T3ngu
05-05-2010, 12:07 AM
This is something i would like to hear others opinions on. This is largely based on books i have read, and me pinching from Wiki and other websites.
I have recently finished reading a book on the Australian actions on Tarakan during the closing period of WW2.
Essentially the Oboe 1 operations were used to capture the oil producing island of Tarakan, but many argue that the 251 allied dead, and over 669 allied wounded did not to need to occur in the first place. The Australian historian Gavin Long concluded "the results achieved did not justify the cost of the Tarakan operation".
With Oboe 1, approxiamtely 15,000 (i have read more) troops were landed on Tarakan, which was approximately 270 kilometres from Sandakan.
At Sandakan, on Borneo, reports say around 3,600 civilian labourers, and around 2,400 prisoners of war were held by the Japanese. Of these, only 6 soldiers (5 Australian) survived to tell the tale. This is regarded as the single worst atrocity suffered by Australian servicemen during the second world war.
As the war neared its close, the Japanese saw the writing on the wall, and began a series of forced marches from Sandakan to Ranau (around 150 kilometres in a straight line). What made things worse was that the locals who were asked to construct the track that the POWs travelled on, thought the track was for the Japanese and made the track as impassable as possible. This in turn, made things worse for the POWs.
During the first march of 470 troops, stragglers, many of whom were unfit to start with, and could not survive the nine days on four days of food, were killed, or left to die. During the second march, of the 536 that left, only 183 managed to get to Ranau and found only six of the original marchers alive.
The final march started with the 250 troops still alive. However, it was decided that another group of men (75) would be sent on a final march. Many were so weak that none survived further than 50 kilometres. As each man collapsed they were shot. Those remaining at Sandakan were killed or died from starvation and sickness prior to the japanese surrender.
At Ranau, there were 38 POWs still alive at the end of July. As they were so weak and sick, the POWs were shot by the guards during August, some say up to 12 days after the end of the war.
Operation Kingfisher was proposed during 1944, with a view to rescuing the POWs at Sandakan.
The AWM's website states
{72} It seems then that a prime focus of AGAS operatives was to gather intelligence relating to the Sandakan POWs. Apparently this objective proved to be quite successful because "an extensive system of contacts has been extended, and agents have been placed in and around SANDAKAN, BELURAN, LINKABAU, KUDAT and LANGKON".65 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#65) Acting upon the information received from AGAS, the results were as follows:
The destruction by air of approx. 600 Japs in SANDAKAN, plus 9 motor launches. ...
Much reliable information has been passed on as to Japanese movements from SANDAKAN to RANAU, the extent of troop movements and concentrations in KHOTA [KOTA] BELUD, LANGKON and KUDAT, and the move of the PW Camp, previously in SANDAKAN, in groups to RANAU. ...
{73} It is amply clear that AGAS operatives in the field possessed detailed as well as accurate information as to the situation of the POWs of Sandakan, including their movements "in groups to RANAU", namely the "Death March". Furthermore, Major Chester, the leader of AGAS, claimed inter alia that "There has been no break or trouble in communication from the date of the first contact [February 1945] up to the present moment [May 1945]".66 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#66)
{74} If the AGAS report is to be believed, and there is no apparent reason to doubt its veracity, why then was no attempt been made to effect the planned rescue of the Sandakan POWs – that is, implement Operation KINGFISHER? KINGFISHER, conceived sometime in mid-1944, proposed a rescue plan of POWs in Sandakan by a paratroop unit.67 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#67) The probable reason for aborting KINGFISHER has been hotly debated, with arguments ranging from a conspiratorial cover-up that implicated Australia's military elite to MacArthur's non-cooperation in providing vital support for the operation.
{75} Blamey's speech at the Second Annual Conference of the Australian Armoured Corps Association in Melbourne on 19 November 1947 apparently "let the cat out of the bag". Lieutenant Colonel (later Sir) John Overall's 800-strong paratroop battalion which had been training at the Atherton Tableland for a covert operation that never came through knew nothing of the details of their mission until Blamey's address.
We had complete plans for them [paratroopers]. Our spies [AGAS and its local agents] were in Japanese-held territory. We had established the necessary contacts with prisoners at Sandakan, and our parachute troops were going to relieve them. ... But at the moment we wanted to act, we couldn't get the necessary aircraft to take them in [emphasis added]. The operation would certainly have saved that death march of Sandakan.68 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#68)
{76} Lynette Ramsay Silver argued that Blamey blamed MacArthur as an excuse to cover-up an SRD bungle in the gathering of accurate intelligence.69 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#69) The Blamey-MacArthur relationship had never been cosy, each accusing the other of attempting to undermine his authority. Blamey, she claimed, told Air Vice-Marshal George Jones, the Chief of the Air Staff, that "while he [Blamey] had not submitted his rescue plan to the Australian government or other authorities, he had raised it with MacArthur, 'who did not favour it'".70 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#70)
{77} Silver denounced Blamey's claim about "getting the necessary aircraft" as utter nonsense which was not supported by evidence. First, she said, it was absurd to blame MacArthur and the American reluctance to supply the necessary air transport. No such request was made to MacArthur, who evidently then had at his disposal 600 C-47s. If the Americans were reluctant as was claimed, the RAAF had in its own pool of 71 C-47s. According to KINGFISHER, only 34 aircraft were required. Secondly, and more conclusively, there was no need of American planes or that of the RAAF, as SRD itself had its own exclusive Air Section, codenamed 200 Flight, which had been established in February 1945. As of March, there were in operation six Liberators (B-24s) utilized in dropping personnel and "storpedoes"71 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#71) in Borneo and Timor. http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp
My question is this. Given the build up of troops in the area, and considering the kingfisher operation planning, and the troops already on the ground.
Would it have been prudent, or possible to extend the Oboe operations in a way which would have supported kingfisher.
I am very interested in others thoughts on both operations, and the potential interconnections which could have occurred. Im ashamed that kingfisher didn't go ahead, given the loss of life that occurred, especially as we already had people on the ground providing intel.
I have recently finished reading a book on the Australian actions on Tarakan during the closing period of WW2.
Essentially the Oboe 1 operations were used to capture the oil producing island of Tarakan, but many argue that the 251 allied dead, and over 669 allied wounded did not to need to occur in the first place. The Australian historian Gavin Long concluded "the results achieved did not justify the cost of the Tarakan operation".
With Oboe 1, approxiamtely 15,000 (i have read more) troops were landed on Tarakan, which was approximately 270 kilometres from Sandakan.
At Sandakan, on Borneo, reports say around 3,600 civilian labourers, and around 2,400 prisoners of war were held by the Japanese. Of these, only 6 soldiers (5 Australian) survived to tell the tale. This is regarded as the single worst atrocity suffered by Australian servicemen during the second world war.
As the war neared its close, the Japanese saw the writing on the wall, and began a series of forced marches from Sandakan to Ranau (around 150 kilometres in a straight line). What made things worse was that the locals who were asked to construct the track that the POWs travelled on, thought the track was for the Japanese and made the track as impassable as possible. This in turn, made things worse for the POWs.
During the first march of 470 troops, stragglers, many of whom were unfit to start with, and could not survive the nine days on four days of food, were killed, or left to die. During the second march, of the 536 that left, only 183 managed to get to Ranau and found only six of the original marchers alive.
The final march started with the 250 troops still alive. However, it was decided that another group of men (75) would be sent on a final march. Many were so weak that none survived further than 50 kilometres. As each man collapsed they were shot. Those remaining at Sandakan were killed or died from starvation and sickness prior to the japanese surrender.
At Ranau, there were 38 POWs still alive at the end of July. As they were so weak and sick, the POWs were shot by the guards during August, some say up to 12 days after the end of the war.
Operation Kingfisher was proposed during 1944, with a view to rescuing the POWs at Sandakan.
The AWM's website states
{72} It seems then that a prime focus of AGAS operatives was to gather intelligence relating to the Sandakan POWs. Apparently this objective proved to be quite successful because "an extensive system of contacts has been extended, and agents have been placed in and around SANDAKAN, BELURAN, LINKABAU, KUDAT and LANGKON".65 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#65) Acting upon the information received from AGAS, the results were as follows:
The destruction by air of approx. 600 Japs in SANDAKAN, plus 9 motor launches. ...
Much reliable information has been passed on as to Japanese movements from SANDAKAN to RANAU, the extent of troop movements and concentrations in KHOTA [KOTA] BELUD, LANGKON and KUDAT, and the move of the PW Camp, previously in SANDAKAN, in groups to RANAU. ...
{73} It is amply clear that AGAS operatives in the field possessed detailed as well as accurate information as to the situation of the POWs of Sandakan, including their movements "in groups to RANAU", namely the "Death March". Furthermore, Major Chester, the leader of AGAS, claimed inter alia that "There has been no break or trouble in communication from the date of the first contact [February 1945] up to the present moment [May 1945]".66 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#66)
{74} If the AGAS report is to be believed, and there is no apparent reason to doubt its veracity, why then was no attempt been made to effect the planned rescue of the Sandakan POWs – that is, implement Operation KINGFISHER? KINGFISHER, conceived sometime in mid-1944, proposed a rescue plan of POWs in Sandakan by a paratroop unit.67 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#67) The probable reason for aborting KINGFISHER has been hotly debated, with arguments ranging from a conspiratorial cover-up that implicated Australia's military elite to MacArthur's non-cooperation in providing vital support for the operation.
{75} Blamey's speech at the Second Annual Conference of the Australian Armoured Corps Association in Melbourne on 19 November 1947 apparently "let the cat out of the bag". Lieutenant Colonel (later Sir) John Overall's 800-strong paratroop battalion which had been training at the Atherton Tableland for a covert operation that never came through knew nothing of the details of their mission until Blamey's address.
We had complete plans for them [paratroopers]. Our spies [AGAS and its local agents] were in Japanese-held territory. We had established the necessary contacts with prisoners at Sandakan, and our parachute troops were going to relieve them. ... But at the moment we wanted to act, we couldn't get the necessary aircraft to take them in [emphasis added]. The operation would certainly have saved that death march of Sandakan.68 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#68)
{76} Lynette Ramsay Silver argued that Blamey blamed MacArthur as an excuse to cover-up an SRD bungle in the gathering of accurate intelligence.69 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#69) The Blamey-MacArthur relationship had never been cosy, each accusing the other of attempting to undermine his authority. Blamey, she claimed, told Air Vice-Marshal George Jones, the Chief of the Air Staff, that "while he [Blamey] had not submitted his rescue plan to the Australian government or other authorities, he had raised it with MacArthur, 'who did not favour it'".70 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#70)
{77} Silver denounced Blamey's claim about "getting the necessary aircraft" as utter nonsense which was not supported by evidence. First, she said, it was absurd to blame MacArthur and the American reluctance to supply the necessary air transport. No such request was made to MacArthur, who evidently then had at his disposal 600 C-47s. If the Americans were reluctant as was claimed, the RAAF had in its own pool of 71 C-47s. According to KINGFISHER, only 34 aircraft were required. Secondly, and more conclusively, there was no need of American planes or that of the RAAF, as SRD itself had its own exclusive Air Section, codenamed 200 Flight, which had been established in February 1945. As of March, there were in operation six Liberators (B-24s) utilized in dropping personnel and "storpedoes"71 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp#71) in Borneo and Timor. http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/borneo.asp
My question is this. Given the build up of troops in the area, and considering the kingfisher operation planning, and the troops already on the ground.
Would it have been prudent, or possible to extend the Oboe operations in a way which would have supported kingfisher.
I am very interested in others thoughts on both operations, and the potential interconnections which could have occurred. Im ashamed that kingfisher didn't go ahead, given the loss of life that occurred, especially as we already had people on the ground providing intel.