The Israeli Experience In Lebanon, 1982-1985

[mack pl]

Major George C. Solley
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia
10 May 1987

CHAPTER VII -- IDF LESSONS LEARNED

Tactics

"A number of criticisms have been directed at the IDF for its
tactics in the June invasion, among which are the following: the
IDF shoved extreme caution in the MOUT operations in Tyre, Sidon,
and Beirut; the rates of advance in Lebanon were too slow,
resulting in the failure to capture or kill a single PLO leader;
poor tactical measures resulted in a number of serious ambushes,
especially by Syrian forces in the Center and East; the IDF
exhibited a tendency to substitute firepower and frontal attack
for tactical maneuver; the Israeli forces did very little
fighting at night; the IDF used conventional military tactics
against a guerilla force. Each of these charges contains some
truth, but each must be examined in light of the political
constraints under which the IDF was forced to operate."

Infantry


"One lesson the IDF did learn in Lebanon was that it had
neglected infantry for too long. As has been noted, the IDF opted
for tank formations and relegated infantry to the secondary role
of mopping up what the tanks left. The Yom Kippur War showed the
ineffectiveness of that doctrine, but the solution of IDF
planners was to put infantry in APC's so they could keep up with
the tanks and to increase the number of self-propelled artillery.
It would be the artillery, it was thought, which would suppress
the enemy's anti-tank guided missiles. In fact, the ratio of
infantry formations to armored actually declined between 1973 and
1982, at a time when the overall force had increased nearly 100
percent. In Lebanon, however, anti-armor ambushes were sprung at
close range from previously unnoticed prepared positions; by the
time artillery was brought to bear, the attackers had fled and
the losses sustained.

Part of the problem lies in IDF doctrine and part lies in the
unwillingness to take casualties. The argument centers on the
proposition that overall casualties may be less if infantry takes
the lead in terrain which is inhospitable to armor. Although the
IDF has acknowledged the problem by starting up an additional
infantry brigade, the Givati, it must still structure its forces
for the most likely type of warfare -- and that is armored
warfare in open terrain."
........
It was only few quotes-
check this

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1987/SGC.htm

........
Regards
mack pl

[gilgoul]

Very interesting points.
Even if I do think that the IDF is equal to none for it`s ability t adapt and overcome, those extract bear some truth.
First and foremost, the unwillingness to take casualties backfires sometimes, but lets not forget that the strategic goal of "peace for galilee" was obtained, to know, the end of the threat of palestinians D30, katiusah`s and other frog missiles pointed on the northern part of Israel.
As for the combats temselves, the mistakes of "Operation Litani" were not repeated, to know giving the PLO enough time to escape, and not using crushing fire power in front of nothing, for that the Sidon and Tyr operation s were exemplary, since they brought the surrender of the PLO garrisons without having to deploy heavy fire power on the local populations.
Because let`s not forget it, the main enemy during this war weren`t the Syrians or the PLO, subdued pretty "easily" despite the blue on blue and some mishaps, but the press agencies that often falsely reported or made serious mistakes during the time of the invasion.
but I should build up a little my argumentary in order to respond correctly to this thread :)

[Zenchan]

:backhand: The problem with "Schalag" (Peace for Galiliee for all you non-Hebrews) was its apolitical approach:
Sharon, never permitted to be Chief of Staff by the earlier "Powers" became Defence Secretary under Begin and finally found his own war to play around with - vut not as Defence minister but as Ramatkal (C,o.S.). I can still remember him taking on the radio with the spearhead forces CO on the coastal road.

Problem 1: Sharon never had a political plan to parallel his brillant tactical intrusion into Lebanon. Nobody knew what to do, once we were reaching the outskirts of Beirut.

Problem 2: Sharon had not exit plan for Lebanon, for which a lot of paid dearly afterwards.
Problem 3: Sharon relied too much on the Christian Lebanese Militias , the Kataib. anybody with some historicalk knowledge on the Phalange politics of Lebanon would have never taken these people at face value. End Result: Sabra & Shatila.

To make a long sermon short: We won the Battle for lebanon, we lost the war, because we did not have a political conception of what we were doing in that hellhole in the first place... :oops:

[Mark_Aspen]

Ouch. Did both Mivtzah Litani and Shalag. Never thought to compare the two beyond my private experiences. To think about it, Litani was done by an IDF that was very different by 1982; almost like Litani was the final operation of the Yom Kippur IDF.

I agree with Zenchan that the political objectives weren't matched with the military ones in Shalag. It began as a havayah, going through some of towns was like seeing pictures of the Americans in Paris in 1944. That changed as we went north. Major Solley is correct about the doctrine issues; they were shaped in the Sinai and on the Golan. Like most other armies, we trained and fought the last war. My friends in the infantry companies, especially Nahal and Golani said they learned and adjusted fast; that Beirut wasn't the souk in Hebron.

Enough for this forum.