Soviet commander admits USSR came close to defeat by Nazis

[A_V_8_R]

An interview in which a Soviet commander admitted how close Moscow came to defeat by Germany during the Second World War has been broadcast in Russia for the first time.


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7681504/Soviet-commander-admits-USSR-came-close-to-defeat-by-Nazis.html


The Soviet Union nearly lost the war in 1941 and suffered from poor planning, according to Marshal Georgy Zhukov in the frank television interview that has been banned since it was recorded in 1966.
Zhukov, the most decorated general in the history of both Russia and the Soviet Union, admitted that Soviet generals were not confident that they could hold the German forces at the Mozhaisk defence line outside Moscow.



"Did the commanders have confidence we would hold that line of defence and be able to halt the enemy? I have to say frankly that we did not have complete certainty.
"It would have been possible to contain the initial units of the opponent but if he quickly sent in his main group, he would have been difficult to stop," he told the interviewer, the Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov.
Zhukov also revealed details of his exchanges with Joseph Stalin, the wartime leader, in the interview broadcast on state-run Channel One.
He recalled that a flu-struck Stalin summoned him to Moscow in October 1941 to salvage what until then had been a stuttering defence on the Western front outside Moscow.
After arriving at the front, Zhukov found that the defences in place were "absolutely insufficient".
"It was an extremely dangerous situation. In essence, all the approaches to Moscow were open," he said. "Our troops on the Mozhaisk defence line could not have stopped the enemy if he moved on Moscow."
"I telephoned Stalin. I said the most urgent thing is to occupy the Mozhaisk defence line as in parts of the Western front in essence there are no (Soviet) troops.
Shortly afterwards, Stalin phoned Zhukov back to inform him he had been made commander of the Western Front.
The relationship between the two men would end in acrimony when Stalin became suspicious of Zhukov's popularity after the war, giving him obscure posts in Odessa and the Urals.
Zhukov had been given the honour of leading the Red Army victory parade in 1945, riding into Red Square on a white stallion, and some historians believe Stalin feared he was being upstaged by the charismatic general.
After Stalin's death, Zhukov served as defence minister but remained a controversial figure and the Soviet authorities ordered the tape of his interview with Simonov to be destroyed. However one archive copy survived.
Ultimately, Russia's notorious weather played a major part in the defeat of Nazi Germany, but the Wehrmacht "overestimated themselves and underestimated Soviet troops," said Zhukov.
In giving the reasons for the Soviet victory, Zhukov made no mention of Stalin, who was taken unawares by the Nazi invasion of Russia.
The broadcast of the banned interview came ahead of a huge parade on May 9 to mark the 65th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany and as Russia appears to be cautiously eroding several taboos surrounding its war victory.
Notably, Russia recently posted online documents about the Katyn massacre of Polish officers by Soviet forces in 1940.

[TheKiwi]

Had Moscow fallen, it would have caused great difficulty for the USSR continuing the war. Mocow was not just the center of government power, it was also the most important tranport hub. Rail links between northern and southern parts of the USSR would have been badly affected, making it much much harder to shift forces and supplies between theatres. Even with as much industry and governmental functions as possible moved east, it was still a very important part of the running of the Soviet Union. That kind of administrative functionality is very hard to relocate, even more so in wartime.

I think we can all be greatful that the Red Army managed to hold Moscow.

[A_V_8_R]

Russia is finally giving up some historical revelations as of late. Hope it continues. A lot of interesting history to be had.

[artjomh]

Russia is finally giving up some historical revelations as of late. Hope it continues. A lot of interesting history to be had.

Revelations? Hardly!

The dangerous situation at the Battle of Moscow before Zhukov took over the high command, as well as his failures during the Rzhev and Kharkov counter-offensives are hardly a secret and were common historical knowledge in the USSR and the rest of the world.

The only interesting part of it is the figure of the interviewee himself, since at the time the interview was taken, Zhukov was not the most favourite figure with the Kremlin. So, him revealing all of this at the time would have been "interesting".

However, by the 70's and 80's most of this was common knowledge, not least from Zhukov's own memoirs.

[Mr.K]

Harldy a revelation. Of couse when the enemy is close to you're capital you're automatically come close to defeat.
The courage and determintation of those that defended Moscow deserves to be saluted once again.

[CaptMorgan68]

what Zhukov really revealed was that early in the War the encircled Soviet armies put up quite a resistance to the Germans and that is what really saved Moscow in the end.... it allowed time to prep the defense of Moscow and once those resources were in the game it was all over for the Germans... in his view defense of Moscow proved to be the breaking point.... he also talked about the decisive role the Morpekhi or the marines played in the defense of Moscow among others... he confirmed that later in the war Germans weren't so eager to attack if they knew the marines were present in the area... also while defending Moscow the marines managed to mount a counterattack which then became the basis for a wider counteroffensive... pretty much the defenders grind down the best of the best of German army and whatever was left could no longer be used to continue the momentum gained by the Germans in early stages of Barbarossa...

it was a great interview... too bad there's no English translation....

also the article is full of BS bc Zhukov never said the weather played a major role in German army's defeat... he said the Russians were fighting under the same weather and while a factor what really did the Germans in was their conviction of sabsolute superiority and the fact they underestimated the llevel of resistance put up by the Soviet ppl... the very successful operation Bagration took place during summer time and the weather had little to do with with German army group Centre's total defeat...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration

[SmoothieX12]

Harldy a revelation. Of couse when the enemy is close to you're capital you're automatically come close to defeat.
The courage and determintation of those that defended Moscow deserves to be saluted once again.

This all is, actually, the old news reflected upon in historical literature since mid-90-s many, many times. Those who wanted knew this long ago.

[A_V_8_R]

Revelations? Hardly!.

My bad, revelation was probably the wrong word. What I meant was the Russian State/Government finally opening up and officially allowing archival material to come to light.

[Russian_dude]

Had Moscow fallen, it would have caused great difficulty for the USSR continuing the war. Mocow was not just the center of government power, it was also the most important tranport hub. Rail links between northern and southern parts of the USSR would have been badly affected, making it much much harder to shift forces and supplies between theatres. Even with as much industry and governmental functions as possible moved east, it was still a very important part of the running of the Soviet Union. That kind of administrative functionality is very hard to relocate, even more so in wartime.

I think we can all be greatful that the Red Army managed to hold Moscow.

Napoleon took Moscow, so what? It would have meant a "Stalingrad" in 1941 instead 1942, with most of Group Army center cut off inside the city.

[Lokos]

... It is very widely known that the Soviets were three ragged steps from the abyss in late 1941...

L.

[TheKiwi]

Comparing Napoleon's taking of Moscow with the German attack of 1941 is a little facetious. Troops in WW2 had completely different logistical models. Makes it pretty hard to fight when you can't move POL north to south or south to north.

[Robert.V]

When Napoleon took Moscow he was defeated his army was especially after Borodino in no way and shape what it formally was ...so was the Russian army. But Russians could recuperate the loses and much faster then Napoleon even estimated.



Of the fifty battles I have fought, the most terrible was that before Moscow. The French showed themselves to be worthy victors, and the Russians can rightly call themselves invincible

Napoleon was very much impressed with the Russian after that bloody battle. Although he had a very positive impression of the Russian artillery arm and considered the Russian cavalry arm the best in the world(mainly due to Cossacks). He didn't think much of the Russian Infantry or the people in charge.) despite his generals telling him not underestimate them.

[AlexMartin2]

It is already mentioned by many, but I just amazed by ignorance and stupidity of these journalists. Almost everyone in Russia know about situation in winter 1941-1942 and how important was Battle for Moscow.

[shadowsrider]

Reportedly Stalin was considering at this time the defeat and signing some peace treaty... I do not remember the source, too many "reported" gossips.

[Russian_dude]

Comparing Napoleon's taking of Moscow with the German attack of 1941 is a little facetious. Troops in WW2 had completely different logistical models. Makes it pretty hard to fight when you can't move POL north to south or south to north.

I would have swore I saw many books describing German logistic problems in late 41'.

[TheKiwi]

They did. If anything, German logistics had completely reached the end of their tether in December. Something else to perhaps consider though. Had Moscow fallen, what would have Stalin's reaction been to his high command? How many of them would have gotten a 30 minute trial followed by a bullet in the head as a traitor to the USSR? Would Zhukov for example with his prominent role in the defence of Moscow have been a target?

[TakeIt]

Reportedly Stalin was considering at this time the defeat and signing some peace treaty... I do not remember the source, too many reported gossips.At no point of GPW Stalin considered signing a peace treaty.

[Supe]

... It is very widely known that the Soviets were three ragged steps from the abyss in late 1941...

L.

Has that been seriously disputed? I thought the USSR still had deep reserves, with the situation between Japan deemed a manageable risk to free Divisions from the East. And had Moscow fallen, would that have meant victory for Germans? I'm not convinced that it would have been. By the looks of the battles outside Moscow, the Germans appear quite ragged versus the freshly equipped Soviets facing them.

[YevgenyP]

Has that been seriously disputed?

How many research institutes in the world created for research why people have two legs but not three?

[Lokos]

Had Moscow fallen, what would have Stalin's reaction been to his high command? How many of them would have gotten a 30 minute trial followed by a bullet in the head as a traitor to the USSR? Would Zhukov for example with his prominent role in the defence of Moscow have been a target?

Well, in the first place, that's assuming Moscow was likely to fall. By the time the Germans were nearing its outskirts, formations were being massed for the Winter Counteroffensive. STAVKA officers were not likely to be subjected to show trials or executions upon defeat - even a strategic defeat - due to the fact that almost all significant planning had Stalin's personal seal of approval. At times, General Staff officers did present arguments contrary to Stalin's views, and sometimes even got their way (read: Stalingrad counter-offensive, Bagration etc.), but Stalin still had to approve the planning. Executing the plan was not the 'High Command's job. STAVKA representatives were generally immune to army group level failure.

Zhukov's sobering defeat in the Rzhev operation should be proof enough of that.


Has that been seriously disputed? I thought the USSR still had deep reserves, with the situation between Japan deemed a manageable risk to free Divisions from the East. And had Moscow fallen, would that have meant victory for Germans? I'm not convinced that it would have been. By the looks of the battles outside Moscow, the Germans appear quite ragged versus the freshly equipped Soviets facing them.

We can't simplify the situation too far. The USSR had deep reserves by virtue of undergoing an incredible mobilization of manpower and available resources. This mobilization was not inherent to the Soviet system - rather, it was the result of meticulous planning and enormous sacrifice. What 'saved' the Soviet Union in 1941 was a combination of many factors.

These factors included the ability to introduce fresh, reserve formations to the theater of operations (which would subsequently be destroyed, but would attrite German formations in the process); the willingness to sacrifice hideously in dogged attempts to stall or reverse the German advance; a production miracle that kept Soviet units in supply (although, by October 1941, most line Soviet formations were weaker than their German counterparts in just about every weapons category aside from mortars); the overall strategic context, which forced the Germans to divide their attentions between two strategic centers (Kiev and Moscow); German logistical problems and, of course, the inclement weather that slowed down operations in August-September.

A great number of factors that highlight an underlying truth: the Soviets were perilously close to outright defeat in 1941. Even in mid-1942 there was very little 'faith' in an inevitable, total victory.

In truth, the factors above - and many others that went without mention - to me, personally, comprise the reason behind my admiration for the Soviet effort in WW2. It was a monumental achievement to continue fighting (and, no less, to eventually triumph) under the circumstances.

L.

[TheKiwi]

...

In truth, the factors above - and many others that went without mention - to me, personally, comprise the reason behind my admiration for the Soviet effort in WW2. It was a monumental achievement to continue fighting (and, no less, to eventually triumph) under the circumstances.

L.

Got to agree with you there.

[Hollis]

^^^ along with what was said;

My respect to the Soviet People in their defense of their country. At war's end they had built a very powerful and well equip military from the rubble of the nazi destructive onslaught of their country. Very much a Herculean effort. Also I think a lot of historians would add, the war was close for the other allies too.

[Antey]

Fact is, that Germans made many planning, decision and execution erros. Had they not entirely ruined their own doctrine, USSR would also fall, despite enormous sacrafice that Lokos mentioned and rightfully pointed out. The effects of these errors were magnified by sheer scale of the oponent.

[1] Little initial economic effort on Germany part while Soviet economy, despite destruction and evacuation was moving to entirely war footing
[2] Doctrinal failures: Abandoning "blitzkrieg" principles when they shouldn't - spreading the forces throughout the threatre and headbanging for Stalingrad for no tangilble reason whatsover. Also, inadequate equipment - e.g lack of any "Ural bomber" at early stages and sticking to "fewer but heavier tanks" later.
[3] Poor entry conditions: failure in Africa resulted in inability to attack from Iran/Iraq (generally - South). Apparently no cooperation with Japan.
[4] Increased Hitler direct influence in matters.
[5] Ideological harassment of people of Ukraine and Belarus from the start, instead of drafting them to own ranks.

[Hollis]

Fact is, that Germans made many planning, decision and execution erros. Had they not entirely ruined their own doctrine, USSR would also fall, despite enormous sacrafice that Lokos mentioned and rightfully pointed out. The effects of these errors were magnified by sheer scale of the oponent.

[1] Little initial economic effort on Germany part while Soviet economy, despite destruction and evacuation was moving to entirely war footing
[2] Doctrinal failures: Abandoning "blitzkrieg" principles when they shouldn't - spreading the forces throughout the threatre and headbanging for Stalingrad for no tangilble reason whatsover. Also, inadequate equipment - e.g lack of any "Ural bomber" at early stages and sticking to "fewer but heavier tanks" later.
[3] Poor entry conditions: failure in Africa resulted in inability to attack from Iran/Iraq (generally - South). Apparently no cooperation with Japan.
[4] Increased Hitler direct influence in matters.
[5] Ideological harassment of people of Ukraine and Belarus from the start, instead of drafting them to own ranks.

It has been said, the best help the allies got was from hitler. Everyone makes mistakes as one General stated, "The first casualty of any battle is the battle plan." Regardless of speculation and hind sight observations, the nazis lost. That is what really matters.

[Steak-Sauce]

Hm, interesting posts.

Let me come up with a propably new theory, that Moscow, und thus the USSR, was saved by Greece. Yes, Greece.

If I don't have a mistake, I read a paper about the German advance towards Moscow '41 and why it was a failure. Beside the already mentioned thought of Hitler that he can defeat Stalin's Red Army in a blitzkrieg, the weather conditions and the lack of suitable equipment of the Werhmacht to fight a winter war (mind you, the German army had no real winter clothes like their Soviet counterparts), the German army was already late in the very beginning of Unternehmen Barbarossa on June 22, 1941.

With the Italian advance of 1940 stopped by the Greek soldiers, Germany was more or less forced to secure its southern flank - and to help Mussolini's troops. Ironically enough, German troops attacked Greece in early April '41, two and a half months before the start of Barbarossa. That means additional troops, tanks, fighters, bombers and logistics had to be "wasted", instead of using them against the Red Army. Don't forget the Battle of Crete, which not only had its heavy toll on German airborne troops, but saw also the destruction of hundreds of important Ju-52 transport airplanes.

If the German army wouldn't have been dragged into the Greek campaign by their Italian allies, I'm sure Barbarossa would have started weeks or even months earlier than June 22, thus giving the German troops the advantage of a longer period of "good weather" and perhaps even more equipment, ressources and manpower to reach Moscow.

Just a thought.

[specialweapons]

Didn't realize the Russian Naval Infantry played such a huge role in the defense of Moscow.

[Hast2]

Fact is, that Germans made many planning, decision and execution erros. Had they not entirely ruined their own doctrine, USSR would also fall, despite enormous sacrafice that Lokos mentioned and rightfully pointed out. The effects of these errors were magnified by sheer scale of the oponent.

[1] Little initial economic effort on Germany part while Soviet economy, despite destruction and evacuation was moving to entirely war footing
[2] Doctrinal failures: Abandoning "blitzkrieg" principles when they shouldn't - spreading the forces throughout the threatre and headbanging for Stalingrad for no tangilble reason whatsover. Also, inadequate equipment - e.g lack of any "Ural bomber" at early stages and sticking to "fewer but heavier tanks" later.
[3] Poor entry conditions: failure in Africa resulted in inability to attack from Iran/Iraq (generally - South). Apparently no cooperation with Japan.
[4] Increased Hitler direct influence in matters.
[5] Ideological harassment of people of Ukraine and Belarus from the start, instead of drafting them to own ranks.

You should keep in mind what Soviets have made MANY mistakes as well. Just to mention(because of their impact) very badly planned and executed counter-offensives. We play the "If" game - it should be omnidirectional.

[Antey]

You should keep in mind what Soviets have made MANY mistakes as well. Just to mention(because of their impact) very badly planned and executed counter-offensives. We play the "If" game - it should be omnidirectional.

I agree, but not entirely - Soviet errors were mostly forced upon them by general situation and their pre-war conduct. Most of the issues the Germans had (along with Greek one pointed by SteakSauce) could have been dealt with at their will, during course of war. Especially point 1,2,4...dealing with this alone would present SU with much more difficulties.

[Kilgor]

Some mistakes that he would be specifically mentioning would be the :

Ignoring Intelligence about the certain 41 attack
Battle of Rzhev
Failure to withdraw from Kiev
Failure to see operation blue as the main axis of attack and not Moscow in 42.

Stalin would be to blame for these, but at least he did learn and in future accept generals advice.

[TheKiwi]

Hm, interesting posts.

Let me come up with a propably new theory, that Moscow, und thus the USSR, was saved by Greece. Yes, Greece.

If I don't have a mistake, I read a paper about the German advance towards Moscow '41 and why it was a failure. Beside the already mentioned thought of Hitler that he can defeat Stalin's Red Army in a blitzkrieg, the weather conditions and the lack of suitable equipment of the Werhmacht to fight a winter war (mind you, the German army had no real winter clothes like their Soviet counterparts), the German army was already late in the very beginning of Unternehmen Barbarossa on June 22, 1941.

With the Italian advance of 1940 stopped by the Greek soldiers, Germany was more or less forced to secure its southern flank - and to help Mussolini's troops. Ironically enough, German troops attacked Greece in early April '41, two and a half months before the start of Barbarossa. That means additional troops, tanks, fighters, bombers and logistics had to be "wasted", instead of using them against the Red Army. Don't forget the Battle of Crete, which not only had its heavy toll on German airborne troops, but saw also the destruction of hundreds of important Ju-52 transport airplanes.

If the German army wouldn't have been dragged into the Greek campaign by their Italian allies, I'm sure Barbarossa would have started weeks or even months earlier than June 22, thus giving the German troops the advantage of a longer period of "good weather" and perhaps even more equipment, ressources and manpower to reach Moscow.

Just a thought.

Can't agree with you there. Firstly the number of forces diverted into the Greek campaign were relatively small compared to the size of the force that attacked the USSR. Secondly, the spring of 1941 had been particularly wet, mid June was the first point that the grounds were dry enough for an attack. And thirdly, none of the German generals behaved in any kind of a way that suggested they were desperately behind schedule.

[Astaran]

I recommend von Manstein's book "Lost victories" ("Verlorene Siege" in German) on this topic. Von Manstein frequently points the mistakes out which finally led to the defeat on the eastern front.

Hitler interfered often directly into operational decisions and dropped military necessities in favor of political/economical reasons ( for example the forbidden withdrawal from Stalingrad, the stationary defense of the Donez gap, the delay of the Battle for Kursk). After reading tons of books about the Second World War I think Germany was mainly defeated by Hitler himself. His irrational (and later completely insane) character made it extremely difficult for the German generals to win the war and helped the Allies to defeat the Nazis. I think we can be "glad" about Hitler's character, because a "rational" leader might have won the war.

[Figurant]

I recommend von Manstein's book "Lost victories" ("Verlorene Siege" in German) on this topic. Von Manstein frequently points the mistakes out which finally led to the defeat on the eastern front.
Von M. is a great historical source, as he is von M.
But his diaries and writing are totally misleading a source for historical analysis if taken autonomously.
Simply because he's not a simple witness (which are historically not always reliable either) but a party.
There are tons of books, articles and analysis on Manstein's works and saying, and no one ever took him by the word. He is a source among others, period. And he writes from his own totally subjective perspective.
Take his account that at the Battle of Kursk, German forces were outnumbered 1:27. Analysis shows that they were outnumbered 1,2 to 1 (maximum rate at 1:3,2 at crucial areas).
Von M. tries very hard to put the blame on the High Command and/or Hitler himself, while gloryfying his own operative "genius". This might human, but it's not the ultimate truth. It's called self-marketing nowadays.



Hitler ( for example the forbidden withdrawal from Stalingrad, the stationary defense of the Donez gap, the delay of the Battle for Kursk).

[QUOTE] After reading tons of books about the Second World War I think Germany was mainly defeated by Hitler himself.
QED. It's the same old German theme, without Adolf we all would be drinking German beer. This is simply not true. It would be the same as saying that the SU won only because of Stalin (as he - exactly as Adolf - "interfered often directly into operational decisions and dropped military necessities in favor of political/economical reasons" - and even managed to kill half of his General Staff and thousands of senior officers before the war).


I think we can be "glad" about Hitler's character, because a "rational" leader might have won the war.
Retrospectively, no. Nothing could have saved the rest of the German forces at Stalingrad, Manstein's counter-offensive was met by fierce resistance, the city was strategically of outmost importance, and Hitler was (cynically and cruelly, but infortunately) right in bleeding the Red Army by refusing to withdraw (it won him time till 1943). Of course, he made a lot of very bad decisions. But no general and no Führer could do anything against the superiority of the Soviet mobilisation plans in 1942-43 and the general organisation that led to the successful "reverse Blitzkrieg" in 1944. Even the Führer acknowledged that they had a lot to learn from the Soviets at that point.

[Kilgor]

It would be the same as saying that the SU won only because of Stalin nt.

As absolutely unpalatable as it may be, Stalin was a excellent wartime leader after he realised his limitations and let the Generals do their jobs. Unlike Hitler he did have a very sound and mostly realistic military mind.

[CaptMorgan68]

As absolutely unpalatable as it may be, Stalin was a excellent wartime leader after he realised his limitations and let the Generals do their jobs. Unlike Hitler he did have a very sound and mostly realistic military mind.

he never let himself get tactical the way Hitler did... following the early defeats he did swallow his pride and stood aside only to purge some of those generals that won the war for him almost immediately after the war was over

but let's not fall into the trap of thinking it was all Hitler's fault.... Barbarossa was a strategic blunder from the get go... it was just too big of a piece for the Nazis to swallow... that's what happens when a military command lets ideological nonsense overrule common sense and objectivity and starts believing its own hype too much...

[Redbeard]

Poor perfomance of the SU armies can also be atributed to Stalin's purge actions. He had alot of competent military commanders executed.

[Astaran]

Von M. is a great historical source, as he is von M.
But his diaries and writing are totally misleading a source for historical analysis if taken autonomously.
Simply because he's not a simple witness (which are historically not always reliable either) but a party.
There are tons of books, articles and analysis on Manstein's works and saying, and no one ever took him by the word. He is a source among others, period. And he writes from his own totally subjective perspective.
Take his account that at the Battle of Kursk, German forces were outnumbered 1:27. Analysis shows that they were outnumbered 1,2 to 1 (maximum rate at 1:3,2 at crucial areas).
Von M. tries very hard to put the blame on the High Command and/or Hitler himself, while gloryfying his own operative "genius". This might human, but it's not the ultimate truth. It's called self-marketing nowadays.



QED. It's the same old German theme, without Adolf we all would be drinking German beer. This is simply not true. It would be the same as saying that the SU won only because of Stalin (as he - exactly as Adolf - "interfered often directly into operational decisions and dropped military necessities in favor of political/economical reasons" - and even managed to kill half of his General Staff and thousands of senior officers before the war).


Retrospectively, no. Nothing could have saved the rest of the German forces at Stalingrad, Manstein's counter-offensive was met by fierce resistance, the city was strategically of outmost importance, and Hitler was (cynically and cruelly, but infortunately) right in bleeding the Red Army by refusing to withdraw (it won him time till 1943). Of course, he made a lot of very bad decisions. But no general and no Führer could do anything against the superiority of the Soviet mobilisation plans in 1942-43 and the general organisation that led to the successful "reverse Blitzkrieg" in 1944. Even the Führer acknowledged that they had a lot to learn from the Soviets at that point.

Thank you for the info about von Manstein, I never knew that he is so much criticized. Well, normally I should know that I shouldn't relay on the statements of someone who took actually part in a specific historical theme. Shame on me that I didn't questioned von Mansteins motives and statements enough. Maybe because of his "fame" as a great general.

Concerning the Hitler topic:
Of course he was not the reason for the defeat, but still one of the major ones. The impressive Russian fighting spirit, the massive industrial advantage of the US etc. were all crucial reasons, too. I think that Hitler made tons of mistakes due to his irrational and later insane character which later culminated to the crushing defeat in the war (underestimating Russia was the greatest mistatke).

Do you know, by chance, if it was possible for the Germans to compensate the losses after the destruction of the 6th Army? Until know I had believed that the loss of the entire 6th Army, with all it's equipment and manpower, was an absolutely destructive blow for the Wehrmacht, which could not be compensated in time and was some sort of "point of no return". If the 6th Army had been able to break out of the encirclement, it had been able to "fight another day". But now I'm not sure anymore.

But don't you think that there was a chance for the Germans to win the war against the Soviets? Not by late 1942 of course, but earlier in 1941, spring/summer 1942 when the greatest part of the Red Army was destroyed?