What if Thread: Munich had failed and war broke out Oct 1st 1938

[Alfacentori]

In the great tradition of MP.NET 'What if threads' I thought I would post one I have been wondering about

What if: Czechoslovakia had resisted any attempts to cede the Sudetenland (having already began mobilizing in 1938 due to German demands), and its heavy border defences, to Hitlers Germany and a general European war had commenced with German armies invading in accordance with Hitlers deadline of October 1st 1938.

-Would Britain and France have supported the Czechs once fighting began?
-How would Poland and the USSR have reacted?
-What level of resistance could the Czech army have put up to German forces as both sides were equipped in 1938?
-How would this have affect the later events, such as, assuming it still happened, the German invasion of France, since German forces in 1940 used large numbers of Czech developed and designed equipment, especially tanks, such as the Panzer 35t and 38t?

Photo thread of Czech army 1918-38 here
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?138192-Czechoslovak-army-1918-1938

Discuss


Alfa

[TheKiwi]

Hmm, I'll have to have a bit of a think about this one.

Off the top of my head, I doubt that the UK and France would back the Czechs. It really did take the post Munich betrayal of Czechoslovakia to bring it home to the British and French leadership that Germany could not be trusted in its international dealings. As it was they pressured the Czechs to comply with Germany's "reasonable" demands. It's a bit hard to go to war over something that you were calling reasonable a week ago.

The Poles sad to say, would have almost certainly come in alongside Germany. They got some territory too out of the Munich settlement remember. And with the Poles on Germany's side, there would be pretty much nothing the USSR could do to influence the situation.

[SkyUS]

Hmm, I'll have to have a bit of a think about this one.

Off the top of my head, I doubt that the UK and France would back the Czechs. It really did take the post Munich betrayal of Czechoslovakia to bring it home to the British and French leadership that Germany could not be trusted in its international dealings. As it was they pressured the Czechs to comply with Germany's "reasonable" demands. It's a bit hard to go to war over something that you were calling reasonable a week ago.

The Poles sad to say, would have almost certainly come in alongside Germany. They got some territory too out of the Munich settlement remember. And with the Poles on Germany's side, there would be pretty much nothing the USSR could do to influence the situation.

I disagree. It was opportunism at best.

[TheKiwi]

When you disagree, do you disagree about the actions of the Poles, or disagree completely with my conclusions? Czech President Benes said later that the prospect of Poland joining in the attack was one of the key factors in the deciding to agree to Munich. The French General Gamelin seemed to think that it was likely too.

[SkyUS]

Sorry I edited the post and see that I omitted something.

I disagree with your conclusion about Poland. The territory in question was the Tesin (Teschen) district, where sizable Polish minority resided. The area was of 625 square miles with a population of 230,000 people. Though the gov't in Poland at the time was in effect a "gov't of the lieutenants" ( a quasi- military junta, I think), I don't think they would ally themselves with Germany for the the carving up of Czechoslovakia. I guess it was more of a "protection of Polish minority from Germany" type of a thing.
Edit:

Sorry I also misunderstood you in saying that Poland would form a some sort of axis of evil with Germany

[Alfacentori]

Hmm, I'll have to have a bit of a think about this one.

Off the top of my head, I doubt that the UK and France would back the Czechs. It really did take the post Munich betrayal of Czechoslovakia to bring it home to the British and French leadership that Germany could not be trusted in its international dealings. As it was they pressured the Czechs to comply with Germany's "reasonable" demands. It's a bit hard to go to war over something that you were calling reasonable a week ago.

The Poles sad to say, would have almost certainly come in alongside Germany. They got some territory too out of the Munich settlement remember. And with the Poles on Germany's side, there would be pretty much nothing the USSR could do to influence the situation.

The British and French reaction is hard to tell for sure, the question is could they sit back and aside while Germany destroyed the Czechs, a state that they had helped create. Would the public opinion in Britain and France, that was already turning against appeasement, support their governments sitting on their hands or demand a response? As I recall there was also great disagreement in both governments over the policy, and a German attack on the Czechs could have seen a strong possiblity of at least the British government falling.

I think the Poles would have probably sat on their hands and remained neutral.

The biggest issue I think is what would a determined Czech resistance done to the following events. Germany would have eventually prevailed but it would have lost the production facilities and vast stocks of war materials it gained by annexing Czechoslovakia. How long would this push back Hitlers plans for Poland and give the Britain and France time to rearm.

Alfa

[saturnin]

In the great tradition of MP.NET 'What if threads' I thought I would post one I have been wondering about

What if: Czechoslovakia had resisted any attempts to cede the Sudetenland (having already began mobilizing in 1938 due to German demands), and its heavy border defences, to Hitlers Germany and a general European war had commenced with German armies invading in accordance with Hitlers deadline of October 1st 1938.

-Would Britain and France have supported the Czechs once fighting began?
-How would Poland and the USSR have reacted?
-What level of resistance could the Czech army have put up to German forces as both sides were equipped in 1938?
-How would this have affect the later events, such as, assuming it still happened, the German invasion of France, since German forces in 1940 used large numbers of Czech developed and designed equipment, especially tanks, such as the Panzer 35t and 38t?

Photo thread of Czech army 1918-38 here
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?138192-Czechoslovak-army-1918-1938

Discuss


Alfa

There is a lot of literature dealing with this scenario. Sadly most is in Czech language and weren´t translated. There are many studies disputing condition of Czechoslovak army and german oponent during Munich crisis. (Wehrmacht and Luftwfaffe gone through significant improvement from perspective of training and weapons delivery or logistic) Anschluß of Austria showed a lot of problem for Panzerwaffe which were solved prior to Fall Weiss. Mountains at Czechoslovak border privided in most direction practically perfect protection against movement of large forces (much better then Ardennes). German officers at different levels at that period refused to direct attact of czechosloakia as most of their division were newly formed and lucked proper training and logistic support (that go especially for Austrian army at south with wasn´t yet fully intercoporated into German army.

Main question is support from France and UK by declaring war (gernam generalls saw as gamble to take practically all best formation to Fall Weiss and it take a lot of effort for this strategy to prevail). It might had happened that in case of Czechoslovakia they would let much more forces in west as during that period there weren´t so sure about nature of allied strategy (ie "hold the line" and don´t go east).

As for Poland, this problem is suprisingly overated today. I don´t know why but this was practically question whether let german forces to take territory where majority (depends of particullar villages) were poles and it doesn´t say much about possible Poles reaction to German attack on Czechoslovakia (I came from this area and there are many stories how after twenty minutes shooting accident czech and polish officers shared beer and had good time together at pub. On personal level main disputtation was behind cool miners unions in which in one was majority czech and other poland and nationality wasn´t what bothered them.

Main question is what strategy would german use and how much time they would get for that. Blitzkrieg wasn´t fully invented by that time and most notably many people in german armyn didn´t believed in it yet. Paratroopers tactic of assault on fortres were changed after evaluation on czechoslovak fortress after Munich. Possible area of using massive panzer formation was around Ostrava and Brno. First one was well fortified (get priority) and panzerkampfwaggen III or IV was rarity back then. But south borter was weak point. Main Czechoslovak defence disadventages were unreliable sudeten german and not yet fully finished fortess line (during that period this fortress were mainly 3-6 man small pallpost which would be hurd to hit by contemporary artillery, especiall when well camouflaged and with luck of good fire bases for artillery in front of them.). Hungary wouldn´t take part untill main battle wasn´t win and even than they would be very cautious to take any actions agains Czechoslovakia.

btw. Czechoslovak army didn´t operated PzKpfw 38(t) during Munich crisis.

[Alfacentori]

btw. Czechoslovak army didn´t operated PzKpfw 38(t) during Munich crisis.

Quite true, I was more referring to their importance to Germany in the 1940 campaign in France where they were both used to bulk out German armoured formations and were one of the best tanks the Germans had in service at the time.

Alfa

[saturnin]

Quite true, I was more referring to their importance to Germany in the 1940 campaign in France where they were both used to bulk out German armoured formations and were one of the best tanks the Germans had in service at the time.

Alfa

It´s historical irony that it was 7. pd (and 8.) which were equiped by PzKpfw 38(t) campaign in France. It wasn´t for sure best tank but it suited well german strategy and even logistic. You can´t find many citation how many german divisions were equiped by Czechoslovak weapons but one most notabable impact was czechosloak gold and factories which helped to save german economy ruined by militarization program. Czechoslovak Praga, Škoda, ČKD, Vítkovice, "Zbrojovka Brno" etc. privided weapon system for most central, eastern and even scandinavian countries. We privided tank even to Peru... It was higly industralized country with skillful engineers. Gold for nazi armament programm... But it was sometimes hard to intercorporate it into thier programms. For example "Waffen-SS" took many programms as they at the beginning wasn´t at the top of the priority list...

[TheKiwi]

The British and French reaction is hard to tell for sure, the question is could they sit back and aside while Germany destroyed the Czechs, a state that they had helped create. Would the public opinion in Britain and France, that was already turning against appeasement, support their governments sitting on their hands or demand a response? As I recall there was also great disagreement in both governments over the policy, and a German attack on the Czechs could have seen a strong possiblity of at least the British government falling.

Got to disagree with you on the UK and French public turning against appeasement. The cheers and sighs of relieve that the UK/French leaders were greeted with when they returned home with "peace" were not faked or forced. There was too strong a memory of the Great War for there to be much enthusiasm for war. In addition, the militaries of both nations massively overestimated the forces Germany would have, often by a factor of more than 100%. Meanwhile, neither of their forces were in much condition for fighting. The UK in Autumn of 1938 had only 1 squadron of Hurricanes and another of Spitfires. The oxygen masks issued to their pilots were so crap, no-one flew over 15,000 feet. And the radar chain had only just begun. The French airforce was in even worse condition thanks to the chaotic state of their air industry.

As for the German and Czech armies, both were not in as good a condition as they would have liked (when is an army in the condition I wonder). The Austrian annexation had shown the unreliability of the German armoured forces up. The German General Staff were uncertain of their chances of success too, fearing the French army. The possibility of a coupe to get rid of Hitler was being discussed amoung various high command members.

Meanwhile in Czechoslovakia, the Sudeten Germans who were supposed to be subject to conscription, failed to turn up in large measure, likewise for other minorities. As saturnin pointed out, the fortifications were far from complete, and the take over of Austria had also circumvented a lot of the line.

One final comment. Apparently the Romanians threatened to cut Germany off from their supplies of fuel and grain were they to attack the Czechs. It is a great pity this was not better known as it may have put some spine into the western leaders.

Someone else who should make some comments in this thread is Atlantic Friend, what he doesn't know about the military and political situation in France in the 1930's isn't worth knowing.

[zad]

German's supply lines to Franco's Nationalist Spain would been cut in the middle of the Battle of the Ebro, no more fuel, bombs and spares for the condor legion.
U.S. companies would stopped the supply of fuel and trucks on credit to Franco (maybe).
The soviet material stopped on french ports would have arrived on time.
France would provide weapons and supplies to support Republican Spain.
Republican spanish victory in 1939.
Republican Spain would declare war on Germany after France.
A spanish expeditionary force of 250.000 combat veterans is send to France at the begin of 1940.

[saturnin]

Got to disagree with you on the UK and French public turning against appeasement. The cheers and sighs of relieve that the UK/French leaders were greeted with when they returned home with "peace" were not faked or forced. There was too strong a memory of the Great War for there to be much enthusiasm for war. In addition, the militaries of both nations massively overestimated the forces Germany would have, often by a factor of more than 100%. Meanwhile, neither of their forces were in much condition for fighting. The UK in Autumn of 1938 had only 1 squadron of Hurricanes and another of Spitfires. The oxygen masks issued to their pilots were so crap, no-one flew over 15,000 feet. And the radar chain had only just begun. The French airforce was in even worse condition thanks to the chaotic state of their air industry.

As for the German and Czech armies, both were not in as good a condition as they would have liked (when is an army in the condition I wonder). The Austrian annexation had shown the unreliability of the German armoured forces up. The German General Staff were uncertain of their chances of success too, fearing the French army. The possibility of a coupe to get rid of Hitler was being discussed amoung various high command members.

Meanwhile in Czechoslovakia, the Sudeten Germans who were supposed to be subject to conscription, failed to turn up in large measure, likewise for other minorities. As saturnin pointed out, the fortifications were far from complete, and the take over of Austria had also circumvented a lot of the line.

One final comment. Apparently the Romanians threatened to cut Germany off from their supplies of fuel and grain were they to attack the Czechs. It is a great pity this was not better known as it may have put some spine into the western leaders.

Someone else who should make some comments in this thread is Atlantic Friend, what he doesn't know about the military and political situation in France in the 1930's isn't worth knowing.

Despite popular belief this problem wasn´t so dangerous as would numbers of Sudeten Germans suggested. In fact Czechoslovak army was quite surpsised by realiability of Sudet German (and others Germans in Czechoslovakia) during mobilization. Czechoslovak police, Finanční stráž, SOS and other unit go throug limited fire battle with small Sudetendeutsche Partei groups during that period but Nazis weren´t able to get anything near to full support from German population in Czechoslovakia. Their reports from that period show that they were unsuccesfull to get any armored help from them and it was commented than only small portion of teenage boys were despite their parents will ready to search for help. Practically when Czech representatives showed in problematic village german population often helpted to prevent any confrontation even providing information about possible problematic personall and their location. It is often forgotten that after Munich there were large portion of Germans who together with Czechoslovak population (which were forced to do so) escaped behind new Czechoslvoak borders. German who woted for social democracy, communist party and czech political parties were afraid of Nazis. It´s is interessting part of history forgotten by most today.

[Atlantic Friend]

I think, if Münich fails, that does mean UK and France declaring war automatically - Czechoslovakia was not even invited to take part in the Münich negotiations, remember, so the beef at Münich is strictly between the 4 major European powers Germany, ITaly vs England, France. France had mobilized reservists, the country fully expected war - that much is certain because of the immense (and immensely wrong) sense of relief that overcame Paris in October. The same can probably be said for Britain : nobody wanted a war, not even to support Czechoslovakia, but everybody thought war was imminent.

Also, for Münich to fail, that would have required Germany to overplay its hand in a major, major way, given the extent to which France and Great Britain were ready to go. So we're speaking of something either so enormous or so infuriating that there'd be no way Daladier and Chamberlain could go home with anything but a declaration of war.

This early WW2 could be seen in a very Clausewitzian way : both Western democracies declare war, but neither engages in major operations, preferring air/naval operations or skirmishes in peripheral battlefields. The Allies will hedge their bets, thinking an economic blockade and the erosion of German public support for Hitler will allow them to beat Germany with minimal costs. An early sitzkrieg makes all the more sense since England and France are in the middle of reorganizing their military industries (aeroplane factories in particular) and need time to

Diplomatically, I think Italy will be cautious enough to stay in the sidelines, even more so than in 1939-1940. The combined Allied fleets in the Med and the threat they pose to the security of the peninsula (and the Italian colonial empire) should be enough to deter any early Italian engagement.

Poland will be wooed by the Allies to enter the war on Czechoslovakia's side, and Germany will hint that the coal-rich region of Tescen might be given to Poland as soon as the Czech state is occupied. Colonel Beck might be tempted by both offers as there might be gains to be made either in Eastern Prussia (in case of a German defeat) or in Czechoslovakia (in case of a German victory).

Also, in 1938, there's no Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, so Moscow would be a prime target for diplomatic games. The end result will probably with the same results, as Germany can offer Russia an invasion of Poland (and the assimilation of Baltic States) while the Allies can only offer to maintain the statu quo ante in the Baltic and in Poland. The two dictatorships are therefore bound to find a mutually profitable agreement.

Further events are difficult to predict. Germany cannot be beaten by a simple sitzkrieg, but the Allies might realize that early enough to switch to more offensive strategies.

One thing I"m pretty sure of, though, is that a German defeat in 1938-1939 would sow the seeds of another war somewhere in the next decades, unless a greater threat emerged. An early Allied victory would result in governments saying it's time to settle the German question once and for all, after two Great Wars, bandying around ideas of carving up the Reich into smaller states, imposing even harsher peace terms (since obviously the ones of Versailles would seem insufficient after a rearmed German Reich started another Great War). French politicians in particular would be baying for blood - from 1870 to 1940, that would mean there's not one generation of Frenchmen who wouldn't have had to fight Germany, you can imagine the collective mindset of the nation. The partisans of conciliation with Germany in England and France would be durably discredited by revanchist politicians pointing out that the shackles of Versailles were not too harsh, but too generous since they prevented German rearmament and bellicosity.

[Alfacentori]

Got to disagree with you on the UK and French public turning against appeasement. The cheers and sighs of relieve that the UK/French leaders were greeted with when they returned home with "peace" were not faked or forced. There was too strong a memory of the Great War for there to be much enthusiasm for war. In addition, the militaries of both nations massively overestimated the forces Germany would have, often by a factor of more than 100%. Meanwhile, neither of their forces were in much condition for fighting. The UK in Autumn of 1938 had only 1 squadron of Hurricanes and another of Spitfires. The oxygen masks issued to their pilots were so crap, no-one flew over 15,000 feet. And the radar chain had only just begun. The French airforce was in even worse condition thanks to the chaotic state of their air industry.

I agree in that there was great relief at the news, but I still think it is worth noting that the peace movement that had been so dominant in the late 20s and early 30s was waning by late 1938. Theres a good BBC doco called 'The Road to War', the episode about Britain makes the point, while at the same time reinforcing the 'collective illusion of a nation' that lead to appeasement as a policy and disarmament during the interwar period. It would have been interesting to see the publics reaction if things had gone differently.

Alfa

[mas-36]

I disagree with your conclusion about Poland. The territory in question was the Tesin (Teschen) district, where sizable Polish minority resided. The area was of 625 square miles with a population of 230,000 people. Though the gov't in Poland at the time was in effect a "gov't of the lieutenants" ( a quasi- military junta, I think), I don't think they would ally themselves with Germany for the the carving up of Czechoslovakia. I guess it was more of a "protection of Polish minority from Germany" type of a thing.
Edit:



Key words in bold. This is essentially the very same arguement the Germans made to seize the Sudatenland, i.e. - the almagation of an ethnic kin by means of seizing territory from another sovereign state. It's still wrong, and not a bright moment for Poland.



BTW - 70th anniversary of Blitz in the West today, in case anyone has forgotten.

[mas-36]

I agree in that there was great relief at the news, but I still think it is worth noting that the peace movement that had been so dominant in the late 20s and early 30s was waning by late 1938. Theres a good BBC doco called 'The Road to War', the episode about Britain makes the point, while at the same time reinforcing the 'collective illusion of a nation' that lead to appeasement as a policy and disarmament during the interwar period. It would have been interesting to see the publics reaction if things had gone differently.

Alfa

There is also a strong arguement which can be made that appeasement was seen as a means to revamp the defense industries of France and the UK. Both countries by now realized that war was on the horizon, and both knew they were woefully unprepared. I've read several sources indicating that studies made by both countries concluded that it would have to take them until late 1941 or early 1942 in order to be comfortably matched with Germany's military industrial output and technology. In this respect, appeasment could have also been seen as a step towards that goal.

[Niall]

It would have been interesting to know how the Czechs would have faird in the war. They had a good deal of fortifications.

In my mind it wouldn't have changed the ending of WW2 but it may have got France and Britain to wake up and seriously prepare for the German attack on the low countries and France.

[Pandemonium]

I believe that it would have been the start of a phoney war.
The only one, capable of attacking Germany would be the French, it seems highly unlikely to me that the British would haveundertaken military action, the Britsh establishment was pro-german at the time, there could have been some actions by the Royal navy, but no more.
just an earlier start of WWII, but the invasion of Poland would become harder, French and British troops would have been ready to attack Germany at the start of the invasion, in this case Germany propbably had to do the waestern campaign first before invading Poland.
It would be interesting to know if Poland would have joined the war if France was attacked.

(The part about the result of the Sapnish war was very interesting, thank you for that)

[mas-36]

There's been countless arguements made about France launching an attack onto Germany after their invasion of Poland, most stating that france could have rolled into Germany unopposed and quickly bring about an end to the war. It's all false of course, yet these myths do persist. One of the biggest myths was that the German's Seigfreid Line was unmanned and ill-equipped. This was of course entirely wrong. The biggest argument against the French attacking Germany, is quite simply: the doctrine for mass offensive operations did not exist. France did launch the little Saar offensive, and that only confirmed in the minds of the French high command how unprepared they really were. What little area they did capture also came under intense fire from German artillery along the Seigfreid line. There was simply no way France (or for that matter France and the UK) launching any kind of attack into Germany without any new doctrine, and such a doctrine cannot be adopted overnight.

As for Poland attacking Germany in the event that Germany attacked France first? I seriously doubt it. Lets face it: Poland's fate was sealed with Molotov-Ribentropp's Non-Aggression Pact.

[Pandemonium]

As for Poland attacking Germany in the event that Germany attacked France first? I seriously doubt it. Lets face it: Poland's fate was sealed with Molotov-Ribentropp's Non-Aggression Pact.

??? Molotov-Ribbentrop=> summer 1939? We are talking about 1938 here.

[mas-36]

??? Molotov-Ribbentrop=> summer 1939? We are talking about 1938 here.

true...my bad

[SkyUS]

Key words in bold. This is essentially the very same arguement the Germans made to seize the Sudatenland, i.e. - the almagation of an ethnic kin by means of seizing territory from another sovereign state. It's still wrong, and not a bright moment for Poland.

Indeed. I agree.

[Alfacentori]

There is also a strong arguement which can be made that appeasement was seen as a means to revamp the defense industries of France and the UK. Both countries by now realized that war was on the horizon, and both knew they were woefully unprepared. I've read several sources indicating that studies made by both countries concluded that it would have to take them until late 1941 or early 1942 in order to be comfortably matched with Germany's military industrial output and technology. In this respect, appeasment could have also been seen as a step towards that goal.

Certainly, I doubt if Britain and France had been a military match for Germany in 1938 they would have put so much effort into appeasement. But that said, I think Chamberlain certainly believed in appeasement as a policy and wanted to put it to the test, it clearly wasn't just a delaying tactic on his part, he believed he could gain peace through meeting Hitlers limited territorial demands and diplomacy.

Alfa

[IonBl]

Certainly, I doubt if Britain and France had been a military match for Germany in 1938 they would have put so much effort into appeasement. But that said, I think Chamberlain certainly believed in appeasement as a policy and wanted to put it to the test, it clearly wasn't just a delaying tactic on his part, he believed he could gain peace through meeting Hitlers limited territorial demands and diplomacy.

Alfa

Even in 1939 Nazi-Germany wouldn't have been able to fight a two front war. If the French had invaded in the west while most of the Wehrmacht tried to conquer Poland Hitler would have lost the war before it really began.

They hadn't the infrastructure to transport their troops so fast through whole Germany and if British forces had supported the French there wouldn't have been enough soldiers to stop him.

In addition there was no Hitler/Stalin pact in 1938 and on Sea the German Navy had no chance at that time.

[Wojtop]

Key words in bold. This is essentially the very same arguement the Germans made to seize the Sudatenland, i.e. - the almagation of an ethnic kin by means of seizing territory from another sovereign state. It's still wrong, and not a bright moment for Poland.


True, not a bright moment. Relations with Czechoslovakia were strained after they took the same disputed territory by force 20 years earlier, and due to reasonably good Soviet-Czech relations (Poland was anti-soviet to the core).

Yet it is very doubtfull if Poland would intervene militarly against Czechs only because of that. Basicly if you're stuck between USSR and Nazi Germany you simply don't look for war with other neighbours.

I guess if France joined, Poland would happily join against Germany. If France decided to abstain, Poland would abstain. Polish elites were well aware that Germany under aggresive, militaristic government is a deadly threat to Poland and i'm pretty sure that opportunity to get rid of it would have been immediately used. As for joining Czechs against Germans without French help it's highly doubtfull - war with stronger opponent with USSR standing behind you is a very bad idea. So basicly in case of Poland it was all up to French reaction.

I'm curious if Soviets could possibly provide some support to the Czechs?

[Atlantic Friend]

BTW - 70th anniversary of Blitz in the West today, in case anyone has forgotten.

Le Monde has published a "1940, between collapse and hope" special issue that I recommend to all French-speakers. Short articles and interviews divided in 3 chapters :

- The unthinkable defeat
- The time of collaboration
- The choice of resistance

[Hollis]

I think it would had aided the allies. Time was on the nazis side. Stalin was purging his Red Army, the US was in isolation and the rest of Europe in denial because of WWI. Hitler was able to add to his military might as the allies sat on their hands waiting. The thirties pacifist movement failed humanity. Hitler was on the move and the pacifism of the Western world only aided him in improving his military offensive capabilities.

[Atlantic Friend]

Makes you wonder how would have been waged a war opposing an offensive-oriented army forced into the defensive by an attack from defense-oriented armies.

[saturnin]

I think it would had aided the allies. Time was on the nazis side. Stalin was purging his Red Army, the US was in isolation and the rest of Europe in denial because of WWI. Hitler was able to add to his military might as the allies sat on their hands waiting. The thirties pacifist movement failed humanity. Hitler was on the move and the pacifism of the Western world only aided him in improving his military offensive capabilities.

I would be cautious to say that time was on nazis side, at least for sure not from economical point of view. Their economy was close to bancruptcy. You can find quotes of their officials claming that Czechoslovak gold reserves and confiscation of factories saved their armament program for nearly one next year. France and England by that time know that their will face one way or another Germany and tryed to buy some time.

Ironically enough it was Germany who gained more as their get armement programm was during 1938-39 more robust and what is more more important - their newly formed divisions get time for training, tactic evaluation and weapon delivery. Especially panzerwaffe and Luftwaffe changed a lot between September 1938 and Fall Weiß. Anschluß of Austria showed that logistic solution for their armored forcess practically didn´t existed in 1938 and that untrained NCO´s of unit equiped with PzKpfw Ihad problems to achieve their goals even with no resistence because of pure driver training, communication and navigation. What more is that in 1938 German population was according to unofficial reports opposite to direct confrontation. They welcomed Munich agreemant same way as people in France or UK. Nazis achieved big victory when convinced France that Luftwaffe is strong by various propagandistic action while it was in the middle of reorganization and training. It is also forgotten that german reports claimed that in late 1938 most sources were given to Luftwaffe and other branchess to procude weapons and there was practically no reserves of ammunitiaon especially for Luftwaffe and artillery which would be available in time for possible Fall Grünoperation. Another fact is that in south by that time there wasn´t any real logistical suppor for forces in Austria to start similar campaign. Also wheather conditions during Munich crisis and following six weeks over Czechoslovakia were extremaly unfavourable. There were also personall changes in Wehramcht and many officers claimed that it would be insane to start attack with forces available at Czechoslovak borders and realocation of forces would take nearly two months and would break training of newly formed formations. And there wouldn´t be any factor of surpise on Germany side as Czechoslovak army was already fully mobilized and i short time perioud could achieve even limited numerical superiority as their had military service since 1918 while Germany... and german were in 1938 afraid of possible France reaction in west so big part of forces would be allocated there. Czechoslovak ČKD, Praga, etc. were also in final stage of military delivery to various Eastern europen countries and this weapons were lend to Czechoslovak during Munich crisis. Germany would need at least 2-4 months to prepary any serrious campaing against Czechoslovakia and it was feared that even this wouldn´t be enough.

[Pandemonium]

^^excellent post thank you

[Domen]

The Poles sad to say, would have almost certainly come in alongside Germany.


I don't think so.

After all there were Polish-Czech negotiations which were to lead to the Polish-Czechoslovakian alliance against Germany in case of German invasion. But the quarrel for Zaolzie turned out to be stronger. Moreover the Polish attitude and the final decision to force Czechoslovakia to render Zaolzie was partially casued by the fact that Benes told Moscicki that Czechoslovakia was not going to resist Germany, when Moscicki asked if Czechoslovakia was planning to resist and told Benes that if Czechoslovakia was, then Poland was going to support it. Thus - knowing that Czechoslovakian government was not willing to resist in case of Germany waging war - Poland wanted to protect ethnic Poles in Zaolzie from German occupation.

Accusing Poland of cooperating with the Nazis against Czechoslovakia is groundless as long as you don't have the transcripts of Lipski - Hitler meeting on 20.09.1938. Concerning the words spoken by Joseph Beck during that period: "Poland couldn't be on Germany's side, even partially", it is rather obvious that Lipski tried to discourage Hitler from his aggressive plans against Czechoslovakia during that meeting.

Source:

http://forteca.w.activ.pl/zaolzie.html

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Occupation of Zaolzie.

Zbigniew Pruski (Lodz)

September 30, 1918, the Polish National Council for the Duchy of Cieszyn proclaimed extend their temporary authority and membership of the Polish Cieszyn Silesia. At the same time the Czechs, also forming their own state, came forward with claims to those areas relying on the historical rights of the Holy Crown. Wenceslas. Against this background, clashes in Fryštát several other villages. Conflict resolved temporarily by signing on November 5 agreement between the Polish and Czech National Council National National Committee in determining that the administrative districts of Poland are covered Bielsko and Cieszyn and Czech Frydecki. Regarding the district frysztackiego decisions are left to agreement between Warsaw and Prague. Already on January 23 Czech side demanded the withdrawal of Polish troops for the government. White, however, before the expiry of an ultimatum started shares of Czech military offensive. To January 27, Polish troops were forced to withdraw to the line flux - Dobromyśl - Ochaby - Skoczow - Ustroń. On 30 January the Czech Republic joined the army general attack on Skoczow, but with little of the strong resistance and incurring large losses, were forced to suspend further offensive operations. The next day included a cease-fire, and soon an agreement was signed in Paris on a new, temporary demarcation, the Czech side was left a large part of the districts of Cieszyn and frysztackiego and Karviná basin. On 26 February, the Czech army withdrew to the new demarcation line. In 1920, when Poland was faced with Soviet offensive, the Czech authorities have taken action to undermine the position of the Polish Silesia dispute. At the end of the command of three divisions of the Czech Republic committed to the possible use against Polish troops in action under the code name "Cieszyn". On 10 July at the Spa at the conference of the Entanty, Polish Prime Minister Wladyslaw Grabski, in exchange for a promise of assistance and brokering peace talks with the Soviet Union (which, incidentally, these discussions at this time did not intend to lead), has agreed to accept the order of the highest in the on Teschen. Following the verdict, which fell on July 28, large areas inhabited by the Polish population, were granted Czechoslovakia.

Construction of the Czech fortifications
Since the conclusion of a nonaggression pact in 1934 and the related approximation of the Polish-German Polish is included in the enemy countries, and therefore the Polish-Czechoslovak plan was incorporated into the fortification. The first plans for the spring of 1935 the Polish border security relative importance attached by placing them, for example by Austria, but later the implementation of the construction of these fortifications was postponed to the second half of the 40's. Only exception was the western section, which was to be made in advance. In the area of Cieszyn Silesia and north-western Slovakia was intended to reinforce the border with the Polish section of 90 km in length connecting to the only pride of the fortifications section Ostrava directed against the Germans. The remainder of the border guard were independent strongholds closing lines of communication. The task of these fortifications was primarily to protect the disputed territory Zaolzie and Orava, and guard lines of communication with Romania and the Soviet Union. Overall it was intended to build 94 heavy and 570 light commercial buildings, the total cost of their implementation was to reach 281 million crowns.

First, as mentioned, started construction of 65 km belt of fortifications along the river Olza from Bohumín Nydka Jablunkova to the task in addition to protection against the Polish attack, was to protect against a German attack on the Polish territory by the Ostrava Silesia. In this section of the work started in autumn 1937 and their break concreted 232 shelters LO wz. 37th This item was marked by a considerable depth, up to 1 km long and dense development. In the Cieszyn area shelters were deployed even in the four kicks, the Fryštát and south of Cieszyn 2-3 kicks, strengthening the least expanded at the mouth of the Oder and Olza the Třinec. In autumn 1938, the documentation prepared in 1917 with 32 heavy objects to strengthen and stretch the Bohumín Třinec. For their plantings intended to form a battalion of 1941, a fortress. In 1939, he was to be built part of "XXXIII-Jablunkov" which initially was mapped in autumn 1938, the commander of the Border Division 8, General Birula.

Lightweight shelters LO wz. 37, the so-called. "Řopiky", were designed at the end of 1936, as a typical property ranges fortifications. The lines of these objects form a continuous fires his side firewalls, objects in the latter lines were designed to support and complement the first line of the fires, often used in these shelters, and swept the top shooting. These shelters in the normal execution were resistant to fire 100 mm howitzers, and strengthened to fire 150 mm howitzers. In terms of construction and reinforcement, performed several types of shelters, the vast majority were still dwustrzelnicowe objects of type A (85%) and jednostrzelnicowe B (5%). Both were one-room shelters tradytorowymi shooting jacketed with a short hood. Folded entrance was protected by small arms firing range. Utilities were the LMC mod. 26 or HMG in from 7 / 24 and mod. 37 placed on a wooden carriage. The shelters dwustrzelnicowych cast consisted of seven men and four soldiers jednostrzelnicowych.

In the area of Cieszyn Silesia were also part of the section of the fortifications, "Moravian Ostrava," a subsection "Bohumín" along the border with Germany from the Apiary Kopytowa k / Antoszowic. The area occupied by Poland in 1938 was part of the section to the Oder, which carried four heavy bunkers. Fifth, a unique facility MO S-1 with a rotary turret machine guns, which was to be located on the Polish border on Olza, not performed because of protests by Polish authorities. The section was a strong defense division of the company, przegradzający three road and railway line. On the second line put in from four light objects. 37th However, on the right flank, along the Polish border, near the township Šunychl started at the end of 1937, construction of the so-called. "Záchytného hook on hand and Ola" (literally - the hook on the river cogging Olza), consisting of 9 buildings wz. 37 in two lines. This group was supposed to cover the wings of the defense before the lap section of the Ostrava through Polish territory. Section between the cast and Olza Oder was intended numbering 189 people a company (rota) 4 Borders (hraničářského) Regiment, commanded by Capt. s. bad luck. Václav curls.

Subsection "Bohumín" was designed as the first of the entire plan of fortifying the borders of Czechoslovakia, so there are clear influences of the French experience. Typical for them weapons is 4 cm (47 mm) has guns. wz. 36 (without conjugated HMG) and two heavy machine gun wz. 35 shooting in the walls of the building located at a wing of the line of fortifications. Objects characterized by a considerable size and a large volume of concrete which increased their exposure to enemy fire.

Unique among these objects was a shelter MO S-4, as one of two separate shelters in Czechoslovakia equipped with two bells and two domes. Such objects were only composed of groups of fortified buildings. Also interesting was a shelter MO S-5, which part of 'a' and 'b' were located on both sides of the embankment of railway track and then merged into the sidewalk.

identification of the fortifications by the Polish intelligence
Construction of Czechoslovak fortifications from the beginning, she was actively monitored by the Polish intelligence. In 1936, reported to have the intention to fortify the border with Poland from Cieszyn Silesia, a year later, intelligence sources transmit general, vague information about the first-built premises near Hulczyna (name used in the document, probably Hlučín). Access to these two-storey buildings were to be built with strong metal sheets and plates sliding sideways. The ceiling had kept the window about 75 cm2, and barred zaszklone thick glass, is also sliding. The building that was to be placed tanks. Over time, reports have become more concrete, and as February 24, 1938 are approximate size of the object: width 4 m, height 2 m, height of the lower tier (?) 3 m. April 8 report from the state are already built facilities in various localities, not only along the border with the Polish:

Bohumín seven large and 10 small

Koźmice 1 large and 3 small

Ai, 1 large and 2 small

Darkovičky 1 large and 7 small

Zabrech - Smolkov and hostice Wlke 7 large and 40 small

4 large Hlavnice

Hor. 2 large Beneąov

In addition, obtained information about the construction "of the underground factory in the town of Ai, presumably it was a group of fortified" Smolkov.

Meanwhile, intelligence sources provided information about the product in the steel mills Třinec shelters for machine guns, intended for the episode Kojkowice - Jablunkov. Likewise, in April was already known to the state of the construction of a line from the river Olza Petrovic to Cieszyn - 42 shelters. In May, in the paper for the Chief of General Staff General characteristics of shelters are:

large shelters - two towers, armored, and some for the department, 150 -200 m2 area, the walls - 1,5 m, ceilings - 1 m

small shelters - for HMG (after 2), the walls - up to 1 m, the dimensions of 4 x 2,5 m

Soon, May 25, the data were checked for small shelters: the depth of foundations 3 - 4 m, wall thickness: the side - 60 cm front - 80 - 100 cm, the ceiling - 120 cm, frame - 20 mm rods. Obstacles - rails, 6 rows of deep trenches, and 1.5 - 2 m integrated with slope. In May also reported on the state of construction on the Polish border in the region Frysztat 30 shelters. In early June interview reported on the section that supposedly Louky - Trinec shelters are built in the shape of bells, of which the upper part protrudes 1.5 to 2 m above the ground, intended for heavy machine guns. June 14, 1938 sentry Officer No. 1 in Krakow forwarded to the Division II Chief of Staff of the original drawing of a shelter built in a factory in Trinec, a miniature device for electrification of the dams and fortifications made armored domes figure in Trinec in the amount of 2 -3 per week. The same station shortly forwarded the information to deploy artillery in shelters Hluczyn (Hlučín). In August, General Staff Division II in the tasks of intelligence on the Czech fortifications, states that "at the top Czantoria concrete forts were found to exist" and that the fortifications are being built for the plant of Trinec.

Compared probably dating from the period before taking Zaolzie listed is 225 shelters, including the four great in the area Bohumín, giving their exact location.

The development of the crisis - Polish decision to seizure Zaolzie
Czechoslovak-Polish relations throughout the interwar period did not create themselves best from Warsaw, it was combined with the reluctance of the total disbelief in the possibility of a continuation of the Republic and seek with her agreement. Did not constitute the essence of things and lots Zaolzie dispute with the year 1918-20. A factor was the pro-Russian policy of Czechoslovakia when it came to Russia's territorial claims to Polish territory. Evidence of this material is the Polish Foreign Ministry in March 1938 "... As long as the head of state stands Czechoslovak Benes, or until any other will play a decisive role in the country, and will be left to govern as long as Czech, Polish co-operation with Czechoslovakia seems to me to be excluded. ... Today is also the important point is that Czechoslovakia is influenced by Soviet Russia and all Międzynarodówkom (III, II, IV, forming, masonry, etc.). Hence stemmed, in relation to the Polish are not guided by self-interest but the interests Międzynarodówek . Taking in general, all the proposals at the Czech Polish are cyclical, and especially disingenuous. I never will be loyally carried out ...". Czech affix a reluctance to enter the country, in its view threatened from all sides, which was Poland and the reluctance to take a position in the Polish-German dispute, since, according to Benes of Czechoslovakia and Germany had no reason to quarrel. On the other hand, policies Beck tolerated the possibility of annexation by Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia by Hungary. Moreover, in the interests of the German saw the Czechs a chance to extend the facilities on its own border with Germany.

Czechoslovakia matter of his security without reservations tied with France, with whom relations were based on considerations far more closely than the Polish-French relations. Czechoslovakia has not entered into the path of self-ever policy on the model of Polish politics. More importantly, the military alliance with the Soviet Union had enforceable obligations as allies of France. Once outlined the threat of Czech-German conflict, a "... request made by President Moscicki to President Benes that Czechoslovakia would defend himself with that if that were the case, Poland will engage on her side, Benes said, after a few On that Czechoslovakia has no chance of defense and that whip up arms only if the implementation of a military alliance by France, stressing however that Czechoslovakia alone has not taken the military initiative. In Warsaw, this response was assessed as agreed with the Soviet Union ... ' The decision of the war in defense of Czechoslovakia, which shall be taken automatically mean a Paris performance of the Polish-French alliance against Germany. The Polish government on this possibility was prepared, although it does not believe it accurately assessed the desire of France to maintain "peace at any price." However, if przerodzenia crisis in the European war, according to the minister Mr Beck had 24 hours to change the policy of Poland because Poland could not be on the side of Germany, even indirectly.

On the initiative of the Polish Foreign Ministry Zaolzie put forward in March, still require national autonomy, the same way as did the Sudeten Germans. September 15 Polish diplomats in London, Paris and Berlin have received from Beck's command, to demand the inclusion of a plebiscite in Cieszyn Silesia in the general scheme to resolve the Sudeten. On the Polish note of Sept. 21, the Czechoslovak government responded vague letter, which the minister gave Kroft Papéemu Member of Sept. 25, the letter is completed a letter to President Benes Moscicki sent to Warsaw 26 September. Polish demands for Zaolzie have been sent to Germany on Sept. 23, they were included in three variants:

A. The maximum involving Requests for Olza Silesia with the Moravian Ostrava and Witkowice

B. As above, but no part of the district frysztackiego

C. Requests the minimum, as above, without Ostrava and Vítkovice

On the same day by an exchange of notes between the Governments of the Soviet and Polish.

September 27th, the Polish authorities have identified in a note to the Czechoslovak government being the territorial dispute and request an immediate agreement on the assignment of "clearly Polish" sites and the rest Zaolzie plebiscite. In response to Kroft Minister agreed to transfer the land at issue within two months. According to Beck's odsuwało this matter until the Prague regain a free hand. So on Sept. 30 before midnight, Mr Papée handed in a transfer request, an ultimatum to the Oct. 10 issue of the plebiscite in the provinces and four stages. deadline for the ultimatum expired at noon on October 1. A quarter to midnight on October 1 Minister Kroft gave assent to the Polish claim, however, reported a request for permission to use later with the railway line Bohumín - Zilina.

4. Mobilization
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechoslovak Army in the first phase of the crisis, 20 May 1938 was put into an ambulance. Appointed to the army one year and five vintages of technical troops. Also strengthened border protection.

To a significant worsening of the crisis occurred when the military staff at the meeting in Nuremberg on the night of 9 to 10 September, while held in this city congress of the NSDAP, the German authorities decided to break off negotiations with the government of Czechoslovakia. Served as a pretext incident staged in Ostrava, Moravia. In this situation across the border proliferated armed incidents provoked and organized by the German militia. This forced the Czechoslovak authorities to put in some border districts of the state of emergency. Sept. 14 at 3 am the alarm and opened the border units began to occupy their positions guard the border. Called up the second year and strengthened its youngest cast light objects. Gradually increased since then was in their state of readiness. 22 September the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia became enemies belonging to the surrender of Gen. John Syrový. So when the news reached Prague, the failure of the mission Chamberlain at Bad Godesberg, 23 September announced the mobilization of the evening. It was carried out very efficiently, so that the Czechoslovak army on Sept. 28 reached full combat readiness.

Silesia was in lane two of the Army (commander - gen.dyw. Vojtech Luž a) and falls within the corps band Hraniční XIII (commander - gen.dyw. Emil Fiala). The position of principal, in addition to units fortress, filled in the section Albrechtice-Jablonkuv Division Hraniční Oblast in 1937 (commander - gen.bryg. Otakar Lička). In addition, there were branches fortress, a platoon (rota) and Battalion (praporu) 4 Border Regiment (hraničařského pluku) obsadzające heavy objects into Bohumín, and branches of Evil (Zajiątěni Léhkého Opevněni) obsadzające line of lightweight shelters.

In the second wave was forming part of the body - Sboru IV (commander - gen.bryg. Josef Janacek) 8 dp (commander - gen.bryg. Otakar Zahálka). These troops could be supported by the divisions that are at the disposal of the high command:

12 dp - plk.gąt commander. Joseph Buben, concentrated in the area of Vsetín and moves to N. Jicin,

22 dp - gen.bryg commander. Josef Beranek, concentrated in the region of Žilina ® and moves on Vsetín, and further east

16 dp - gen.bryg commander. Frantiąek Marvan, concentrated in the region of Ruzomberok and move on and Jablunkov Žilina.

POLAND

While the Czechoslovak crisis began in the fall sharper phase, from 5 to 19 September took place in Volhynia large maneuvers, where he attended Marshall E. Smigly-Rydz. Their practical aim was to study the organization and the ability to act Learner cavalry divisions, the possibility of trying out the great armored motor units and the use of command and more a grouping of aviation, as well as an attempt to unit air-desantowego. Maneuvers have been completed which is a parade in Luck at the same time a great manifestation of the national-patriotic. These maneuvers off the training tasks may be the intentions of the Polish authorities, a demonstration of power and readiness of active opposition to Soviet troops attempt to march through the Polish territory. Please note that the Soviet authorities in May of Czechoslovakia declared its readiness to provide assistance. Another obstacle was the lack of consent of the Polish and Romania, the march of Soviet troops through their territories. March 15 Commissioner Litvinov journalists to question how the Soviet Union will be able to fulfill his obligation in the event of aggression against Czechoslovakia, since there is no common border said, "a corridor for sure will be found." During the crisis, two Czechoslovakian fighter squadron, 161 and 162, remained in the so-called. ambush at the airport in Monasterzyskach near Buczacz.

During the maneuvers, Chief of the General Staff informed the Inspector General to date on developments and military decrees Czechoslovakia. On September 16 after taking his own political action Smigly Marshal agreed to send a regiment of school KOP "Osowiec" in order to strengthen border guards on the Silesian section. On 19 September it was decided to shift the next day from Volhynia to Silesia in 1921 the DP and 10BK. It adds that, stationed at the Silesia in 1923 the DP was then well on exercises in the region międzydywizyjnych Jaslo and Gorlice. On his return march. Smigly on 21 September in Warsaw, was established Independent Operational Group "Silesia", which designated the commander gen.dyw. W. Bortnowski (Army Inspector "Pomerania"), chief of staff of the group was płk.dypl. I. Izdebski. The SGO "Śląsk" entered the following units:

21 Infantry Division, commander gen.bryg. J. Kustroń
23 Infantry Division, commander gen.bryg. J. Sadowski
4th Infantry Division commander płk.dypl. M. Boltuc
Wielkopolska Cavalry Brigade, the commander of gen.bryg. Abraham R.
10 Armoured Cavalry Brigade Motorized, strengthened, col. A.Trzaska-Durski
Silesian Brigade of National Defence, the commander of ppłk.dypl. J. Giza
1 / 2 Teschen Brigade of National Defence, the commander of ppłk.dypl. J. Gabrys
KOP Regiment "Rozan"
improvised group of tanks (based on 3 Battalion tanks from Warsaw): 1 battalion of tanks, reconnaissance detachment, 2 and 22 anti-tank squadron
Artillery Group and available 18 DAC motorized heaviest artillery, a battery of howitzers (23 DP)
battalion of sappers
armored train
Air Force: 5 fighter squadrons (including 111,112,121 squadron thought. ECN 131. thought. in the region of Czestochowa and Wielun), two light bomber squadrons (21, 22 Squadron Line), a reconnaissance squadron, five platoons flanking
Together these troops numbered 35 966 officers, NCOs and other ranks, 8371 horses, 267 passenger cars, 707 trucks, 459 motorcycles, 103 tanks, 9 armored cars, 1012 rkm and LMC, 445 heavy machine guns, 117 guns, 117 anti-tank guns, 103 planes.

Flag of the infantry divisions were incomplete, supplemented battalions of national defense or other units marszowymi battalions. The same applied to artillery, to full-time units collected were missing eight squadrons, which were likely to come at later dates. However, saturation of armored equipment, and motor was like the Polish army quite significant.

The information we have about the Czechoslovak troops, initially were quite scarce. Information Communication Division II SGO stating that the strengthening of the Darkov Bohumín appoints the 1st Battalion 8 pp (HO 36), the 2nd Battalion of the regiment in reserve is located to the east of the Moravian Ostrava. Episode Darkov - Trinec occupies 40 pp (HO 37) cast the 2nd Battalion Trinec cyclists. On the stretch from the Třinec Jablunkova battalion is 3 percentage points and 8 units of three unidentified pp. In the forests of south-west of Třinec by unverified messages appear was 15 pp (HO 37). In omberoku stationed Ruz was 16 DP odwodu High Command. Other divisions of odwodu and 3A can be quickly recovered near the Polish border. Was estimated that in 1938 built on that stretch of 231 shelters of light and 4 heavy.

Action plans Polish
Presented on September 26 by General Inspector General Bortnowski SGO action plan "Śląsk" provided for two options: A - "in case of occupation," B - "Fighting the accident." The "case of the occupation" 23 DP together with the national defense would take the northern part of Zaolzie with Bohumín, 21 DP Cieszyn and continue to work on Frydek and district had dealt Jablunkova Greater BK from battalion riflemen and national defense. AB 1910 was the move to the area of Cieszyn Mistřovice. Other groups of individuals were to remain on the Polish side of the border. Plans for the "event of the fight" was vague at this time, the Bortnowski stressed that the situation of the Czechoslovak side is constantly changing, the number of troops is increasing, which may require changes to the plan. Bortnowski expected, "the firm stance of the Czechs on the line of fortifications," and furthermore, the mood in Zaolzie, both among the population of the Czech and Polish, pull request "that the first moment of the fight can be sharp." However, despite the general view of incomplete state of his army, after the addition of offensive artillery groups may be successful in its initial phase. Under these conditions, the plan provided for the execution at dawn attack by two groups of shock: 21 DP, backed later by AB 1910, was circumvented by Trinec Cieszyn from the south, from the insured by the Greater Jablunkova BK enhanced detachment Rozan. 23 DP supported by national defense had to perform a blow on the forehead and Cieszyn from the north. On the right wing of the SGO "Śląsk" three battalions were to take ON Fryštát and Karviná. The attack was to be preceded by a strong artillery preparation. The task was to carry out air reconnaissance and guard against the enemy air force. In the days that followed this plan in more detail has been developed and revised with an emphasis on the section north of Cieszyn.

Information Communication No. 5 with 30.09 confirmed the earlier data on the Czechoslovak troops, but it also turned more attention to the development of fortification: "Work on the fortifications are still in progress. There was a further establishment of entanglement in the stakes of wood and Fryštát Loukia and goats in the barbed wire Division Bohumín and N. Ves (New Village). There are signs that are made to prepare for elektryfikowania obstacles. fortification between objects are set additional kilometers. "

Under the new plan have been prepared orders for the army orders SGO "Slask", remained of them: "The overall operational command. The attack on 4.x" 3.X and dated orders for 23 DP, Artillery Group, and improvised Tank Brigade. Puzzling is the date of the order and timing of the attack. Probably, these documents have been prepared by the staff of SGO before adoption by the Polish ultimatum to the Czechoslovak Government. They also lack in the number of signatures and log. In the general despatches operacyjym assessed that against the forces of Czechoslovakia SGO is 3 DP (DP footnote 8 the author), while the direction comes Moravian Ostrava 7 DP, while the south 16 DP supplies more northern slopes of the mountain artillery Jabłonkowskich attempt to prevent circumvention of the line of fortifications. The task of the "power of Silesia Zaolziański answer" was intended to meet head-on breaking the Czech line of fortifications to the north of Cieszyn focused on a narrow stretch of three division attack to get the lords of the hill Zaolzie Těrlicko (Cierlicka). Implementation of a frontal attack rested for 23 DP Brigade supported by tanks and heavy artillery, the whole group and acting to the left of 4 DP.

23 DP attack had seven battalions of infantry and medium tanks Battalion, supported by all the artillery, with dawn breaking, right-wing strongly fortified line in the section Czech Chotěbuz (Kocobądź) - Bridges (off), and without stopping to get back to 423.9, and skip to defend on the line 423,9-353,1 until further orders. This sentence had to do two groups of forces, the right composed of 75 pp, 73 pp battalion, three medium tank battalion, battalion of sappers, comp. anti-tank No. 2, in direct support of III/23 pal, lewoskrzydłowa composed of 11 pp, comp. sap., comp. No. 22 guns, in direct support of I/23 pal. Both groups had the night to control the valley slope Olza, under cover of which had to wait artillery preparation, and under cover of smoke and tanks of struggle between the shelters are not taking care of disarming them, as soon as possible to get wzg. 351.1 Vyroubany and sticks as the basis for a strike starting on the back of the light tanks of the enemy defense organization, to allow the infantry to deal with wzg. 423.9. The reserve divisions remained without Tank Brigade Battalion 3, 73 pp without Battalion OR division. After mastering the line 414-423,9 11 pp odwodu had to go to the SGO.

[Domen]

And here is the last part:



Tank Brigade, his three medium tank battalion as a direct support of 75 percentage points was hit in the waist Zpupna Lhota - Les Cerny (off) and allow the band to break the Czech shelters, after exiting the rear of fortifications battalion should return from the west against the enemy in the grouping section 11 pp . Light tank battalions (1 and 2) and OR Brigade advancing along with 23 DP odwodami przeciwnatarciom the reserves were intended to prevent the enemy on the left wing of the division and assist them in managing the back Koňákov (Koniakow) - Kostelec (Kościelec). After leaving the infantry wzg. 423.9 titre of at least one tank company to stop the chase for Těrlicko (Těrlicko) and Třenovice (Třanovice) to prepare the invasion of Wielkopolska BK.

4 DP acting in the lane bridges - Koňákov (Koniakow) - Domaslavice (Domasławice) to the north and Dzięgielów - Puńców - Swibice the south, was charged with a powerful right-wing attack along with 23 DP by Bridges to Koniakow. After breaking the Czech line of fortifications Division had rolled me toward the south seeking contact with the DP 21. The lane leading battalion of sappers attack SGO 1923 under the orders of the commander of the DP had a separate patrols to disarm gained shelters, while assigned to the platoon 4DP flame-throwers were to be used for the rolling line of shelters after the breakout. Located in the armies of anti-tank cannons were tyralierą move in the first wave of infantry to fire shooting of Czech side ostrzeliwywać shelters

South of the Cieszyn of SGO cover was 21 DP. For this purpose, starting during the night from the area of Leszno Grn. was supposed to get around from behind and win the strengthening of the Czech Republic in the hills and Osuvka Kojkovice so before dawn to take defensive positions on the southern slope of the hills with sharp lines in the chat rooms - Babi Hora - 306th After completing a task expected to use part of the division to attack the axis Puńców - Zhukov DLN.

SGO rearguard were: Motorized Brigade (10 Pancé BK-Mot) and Wielkopolska Cavalry Brigade. Motorized Brigade, concentrated in the region Skoczow - Lipowiec - Godziszów would be willing to chair. 7th, or to move plenty of Olše attack on the main stretch and move in pursuit of the Moravian Ostrava, or to march through Ustron - Istebna the Jablunkov to exit the rear of the Czech DP 1916. Greater BK concentrated in the region Dębowiec - Ogrodzona - Skoczow was to be the chair. 7th ready to march, or by the Moravian Ostrava Cieszyn, or by the Těrlicko Trinec (Těrlicko).

SGO provide guard troops from the north Brig. ON COL Giza with armored train which was to involve the enemy in the section Pogwizdów - Ruptowa, the south half-brigade of Colonel ON Gabi would leave at the same time in 1921 by DP Jawornik - Nýdek top Prasivo. Vistula Valley closed OW Istebna.

Artillery SGO Slask has been divided into direct support of the Group of 23 and 4 DP (I and III Dyon pal), the Group of combat artillery (1 pamot, Dyon 105 mm cannon with 5 pac), the Group of the movement (Dyon heaviest guns, 2 howitzers dyony 155 pac 5 mm, the second dyony dyony light artillery and heavy artillery of 23 and 4, DP, and horse artillery), the Group covers tanks (Tank Brigade artillery). The attack was to be preceded by a leader without firing a 30-minute artillery preparation, four breakthrough three minutes after the break and 18 minutes, which took aim at the enemy trenches inertia and dazzle. Consumption amount of ammunition was 1 1 / 2 units of fire of which 30% dymotwórczych missiles.

Air Force fighter would protect its own tanks, artillery and attack, and bomber aircraft to fight the enemy artillery on the slopes of the mountains Jabłonkowskich.

The importance attached to the line to break the Czech fortification resulted in the diagnosis on the basis of interview guidelines were developed to combat them:

2. The course of events in the annexation - a conflict of Bohumín
October 1, as previously mentioned, Czechoslovakia adopted a Polish ultimatum by agreeing to cede the disputed territory Zaolzie and 2 October the SGO "Śląsk" crossed the border. Under the command of an agreement between the Polish and Czechoslovakian (Gen. F. Hrabčik) site was divided into zones, which were to be occupied in turn by a few days. At that time, started dismantling and evacuation of weapons, equipment and supplies from the Czechoslovak fortifications. Yet October 7 ROP liners ordered the dismantling of the Bell shooting and armored domes. October 8 and Battalion 4 after leaving the regiment retreated to fortifications Hrušová.

October 10, Polish forces occupied the entire area covered by the agreement with the Government of Czechoslovakia. Surprisingly, experienced trouble with the Germans bogumińskimi organized in SA who, despite lack of support from Berlin began to prepare to defend the city. There was even likely to be forthcoming clashes with Polish troops. In view of the existing situation the Czech side has agreed to accelerate the transfer of Bohumín which, according to initial findings had to be transmitted on October 10. On the second day of operations against the fear that Germany might forestall the Polish army, was sent part of the 1910-BK Pancé Mot. (24 p.uł. Articles and battery. Mot.) For a Rybnik on Bohumín.

In the meantime, however, there are differences between Poland and Germany concerning the delimitation of occupied land. This problem was indeed think the Germans have already indicated during the discussions on September 28, but then because of the Munich conference was not examined more closely. October 4, Marshal H. Goering said that so far as the territory south of the south-eastern strip of Silesia, it must be primarily German. If you disagree with the Polish on the subject, it can be done with the tender for the object of Gdańsk. On the same day Ambassador Lipski submitted a statement that the matter Bohumín and the final determination of the boundary line must be discussed. Therefore, the ambassador called for the seizure as soon as possible Bohumín by the Polish army.

The next Hitler declared that it is not interested in Bohumin, which no longer appears on the German side in the morning, it approved the map. He further stated that the city is thoroughly Polish and do not want to bargain with the Poles for each city, but will act against them because they were generous in their demands for moderates. However, in spite of German diplomacy to recognize the rights of Polish Bohumín continued pressure sliding economic and ethnic demands. Warsaw, Oct. 7 was submitted a few things that the German Government should be addressed:

regulation of communication in connection with the railway line Sw Anny - Bohumín - Witkowice
provide consent for the construction of the Polish section of the channel within the Oder - Danube
opening of the German consulate in Cieszyn
treatment of the German population in that territory is not worse than it is now
Casting of heavy object
Probably, however, feared the German reaction to the possible conflict with the German minority in Bohumín and presumably, therefore, 75 pp and 3 riflemen battalion occupied defensive positions on the basis of a line of fortifications from the Oder to the Czechoslovak Bohumín inclusive. Grouping of the regiment and its individual subunits tasks defined ordered fighter regiment No. 2 commander of October 12, 1938, the Regiment Battalion had no one to defend the old section of the state border to the south Wierzbica based on heavy shelters Czechoslovakia, MO S-2 to S-MO 5, and at the tip of the point resistance with extended Pudłów the Oder line insurance. The regiment was to be prepared for counterattacks in the general direction Pudlov (Pudłów) - Vrbice (Wierzbica) and N. Bohumín - Fw. Cerwin. Responsible for a defense shelters Comp. HMG with four teams and działonem strzeleckimi artillery. Reserve regiment were two battalions, each without a single company. Defence to provide artillery support was assigned to an armored train, and 6 / 23 pole.

The orders set specific tasks for various heavy shelters, which are called in these documents forts. And so appropriately the object MO S-2 fort I MO S-3 II fort, MO S-4 Fort III, MO S-5 Fort IV.

Summary - Opinions on the Czech fortifications
In summary, pay attention to recognize the intensity of Czechoslovak fortifications by the Polish intelligence, from the beginning of construction until Zaolzie classes, and the emphasis you kładzino plans in the event of a conflict in przerodzenia Zbójna clash with the Czech Republic, breaking the smooth line of fortifications and their output rear. Draws attention to focus on a narrow section, in addition to substantial forces of infantry, artillery group aiming to make the preparation of a large number of artillery guns, and the use of tanks to break Battalion medium (49 cars 7TP), and detailed discussion of the orders or instructions and disposal methods incapacitate shelters by infantry, artillery, anti-tank weapons and flame throwers. It is significant that the main force when broken on a narrow stretch of the fortifications were not to become embroiled in the acquisition of the remaining objects the line, leaving that task to Sappers and second-line troops.

Everything has been presented above, testifies to the fact that Poland highly appreciated the value of defensive fortifications Czechoslovak and their importance in the defense system.

After the occupation of Cieszyn Silesia Polish military authorities have made a careful evaluation of fortification located there. Inventoried in detail all the four heavy shelters, including their bells, sample light objects and components, firewalls and anti-landmines. The study of the Department of the Ministry of War Infantry "Fortresses in the Czech Teschen district and frysztackiego" in describing heavy objects highlighted the relatively limited angle of fire main shooting, which can be run only according to the authors addressed the fire, also drew attention to a number of small arms to defend shooting entrance and walk. In describing the objects of light highlighted the depth of the lines of those shelters, to meet the four kicks Cieszyn, south of Cieszyn and meet Frysztat in 3 kicks. According to the authors places the impression schematic filling of land without a dense network of shelters deeper tactical thinking. Explained that the shelters meet 50-100 m standing on the front of the veil, to facilitate the approach to them. Considered possible that the skeleton had a field position.

Carried out by the artillery and market experience showed that the destruction of one light needed in the shelter / g theoretical calculations of 1980-1990 is the heaviest artillery shells work 2 hours and 20 minutes of one battery or one hour and 30 minutes the entire squadron.

In the opinion of the General Work artillery at the General Inspector of the Armed Forces Brig. S. Miller, the force line of fortifications to defend the Czech Republic mainly consists of:

- Fire side high-density machine which effectively covers the firewall flat międzypola, fires all the objects are very well connected.

- Anti-tank obstacles (ditches and called. Bitterns)

- Resistance of small objects on the operation of missile 15 cm high and 42 cm on the missiles. Minor side wall thickness of primarily small shelters to be explained by the fact that the constructor does not reckoned with the possibility of fire in front of the firing of the cannon more powerful.

- Small size shelters (4 x 6.5 m) which are difficult to destroy because of the low probability of a hit by artillery attackers

Furthermore, the gene Miller fortifications Czechoslovak artillery support was based solely on a mobile artillery possesses an enormous number of observation points, each object has periscopes and can be used by the artillery observer. This was consistent with the views of the general organic artillery fortifications, which tried to implement in the Polish fortifications in the east. The impact on the development of the concept of Polish fortifications and construction of fortifications had these tests and evaluation of the Czech fortifications, however, constitute a separate subject.

[Domen]

By the way:



March 15 Commissioner Litvinov journalists to question how the Soviet Union will be able to fulfill his obligation in the event of aggression against Czechoslovakia, since there is no common border said, "a corridor for sure will be found."


Try to guess were was that corridor. Probably Warsaw was in the center of that corridor...

[Mordoror]

hum interesting what if

let me give my hypothesis

Germany was very dependant (at the beginning of the war) of a quiet Western front (especially because much of its industrial grid was there) and of SU issued supplies (provided through the Molotov Ribbentrop deal)

Stalin was not so crazy (well may be a littlep-)) but Germany was his ideological ennemy
If the Allies had not put down their pants with the Cezch affair, i don't see him agreeing on an hypothetical Molotov Rivventrop treaty (that was signed because SU knew once the Anschluss and Czech invasion done that the West were pussies)

After all before that (and before the winter war) there was a good understanding between at least France and SU and even some treaties could have been managed
I suspect the winter war to be an answer to the weakness the Allies showed during the Czech event too

so from a strategic point of view, had not been the Munich event, the stance of SU would have been less friendly (perhaps more neutral, maybe even hostile not directly but by providing support to Czech fighting troops or resistance)

moreover i may hypothezise that the Poland and Baltic states invasion was done because of the weakness of the West. With an harder stance from France and UK, SU would have not moved. After all this strategic move was intended to provide SU a strategic depth (at the expanse of Poland, Baltic States and Romania) because the West-East encircling Germany strategic depth was not existing anymore politicaly

without that move in Poland the SU forces would have been less unwary in case of later German attack and would have not been caught the pants on the knees

so if i sum it up :
no supplies for the German military machine

no Molotov Ribbentrop deal, leading to the maintain of a significant force on the east (depleting by such any Western front)

fighting (maybe fierce) in Czechoslovakia with possible significant equipment losses (and at least industrial losses as the Skoda et al factories could habe been sabotaged or destroyed)

no lose of the red army legend (Hitler was also convinced to attack SU because of the catastrophic way the Winter war was conduced, winter war that was initiated because of the weakness of the West at Munich)

better readiness and preparation of the Polish army and any Western army (rather than beginning the mobilization very late, it would have been done earlier and industrial production of war tools would have been quickened)

Earlier exposure of the industrial Sarre grid to air or artillery raids leading to lower industrial military production (through damages but even without that, the time to evacuate and relocate key factories)

Italian stance would have been questionnable too (Mussolini followed AH because of his quick successes...a stalemate due to overstreching of the forces may have impered him to do any foolish action)

and and and .... a lot of small satellites influenced by the weakness of the west and the big boy stance of germany may have not been involved either economically (like the big market the German made in the Balkans just after the Anschluss and Czecoslovakia invasion......Bulgaria, Romania, Yougoslavia were providing coal, steel and powder too to the Reich)

even if the French and UK armies were not able to bring battle on the german soil due to early unreadiness and defensive only doctrine, i bet that a lot of things would have been strategically different

[Sada]

In the great tradition of MP.NET 'What if threads' I thought I would post one I have been wondering about

What if: Czechoslovakia had resisted any attempts to cede the Sudetenland (having already began mobilizing in 1938 due to German demands), and its heavy border defences, to Hitlers Germany and a general European war had commenced with German armies invading in accordance with Hitlers deadline of October 1st 1938.

-Would Britain and France have supported the Czechs once fighting began?
-How would Poland and the USSR have reacted?
-What level of resistance could the Czech army have put up to German forces as both sides were equipped in 1938?
-How would this have affect the later events, such as, assuming it still happened, the German invasion of France, since German forces in 1940 used large numbers of Czech developed and designed equipment, especially tanks, such as the Panzer 35t and 38t?

Photo thread of Czech army 1918-38 here
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?138192-Czechoslovak-army-1918-1938

Discuss


Alfa
I wish it had happened, western democracias should have to take an active part regarding spanish war in the place of helping the friends of Mussolini and Hitler, maybe a definitive chance for a spanish republic. What it´s sure is that in late 1938 Germany wasn´t as ready for war as it was 11 months later.

[MN_Air]

I believe that the UK and France would have formally declared war on Germany, but nothing would have came of it just like the Phony War of 39. The UK didn't want to get dragged into another conflict so shortly after the Great War.

[Hollis]

I would be cautious to say that time was on nazis side, at least for sure not from economical point of view. Their economy was close to bancruptcy. You can find quotes of their officials claming that Czechoslovak gold reserves and confiscation of factories saved their armament program for nearly one next year. France and England by that time know that their will face one way or another Germany and tryed to buy some time.




You made some good points. I am still of the mind time was on the nazis side. France and England was never prepared when the nazis attacked Poland. Look at how long France held out. England was saved by the canal. The Molotov-Ribbentrop was probably Stalin's attempt to gain time. Also if you look at the war conclusion, it could have ended differently. Again probably the best help the allies received was from Hitler. Then again, without Hitler there may not have been a war.

[MN_Air]

In my opinion, if the war would have been run completely by the Field Marshals and their subordinates, instead of Hitler; we would have seen a very different outcome. Hitler always seemed to intervene with things just at the right moment. He pulled a couple luftwaffe squadrons out of Cyrenaica to send to OP: Barbarossa, which gave the RAF air superiority for a time delaying Rommel's victories. He also put most of the tank forces into the eastern front, when there shouldn't have been an eastern front in the first place.

[1Cie GevGn]

This is completely unrelated, but for our "What if"-buffs, I'm going to recommend a book. It's called "Fatherland", by Robert Harris.

It's a crimestory set in Berlin in 1964. Basically Nazi Germany won the war, conquered most of Russia. Borderwars still rage in the Urals. Europe exists, albeit Nazi Germany rules over them. The USA is trying to improve it's relationship with Nazi Germany, in fact President Kennedy is due to attend Hitlers 75th Birthday.

I recommend it NOT because it offers a clear alternative history. In fact, you only learn a few things about how the war turned out in little snippets across the book. The crimestory still is the main story. It's just wierd to be completely into this crime investigation, when all of a sudden they remind you it's taking place in this freaky world that *could* have happened...

Interesting thread!

[Domen]

Jon Kimche in his book "The Unfought Battle" claims that the most important battle of WW2 was the battle which did not take place - the Western Allied full scale offensive against Germany in September of 1939.

[Atlantic Friend]

Jon Kimche in his book "The Unfought Battle" claims that the most important battle of WW2 was the battle which did not take place - the Western Allied full scale offensive against Germany in September of 1939.

Such a battle was a pipe dream IMHO - in 1939 there was no British Army to speak of, and the French Army's plans were (rather understandably for a country facing an enemy with two times its population and three times its industrial capabilities) strictly defensive. For it to be possible, it would require a "divergence point" much earlier than 1939, causing faster Allies rearmament and change of doctrine.

[saturnin]

Such a battle was a pipe dream IMHO - in 1939 there was no British Army to speak of, and the French Army's plans were (rather understandably for a country facing an enemy with two times its population and three times its industrial capabilities) strictly defensive. For it to be possible, it would require a "divergence point" much earlier than 1939, causing faster Allies rearmament and change of doctrine.

Well original post pointed divergence point to Munich crisis (September 1938). In this period Panzerwaffe was something completaly different to what existed one year later during Poland campaign. Panzer units by 1 October 1938 consisted of 1468 Pz.kpfw. I, 823 Pz.kpfw. II, 59 Pz.kpfw. III, 76 Pz.kpfw. IV + limited numbers of derivates mostly artillery observations etc (Jentz). Large part of this force was at the moment engaged in heavy training and organization change during September and following months and weren´t located near Czechoslovak borders. Btw. Pz.kpfw. III/IV were or early version with no aditional armor and could by easly penetrated by all standard czech antitank weapons, even heavy machinengan under good conditions. It´s funny that even today some historian try France and UK. policy in connection to Munich agreemant interpret as buying time to catch with German armament program :roll:. When Germany attack Poland year later large portion of their "modern" tanks were of Czechoslovak origin. Where they come to idea that to give germany highly industrial countries which at the moment base their economic growth on military supply to east, central, north Europe and many countries elsewhere I don´t understand. ČKD, Praga, Škoda, Vítkovice, Česká zbrojovka, and hundereds of different artillery, small arms and AFV producers. As subcontractors they became soon base to German armament growth in 1939. And how exactly should idea of giving Gemany over ~3 mil. sudeten population (and thus base of conscipts) by signature of one document help to give Allies upper hand in next conflict?
Especially when Munich crisis from historical point come from NOTHING. It wasn´t Hitler long-term plan but opportuny given by history. Nazi germany didn´t planned Munich crisis and didn´t take any serrious military preparation to take military action if needed. There existed Hitler general direction which said what should be done in case of military action against Czechoslovakia but in praxy - no real preparation were done. OKW dind´t take any serious preparation or realocation of forces which would annable any serious military actions. And Hitler directions bases attack on suprice moment - something what was after full Czechoslovak mobilization in September lost. There wasn´t any logistic support for german armies in Austria (and there were very limited numbers of their formation here). Character of border based on mountains (much harder to cross that anything in Ardenny) make possible only limited rout to Czechoslvakia this directions were crossed by fortiffies which get priority and were already finished + operationa reserves were also already located behind them.

As for luftwaffe, there weren´t any JU-88 operational, If my memory serves good there were only about 150 JU-87 in September (correct my if I am wrong). Heck, luftwaffe officers were afrad of our bombers SB-2 as their new figther formations would be possible allocated to protect Rurh area, Berlin this policy changed before Poland campaign but frontal german units weren´t at this time at best condition.

Anyway reaction of Gen. d. Inf. Hans Freiherr Seutter von Lötzen when he get possible plans for Fall Grün was: "Ja, sind denn diese Leute wahnsinnig geworden"

Germany wouldn´t started attack in Septemer, October (which were extramely unfavourbale for whether as I said in some early post) or even in another months but by this time strong winter would make any larger operations in most areas around border practically nightmare.

[Sada]

As for luftwaffe, there weren´t any JU-88 operational, If my memory serves good there were only about 150 JU-87 in September (correct my if I am wrong). Heck, luftwaffe officers were afrad of our bombers SB-2 as their new figther formations would be possible allocated to protect Rurh area, Berlin this policy changed before Poland campaign but frontal german units weren´t at this time at best condition.


I need to "googleing", but the Ju-87 Stuka was a seasoned war veteran in late 1938, there were used many of them only in Spain, so I suppose the number of those being operating in Spain together with those stocked in Germany should have been far higher than 150. The J88 is right it was a new bird. And of what had been seen in spanish campaign, still not finished in 1938, About the tanks that germans showed in Spain in that time, they hadn´t anything near the soviet T-26. It´s a very biased opinion, but I think that Hitler was like a compulsive gambler and when he invaded Poland he had a little hope that GB and France wouldn´t go to war.

[saturnin]

I need to "googleing", but the Ju-87 Stuka was a seasoned war veteran in late 1938, there were used many of them only in Spain, so I suppose the number of those being operating in Spain together with those stocked in Germany should have been far higher than 150. The J88 is right it was a new bird. And of what had been seen in spanish campaign, still not finished in 1938, About the tanks that germans showed in Spain in that time, they hadn´t anything near the soviet T-26. It´s a very biased opinion, but I think that Hitler was like a compulsive gambler and when he invaded Poland he had a little hope that GB and France wouldn´t go to war.

Development of Ju-87 started early but were there serious delays as diving technique proved to be demanding on design. To Spain only one single Ju 87A-0 arrived in the beginning (serial number serial number 29-1 ), later three Ju 87A-1s "Antons" arrived in January 1938 which had same minor problems in operational service. This were followed by five Ju 87B-1s "Bertas" and that´s practically all for this time period.

I came across many sourcres claiming very different numbers of Ju-87 available for time period of Munich crisis. Offten it is about ~ 290 but production numbers are different and what is more important trained and ready units are something completaly different. Some sources claim about 120 Ju-87 and not all off them would be alocated around Czechoslovakia. It was time of preparation and evaluation of technique for Luftwaffe.

As for how important was Czechoslovakia for Germany. For example this is number of tanks which entire Germany army had at the beginning of Poland campaign. (all units including training, etc. and not available for operations).

1445 Pz.I, 1223 Pz.II, 202 Pz.35t, 78 Pz.38t, 98 Pz.III, 211 Pz. IV, 215 Pz.Bef

Note that significant part of Pz.I were were alocated to training.