German allies. (It might have ended up being the only sharp reaction, had President Carter not undergone his own change of feeling about Russian intentions.) In any case, this harsh British reaction was the result of their own assessment of the situation, and represented in no way an attempt to renew their old "special relationship" with the U.S., as the author of the French working paper had suggested.

One reason most of the allies had not better prepared to react to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, according to an International speaker, was that they had heard "wolf!" cried too often before. Nevertheless, the U.S. government had warned its allies as early as last November that Soviet troops were massing on the northern frontier of Afghanistan, a presage of possible intervention. All the allies were menaced in the same way by this escalation of Soviet military power, but they did not all see the danger in the same way, so that there was no consensus about how we should react. The U.S., though, had unequivocally warned the Soviets that any new movement toward the oil fields would mean war. If the European powers had given the same sort of warning to Germany after Munich, World War II might have been avoided. (A German speaker differed with that, saying that no protest would have stopped Hitler, who had "wanted his war.")

Another German speaker, who was seconded by a Luxemburger, wondered whether Afghanistan was part of a relentless geopolitical advance of the Soviets, or rather a specific response to a specific problem on their southern border -- a passing phenomenon. In either case, the problem of Afghanistan would not be solved by moving the Europeans into the firing line. That would jeopardize all the palpable gains of detente, which had brought more frrom for dissidence and more human contacts between the two Germanys.

The author of the French working paper took exception to the general European preoccupation with analyzing at length why the Russians had intervened in Afghanistan. To him, it had been simply to avoid the contamination of Islam, as they had intervened in Czechoslovakia to avoid the contamination of liberty. One could say that they had acted to protect their internal empire -- but none of this was important to the question of whether and how we should react.

On this point, an American speaker said that the basic question about Soviet motives in Afghanistan should be asked in connection with their part in the coup d'etat which had brought a Communist regime into power there in April 1978. The Soviets had been preparing for that opportunity for many years, having begun a training and advisory program in the 1950's which enabled them to organize their own cadres within the Afghan armed forces. As early as the 1960's, they had organized Communist political groups inside the country, and in 1977 they had forced a merger between the two principal feuding groups. Given their close ties to Taraki and Karmal, it was inconceivable that the Soviets had not had advance knowledge of the coup in April 1978.

They key question was why they had found it necessary at the time to destroy a nonaligned and independent government which fully protected their interests and posed no threat to them. The speaker's conclusion was that this had been an act of imperialism, culminating 150 years of advance into central Asia. He further believed that neither the Americans or the Europeans had possessed the political or military assets to forestall that coup.

After April 1978, the old split within the Afghan Communist movement had re-emerged, and insurgents had begun to operate in teh fall and winter of 1978-79. In September 1979, Taraki had been overthrown by Amin, who had proved to be a less dependable puppet. The USSR had then invaded in order to protect "their revolution," a clear example of the operation of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The Russians' entrenchment in Afghanistan offered them various advantages. Through overlapping tribal groups in Iran and Pakistan, they had new opportunities for infiltration and subversion in those countries. By contending that history was on their side, they also could hope to intimidate other states, especially in the Gulf area. This participant disagreed with the suggestion of the previous speaker that the Soviet invasion had resulted from their own fear that the Islamic revolution might spread into their southern regions, although the growth of the relative size of the central Asian population within the USSR was indeed a cause for concern in Moscow.

We should not base any of our policies on wishful thinking that the Soviets could be dislodged by military means. The Afghan insurgents lacked firepower and outside support, and no groups were openly complaining in the Soviet Union about Russian casualties. Nor should we hold out much hope for neutralization of the country. Furthermore, it was unrealistic to expect the Soviets to leave voluntarily, as anyone who had been associated with their regime would be summarily dispatched by the Afghans after their departure.

Unfortunately, the Western response to the coup of April 1978 had been almost nonexistent. And our neglect had not even been "benign." The most important thing we could have done was to restore close ties and working relations with Pakistan. Indeed -- in the name of human rights and nuclear nonproliferation -- we had virtually destroyed the links between the U.S. and Pakistan, cutting off all American assistance to that country in 1979. The shock of the Soviet invasion had finally made clear the threat to international stability and to our oil lines.

The speaker concluded that, for the most part, our response to the invasion of Afghanistan had been appropriate. Although we could not hope to oust the Soviets militarily, we had to make the point that this kind of transgression against the international order could not be tolerated, and that we would not hesitate to take measures to protect our access to the oil of the region. We would have to keep our military forces "over the horizon", and we could not expect the Arab states to help us. We should seek to regain Pakistan's shaken confidence, and to supply arms to the Afghan rebels, who would continue to fight as long as possible. The terrain in Afghanistan was not conducive to effective guerilla[sic] warfare, especially against helicopters, but the rebels' bravery would keep them going for some time. Above all, our response to what the Soviets had undertaken would have to be with consistent policies which underlined our interests both in that region and globally.

A Portuguese participant said that the Afghan invasion had to be condemned on the basis of international principles. It had changed the geostrategic picture not only in the region, but worldwide. The question was, what were we going to do next in response to this Soviet move? The speaker found the Iranian and Afghan problems to be very different in nature, and he regretted that the Americans in both cases were "going along the same road, taking similar measures."

The pros and cons of boycotting the Olympic Games in Moscow were dealt with in several interventions. A Briton thought that such action would not be effective in the context of a wider demonstration, while an International participant characterized it as a sentimental rather than a strategic reaction. Let us not make Afghanistan the touchstone of the survival of the detente, he said. An American emphasized that a boycott would be a powerful symbolic protest, delivered within the Soviet Union in a highly visible and dramatic way. Its message would not be lost on the Russian people, whether or not it was followed by other measures.

A German speaker agreed about the symbolic importance of staying away from the games. Thinking back to "Hitler's Olympics" of 1936, he asked whether the various countries really had to wait for a lead from the U.S. Olympic Committee before acting on their own. With all of our tak about human rights, did we not have the moral strength to adopt a stand? The German Committee would take its final decision the following week, but it appeared that three-quarters of the citizens of the Federal Republic favored a boycott.

Another German predicted that his country was likely to follow the American lead and boycott the games, although many people doubted this would induce the Russians to leave Afghanistan, and indeed feared that it might bring reprisals on dissidents and Jews in the Soviet Union. The Germans in any case could not be more concerned than they were about the implications of Afghanistan, and believed that there had to be a Western response. They were prepared to support economic sanctions in matters of strategic importance, but not if certain countries, or the West as a whole, would be hurt more than the Russians. It had to be remembered that the Germans had certain treaty obligations with the USSR, and they wanted to avoid giving the Russians any excuse to break those treaties. (A compatriot agreed that it was enormously important for the Germans, living in a divided nation, to maintain their obligations, and they would not let themselves be talked into not honoring their agreements.) Most people in the Federal Republic believed in a combination of incentives and pressures to get the Russians out of Afghanistan, and in the need for a long-term strategy to deter further aggression. This would include redressing the military imbalance, and perhaps the single most important and credible signal America could give the Russians in the wake of Afghanistan would be the reintroduction of Selective Service in the U.S.

A Greek speaker advocated both a boycott of the Moscow games and a limit on the growth of Western credits to the USSR>

According to a German participant, the French working paper had overemphasized the consequences of economic sanctions on the Soviet Union, and the possibilities of Russian retaliation. Germany's trade with the Eastern bloc, for instance, amounted to little more than seven per cent of its total foreign trade, and the value of high technology exports to the East had been exaggerated. Furthermore, an embargo could be easily bypassed via neutral or socialist countries, and the Soviets could take counter measures within their own orbit. Perhaps the strongest argument against economic sanctions was that relations among the allies were bound to suffer as they wrangled month after month about the framework and its details.

Several participants commented on the suggestion by the author of the French working paper that the fate of the people of El Salvador, under a regime supported by the U.S., was probably not much better than that of the Afghans.

One American remarked ironically that he was "fascinated by visions of 80,000 U.S. troops in El Salvador," while another called the comparison "inaccurate, outrageous . . not helpful or productive."

A Swiss participant commented on the difference between the two situations as observed by the International Red Cross. In Latin America -- e.g., El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Argentina, Colombia -- the Red Cross was allowed to visit all political prisoners without the presence of witnesses, to bring letters and family news both ways, and to give medical care. The prisoners in these countries were free to register complaints on any subject, including the U.S. But it was notable that, while there might bec omplaints about U.S. political influence, there were no complaints of American military aggression or torture.

In Afghanistan, the Red Cross had not been allowed to visit a single prisoner, political or military, and it had been furnished no list of names. In the USSR, it had not been permitted for the last fifty years to visit political prisoners, and such visits were also forbidden in East Germany and other East bloc countries, as well as North Vietnam. Some access to prisoners had recently been granted in Iran, but not without witnesses. These facts, which had been published in the IRC's annual report, had to be borne in mind when one was tempted to make facile comparisons about human rights conditions.

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Bilderberg_meeting_report_Aachen,_1980/Text#Afghanistan