Is asymmetric warfare the Achiile's Heel of the US military?

[matthew.manhorn]

The modern US military is way too powerful to force a conventional warfare with almost all of its enemies, is it a good thing or bad thing?

[YevgenyP]

The modern US military is way too powerful to force a conventional warfare with almost all of its enemies, is it a good thing or bad thing?


asymmetric warfare is Achiile's Heel of any military, since it is destroying basic sense of existence of military.

[Flagg]

Asymmetric warfare has been around as long as warfare.

Hell, the founding of the US as a nation and the military engagements during that period exhibited unconventional and asymmetric warfare traits and concepts when placed in contrast with conventional warfighting doctrine of the day.

I'm no subject matter expert...not by a long-shot, just an interested amateur.

But I would say that the US has made significant strides in countering unconventional/asymmetric/insurgent/non-state actor threats over the last decade in shifting from a legacy Cold War Fulda Gap conventional combined arms org with some strong special operations capability to a more agile, more relevant force better equipped to counter these "new" threats partnered with an even larger and stronger special operations capability.

I suspect that in the next 10 years, once the US military has even more aggressively and effectively developed it's capabilities to counter unconventional/assymmetric/insurgent/non-state actor threats then someone will post on here why the US military is too light in conventional combined arms capability to deter Pakistan/India/China from putting on a future fireworks display....because it's too focused on finding/fixing/finishing those 3 nasty dirka dirka dudes in civvies hiding in a non-permissive urban suburb of 500,000.

Asymmetric is the new "black"............someday massed tank and artillery combined arms actions could be the new "black" again.

It takes a while, even for large world class organizations, to make a significant shift in doctrine/R&D/training output/procurement/operational capability and effects....often measured in a number of years to become a broad based core competency beyond just small numbers of highly focused specialists.

Just my 0.02c

[YevgenyP]

All i wanted to say - army if well prepared to fight "3 nasty dirka dirka dudes in civvies hiding in a non-permissive urban suburb of 500,000" is no more but heavy police.

[Alex G]

Actually, army is ready. Only problem is of political kind. This kind of warfare was used during WW2, its nothing new.

[Astaran]

How to deal with insurgencies is pretty well developed within the US military. Have a look at the "Small Wars Manual", published first time in the 1940s by the US Marines or the more lately counter-insurgency field manual by General Petraeus.
In the time between the two books was the Vietnam war with a lot of "lessons learned" more (look at the Vietnam related chapters in General Krulak's book "First to fight").

The main problem are people who think in black and white: either conventional cold war scenarios or nasty little insurgencies all around the globe. A military has to be prepared for both scenarios at the same time and I think the US military is capable of this challenge.

Well, the political (civilian) aspects are a totally different matter, because politicians tend to follow their very own "ideas" and "strategies" and tend ignore uncomfortable advisors.

[Violet Fashion by Mindy]

It's been the Achillies heel of armies since the dawn of time. Yet it's generally how 90% of all warfare is waged. Yet we base military doctrine on set piece battles.

Weird.

[Royal]

Yet we base military doctrine on set piece battles.

Wierd

Google Auftragstaktik- its been the centrepiece of NATO infantry doctrine for as long as I can remember. High intensity warfare is useful for teaching the full spectrum of TTPs (or skills as we used to call them) - it's not the basis of doctrine and hasn't been since the 50s at least.

[Stainless Steel Rat]

It's been the Achillies heel of armies since the dawn of time. Yet it's generally how 90% of all warfare is waged. Yet we base military doctrine on set piece battles.

Weird.


Not so wierd. Asymmetric warfare can discomfort and harass an enemy, make his stay in your country costly, and cause dissention and economic/political troubles at home, but it has seldom thrown a detemined enemy out of a country (Afghanistan vs. SovUnion is one exception). To give three examples:

(1) American Revolution--There is always praise for the Minuteman and the guerilla fighters, but it wasn't until Washington (and Greene) had disciplined and regular forces able to stand up to the British and conduct (along with the French) regular siege operations at Yorktown that America finally won it's independence.

(2) Napoleon's Conquest of Spain - The Spanish celebrate their guerilla fighters (who made the 1805-1814 about as brutal and nasty a conflict as that century saw), but it was the Spanish Armies (and of course, most notably, Wellington and his British and Portuguese regulars) that fought the battles necessary to drive the French back across the border into France.

(3) Vietnam - As has been mentioned here before, the Viet Cong (guerrilas) had been pretty much wiped out in the Tet offensive. The conflict was then primarily between two regular militaries, with different tactics and strageties based on their respective strengths and weaknesses, but seldom in the classic "guerrila" actions.


Assymetric warfare can occassionally be effective; but it is (at least until the high-tech battlefield of the 21st Century), bloody, brutal, and hard on the occupied civilian population. And it seldom drives a determined and ruthless occupier out--unless regular forces are in position to do battle.

I concur that Afghanistan may prove the exception to the rule (it is an exception to many rules, as rulers thoughout history have found), but in general if you are going to remove an occupier--have an Army.

IMHO as always. YMMV.

[Mastermind]

asymmetric warfare is Achiile's Heel of any military, since it is destroying basic sense of existence of military.
That is a very interesting comment.

I have worried this topic at length in both discussion and personal research. I have never thought of AW as undermining the essence of an organized conventional military force.

History tells us that unconventional forces usually fall to the more conventional force. Unconventional forces are used mainly due to the weakness of the body employing them. The reason the US fails to overcome them is not due to weaponry or organization, training, leadership, or innate ability, but expressly due to doctrinal investment.

Imagine, for example, any communist Asian nation organized or conventional force failing to overcome unconventional forces. Although the Nazi Germans failed to win over the unconventional forces of Tito in Czechoslovakia or in latter war French Freedom fighters, look what they accomplished in Poland...given enough time and resolve, they would have disintegrated Tito's forces...and the FF were running a deadly race to see who would get to them first, the Germans or the allies.

The success of conventional forces over the AW forces is based, in my opinion, on the resolve of the conventional forces to take the necessary action to destroy the AWs.

I would also cite the lack of potential of AW (asymmetrical warriors) against the Russians under Stalin...or Khrushchev, for that matter. I know I am leaving the question of the Soviets in Afghanistan to a question of my theory...but, I don't think the Soviets in Af were necessarily due for a defeat given a more stable situation at home. The SU was crumbling just as the SU was getting the ball rolling and the AWs in Af had nothing at all to do with that.

I can't imagine any situation where AWs, when placed against a determined, well equipped conventional army, led by determined, resourceful commanders would have to fall to their techniques. A study of Caesar in Gaul exemplifies my reasoning on this question...he performed ruthlessly when the AWs opposed or attacked him and extraordinarily generously when the opposition forces worked with him. Then he used the locals who had been converted to his side to help extinguish almost all AW opposition in his areas of interest.

Yes..that word, "almost" is glaring. But, we can also say the AWs had ceased to be a serious threat to any objectives set by the Romans...they were incapable of denying the Romans any resource or area...so, even though some small levels of hard core hold-outs exist in the post war presence of a conventional force, the become relegated to being in the same class as pirates, bandit bands or isolated criminals, sually handled by much smaller policing forces...

So, IMO, the US is hampered in this area of human conflict by it's own government and doctrine...that is, the US govt. refuses to allow the US military to take the necessary actions to take out AW opposition. If it were ever let off the leash, I suspect the US would be every bit as successful as nay military force in history in this regard. Thus, the US military are, in the modern sense, doomed to lose every war that it engages in...all the opposition has to do is fight at a low level, keep inflicting casualties on US personnel, but just never stop fighting...eventually, the American people lose resolve, toss in the towel, call their troops back home and the AW forces inevitably win just by lasting.

[matthew.manhorn]

asymmetric warfare is Achiile's Heel of any military, since it is destroying basic sense of existence of military.

I think you got my question wrong, I'm not talking about military's performance in asymmetric warfare, but how strong militaries LEAD to asymmetric warfares

1<3
2>1
3>2

Battle of France is a good example, French also had confidence and pride of their military with superior tanks and a larger army, yet all of their best forces were annihilated by going toe to toe. Same goes to the difference in strategies between Chinese KMT military and Chinese communist guerillas against the Japanese invaders.

Why have a conventional warfare when your equipments are vastly inferior to your enemy's? Operaiton Desert Storm proves it to the Iraqis

[YevgenyP]

^^^
i'm not professional in this field, but my ideas are

1) Army became not an instrument for fight but due to price and overcomlexity it became an instrument in shininig showcase - an example is simple, what is price of VBIED which can destroy M1A1? couple thousand $? a little bit more?
2) "Humanistic" tendention of XX century (actually i don't believe in this "humanism"), especially after WW2, show us a lot of wars, which were won by force but lost by politicians. No need for examples.

So conclusion is - being strong, army can loose any conflict in circumstances when most of important orders are given by civil unprofessionals.

[CaptMorgan68]

imho AW is more of a defensive posture an opposing force may take when conducting SW is not permissible... if we are talking guerilla type low intensity warfare then the only reason why NATO would fail Astan for example would be political rather than military in nature... as much as I hate Hitler he used to say that when you are done fighting conventional forces and are facing a guerrilla force you have already won....

[junglejim]

imho AW is more of a defensive posture an opposing force may take when conducting SW is out of reach... if we are talking guerilla type low intensity warfare then the only reason why NATO would fail Astan for example would be political rather than military in nature... as much as I hate Hitler he used to say that when you are done fighting conventional forces and are facing a guerrilla force you have already won....


I would have to agree. For example in the Philippines alone whose armed Forces have been battling up to 3 insurgency at one time, it continues to take on casualties and most call it a failure. What most people fail to see is that for 40 years, with about 70000 insurgents at its peak these insurgents have never made progress other than in propaganda. Now the 20 thousand strong Communist rebels is down to 2000 and the biggest and most well armed separatist MNLF has been pacified and are working on building up their autonomous region.

Why it still exist because AW is complicated and it mostly due to political matters rather than the Armed Forces.

what I'm trying to say is the AFUSA is by far the deadliest Armed Force in the planet today... the only reason why you see a timid German Sheperd as opposed to a Grizzly Bear on crack is because its population, though often timesdeluded, are pretty much for good.

Someone measured the cost of material they use for an insurgent... they could just carpet bomb 24 hours non stop for a year. trust me no insurgency would survive that, well maybe the Roach Liberation Front

[[WDW]Megaraptor]

All i wanted to say - army if well prepared to fight "3 nasty dirka dirka dudes in civvies hiding in a non-permissive urban suburb of 500,000" is no more but heavy police.

Yep. I'm worried that with all this focus on counter-insurgency, we'll end up degrading our ability to fight conventional war.

As James Mattis pointed out when I heard him speak last month, people fight us with insurgency because that's our point of weakness. If we become good at insurgency and let our conventional capabilities degrade, other countries will simply fight us conventionally.

[Royal]

these insurgents have never made progress other than in propaganda.


and the biggest and most well armed separatist MNLF has been pacified and are working on building up their autonomous region.

Hate to say it, but I'd call the ARMM (or whatever else comes out of the talks with MILF) progress acheived by the insurgents.

[junglejim]

Hate to say it, but I'd call the ARMM (or whatever else comes out of the talks with MILF) progress acheived by the insurgents.

Its more of a draw, considering what they wanted was an independent state. Sadly, the ARMM is a massive failure due to corruption amongst them. So much so that in the last referndum wherein other Muslim dominated areas would be considered to join them, no one took the offer. Put the guns down first then build them up, later down the road that region will probably disappear as more and more of them integrate.

Their demands for ancestral domain is actually legit, so more power to them. Considering that the territory remains intact and they still are Filipinos, thats a victory for the country. its like killing your own family memeber, no matter who wins the gun fight you both still lose. So the sooner they go for peace the better for everyone.

[Astaran]

I don't think it's the task of a military to end an insurgency. To end it is the task of politicians and civilians because most causes for an insurgency originate from social, economical or religious disparities within the country. The military (and other law enforcing organizations) can only "hold the insurgents at gunpoint" and drive them back into "sealed-off strongholds" while the civilian administration must work to find a solution for the original problems which caused the insurgency.

This is why insurgency is some sort of "Achilles' heel" of a military, because the military is forced to depend on the efforts of non-military agencies to defeat it. Unfortunately, we all know how reliable and practical-thinking politicians and bureaucrats are.

Another aspect is our present day media-coverage of conflicts. I think since the Vietnam War the public opinion is heavily influenced by reports and more important photos and films directly out of the combat zone. The civilian population gets a taste of what war is really like and what suffer and grief it causes. Especially own casualties are often not only numbers and statistics, but also get a published face, a name and a real person behind it. The insurgents don't need to kill masses of soldiers. They only need to kill enough for a frequent medial coverage to undermine the public support for the war. Presenting dead women and children (the famous Afghan "wedding parties") on TV helps the insurgents as well.

So, as a conclusion one can they that insurgents are unlikely able to defeat a military in combat, but they can defeat it on the medial battlefield where the military has its most vulnerable point.

Both examples show that the main Achilles' heels of the military in a asymmetrical war are areas which can not be (directly) influenced by the military and it's war-fighting abilities itself.

[Lamer]

This kind of warfare is around for as long as there are conventional forces in the world. Also chalk this one too as successful: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yugoslav_Partisans

[Dercius]

The lesson history can teach us is that AW is a pain in the ass for any army, today, or 200 hundred years ago. But at the same time we can say that in modern history, not a single insurgency won without substantial help and support from another nation/country

[Mastermind]

^^^
i'm not professional in this field, but my ideas are

1) Army became not an instrument for fight but due to price and overcomlexity it became an instrument in shininig showcase - an example is simple, what is price of VBIED which can destroy M1A1? couple thousand $? a little bit more?
2) "Humanistic" tendention of XX century (actually i don't believe in this "humanism"), especially after WW2, show us a lot of wars, which were won by force but lost by politicians. No need for examples.

So conclusion is - being strong, army can loose any conflict in circumstances when most of important orders are given by civil unprofessionals.
IMO, that is a quite honest, concise assessment...much better said than mine. :-)

[filochard]

Not so wierd. Asymmetric warfare can discomfort and harass an enemy, make his stay in your country costly, and cause dissention and economic/political troubles at home, but it has seldom thrown a detemined enemy out of a country (Afghanistan vs. SovUnion is one exception). To give three examples:

(1) American Revolution--There is always praise for the Minuteman and the guerilla fighters, but it wasn't until Washington (and Greene) had disciplined and regular forces able to stand up to the British and conduct (along with the French) regular siege operations at Yorktown that America finally won it's independence.


the brits were far from there home and there was the french both on the ground and at sea (that is a very rare case in the history where the french navy could match the Royal Navy)



(2) Napoleon's Conquest of Spain - The Spanish celebrate their guerilla fighters (who made the 1805-1814 about as brutal and nasty a conflict as that century saw), but it was the Spanish Armies (and of course, most notably, Wellington and his British and Portuguese regulars) that fought the battles necessary to drive the French back across the border into France.


the french lost Spain in Russia. The whole thing was a slow retreat along our trouble in east Europe, no real defeat there. That was nasty but the Spanish/Brits/Partuguese would never have been able to kick the french out.

A regular army try to keep your civilian out of your enemy's reach while a unregular army count on your enemy's pity to protect your civilians.
So without pity it's easy to win by bringing terror. Historicaly speaking guerilla is a dead end : one can't count on his enemy's pity .. apart when your enemy is the US it seems ;-)

[Mordoror]

AW could be the scourge of any army if there is two conditions

* the insurgency is supported by foreign power that gives it money, training and rest rear bases and equipment
* the occupying (target) army is impered by the politics and ROE

unfortunately there is no 100 way of dealing with an AW
- either play it the roman or mongol way : pyramids of heads and burned villages set as examples and you'll be quiet for a long time especially if you have boots on the ground to enforce the fear feeling after the previous "examples"

- either learn to play one clan vs the other one, one team vs the other one, one side vs the other one. use the locals, they know there country better, they know their countrymate better and essentailly they kwno how to deal with them better than a foreign officer coming fresh from a school and with only book knowledge

[Blue_0]

If I remember right the Romans failed to defeat the Caledonia tribes in northern Britain despite having committed overwhelming forces to the task and using ruthless tactics starting in 78 AD with multiple Roman emperors dedicated to the tast before finally giving up the attempt of the conquest of northern Britain 180 AD, satisfied simply to occupy positions behind Hadrian’s wall there after.

My point is, it does not matter who you are, how good your leadership is, or how big your army is, or how ruthless you choose to be. A sufficiently pre-disposed population can resist you indefinitely. Especially if your enemy does not care for the benefits of civilization.

[James]

I don't think AW is a weakness for the U.S. Military. In Afghanistan in 2001 small numbers American and Allied SOF, using AW, destroyed and/or routed tens of thousands of Taliban and AQ units who were attempting to fight us with conventional techniques - tanks, artillery, and mobile infantry. We certainly know how to do it, and how to fight against it. The U.S. Army actually has an Asymmetric Warfare Group. I think our biggest obstacles are political weakness or uncertainty and the trap of inflexible or complacent thinking. AW is constantly evolving, and we need to also. As soon as a paper or field manual is written to tell us how to deal with insurgencies, you can be sure that some part of it is out of date.

[Astaran]

AW is constantly evolving, and we need to also. As soon as a paper or field manual is written to tell us how to deal with insurgencies, you can be sure that some part of it is out of date.

Especially is one consider that newly written Field Manuals are often published at Amazon. If I remember correctly "the U.S. Army Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5" is the latest Field Manual dealing with AW. Hostile fighters / supporters can order and read these books, too, and can adapt their strategies and tactics. Well, since I never got my hands on a FM 3-24 copy I can't say if there are "censored" parts in the public available version compared to the Army / USMC one. But even if the public version is "censored": the basic knowledge about current AW strategies can be learned and maybe countered.

"Rommel, you magnificent bastard! I read your book!"

[Mastermind]

Truth is, the American people have become so weak minded about war they have lost their edge. If we had to fight a real war...they would rather give up than contaminate the planet or kill a civilian. They want to put POWs in civll court and then put their own warriors on trial for gut punching a terrorist who does not cooperate while being captured. They actually are just a mere shadow of what they once were...all a bunch of latent hippy pu55ies.

Well, Americans will pay the price for this and AW is the golden tactic to beat the Americans. That and time. Eventually, Americans always pick up their toys and just leave if the war lasts long enough. At this stage, in my humble opinion as unpopular as it is...a squadron of dedicated Boy Scouts could whip America.

[matthew.manhorn]

AW could be the scourge of any army if there is two conditions

* the insurgency is supported by foreign power that gives it money, training and rest rear bases and equipment
* the occupying (target) army is impered by the politics and ROE

unfortunately there is no 100 way of dealing with an AW
- either play it the roman or mongol way : pyramids of heads and burned villages set as examples and you'll be quiet for a long time especially if you have boots on the ground to enforce the fear feeling after the previous "examples"

- either learn to play one clan vs the other one, one team vs the other one, one side vs the other one. use the locals, they know there country better, they know their countrymate better and essentailly they kwno how to deal with them better than a foreign officer coming fresh from a school and with only book knowledge

Don' think so, let's compare Russia's war with the Chechens and its war against Georgia.

AFAIK Chechens were supplied by Islamic nations, but nowhere as much as the ones Georgia received from NATO and western powers.

Yet Russia had an easy victory against the Georgian army in comparison with their fights against the Chechens. It has to do with AW imo.

[Pete031]

Officers and Soldiers are still adapting to COIN warfare. Often, steps are skipped at the strategic level, so that good news can be sent back home.
Gen MacCrystal was great for that. Skip a whole bunch of steps and go right into rebuilding... Nothing gets done.

The problem with this type of warfare, and what is hardest on the soldiers, is that in the short term it produces minor results. A soldier may not feel any sense of accomplishment in a 8 to 1 year tour overseas .

In order for COIN to work, you have to destroy the enemy in the vicinity of the area you want to work with. If not, its just lip service to the locals.

I think James said it best with his response, its political weakness and the wrong type of approach by the senior leadership that needs work.

For the Rest of the Army, AW or COIN or whatever, is just another tool in the toolbox.

[sgt_G]

At this stage, in my humble opinion as unpopular as it is...a squadron of dedicated Boy Scouts could whip America.


My dad used to say that too...so your not alone in that thinking

[Pete031]

Well its a good thing you have some hard mother****ers killing these bastards everyday over there.

[Mastermind]

AW could be the scourge of any army if there is two conditions

* the insurgency is supported by foreign power that gives it money, training and rest rear bases and equipment
* the occupying (target) army is impered by the politics and ROE

unfortunately there is no 100 way of dealing with an AW
- either play it the roman or mongol way : pyramids of heads and burned villages set as examples and you'll be quiet for a long time especially if you have boots on the ground to enforce the fear feeling after the previous "examples"

- either learn to play one clan vs the other one, one team vs the other one, one side vs the other one. use the locals, they know there country better, they know their countrymate better and essentailly they kwno how to deal with them better than a foreign officer coming fresh from a school and with only book knowledge

Indeed, you have stated the case very well. Conventional forces can win against the insurgent or AW force. But, the problem modernists are faced with in accepting this precept is that the necessary actions to take control are unacceptable.

Above, your comment was aggressed using the example of the Chechen war vs. the Georgian as the Russians were opposed. The Georgians were a very conventional military force with a very conventional westernized government behind it. It follows; the conventional force was easily defeated (even before the so-called war began) because as a conventional force, they were very aware of the consequences of continued resistance. They also understood when they were unable to control the situation in favor of their nation. This is absolutely not so with unconventional forces. The Chechens were able to cause so much ruckus against the Russians because they fought guerilla style, with a mix (when it suited them) of conventional tactics. They used conventional forces at the beginning; with NO regard for the people they were supposedly fighting for...casualties meant nothing to them, either for their militants or for their civilians. they also used "World Opinion" and heavy propaganda to enlist global "Useful Idiots" in the media and in other western liberal nations to bring pressure against their foes.

The Russians reeled, at first, under this onslaught. Russia failed inimitably, to understand the nature of their opponents. However, Russians were not unfamiliar with such tactics and had already, basically "lost" one AW in Afghanistan. Russian forces and leaders very quickly realized their mistakes and changed tactics to the point of hitting back with multiples of ruthlessness used against them. As a result, they have demonstrated to this ruthless enemy that they will not be led down some miss-guided outer defined path to defeat as the Americans were in Vietnam. In the 2nd Chechen war, things were vastly different. And, as a result, the Chechens rebels were handed their asses. The Chechen rebels are now tentatively raising their ugly heads again, but, I notice this time, they are much less organized as a fighting force and now exist as a terror organization. This is a sign of utter defeat on the battlefield and thus, conceding the victory to their opponents.

Ergo, the truth behind what has been said about the potential for conventional forces to defeat such foes. But, going into such conflict, the conventional force commander has to be initially prepared and committed to take the ruthless steps necessary to defeat that opponent. And, that commander has to have the confidence of the nation he represents. He and his forces must not be threatened with niceties of peace, such as “War Crimes” accusations and defeatism at home led by the AW forces using homeland useful idiots. This is primarily why the US is doomed to defeat in the WOT….the people simply will not support a war without a hated enemy…to kill them; you must truly hate them, not “understand” them or “feel their pain”. This is a road headed straight for defeat for any conventional force, no matter how powerful.

[Mordoror]

Ergo, the truth behind what has been said about the potential for conventional forces to defeat such foes. But, going into such conflict, the conventional force commander has to be initially prepared and committed to take the ruthless steps necessary to defeat that opponent. And, that commander has to have the confidence of the nation he represents. He and his forces must not be threatened with niceties of peace, such as “War Crimes” accusations and defeatism at home led by the AW forces using homeland useful idiots. This is primarily why the US is doomed to defeat in the WOT….the people simply will not support a war without a hated enemy…to kill them; you must truly hate them, not “understand” them or “feel their pain”. This is a road headed straight for defeat for any conventional force, no matter how powerful.

x100
not that i am advocating scorched earth technic
however US army (like any Western Army) should have known that it would have its hands tighted behind the back in Astan and that in that case the only winning (in fact a double win solution) was to form and use earlier, more actively, more agressively and with their own art of war the locals : like that no US troops involved (except advisors and air support so the hands stay clean) and the locals will know how to deal (as they did in the very beginning) with our hostiles

It is done again actually but too slowly, too late and especially with a western centered state of mind that is beyond stupid : we are forming the ANA and ANP with western standards !!
Western standards for illiterate, tribal and clanic minded men !! WTF ?? trying to drill them to fight like our soldiers, hence lowering to the ground their field efficiency just for the sack of having allies with fancy stuff (M16, Multicam and digit radios) that they don't know and will never know to use properly

these guys were efficient by themselfes with an AK and a bowl of rice and we are turning them in a bunch of sissies, trying to make them fight our stylr and wondering why they scatter at the first bullet or turn traitors when we are not respecting their ancestral way of life (like mixing different and hostile clan, villages and ethnicity in the same unit)

so now we have to fight ourself and because we have western values and all, again we have to fight in a righteous way (rules of war and all) that is not fitted for a COIN in a volatile and complex environment like Astan

what we are doing is not wining on the ground but just wining time for the so called Astan gov. The earlier everybody pull out from that country the better as from the beginning no true operational and political aim was emitted so none can be achieved. We could be pourring thousand more troops, if we don't state a clear political aim, the soldiers on the ground will just waste their boots and their blood, patrolling the same areas eternaly, taking the fight in villages then leaving these villages them coming back again to take a new fight and so on and son uselessly

in conclusion A COIN war is winnable if the political roadmap to achieve is clear from the beginning. The military will do their job with the mean given to them. But that job as successful it can be on the field is so easily wasted by politics blindness that sometimes i wonder why soldiers are dying when everybody knows (brass included) that at the end the result will be disatsrous politically and by ricochet so militarily

[Mastermind]

^^ top Notch assessment!