hist2004
07-30-2004, 01:54 PM
While both Iraq and Afghanistan have about the same population, and both countries are still suffering from attacks by the supporters of deposed groups (Taliban or Baath Party) trying to regain power, the American combat deaths in Afghanistan are only about a tenth of what they are in Iraq. How can this be? The Afghans have a long, and well deserved, reputation as fierce fighters. The Afghans are also known to be very hostile to foreigners.
The answer is simple; Afghans don’t believe they were invaded. The few hundred Special Forces troops who were sent there in late 2001, spoke the local languages and understood the culture. The result was that the Afghans believed that they had liberated themselves, with the help of a few hundred culturally sensitive Americans, and a bunch of bombers far up in the sky. The 17,000 American, and 5,000 NATO troops currently in Afghanistan are seen as a form of foreign aid, helping to hunt down the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda diehards. The armed foreigners are also seen as useful in attempts to rein in the warlords, who have long been a problem in Afghanistan.
Thousands of Special Forces troops were sent to Kuwait (and, secretly, Jordan) in late 2002, to explore the possibility of “doing an Afghanistan” on Iraq. The Kurds in northern Iraq were armed, and willing to fight Saddam. The Shia Arabs in the south had suffered much from Saddam for several decades. But the Taliban, it was pointed out, had much less control over Afghanistan than Saddam had over Iraq. While both nations had an extensive system of tribes, and tribal leaders, Saddam had done a much better job of intimidating the tribes than had the Taliban in Afghanistan. In fact, by late 2001, Taliban control was largely backed up by a few hard core Pushtun tribes, and a brigade of al Qaeda troops who operated as “enforcers”. Saddam had several hundred thousand secret police and street level vigilantes on the payroll. Despite the UN embargo, Saddam still had several billion dollars a year coming in with which to pay his thugs. The Taliban were largely dependent on the illegal drug trade for their income of several hundred million dollars a year, and it wasn’t enough to build a secret police establishment. Moreover, the concept of secret police had been discredited in Afghanistan, as the communist government of the 1970s, which Russian troops tried to prop up in the 1980s, relied heavily on a much hated secret police. So the Taliban had to depend on a brigade of al Qaeda mercenaries, and a lot of tribal politics, to maintain control of the country. Saddam was in much better shape, as his secret police also enabled him to maintain several hundred thousand soldiers on duty.
Regards,
Hist2004
The answer is simple; Afghans don’t believe they were invaded. The few hundred Special Forces troops who were sent there in late 2001, spoke the local languages and understood the culture. The result was that the Afghans believed that they had liberated themselves, with the help of a few hundred culturally sensitive Americans, and a bunch of bombers far up in the sky. The 17,000 American, and 5,000 NATO troops currently in Afghanistan are seen as a form of foreign aid, helping to hunt down the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda diehards. The armed foreigners are also seen as useful in attempts to rein in the warlords, who have long been a problem in Afghanistan.
Thousands of Special Forces troops were sent to Kuwait (and, secretly, Jordan) in late 2002, to explore the possibility of “doing an Afghanistan” on Iraq. The Kurds in northern Iraq were armed, and willing to fight Saddam. The Shia Arabs in the south had suffered much from Saddam for several decades. But the Taliban, it was pointed out, had much less control over Afghanistan than Saddam had over Iraq. While both nations had an extensive system of tribes, and tribal leaders, Saddam had done a much better job of intimidating the tribes than had the Taliban in Afghanistan. In fact, by late 2001, Taliban control was largely backed up by a few hard core Pushtun tribes, and a brigade of al Qaeda troops who operated as “enforcers”. Saddam had several hundred thousand secret police and street level vigilantes on the payroll. Despite the UN embargo, Saddam still had several billion dollars a year coming in with which to pay his thugs. The Taliban were largely dependent on the illegal drug trade for their income of several hundred million dollars a year, and it wasn’t enough to build a secret police establishment. Moreover, the concept of secret police had been discredited in Afghanistan, as the communist government of the 1970s, which Russian troops tried to prop up in the 1980s, relied heavily on a much hated secret police. So the Taliban had to depend on a brigade of al Qaeda mercenaries, and a lot of tribal politics, to maintain control of the country. Saddam was in much better shape, as his secret police also enabled him to maintain several hundred thousand soldiers on duty.
Regards,
Hist2004