How realistic is the combat shown in HBO's "The Pacific"?

[Smersh]

I've gotten into a few discussions over how accurate the portrayal of fighting is in the new HBO series the Pacific. What was the average engagement range of combat in the pacific theater? All the fighting so far in the episodes has been with the enemy clearly visible, standing up right, no more then 50 meters away. With US Machine gunners wiping out the Japanese 10 or 20ft away.

All the fighting in the series seems to be at <50m or less, with the enemy appearing already almost on top of the US troops. Using artillery at ranges that close would be dangerous I would think. Also something that continually sticks out is the placement of MGs. why would you ever set up a MG in a position, that you can't observe further out then 50m. The MG position would be practically over run as soon at the enemy are in sight. I would think at the ranges shown, a Japanese soldier could have easily tossed a grenade at the American dug-out.

I understand this is a Hollywood production, the sets can't have the scope and scale of actual battles, but some people have argued with me, "this is how it was". In my view the engagement distances shown in the series, is more about the audience being able to clearly see who the Americans are shooting at, that its more about action, and drama then realism.

What do you think?

[BlackFlag]

Well, like you said, It probably has a lot to do with Hollywood not being able to use a full scale battlefield. Another thing to consider is that the Pacific campaign, and specifically the episodes shown on Guadal Canal were fought in a densely forested environment. It would be a difficult task finding more than 50-100m of clear shooting lanes to set up an MG,

[LineDoggie]

How does one clear 400m fields of fire in the Guadalcanal primary jungle?

If you read Leckie, or Tregeskis- the Machetes issued broke with regularity and the Gyrenes used Bayonets to try and hack the growth away. Severe lack of Combat Engineering equipment (most wasnt unloaded before the fleet left).

http://ftp1.us.proftpd.org/hyperwar/USMC/Guadalcanal/USMC-M-Guadalcanal-1.html

Between the inland extremities of each flank extension lay a chaotic jumble of ridges, ravines, and flat jungle country. It was impossible to establish a continuous line across such terrain even had there been sufficient Marines for the task. The alternative to such a defense was to dispose various units in compact areas along the general defensive line and maintain contact and security by a system of out-posts. It was realized that any attack from inland could result in a penetration of the perimeter, but such a disposition of troops would permit the various unit sectors to be defended separately, so that the normally disruptive effect of penetration would be minimized

[Panchito12]

How does one clear 400m fields of fire in the Guadalcanal primary jungle?

If you read Leckie, or Tregeskis- the Machetes issued broke with regularity and the Gyrenes used Bayonets to try and hack the growth away. Severe lack of Combat Engineering equipment (most wasnt unloaded before the fleet left).
[/I]

There were a few pieces of engineering equipment left behind by the Japanese in Guadalcanal that the US forces put to use, including a small earth mover to fill up some craters at Henderson Field.

[Smersh]

"[Guadalcanal] presents a varied terrain, with plains, foothills, and mountains and with a range of vegetation that runs from grassy plains to true rainforest and jungle". The island did contain more open areas. Although from Linedoggie's quote, it looks like the flanks were too topographically chaotic for a conventional disposition.

I can understand the limitations of fighting in a jungle, while lacking engineering equipment. Is the general consensus here, that the Guadalcanal fighting portrayed in the series is fairly accurate?

It doesn't seem to fit with documentary footage I've seen of the fighting on the island.

[Skutatos]

The fact the fights took place at night might be a contributing factor. With the type of tactics the japanese were using, getting as close as possible before charging would probably be ideal.

This might be of some interest:
http://www.ww2gyrene.org/fighting_on_guadalcanal_index.htm

Plenty of accounts in that about very close fighting i.e. bayonets, swords, running into a 37mm cannon at a range of 4 feet, running into MG nests on the reverse slope when going over a ridge etc...

[LineDoggie]

There were a few pieces of engineering equipment left behind by the Japanese in Guadalcanal that the US forces put to use, including a small earth mover to fill up some craters at Henderson Field.
Indeed, but as you say used to keep Henderson field up and running. Not out in the Boonies like Bloody Nose Ridge clearing FPL's.

[Hollis]

It doesn't seem to fit with documentary footage I've seen of the fighting on the island.


Generally there is never footage taken in a all out fight. The situation is just too hot for the photographer. One is either fighting, reloading, some how a active participant or dead.

[khalifah]

if you have the time, id recommed reading the books the series is based off of. more often then not, the source has a better description of whats going on than the movie.

[USMC29]

If you take a look at some after action photos of Gudalcanal the ranges were short and there were actually that many dead Japs littering the field in front of Marine positions.

http://i123.photobucket.com/albums/o315/usmc29_photos/ridge.jpg

[Smersh]

if you have the time, id recommed reading the books the series is based off of. more often then not, the source has a better description of whats going on than the movie.
I have read Sledge's Old Breed, but that starts later in the war. Because of that, the intensity of the fighting depicted in the series, I can believe. I just had a problem with the ranges, and spacing of soldiers. I don't get what stopped the Japanese from tossing grenades, even dying with a grenade in your hand could have caused causalities if you're dying 10-20ft from American lines. US machine gunners actually mowed down charging Japanese at that close!? That changes my view of pacific war fighting considerably.

From a modern perspective, I would think something is seriously wrong if you allow the enemy to surprise you with a mass charge at such a short range. shouldn't sentries be posted a head of the line, to spot and screen such attacks? and something is even more wrong with the Japanese tactics! I would have thought that fighting at such close range would negate the advantages of guns, and be more ****e to sword and bayonet melee fighting. An army armed with medieval weapons (swords, axes, javelins), I would think, could have had better results charging 50m at enemy lines.

[Lokos]

that many dead Japs

Would you mind terribly if you didn't call the Japanese 'Japs'? Thanks in advance.

As for the topic at hand:

The Japanese infantry actually favored night-time assaults - as the Soviets were to realize in 1939, when much of the initial fighting between Soviet formations and the Japanese infantry at Khalkin Gol took place at night. The close quarters fighting neutralized some of the deficiencies of the Japanese system, and emphasized the qualities of the individual soldier (speaking generally: bravery, aggression, discipline etc). These assaults could be very successful against poorly prepared opponents who did not have access to considerable fire support. The Soviets, who did not equip their early-war infantry formations with great quantities of automatic arms, suffered casualties in understanding and countering this approach.

The American infantry in 1944-1945, obviously, had access to considerable stocks of automatic and semi-automatic arms, which made the bayonet charge/close assault an especially painful experience with regard to casualties sustained.

L.

[KEEPER0311]

From a modern perspective, I would think something is seriously wrong if you allow the enemy to surprise you with a mass charge at such a short range. shouldn't sentries be posted a head of the line, to spot and screen such attacks? and something is even more wrong with the Japanese tactics! I would have thought that fighting at such close range would negate the advantages of guns, and be more ****e to sword and bayonet melee fighting. An army armed with medieval weapons (swords, axes, javelins), I would think, could have had better results charging 50m at enemy lines.

You've got to realize they were fighting in the jungles. The enemy had cover and concealment for quite a length of distances, and the covered the last few dozen meters with mortars, artillery, and machine gun cover. Allowing them to get nearly on top of the Marines positions. Add to the fact that the Marines were malnourished, tired, and most suffered from some sort of sickness, it becomes hard to stare into the jungle for hours at a time.

[darklands]

You've got to realize they were fighting in the jungles. The enemy had cover and concealment for quite a length of distances, and the covered the last few dozen meters with mortars, artillery, and machine gun cover. Allowing them to get nearly on top of the Marines positions. Add to the fact that the Marines were malnourished, tired, and most suffered from some sort of sickness, it becomes hard to stare into the jungle for hours at a time.

@KEEPER0311: i agree with you. a similar thing happened at the abucay line at bataan peninsula when the japanese forces attack the island garrison. the defenders had a short field of fire. when the japanese forces attacked similar to that shown in the "pacific" series, they(USAFFE) were nearly overrun. the attacked was repulsed and the line hold.

[Ngati Tumatauenga]

I haven't seen the series yet but i've walked all across the battlefields of Bloody Ridge, Aligator river/Ilu creek, Mount Austen, the Galloping horse, the Sea Horse (The thin red line).

There really isn't any point pontificating about that terrain unless you've seen it.

[Redox]

I always thought that the fighting as portrayed in "The Thin Red Line" was pretty realistic.

[hasanito]

I'm always flabbergasted how the Japanese portrayed with their fighting techniques in ww2! This reckless mass bayonet charge in large numbers, at dug in enemy positions seems way too unrealistic.
Did the Japanese really fought in that style? Bayonet charge in mass at enemy, with no regard for their soldiers safety?

[BLUE THOR]

I have heard of a banzai charge in PNG involving the whole assaulting force. However, I have also heard stories of a Japanese Platoon counter attacking a position they were shoved off being forced a to withdraw by one Aussie soldier with an Owen gun and a bloody lot of fight in him - heard that from the man himself, his mates back it up. So with that in mind I dont think the Japanese were all Banzai charges and suicide missions. I think these became more prevelent as the Japanese situation deteriorated and desperation set in, just as the Japanese were forced to cannabilism due to their dire situation in some places in PNG.
During the Allied Assault on Buna 1942 (nth PNG) the japanese defence refused to surrender, and the Aussies involved had to kill everyone they found, going from strong point to strong point, and from my grandfathers account and another veterans account I have personally heard of that battle, the Aussies didnt mind knocking off all the Japs, no-one was in the mindset of taking Jap prisoners. They'd heard the stories and found their mates bodies by then.
from the accounts I have heard they only had a couple of goes at the Banzai charge in PNG, most battles were encounter battles on the Kokoda Trail and their really wasnt much time for that sort of thing.
I believe Hollywood portrays the Japanese Banzai charge in all its movies as it was a fearsome tactic and gives the Japanese (in the movie) the air of being without fear, completely dedicated to the emperor and ruthless and bloodthirsty.

[pocoloco]

Like stated before, it's a good start to read the books that are used as basis for the series. Nothing beats the eye-witness accounts. And Japanese changed tactics later in the war so all-out bayonet charges were no-go later, replaced by bitter and resolved defense inland on those islands.

[Lokos]

This reckless mass bayonet charge in large numbers, at dug in enemy positions seems way too unrealistic.

... The retrospective is always crystal clear.

Consider that the Japanese did not have access to the firepower of the Allies. How do they breach, say, a MLR? Infiltration at night seems like a good option, at that point, does it not? This is not a headless-chicken bayonet charge of the 18th century we are talking about. It's a calculated close assault by formations of variable strength (platoon, company, battalion etc). When it works (usually, against opponents caught flatfooted/unprepared possessed of weak reserves), great - chalk one up for bushido. When it doesn't (against dug-in opponents with considerable firepower and possessing strong reserves), well, that's failure for you. The product of time, place, circumstance and action.

From the late 19th century until all the way through 1945, the IJA spent a great deal of time and expended enormous resources instilling the 'warrior ethic' in its fighting troops. Partially, this was a matter of tradition. However, IJA theorists considered this intangible advantage necessary in overcoming its institutional, material weaknesses. That this was a flawed mode of thinking is, unfortunately, obvious to all today. At the time, however, the Japanese did not have an enormous window of opportunity to establish new doctrinal structures, to implement them, and to thereby alter the very foundation of their infantry fighting arm. The chronological and developmental nature of WW2 in the Pacific meant that, by the time the fallacy of this approach was irrevocably proven on the battlefield, it was far too late.

Furthermore, it is more than likely that the Japanese higher leadership understood, fully, the implications of the early application of this doctrinal approach to modern warfare. But, again, a lack of time and resources meant that they had to work with what they had. Which, manpower aside, was not a great deal when compared to the other major powers of the age...

L.

[TheKiwi]

Further to Loko's excellent points above, the Japanese did eventually turn away from the hard pressed Banzai charge. By the time of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, there were very few Banzai charges. Instead the Japanese troops were very tightly dug in, with difficult to winkle out bunkers and so forth. The few Banzai type charges that did take place were by troops who had run out of other options and wanted to try to take a few more Americans with them.

[pocoloco]

Further to Loko's excellent points above, the Japanese did eventually turn away from the hard pressed Banzai charge. By the time of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, there were very few Banzai charges. Instead the Japanese troops were very tightly dug in, with difficult to winkle out bunkers and so forth. The few Banzai type charges that did take place were by troops who had run out of other options and wanted to try to take a few more Americans with them.

Just what I said.

[James]

I'm always flabbergasted how the Japanese portrayed with their fighting techniques in ww2! This reckless mass bayonet charge in large numbers, at dug in enemy positions seems way too unrealistic.
Did the Japanese really fought in that style? Bayonet charge in mass at enemy, with no regard for their soldiers safety?

Yes, that's actually how they fought sometimes.

For other posters, seeing beyond 50 meters in heavy jungle isn't common. While I never fought in jungle, I've trained in them, and it's fairly common to stumble upon the opposing force at 20 meters or less. Japanese grenades were known for being notoriously underpowered compared to American grenades - more than one American dove on a Japanese grenade to save his buddies and survived the blast.

[California Joe]

I don't think this is one of those typical "Hollywood produces their own version of history".

I would assume that between Tom Hanks and Steven Spielberg, and the resources they have available to them, that they had at least a few reputable historians and gee, maybe even actual veterans of the campaign to use as far as accuracy goes. You know, those frail looking old guys at the beginning that were actually there...

[JCR]

Basilone's action on the 24th in Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Henderson_Field)


Maruyama's first attacks on the perimeter

With the redeployment of Hanneken's battalion, the 700 troops of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Battalion_7th_Marines) under Lieutenant Colonel Chesty Puller (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chesty_Puller) were left alone to hold the entire 2,500 yards (2,286 m) line on the southern face of the Lunga perimeter east of the Lunga River. Late on October 24, Marine patrols detected Maruyama's approaching forces, but it was now too late in the day for the Marines to rearrange their dispositions.[31] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Henderson_Field#cite_note-30)
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d7/GuadBattleOct20-25.gif (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:GuadBattleOct20-25.gif) http://bits.wikimedia.org/skins-1.5/common/images/magnify-clip.png (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:GuadBattleOct20-25.gif)
Map of the battle, October 23 – October 26. Sumiyoshi and Oka attack in the west at the Matanikau (left) while Maruyama's 2nd division attacks the Lunga perimeter from the south (right)


At 14:00 on October 24, Maruyama's left and right wing units began to deploy for their attacks. Maruyama's troops had very little artillery or mortar support for their upcoming assault, having abandoned most of their heavy cannons along the Maruyama Road. Between 16:00 and 21:00, heavy rain fell, delaying the Japanese approach and causing "chaos" in the Japanese formations, already exhausted from the long march through the jungle.[32] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Henderson_Field#cite_note-Frank_Guadalcanal_353-4-31) Shoji's right wing force accidentally turned parallel to the Marine lines, and all but one battalion failed to make contact with the Marine defenses. Shoji's 1st Battalion, 230th Infantry Regiment "stumbled" into Puller's lines about 22:00 and were driven off by Puller's men. For unknown reasons, Maruyama's staff then reported to Hyakutake that Shoji's men had overrun Henderson Field. At 00:50 on October 25, Hyakutake signaled Rabaul that, "A little before 23:00 the Right Wing captured the airfield."[32] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Henderson_Field#cite_note-Frank_Guadalcanal_353-4-31)[33] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Henderson_Field#cite_note-32)[34] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Henderson_Field#cite_note-Griffith_Battle_197-98-33)
At about this time, Nasu's left wing battalions finally began to reach the Marine defenses. At 00:30 on October 25, the 11th Company of Nasu's 3rd Battalion under Captain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Captain_%28land_and_air%29) Jiro Katsumata found and attacked Company A of Puller's battalion. Katsumata's attack was impeded by heavy barbed wire (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbed_wire) emplaced in front of the Marine line and then hit heavily by American machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire. By 01:00, the Marine fire had killed most of Katsumata's company.[35] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Henderson_Field#cite_note-34)
Further west, the 9th Company of Nasu's 3rd Battalion charged straight into Puller's Company C at 01:15. Within five minutes, a Marine machine gun section led by Sergeant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergeant) John Basilone (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Basilone) killed almost every member of the 9th Company. By 01:25 heavy fire from the Marine divisional artillery was falling into Nasu's troop assembly and approach routes, causing heavy casualties.[36] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Henderson_Field#cite_note-35)
Recognizing that a major Japanese attack was underway, Puller requested reinforcement. At 03:45, the 3rd Battalion, 164th Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hall (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Hall_%28National_Guard_Officer%29) and being held in reserve, was fed piecemeal into Puller's line. In spite of the darkness and intermittent heavy rain, the Army National Guard troops were successfully placed in Puller's defences before daybreak.[37] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Henderson_Field#cite_note-36)
Just before dawn, Colonel Masajiro Furimiya, the commander of the 29th Infantry, with two companies from his 3rd Battalion plus his headquarters staff was able to penetrate the Marine artillery fire and reach Puller's lines about 03:30. Most of Furimiya's troops were killed during their assault, but about 100 broke through the American defenses and carved a salient (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salients,_re-entrants_and_pockets) 150 yards (137 m) in width and 100 yards (91 m) deep in the center of Puller's line. After sunrise, Furimiya's 2nd Battalion joined in the assault on Puller, but were thrown back. At 07:30, Nasu decided to withdraw most of the remainder of his troops back into the jungle and prepare for another attack that night.[38] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Henderson_Field#cite_note-37)

So it seems quite realistic, as the japanese more or less stumbled across the US position by accident, had little or no fire support and no time to properly set up an attack.

[LineDoggie]

Ichiki Detachment dead, Guadalcanal:
http://i65.photobucket.com/albums/h222/linedoggie/JapaneseDeadTenaru.jpg (http://i65.photobucket.com/albums/h222/linedoggie/JapaneseDeadTenaru.jpg)

Tregeskis described the tracks of the M3 Stuarts as looking like meat grinders as they manuevered through the Dead to firing positions. My Neighbor Bill who served on the Canal, New Georgia, Saipan, Okinawa said without a doubt it was the worst place to fight and the most frightening. At the time the Japanese way of fighting was alien to the Marines who had no combat experience to speak of.

[ayanami_tard]

about the banzai charge,it works well in china against an inexperienced chinese (KMT fighters most probably) and their bolt action rifle

but against marines that don't run away seeing the charges and equipped with a gun with 8 hard hitting round that can be used in one go,it's another story

[ferguson]

I recall reading so many books as a kid on this subject.
Both fiction and actual history.

Sad that knowledge accumulation has sunk to simply blurting questions on the internet.

[Smersh]

I recall reading so many books as a kid on this subject.
Both fiction and actual history.

Sad that knowledge accumulation has sunk to simply blurting questions on the internet.

This is a discussion forum.

[LineDoggie]

I recall reading so many books as a kid on this subject.
Both fiction and actual history.

Sad that knowledge accumulation has sunk to simply blurting questions on the internet.
Might not be an American with access to those books. That's the thing about the internet, not everyone is American asking the questions.

[Smersh]

"Some nagging points. Terrain. I didn’t notice any ridges in there, or any airfield. Lack thereof had a cheapening effect. Also, Chesty Puller’s intense interest and direct command of squad level operations."

from http://www.julescrittenden.com/2010/03/24/good-bang-bang

[brokenlegdrunk]

"Some nagging points. Terrain. I didn’t notice any ridges in there, or any airfield. Lack thereof had a cheapening effect. Also, Chesty Puller’s intense interest and direct command of squad level operations."

from http://www.julescrittenden.com/2010/03/24/good-bang-bang


well u do get to see the airfield for a good 4 seconds

[JCR]

Lack of air activity really was a nitpick.
Also by October 24th Guadalcanal had a working cactus airfield, even the thin red line had planes landing and taking off.
The cactus air force was certainly active, even though most of its activities did take place out of view of the marines.
The japanese bombing raids were usually pretty high but there were a few low altitude dogfights.
At least that's what I learned from Franks "Guadalcanal" and Lundstroms "First Team vol. 2"

The feeling of being left alone might be realistic in August and early September but it is a bit strange the constant "we're cut off" "we're starving" and suddenly "the army's here"
Where did it come from if there was no supply line?

[USMC29]

Would you mind terribly if you didn't call the Japanese 'Japs'? Thanks in advance.

L.

Apologize about that I lack all political correctness

[Slouch]

I actually had the opportunity some time ago to visit the Solomon Islands. I got to visit Lunga River and the souther defensive positions of Henderson Field.

The terrain show in Ep 1 of the battle of Lunga River is spot on. The most significant aspect being the sandbar which channelled the Japanese into a killing zone. Also, the pits and even some barbed wire are still visible at Henderson Field. I have some photographs of both, I'll have to search my archives to dig them out.

[California Joe]

The dense jungle and relatively limited distances are probably the reason that Gunny Basilone exposed himself to enemy fire in order to knock the Japanese corpses off the barbed wire to clear the field of fire for the machine gunners...Seeing as how that is well documented I would assume the distances reflected in the dramatization would also be accurate. If they had a huge killing zone that wouldn't have been necessary.

[T3ngu]

I have recently spent time in the USA. This very topic came up as one of the guys i was meeting with had a relative who fought in the pacific with the US forces and we were dicsussing "The pacific". His relatives view was that the depiction was pretty good.


During the Allied Assault on Buna 1942 (nth PNG) the japanese defence refused to surrender, and the Aussies involved had to kill everyone they found, going from strong point to strong point, and from my grandfathers account and another veterans account I have personally heard of that battle, the Aussies didnt mind knocking off all the Japs, no-one was in the mindset of taking Jap prisoners. They'd heard the stories and found their mates bodies by then.

This campaign is well document as is the killing of all Japanese. Three reasons existed
1. They hated the Japanese, especially the treatment of prisoners around the Kokoda area early in the campaign. As a more tame example, the disappearance of a senior captured Australian officer last heard of being interviewed by the Japanese. A less appealing example are the prisoners who were tied to trees and bayoneted to death in an the thought that the screams of the dying men would draw the defenders out of their positions into prepared ambushes.
2. The Japanese would not give up and would fight to the death
3. The Japanese would feign death and when the Aussies past would jump up and attack them. Hence, the adage of the time "the only good Japanese was a dead one".



A good account of early bayonet charges was that which occured during the battle of Milne bay, number 3 airfield IIRC.

There was lull in the fighting until a determined attack on No. 3 strip was launched in the early hours of the 31st of August. Although the Japanese launched 3 massed charges, the Australian infantry, together with troops from the US 43rd Engineer Regiment, held firm. Making no progress, dawn saw the Japanese withdraw, having lost many men to machine guns and artillery fire. http://www.kokodatreks.com/history/majorbattlesofthekokodacampaign/battleformilnebay.cfm

[budgie]

Watching episode II had me wondering if the Japanese were forced to make these suicidal charges. Was it purely military doctrine as Lokos suggested, or were they perhaps a little desperate? Maybe being low on ammo and supplies themselves, did they think it made more sense to try a wild charge to wuickly overwhelm an enemy position?

[California Joe]

At that point the Japanese Navy had control of the waters off the island and was able to unload men and materiel at will, so in this case probably not. But I'm sure it happened later in the Island Campaigns.

[JCR]

The series is a bit unrealistic in that point. But it is from a subjective perspective.
The Marines feld being abandoned while in reality they were not, at least not since Henderson Field was completed.
But of course their situation was still worse in terms of supplies than any other US soldiers in WW2 and maybe in any other war since the civil war.
1st MarDiv was undernourished, suffering from bugs, malaria and dysentery but they were still far better off than the japanese.
The japanese soldiers had no secure perimeter as Henderson field, no heavy weapons except for about half a dozen heavy artillery pieces around a dozen tanks.
"Pistol Pete" might have been a harassment to the Marines and caused casualties, it was nothing compared to what the divisional artillery of 1st MarDiv could lay down on call. The japanese, while at division strenght, had no divisional artillery. The few pieces were used for harassment fire.
Mortars was the heaviest that could really support the infantry. Not to mention medical supplies being nearly nonexistent.
And the US could evac the worst cases by air, the japanese wounded usually just died.
The vaunted "Tokyo Express" usually could not do more than drop overboard oil drums containing rice or ammo and those often drifted away.

[Lokos]

Was it purely military doctrine as Lokos suggested, or were they perhaps a little desperate?

No doubt they were. Perhaps they lacked provisions and attempted to negate the issue by forcing a decisive engagement at close quarters. Or perhaps they knew that American artillery would simply grind them down in the long run, and therefore wished to 'hug' their opponents, in many instances. Whatever the case, their doctrine certainly endowed them with a preferable method of engaging opponents, given the realities of their infantry arm's capacity.

L.

[LineDoggie]

Col. Ichiki didnt even wait for his entire unit to arrive he was that sure he could defeat the Marines. He had been told that the Marines strength was minimal, not a Division reinforced. IIRC he attacked the Marines with about 750 men.

[khalifah]

interesting discussion guys, what do you suppose would have been the best the best course of action the Col. could hav taken considering his lack of supplies, support, etc.?

Wait until his whole unit was on the island, as Linedoggie mentioned,. But then, wait any longer and he would have risked the Marine Artillary playing its part, no?

[LineDoggie]

Ichiki's 28th Infantry at Full Strength was only a Regiment of 3,000 versus 1MARDIV's 19,514. Japanese Intell GROSSLY underestimted the Marine strength on Guadalcanal initially.

[Skutatos]

about the banzai charge,it works well in china against an inexperienced chinese (KMT fighters most probably) and their bolt action rifle

but against marines that don't run away seeing the charges and equipped with a gun with 8 hard hitting round that can be used in one go,it's another story

The USMC was still using the 1903 Springfield bolt-action rifles while on Guadalcanal.

[LineDoggie]

The USMC was still using the 1903 Springfield bolt-action rifles while on Guadalcanal. And the 1st ParaMarine Bn. used the M1941 Johnson on Guadalcanal and Tulagi along with the M55 Reising(folding stock) and M1941 Johnson Light Machinegun.

[JCR]

Ichiki's 28th Infantry at Full Strength was only a Regiment of 3,000 versus 1MARDIV's 19,514. Japanese Intell GROSSLY underestimted the Marine strength on Guadalcanal initially.

This is a bit of a misconception. The 19,514 include chaplains, cooks, drivers, staff, artillery and whatnot.
And the strenght of the south seas detachment was around 700 effective. Ichiki had 2,200 but some where left behind for lack of transport and only got to Guadalcanal later.
Also, the Japanese never faced the whole 1stMarDiv at once. The Marines had to hold a perimeter, so in theory the Japanese could concentrate on one point when the US had to hold all fronts.
Problem is that this was theory and meant crossing impenetrable jungle.

[Brasi]

Watching episode II had me wondering if the Japanese were forced to make these suicidal charges. Was it purely military doctrine as Lokos suggested, or were they perhaps a little desperate? Maybe being low on ammo and supplies themselves, did they think it made more sense to try a wild charge to wuickly overwhelm an enemy position?

The colonel in charge of the assault on the Marine position had nothing but contempt for American fighting ability. That, plus the fact Japanese intelligence grossly underestimated Marine troop numbers lead the colonel to try the massed attack. The colonel was one of the best the Japanese Army had to offer and the same holds for the 28th Infantry Regiment which he commanded. He had many successes in China using the same attack method of attacking at night, and his own soldiers shouting slogans to scare timid Chinese soldiers. It worked back then, but obviously didn't that night.

[ayanami_tard]

The USMC was still using the 1903 Springfield bolt-action rifles while on Guadalcanal.

forgot this one

thanks for the correction

[Jurinko]

interesting discussion guys, what do you suppose would have been the best the best course of action the Col. could hav taken considering his lack of supplies, support, etc.?

Wait until his whole unit was on the island, as Linedoggie mentioned,. But then, wait any longer and he would have risked the Marine Artillary playing its part, no?

I am afraid Japanese did their best, but the battle was decided by ability of adversaries to secure flow of supplies for own units and to cut it for the enemy.
Marines had the perimeter supplied directly from the beaches behind or via Henderson field, while Tokio express brought the supplies to the western part of the island and all stuff had to be moved through terrible terrain by hand to the perimeter border. No wonder that coordinated attack was difficult to organize and Japanese soldiers were hungry and exhausted, plus their painfully collected assets were immediately subjected to artillery and air strikes from the perimeter.

The only decisive thing could have been the Japanese navy destroying the Henderson airfield and cutting the supply for the Americans. They had local naval superiority and Henderson field was few times on the verge of collapse.

[JCR]

Funny is how western writers usually take over japanese prejudice about "timid" and whatnot Chinese.
The chinese usually simply lacked the firepower to stop a determined japanese assault.
Not to mention that the japanese tactics for some reason didn't really allow for an enemy that actually stood and fight and couldn't be bypassed.
The german equipped Chinese elite divisions near Shanghai caused heavy casualties with the IJA, as did the Soviets.
But in both cases the Japanese were well supplied and could outmaneuver the enemy.
I think the "Banzai charge" was originally not meant to actually break a determined enemy, only to pin him down, in the "hook" tactic.
Tie down the enemy by charging him in front while maneuvering a second force around his flanks, Napoleon used similar tactics.
Problem was Guadalcanal didn't allow for this.
You couldn't outflank Henderson field, it was a 360 deg perimeter, not to mention that large parts were simply inacessible.
The usual japanese (as any other) tactic for this would've been Artillery, and lots of it, plus air support.
Trickery like in Singapore didn't work because that called for good communications which weren't there either on Guadalcanal.
Japanese communications were usually messengers, rarely field telephone and only fixed radio. They couldn't coordinate in anything resembling real time.
Only pre planned attack and one part of the plan had no possibility of knowing what went wrong or right with the other.
They didn't have artillery, at least not in sufficient quantities and the bombers had to fly a route comparable to London-Berlin every time to attack a well defended target.
On-call CAS or even pre planned CAS was not possible, only preplanned raids against the airfield and other easily recognizable targets.
The IJA recognized all these shortcomings, that was the reason for the large convoys the japanese sent to Guadalcanal.
But these were smashed by the Cactus air force. Tokyo express could only land infantry and on a single occasion a few tanks and artillery pieces.
And even that only because they used fast seaplane tenders instead of destroyers and after October 1942 these were no longer risked in Battle, not to mention that 2 of them were no longer available because they were converted to carriers.

[nemowork]

Japanese communications were usually messengers, rarely field telephone and only fixed radio. They couldn't coordinate in anything resembling real time.


From the 'fighting on Guadalcanal' link posted earlier, a certain lieutenant colonel Puller would disagree

http://www.ww2gyrene.org/fighting_on_guadalcanal_2.htm


"The 'walky-talky' the Japs have operates. Why can't we have a similar one?And the marines weren't doing any better




"To HELL with the telephone wire with advancing troops. We can't carry enough wire. We received an order. 'This advance will stop until the wire gets in.' THIS IS BACKWARDS!


*edit* learn something new every day. It looks like they were pretty well supplied with some radio communication, its more like they preferred to use telephones and restrict access to them for security reasons.

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt09/japanese-signal-services.html

[Creampuff]

A pity my dads family friend had to run the the wire between dispositions, he may have survived Guadalcanal. :-(

[Creampuff]

As far as I know prvt Richard Weir USMC's mother wrote back to my dads family in Samoa, after the untimely death of their son on Guadalcanal. If this name is familiar, would be good to here from the family after all these years! sorry for the side track. God bless the "old Breed."

[11B101ABN]

The weapons effets are on par with what I have witnessed. So is the carnage of high explosives damage. Other that that, enlist and find out.

[LineDoggie]

This is a bit of a misconception. The 19,514 include chaplains, cooks, drivers, staff, artillery and whatnot.
And the strenght of the south seas detachment was around 700 effective. Ichiki had 2,200 but some where left behind for lack of transport and only got to Guadalcanal later.
Also, the Japanese never faced the whole 1stMarDiv at once. The Marines had to hold a perimeter, so in theory the Japanese could concentrate on one point when the US had to hold all fronts.
Problem is that this was theory and meant crossing impenetrable jungle.And there were no Cooks, Clerks, and Jerks among the Japanese?

Vandegrifts bodyguard personally killed Japanese Infiltrators outside the division C.P tent.

[Smersh]

By Eric Hammel
Best Defense guest TV reviewer
Tom Hanks is an accredited war history buff, and I think he really has put his heart into paying homage to WWII vets. His heart's in the right place, but his head is in Hollywood.
Why should I be surprised a "docudrama" like The Pacific (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/26/hbo_s_pacific_someone_please_flush#/the-pacific) is ****? The whole effort behind the docu part is invested in toys such as gunner's gloves. I long ago boycotted documentary filmmakers who want my brand to legitimize their sorry little TV vignettes. Their objective is entertainment centered on the dramatic visual, not the intellectual, and not quite the historical. If self-professed documentarians can't get it right because they edit the talking heads to accommodate their thin film libraries, why should self-professed entertainers make a better effort, show greater concern?
Has anyone else noticed that the talking heads -- nameless, unexplained vets -- in The Pacific seem to be reading from scripts rather than dipping into memories? They merely mouth error-filled platitudes. Band of Brothers used interesting people with interesting observations. This is the worst way to exploit vets -- making them look like idiots.
It is difficult to frame this story using this set of icons. But the people behind The Pacific volunteered for this. This is their befouled vision, perhaps with the aid of a few bought historians who were probably ignored when the script -- a visual outline -- was fabricated from its many disparate parts. Their good intentions ran afoul bad toilet training; they left the seat up and neglected to flush.
It all comes down to adults making bad, ill-informed, drama-driven decisions that end up befogging the teachable events in bull**** that must be the knee-jerk impulses of people trained to do what they do.
Was there not a reasonable effort made to understand that selecting relatively rare machine gunners as focus for two out of two visually entangled storylines would confuse rather than enlighten? Why is the basic philosophy of The Pacific romance while the hallmark and touchstone of Band of Brothers is true grit? Does anyone ever say "No!" to Spielberg?
Waiting to see if Part 3, etc. are better overlooks that the series was filmed and edited as a whole. I doubt it, because it's not like a regular TV series, where the third episode is being filmed the same week the first is shown, as scripts for episodes four and five are being tweaked. This mess was conceived, edited, and market-tested as a single unit long before Part 1 appeared. So it can't get much better. There's no way to change to a course that's backed by anything better than the bad decisions we've already seen manifested in Parts 1 and 2.
These people got hung up on knick-knacks and drama, but they sacrificed the history and clarity they implicitly promised by advertising it off Band of Brothers. That's a dishonest coattails strategy that dishonors the memory of all who were there.

[California Joe]

^All that bitching and it boils down to his opinion that it's crappy? With no supporting details? That was gay.

[JCR]

But somehow he has a point.
Band of Brothers had something the Pacific lacks, I can't quite put my finger on it.

[Smersh]

The crux of what he is saying is what my original feeling was. That the series is more Hollywood then history. Also, "They merely mouth error-filled platitudes", there is a scene in the first episode, where one of the Marines yells "they're flanking us", at the sight of some Japanese running clearly visible in front of them. Military-action jargon thrown in for dramatic effect.

[California Joe]

Band of Brothers, the book and the series, followed a tried and true formula...We're all used to it and it works well. It's been used in tons of war movies, from Sgt. York to The Devil's Brigade to Full Metal Jacket...If they did this series exactly the same, people would be bitching about that. I agree that it's probably not going to have the exact same impact as the first one due to the more fractured style.

I love they way the first one was written, I have the boxed set...But I'm willing to take this one at face value and give it some time and accept that it's not going to be the same.

I think one of the huge positives that go with these types of series is that they're actually attempting to be accurate while drawing in an audience that may be inspired to do a little research or learn something, or even give a sh*t that the old guy down the street, that walks really slow, does so because he's still carrying shrapnel in his leg from serving at Guadalcanal or Bastogne, and it might be worth getting to know him...

[KEEPER0311]

...there is a scene in the first episode, where one of the Marines yells "they're flanking us", at the sight of some Japanese running clearly visible in front of them. Military-action jargon thrown in for dramatic effect.

And that's exactly what he should have shouted, just because they were in the open doesn't mean that everyone was fully aware of it. Machine gun crews, and leaders need to know these things, and their attentions could be drawn to other sectors in their immediate vicinity.

[Smersh]

I think one of the huge positives that go with these types of series is that they're actually attempting to be accurate while drawing in an audience that may be inspired to do a little research or learn something, or even give a sh*t that the old guy down the street, that walks really slow, does so because he's still carrying shrapnel in his leg from serving at Guadalcanal or Bastogne, and it might be worth getting to know him...

I completely agree with you. But we should accept what it is and isn't. It's not a documentary, for sure, about the battles in the Pacific. I don't understand why some people, not necessarily in this thread, have to defend it so staunchly.

[Breakfast in Vegas]

Band of Brothers had something the Pacific lacks, I can't quite put my finger on it.Paratroopers.

'nuff said.

[JRT]

But somehow he has a point.
Band of Brothers had something the Pacific lacks, I can't quite put my finger on it.

BoB followed closely the life and career of **** Winters, and in some episodes the perspective of the battle was a bit more from an officer's view, sometimes through the eyes of Speirs and Nixon. The two episodes of The Pacific have focused on the endeavours of individual marines and NCO's in squad-level combat, while the platoon leader, company CO and battalion commander have only been shown occasionally if at all. The perspective is thus different.

To add to this, the combat went on during dark hours, giving a narrower view of the events.

[JPBaz]

I think one of the huge positives that go with these types of series is that they're actually attempting to be accurate while drawing in an audience that may be inspired to do a little research or learn something, or even give a sh*t that the old guy down the street, that walks really slow, does so because he's still carrying shrapnel in his leg from serving at Guadalcanal or Bastogne, and it might be worth getting to know him...

X2

Nice point, its worth remembering veterans of the Korean War while we are at it. In my experience, most combat vets are reluctant to discuss their experiences unless you are one of them. The Boston Globe had a great article today on efforts to document the memories of our veterans before they are lost forever.

The stories they’ve carried

With time swiftly thinning the ranks of World War II veterans, the race is on to capture their memories

BOXFORD — Franklin P. Pomroy never told war stories. Not the one about the desperate firefight on Guadalcanal when the cannon he was manning flew into the air after it fired a single shot. Not the one about a buddy who was killed with his finger on the trigger of his machine gun, and in death kept shooting at Japanese soldiers. Not even the story that produced an iconic image of World War II: a 1944 photograph of Pomroy sitting with his head in his hands on a Pacific atoll, exhausted from combat, left leg spattered with blood.

http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/03/27/last_of_world_war_ii_veterans_share_untold_stories/

Here is a link to the witness to war website.

http://www.witness-to-war.org/content/full_index.php

Image of Pomroy at Peleliu

115942

[Mastermind]

I caught a few silly things. first, their dialog is way off the mark. They have no one advising very well about the era. My mother was still a "War lady" and talked the talk....the writers keep using too much contemporary lingo and behavior. I also caught them showing too many action scenes repetitive yet not as 'flashback"...nothing important, but distracting. The combat scenes on Guadalcanal did not seem to jive with the actual history...but, few personal eye-witness accounts do...so, I guess I can forgive that.

I just found the dialog boring, the combat scenes over acted, the digital masking and "scatter" effects obvious. So, I quit watching. I guess I was spoiled by Band of Brothers.

[ben_jovi]

yeah i too am struggling with the dialogue .. and an intense disllike of the short curly haired actor/character who is very angry and gets the dinted helmet. cant put my finger on it exactly. there's just a shallowness and i find his parts extremely unconvincing. it should pick up tho when the battles increase in ferocity

[3rdMillhouse]

yeah i too am struggling with the dialogue .. and an intense disllike of the short curly haired actor/character who is very angry and gets the dinted helmet. cant put my finger on it exactly. there's just a shallowness and i find his parts extremely unconvincing. it should pick up tho when the battles increase in ferocity

You talking about JP Morgan?

[Laconian]

I can't say how realistic the fighting scenes are because I wasn't around the Pacific in WWII and although I've read some histories, I haven't walked the ground like I've done at Kennesaw Mountain, Vicksburg, Princeton and Monmouth to get a perspective. As far as the series, what it lacks from BoB is the single unit perspective. Where BoB followed a single book that tried to portray the experiences of a single Airborne company, the Pacific series is focused around the lives of three soldiers in three different units. One of the things that was commented on by vets in BoB (and I imagine it would hold true for The Pacific, because of the times) is the use of the F-bomb. Many vets admitted they used profanity, but not the f-bomb because it was just considered bad form. We accept it more now, so I guess they find the need to put it in the movie.

[11 Bravo]

If you take a look at some after action photos of Gudalcanal the ranges were short and there were actually that many dead Japs littering the field in front of Marine positions.

http://i123.photobucket.com/albums/o315/usmc29_photos/ridge.jpg


USMC29 ; I have a better press like copy of this photo you post. My question is what battle was this pic taken from ?. It' certainly not the canal as all the dead marines in the pic have M1's. The picture seems to show a couple attack/counterattacks in a very short vicious period of time as none of the dead have turned color or swollen in the tropical heat. Anybody know ?.

[11 Bravo]

http://www.wehrmacht-awards.com/forums/showthread.php?t=353845


Here's a link to a collector forum with a decent discussion of the series.

[Smersh]

By Eric Hammel
Best Defense TV reviewer
... I worked on [writing about] Guadalcanal for years. I wouldn't bother you with the specifics; I wrote four books to get at the specifics. I don't expect all that to be in two hours of television.
I'm all about giving less knowledgeable viewers a fair shot. A few simple fixes, use of standard techniques, and a little consistency could have gone a long way, but the makers of The Pacific abused you by skipping over inner plot dimensions. They didn't fulfill their obligation within the confines of their own vision.
Examples: Before the Tenaru battle in Part I, they flashed "Alligator Creek" on the screen. It's the only tag I can recall. No date was given. On Part 2, no tag was shown for Bloody Ridge, and no date. Most viewers -- perhaps all of you here -- were not given a fair shot at knowing the Tenaru battle took place in late August and Bloody Ridge 2 (!) took place in late October. A little tag and/or a brief voiceover would have provided a clue about how long the 1st Marine Division held the Lunga Perimeter, how long the Marines were on short rations. It was a very long time.
The only (slim) clue about the point of the whole Guadalcanal effort was a formation of CGI planes passing over a group of Marines bent on stealing from the new Army troops. It was handled within a joke, not as the reason for everything. That's just plain sloppy bordering on disrespectful of viewers. And the entire joke wasted time that could have been spent on explaining just one event in context.
It was Basilone's gunners who went out to steal, so why did Leckie pop up in the middle? He was a member of another regiment. Was any effort expended on continuity? It looked to me like scenes that were supposed to lead to other scenes were truncated when the film was edited. There were abrupt transitions, events that led nowhere, events that began without planned preamble.
Puller mentioned that "Hanneken's battalion" had pulled out to the coast, but at no time was it communicated that Puller's battalion had to stretch over the two-battalion front. That is, they used up time and dialog to give you information that got you exactly nowhere. "The 164th" was mentioned during the battle (or just after), but that led nowhere. The fresh army troops (with M1 rifles like those shown during the theft scene) were not shown filling into the Marine line, even though we know they had uniforms and extras to simulate them. This is not about the historical details, it's about the lack of follow-up within the confines of the teleplay. Bad continuity. Oh, bonus info: the Japanese attacked the same front the very next night.
Basilone spent a lot of his big night running along trails paralleling the front line (true) that had no Marines near them (not true), yet the Japanese only attacked machine gun strongpoints, and not the fictionally unguarded areas, where logic, even in movieland, would dictate that passage was free. More disrespect heaped on you.
These Marines were practically starving, but all were clean-shaven?
I say again: selecting main characters who were both machine gunners ended up being awkward and misleading.
Not trained? There's no reason for anyone here to know, but I've done content editing for around a hundred military history books going back decades. It's been my job to demand fixes when I routinely find gaping holes like the ones I outline here. As an acquisitions editor, I have many times rejected books that had better, clearer storylines than The Pacific offers. The issues I count up in making my deservedly harsh assessment of The Pacific aren't about the details of the history -- LCVPs in 1942, soft covers in 1942? -- they're about the foundation of everything, they're about the storytelling.
The makers of The Pacific have, in only two segments, proven themselves to be lazy and arrogant, disrespectful of their viewers.
Enough said?



from http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/29/the_ugly_specifics_of_the_pacific

[Breakfast in Vegas]

[INDENT] By Eric Hammel[I]
They didn't fulfill their obligation within the confines of their own vision. Tend to agree here, they aren't doing the best job of storytelling. Some background information would be nice, even if it is simple. I've been following a bit about the battle on the internet, which is interesting. But a little help... like the afore-mentioned dates and locations, certainly would help.

And the pace suffers at times. I hope it is building to an extended climax, but they could have done that within the episodes themselves.

I'm sure some will buy the boxed set when it comes out. Think anybody is actually going to watch episode 3 again?


Oh well, waiting for episode 4... thankfully I am an optimist.

[James]

Japanese Intell GROSSLY underestimted the Marine strength on Guadalcanal initially.

The Japanese did that very consistently until August 1945.

[James]

As far as the series, what it lacks from BoB is the single unit perspective. Where BoB followed a single book that tried to portray the experiences of a single Airborne company, the Pacific series is focused around the lives of three soldiers in three different units.

I agree. BoB was about a single company, while The Pacific involves characters in the 3 different regiments of the 1st Marine Division; Leckie is in the 1st, Sledge (we'll meet him later) is in the 5th, and Basilone is in the 7th (my old regiment). In addition to that, many of the guys who went overseas with the division in 1942 went home in 1944, because they'd been overseas for two or more years. Basically, we're comparing stories about a unit that saw perhaps 300 men pass through it during 11 months of active service (D-Day to VE Day) vs. a unit that saw perhaps 30,000 men serve over three years.

I think comparisons between The Pacific and Band of Brothers are inevitable, but I also think The Pacific is a far more ambitious project. I'm enjoying it.

[Violet Fashion by Mindy]

... The retrospective is always crystal clear.

Consider that the Japanese did not have access to the firepower of the Allies. How do they breach, say, a MLR? Infiltration at night seems like a good option, at that point, does it not? This is not a headless-chicken bayonet charge of the 18th century we are talking about. It's a calculated close assault by formations of variable strength (platoon, company, battalion etc). When it works (usually, against opponents caught flatfooted/unprepared possessed of weak reserves), great - chalk one up for bushido. When it doesn't (against dug-in opponents with considerable firepower and possessing strong reserves), well, that's failure for you. The product of time, place, circumstance and action.

From the late 19th century until all the way through 1945, the IJA spent a great deal of time and expended enormous resources instilling the 'warrior ethic' in its fighting troops. Partially, this was a matter of tradition. However, IJA theorists considered this intangible advantage necessary in overcoming its institutional, material weaknesses. That this was a flawed mode of thinking is, unfortunately, obvious to all today. At the time, however, the Japanese did not have an enormous window of opportunity to establish new doctrinal structures, to implement them, and to thereby alter the very foundation of their infantry fighting arm. The chronological and developmental nature of WW2 in the Pacific meant that, by the time the fallacy of this approach was irrevocably proven on the battlefield, it was far too late.

Furthermore, it is more than likely that the Japanese higher leadership understood, fully, the implications of the early application of this doctrinal approach to modern warfare. But, again, a lack of time and resources meant that they had to work with what they had. Which, manpower aside, was not a great deal when compared to the other major powers of the age...

L.

From what I've gathered from Japanese tactices in their actions against Australian and US forces in New Guinea especially when on the offensive there was considerable planning involved. Good use of artillery, machine guns and encirclement. As well as good intelligence gathering prior to any action.

The fact that they went to considerable length to carry artillery from the beachead to Brigade Hill is testamount that they were not stupid. Australian forces were completely routed in a classic encirclement which anywhere else would have resulted into the complete destruction of 2 battallions of AIF and elements of Militia, PIB and ANGAU forces.

During the battle of Milne Bay they landed tanks, artillery and had naval gunfire support and only launched "Banzai Charges" when all was lost. They were not a regular thing, especially not in the way Hollywood portrayed them.

[Violet Fashion by Mindy]

Oh yeah. For sources I've got pretty much every available book on Australia in New Guinea during WW2. Peter Brune is especially thorough in his research and interviewing surving veterans of both allied and japanese personal.

[SniperLane]

very.


...........................

[JCR]

"combat scenes" last episode where quite realistic though....

[Lokos]

consistently until August 1945.

Until well into August 1945 - their perceptions of Soviet intentions and capabilities in the Russian Far East were catastrophically incorrect.

L.

[ferguson]

I'm a lifelong history and literature fan.
This series is well done and aimed at entertaining millions of people.

Some of the effects and other aspects are very well done.

Some of the discussions across the net are downright creepy.

I havent seen any body counting buttons on uniforms yet, or but I bet I have just missed that.

Another episode tonight. Have all reference material and critique sheets at hand.

In reference to a previous post, I have used the exact phrase, "Theyre flanking us" in an actual firefight.
That lingo has a purpose-it leaves no doubt as to what you mean.