Brzeczyszczykiewicz
08-01-2004, 09:47 AM
Operation Tempest
From the very beginning of its existence the Home Army was planning an all-national uprising against the German forces. Initial plans of 1942 created by the Polish government-in-exile assumed that the allied invasion of Europe would lead to German withdrawal of notable forces from the Eastern Front for the defence of the Third Reich. The Home Army was to start such an uprising to prevent troops transfer to the west and to allow the British and American forces to seize Germany by breaking all communication links with the majority of German forces massed in the Soviet Union.
However, by 1943 it became apparent that the allied invasion of Europe would not come in time and that with all probability the Red Army would reach the pre-war borders of Poland much sooner. In February, 1943, general Stefan Rowecki amended the plan. The Uprising was to be started in three phases. The first assumed the starting of an armed uprising in the East (with main centres of resistance in Lwów and Wilno), before the advancing Red Army. The second part was to contain armed struggle in the belt between the Curzon Line and the Vistula river, while the third part was to become an all-national uprising in the rest of Poland.
Polish-Soviet relations were broken off on April 25, 1943 due to the Katyn massacre and it became obvious that the advancing Red Army might not come to Poland as a liberator but rather, as gen Rowecki put it, Our Allies' Ally. On November 26, 1943 the Polish government in exile issued an instruction, which assumed that if the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would not be resumed before their entry to Poland, the Home Army forces are to remain underground until further decisions are made. However, the Home Army commander took a different approach and on November 30, 1943 the final version of the plan was created. It became known as the Operation Tempest.
The Soviet advance
The plan was intended both as a political manifestation of the influence of Polish Government in Exile and as a direct operation against German occupiers. The fear was that in the aftermath of the war the allies would ignore the legal London-based government. It was clear that Poland would be 'liberated' by the Red Army, and that the Soviet Union did not recognise the Government-in-Exile.
Initially, after the Red Army forces crossed the pre-war Polish borders, the local Home Army units were engaged in successful cooperation with the Soviets in liberating several towns and cities. However, in most cases after the struggle ended the Polish officers and members of local administration were caught by the NKVD and either shot or sent to Gulags and prisons in Russia. At the same time most of the Polish soldiers caught by the Soviets were given the choice of either joining the Soviet-backed Polish People's Army or sharing the fate of their officers.
Nevertheless, the Soviet advance was fast and the Polish authorities saw no other choice but to continue the struggle against the German forces and aid the Soviets. At the same time the government in London asked the SOE and the Foreign Office several times for an allied mission to Poland to be sent (such missions were already dispatched to all resistance movements in Europe, including Albania, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Yugoslavia). However, the pleas were not fulfilled until December 1944.
The official line of Soviet propaganda underlined that the Polish underground is "waiting with their arms at ease" and is not fighting the common enemy. As the Soviet forces were nearing Warsaw in June and July 1944, the Soviet radio stations demanded a full national uprising in Warsaw to cut the communication lines of the German units still on the right bank of Vistula. On July 29, 1944 first Soviet armoured units reached the outskirts of Warsaw.
Preparations
By the end of July Warsaw had been declared a Festung Warschau by the Germans. It was to be defended at all cost against the Soviet offensive. However, the July 20 Plot and the failed attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler made many German units withdraw westward through Warsaw. The Home Army saw it as a sign of defeat of the Germans. The number of German soldiers in the area was lowered significantly.
With the recent flood of reports from the eastern territories about forced demilitarisation, trials and execution of Home Army soldiers by the Soviets, on 21 July 1944 the High Command of the Home Army decided to expand the scope of the Operation Tempest to include Warsaw itself. Warsaw Uprising date was set to 1 August.
On July 27, the governor of the General Government, Hans Frank called for 100,000 Polish men between the ages of 17–65 to arrive at several concentration places in Warsaw the following day. They were to be employed at construction of fortifications for the Wehrmacht in and around the city. This move was viewed by the Home Army as an attempt to neutralise the underground forces and the underground urged Warsaw inhabitants to ignore it. Fearing German reprisal actions, general Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski ordered full mobilisation of Home Army forces in Warsaw area.
Opposing forces
The Home Army forces of the Warsaw District numbered about 50 000 soldiers of whom 23 000 were equipped and combat-ready. Most of them were trained for several years in partisan warfare and urban guerrilla war, but lacked experience in prolonged day fighting. The forces were ill-equipped, especially since the decision to include Warsaw in the Operation Tempest has been made on 21 July and before that weapons and men had been shuttled east of Warsaw.
On August 1 their state of arms was as follows:
* 1 000 rifles
* 1700 pistols
* 300 machine pistols
* 60 sub-machine guns
* 7 machine guns
* 35 anti-tank guns and carbines (including several PIATs)
* 25 000 grenades
The commander of Polish forces in Warsaw was general Antoni Chruściel, codename 'Monter'.
In the course of the fighting further arms were obtained through air drops and by capture from the enemy (including several armoured vehicles). Also, the insurgents’ workshops were busy all the while producing during the uprising: 300 automatic pistols, 150 flame-throwers, 40,000 grenades, a number of mortars and bazookas, and even an armoured car.
On August 1, 1944 the German garrison of Warsaw numbered some 10 000 troops under general Rainer Stahel. Together with various units on the left bank of the Vistula river the German forces were composed of some 15 to 16 000 Wehrmacht soldiers as well as SS and police forces. However, the German forces were well-equipped and have been preparing for defence of city's nodal positions for many months. Several hundred concrete bunkers and barbed wire lines protected the buildings and areas occupied by the Germans. Also, at least 90 000 additional German troops were present in the area.
The "W" hour
The 'W' hour has been scheduled for 1 August 1700 during a briefing on 31 July around 1730. The change of 'W' hour from 2400 (in earlier plans) to 1700 proved to be a costly strategic decision, reducing the chance of surprising Germans especially since many of the Polish partisans where not trained for prolonged day fighting. The order to start the uprising reached only some of the units (around 23,000 personel) due to organisational problems.
Boy-scouts fighting in the Uprising
First moves
In several places where German units have encountered organising Polish forces fights have erupted before the 'W' hour scheduled for 1700 (around 1400 on Żoliborz, 1500 on Czerniaków, 1600 around Plac Napoleona, Hale Mirowskich, Plac Kerclego, ul. Okopowa and Mokotów).
Until the 'W' hour those separate incidents have not been connected as a part of a bigger plan. However around 1600 SS-Standartenfuher Geibel, chef of police and SS in the Warsaw District, have received a warning about the uprising from an anonymous 'lieutand of Luftwaffe', who has in turn been warned about it by a Polish women. He has alarmed units under his command, which have thus been prepared for the assault at 1700. This has drasticly reduced the element of suprise of the insurgents.
On the other hand, while Germans have been considering the possibility of an uprisng, they had no operational plans prepared for such an occasion.
Area I (Śródmieście, Stare Miasto): Units in that area has captured most of their assigned territory, but failed in capturing most objects of military importance in its area. It has thus failed in creating a central stronghold and securing communications links for other areas.
Area II (Żoliborz, Marymont, Bielany): Units here have failed in securing Żoliborz. Many units has reatreated outside of the city, into the forests.
Area III (Wola): Units here have failed in securing its territory, sustaining heavy loses. Some units have rretreated into the forests, few have remained insinde the territory.
Area IV (Ochota): Units here have failed in securing its territory and retreated into the forests.
Area V (Mokotów): Some units have retreated into the forests, others have managed to capture parts of Dolny Mokotów, which was however severed from most communications routes to other areas
Area VI (Praga): The Uprising was also started on the right bank of the Vistula. The main task of the Area VI (Obwód VI) was to seize the bridges on the river and secure the bridgeheads until the arrival of the Red Army. It was clear that, since the situation was far worse than in other areas, there were no chance for any help from the outside. After some minor initial success, the forces of lt.col. Antoni Władysław Żurowski were badly outnumbered by the German forces concentrated there. The fights were halted and the Home Army forces located in the Praga area went underground. After the Soviets finally reached the right bank of Vistula on September 10, the officers proposed recreating the pre-war 36th 'Academic Legion' infantry regiment, however they were all arrested by the NKVD and sent to Russia for interrogation.
Area VII' (Powiat Warszawski): this area consisted of territories outside Warsaw city limits. Actions here have mostly failed to capture their targets.
Zgrupowanie Kedywu Komendy Głównej: those units have secured parts of Śródmieście and Wola, achieving most success alongside the units of Area I' in the first few hours.
Many primary targets where not achieved on the first and subsequent days. Those included the early plans to capture the PAST building and failed attacks on Okecie, Pola Mokotowskie and Warszawa Gdanska train station. The area held by the insurgents have been quickly reduced in scope and severed into independend strongholds.
63 days
The Uprising reached the apogee on August 4 when the Home Army soldiers managed to establish the frontlines in the Wola and Ochota districts. However, they failed to secure the bridges over Vistula or bridgeheads on the other side of the river. Also, there were still several German pockets of resistance inside of the Polish-controlled territory. Most notable of them were the PAST skyscraper, the bridgeheads and Headquarters of the police.
On that very same day SS general Erich von dem Bach was appointed commander of all the forces fighting with the uprising and began concentrating the newly arrived troops. These included Units of Dirlewanger, Schmidt and Reinefarth. The main aim of the German forces was to break through to the German bridgeheads and then cut off the Uprising from the river by attacking both southward and northward.
Wola Massacre
On August 5 the three German groups started their advance westward, along Wolska and Górczewska streets toward the main East-West communication line of Aleje Jerozolimskie. Their advance was halted, but the Reinefarth and Dirlewanger regiments started to carry out orders of Heinrich Himmler: behind the lines special groups of SS, police and Wehrmacht went from house to house shooting all inhabitants and burning their bodies. The aim of this policy was to crush the will to fight and put the uprising to an end without having to commit to the heavy city fights. In mass executions approximately 30 000 civilians were slaughtered. At the same time the Zośka and Wacek battalions managed to capture the ruins of Warsaw Ghetto and the Warsaw concentration camp. The area became one of the main communication links of the insurgents fighting in Wola with those defending the Old Town.
On August 7 the German forces were joined by the tanks with civilians being used as human shields. After two days of heavy fights they managed to cut Wola in two and reach the Bankowy square.
Until mid September, the Germans were shooting all captured insurgents on spot. The main protagonists of the drama were Oskar Dirlewanger and Bronislaw Kaminski, who committed the most cruel atrocities. After von dem Bachs arrived in Warsaw (August 7), it became clear that atrocities only stiffened the resistance and that some political solution should be found due to the small forces at the disposal of the German commander. The aim was to gain a significant victory to show the Home Army the futility of further fighting and make them surrender. This did not succeed, but from the end of September on, some of the captured Polish soldiers were treated as POWs.
Ochota
Simultaneously to German attack on Wola, the Kaminski Brigade started its onslaught on Ochota district. The forces defending the area consisted of only two ill-equipped battalions while the Germans were aided by tanks, artillery and Goliath self-propelled mines. However, the morale of German and Russian troops fighting in the area was low and the main aim of the soldiers fighting there was to loot and rape rather than attack enemy positions. Because of that the two battalions of the Home Army managed to defend the area with heavy casualties until August 11, when they retreated toward Mokotów.
Old Town
The Old Town area (Polish Starówka or Stare Miasto) was initially weak and almost undefended. However, it posed a great threat to the German-held bridgehead of the Kierbedź bridge. Also, the Polish positions were close enough to the northern railway line and the Cytadela stronghold to prevent the Germans from effectively using them. Knowing that the Germans planned to cut the Old Town both from the north (attack along the railway line toward Vistula) and from the south (attack from the Bankowy sq. Most Kierbedzia bridge). On August 9 the German units from the Mariensztat area managed to capture the Royal Castle, but failed to drive further inland. The Home Army counter-attacked and on August 12 forced the Germans out of Bankowy sq. However, German aerial bombardment and extensive usage of tanks imposed high casualties on both the defenders of the Old Town and the civilians. One of the first buildings to be bombed was a field hospital marked with a huge symbol of the Red Cross on the roof.
Royal Castle in Warsaw in 1944
A German attack from the north was also halted with heavy casualties on both sides. Heavy city fights started in the area of Plac Bankowy with the square and the nearby barricade at Tłomackie street changing hands several times. The Germans managed to establish a link with the German forces under siege in the building of the German Garrison (Mostowski Palace) on August 15, but the huge building became a scene of heavy door-to-door and room-to-room fights. The fights lasted until August 18 when both sides withdrew from the ruins.
The no-mans-land and the covering positions of the Polish defence lines were composed of Warsaw Ghetto ruins and big open areas of Kercelak sq., Żytnia street and Leszno street. The Home Army was not well enough equipped to withstand a German armoured attack in open field. However, the main positions in the Old Town were densely urbanised and covered with small, narrow streets. Because of that, after initial successes in taking the outer rim, the German advance was halted. However, Germans amassed large numbers of artillery for the constant bombardment of the area behind Polish lines. According to von dem Bach himself the number of guns used in the bombardment was as follows:
* 220 guns of various calibres
* 1 heavy mortar Thor 610mm
* 50 Goliath self-propelled mines
* one company of Nebelwerfer 42/43
* one battery of Wurfgranate of various calibres (ranging from 150mm to 320mm)
* 4 Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bombers operating from the Okęcie airport 1
One of the planes was shot down by Polish troops with hand guns on August 26.
The usage of heavy artillery and constant air bombardment (the planes from Okęcie airport needed only 5 minutes to reach their targets) was to inflict heavy casualties on the civilians and destroy the city itself. This aim was expressed in direct orders of Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler and Heinz Guderian.
Plan of sewer evacuation routes to Żoliborz and Śródmieście
Despite German both technical and numerical superiority, the Old Town was held until end of August. However, situation of both the Home Army and the civilians became critical: lack of food, water and munitions made further defence of the ruins impossible. Several plans to break through the German positions in Ogród Saski park to the downtown and through the northern railroad to Żoliborz failed. On September 2 the defenders of the Old Town withdrew through the sewers. More than 5.300 men and women were evacuated using this way.
Loss of Żoliborz and Stare Miasto
The front lines stabilised for a short while, but during the upcoming days and weeks the German counteroffensive would recapture Żoliborz and Stare Miasto, splitting the area hold by insurgents into three separate sectors, connected only by underground canals.
The sewers and the barricades
The city sewer system became an important communication network for the insurgents, who used the sewers to move under the areas occupied by Germans, thus allowing contact between surrounded positions (insurgents had almost no radios). Sewers were also used as a means of evacuation of areas that couldn't be defended any longer.
Life behind the frontlines
In the first weeks of the Uprising on Polish-controlled territory, people tried to recreate normal life in their free country. Cultural life was vibrant, with theatres, post offices, newspapers and similar activities.
Near the end of the Uprising, lack of food, medicine, overcrowding and obviously German indiscriminate air and artillery assault on the city made the civilian situation more and more desperate.
Composition of smaller fighting forces
Although the vast majority of insurgents in Warsaw were members of Armia Krajowa, there was a small number of fighters who weren't members of that organisation.
In the course of the Uprising some 1 700 members of other resistance organisations joined the Uprising. Those included the Armia Ludowa, Gwardia Ludowa and Narodowe Siły Zbrojne.
Although the vast majority of soldiers who took part in the Uprising were Polish, there were also members of other nationalities fighting alongside. Among them was a number of Hungarian deserters and Italian escapees from POW camps in Poland. Also, a number of RAF and USAAF airmen who were shot down over Warsaw and kept hidden from the Germans in various places by the Home Army joined the fights. It is believed that some 25,000 Jews were hiding in Warsaw before the Uprising. The vast majority of them died together with other Polish civilians. However, many Jews (possibly as many as 1 000), including those released by Home Army from the Warsaw concentration camp (Gęsiówka), joined the Home Army. During the final stage of the battle a number of Soviet soldiers (possibly as many as 1 000, most of them members of Polish units in Soviet army) also crossed the river and fought the Germans in Powiśle area. Airdrops were carried out by allied airmen from Italy, mostly by Poles, Canadians and the British.
International situation: Poland, Europe, World
In September the eastern part of Warsaw had been captured by the Soviets. In the Praga area Polish units under command of general Zygmunt Berling (thus sometimes known as 'berlingowcy' - 'the Berling men'), the 1st Polish Army (1 Armia Wojska Polskiego) were in position. On the night of 14/15th of September three patrols from landed on the shore of Czerniaków and Powiśle areas and made contacts with Armia Krajowa forces. Under heavy German fire only small elements of main units made it ashore (I and III battalions of 9th infantry regiment, 3rd Infantry Division). At the same time the commanders of the Red Army declined to support the Polish troops with artillery, tanks or bombers.
The Germans intensified their attacks on the Home Army positions near the river to prevent any further landings, which could seriously compromise their line of defence, but weren't able to made any significant advances for several days, while Polish forces held those vital positions in preparation for new expected wave of Soviet landings. Polish units from the eastern shore attempted several more landings, and during the next few days sustained heavy losses (including destruction of all landing boats and most of other river crossing equipment). Other Soviet units limited their assistance to sporadic and insignificant artillery and air support.
Shortly after the Berling landings, the Soviets decide to postpone all plans for a river crossing in Warsaw "for at least 4 months" and soon afterwards general Berling was relived of his command. On the night of September 19, after no further attempts from the other side of the river were made and the promised evacuation of wounded did not take place, Armia Krajowa soldiers and landed elements of Wojsko Polskie were forced to begin a retreat from the positions on the bank of the river.
Out of approximately 3000 men who made it ashore only around 900 made it back to the eastern shores of Vistula, approximately 600 of them seriously wounded.
The airdrops
From August 4 the Western Allies begun supporting the Warsaw Uprising with airdrops of munitions and other supplies. Initially the air raids were carried out mostly by the Polish bomber units stationed in Bari and Brindisi in Italy. Later on at the insistence of the Polish government-in-exile they were joined by South African and British units. The drops continued September 21. The total weight of allied drops was 104 tons.
Although German air defence over the Warsaw area itself was almost non existent about 12% of the 296 planes taking part in that operations were lost. Most of the drops were made during night, and poor accuracy left many parachuted packages stranded behind Polish-controlled territory.
Monument to the Allied airmen who lost their lives over Warsaw
The Soviet Union did not give permission to the Allies for use of its airports for those supply operations and thus the planes were forced to use bases in United Kingdom and Italy which reduced their carrying weight and range. From September 13 on the Soviets begun their own airdrop raids with supplies, and dropped about 55 tons in total. The drops continued until September 28. Since the Soviet airmen did not equip the containers with parachutes, the majority of recovered packages were damaged.
Aftermath
The capitulation
On October 2 General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski has signed a capitulation of remaining Polish forces (Warszawski Korpus Armii Krajowej or Home Army Warsaw Corps) in the German headquarters in presence of general von dem Bach. According to the capitulation treaty the AK soldiers were to be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention and the civilian population was to be treated humanely.
The next day the Germans begun to disarm the Home Army soldiers. Most of them were later sent to POW camps in various part of Germany. At the same time the civilian population (approximately 700 000) has been resettled to concentration camps west of Warsaw. Many soldiers, fearing German atrocities in captivity, chose to blend into civilian population, escape Warsaw among them and continue the fight later.
Destruction of the city
After the remaining population has been expelled, the Germans started the destruction of the remnants of the city. Special groups of German engineers were dispatched to the city in order to burn and demolish the remaining buildings. According to German plans, after the war Warsaw was to be turned into a lake. The demolition squads used flame throwers and explosives to methodically destroy house after house. They paid special attention to historical monuments and places of interest: nothing was to be left of what used to be a city.
By January 1945 85% of buildings were destroyed: 25% as a result of the Uprising, 35% as result of systematic German actions after the uprising, the rest as result of the earlier Warsaw Ghetto uprising (15%) and other combat including the September 1939 campaign (10%).
Material losses were estimated at 10 455 buildings, 923 historical buildings (94 percent), 25 churches, 14 libraries including the National Library, 81 elementary schools, 64 high schools, Warsaw University and Warsaw University of Technology, and most of the historical monuments. Almost a million inhabitants lost all of their possessions. The exact amount of losses of private and public property as well as pieces of art, monuments of science and culture is unknown. However, various estimates place it at an equivalent of approximately 40 000 000 000 1939 US dollars. The municipal council of Warsaw is currently disputing whether claims for German reparations should be made.
The legacy
Due to lack of cooperation and often the active aggressive moves on the part of the Soviets and several other factors, Warsaw Uprising and Operation Tempest failed in their primary goal - to free part of Polish territories, so that a government loyal to Polish government in exile could be established there instead of a Soviet puppet state. There is no consensus among historians if that was ever possible, and if those operations had other lasting effect. Some argue that without Operation Tempest and Warsaw Uprising, Poland would end as a Soviet republic, a fate definitely worse than that of independent puppet state, and thus the Operation suceeded at least partially in being a political demonstration to Soviets and Western Allies.
Reasons for failure
There are several factors responsible for the failure, although there is no consensus about all of them nor their relative importance.
One of the main reasons for the failure of the uprising was the lack of expected support from the Soviet Red Army. Soviet assistance to the Home Army on the eastern territories was limited to small collaboration on a tactical level at best, with common incidents of shooting or imprisoning of Home Army soldiers after the area was liberated. During the Warsaw Uprisng the Red Army stood on the other bank of the Vistula River and only elements from Polish 1 Armia Wojska Polskiego has attempted to make a crossing and received an artillery support. Soviet High Command had not allowed pilots from the RAF and Polish Airforces to use Soviet landing strips. After the initial radio and leaflet propaganda campaign, the Moscow-backed Wanda radio station remained silent until the very end of the fighting. It has been argued that the Soviets deliberately allowed the Germans defeat the AK in order to eliminate a force in Poland which would oppose the communist puppet government which the Soviets planned to install in Poland. This is consistent with Soviet latter treatment of many AK soldiers, who were usually imprisoned, tortured and executed.
The decision about the start of the Uprising can be viewed more as a political one (a demonstration to show Soviets and Western Allies that Polish governement in exile has control over the country) then a military one (since a military situation was worsening, as German troops in Warsaaw were being strenghtened and fortified). The decision to start the Uprising was rushed several times - first on 20 July, when plans for Operation Tempest were changed to include Warsaw (after the series of reports on agressive actions by Soviets towards Armia Krajowa units in the eastern territories), then on 31 July when exaggerated reports of closing Russian forces convinced some decision makers that if they don't start the Uprising soon it will be too late to aid the Russians and 'make a stand'. Due to this rushed change the plans, personel and ammunition available at the time of 'W' hour in Warsaw were not optimal.
"Liberation" of the ruins
After several months of watching the city die, the Red Army finally crossed the river on January 17, 1945. The ruins of the Festung Warschau were captured in several hours with little or no opposition from the Germans.
RIP to all of them, we'll remember their sacrifice
From the very beginning of its existence the Home Army was planning an all-national uprising against the German forces. Initial plans of 1942 created by the Polish government-in-exile assumed that the allied invasion of Europe would lead to German withdrawal of notable forces from the Eastern Front for the defence of the Third Reich. The Home Army was to start such an uprising to prevent troops transfer to the west and to allow the British and American forces to seize Germany by breaking all communication links with the majority of German forces massed in the Soviet Union.
However, by 1943 it became apparent that the allied invasion of Europe would not come in time and that with all probability the Red Army would reach the pre-war borders of Poland much sooner. In February, 1943, general Stefan Rowecki amended the plan. The Uprising was to be started in three phases. The first assumed the starting of an armed uprising in the East (with main centres of resistance in Lwów and Wilno), before the advancing Red Army. The second part was to contain armed struggle in the belt between the Curzon Line and the Vistula river, while the third part was to become an all-national uprising in the rest of Poland.
Polish-Soviet relations were broken off on April 25, 1943 due to the Katyn massacre and it became obvious that the advancing Red Army might not come to Poland as a liberator but rather, as gen Rowecki put it, Our Allies' Ally. On November 26, 1943 the Polish government in exile issued an instruction, which assumed that if the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would not be resumed before their entry to Poland, the Home Army forces are to remain underground until further decisions are made. However, the Home Army commander took a different approach and on November 30, 1943 the final version of the plan was created. It became known as the Operation Tempest.
The Soviet advance
The plan was intended both as a political manifestation of the influence of Polish Government in Exile and as a direct operation against German occupiers. The fear was that in the aftermath of the war the allies would ignore the legal London-based government. It was clear that Poland would be 'liberated' by the Red Army, and that the Soviet Union did not recognise the Government-in-Exile.
Initially, after the Red Army forces crossed the pre-war Polish borders, the local Home Army units were engaged in successful cooperation with the Soviets in liberating several towns and cities. However, in most cases after the struggle ended the Polish officers and members of local administration were caught by the NKVD and either shot or sent to Gulags and prisons in Russia. At the same time most of the Polish soldiers caught by the Soviets were given the choice of either joining the Soviet-backed Polish People's Army or sharing the fate of their officers.
Nevertheless, the Soviet advance was fast and the Polish authorities saw no other choice but to continue the struggle against the German forces and aid the Soviets. At the same time the government in London asked the SOE and the Foreign Office several times for an allied mission to Poland to be sent (such missions were already dispatched to all resistance movements in Europe, including Albania, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Yugoslavia). However, the pleas were not fulfilled until December 1944.
The official line of Soviet propaganda underlined that the Polish underground is "waiting with their arms at ease" and is not fighting the common enemy. As the Soviet forces were nearing Warsaw in June and July 1944, the Soviet radio stations demanded a full national uprising in Warsaw to cut the communication lines of the German units still on the right bank of Vistula. On July 29, 1944 first Soviet armoured units reached the outskirts of Warsaw.
Preparations
By the end of July Warsaw had been declared a Festung Warschau by the Germans. It was to be defended at all cost against the Soviet offensive. However, the July 20 Plot and the failed attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler made many German units withdraw westward through Warsaw. The Home Army saw it as a sign of defeat of the Germans. The number of German soldiers in the area was lowered significantly.
With the recent flood of reports from the eastern territories about forced demilitarisation, trials and execution of Home Army soldiers by the Soviets, on 21 July 1944 the High Command of the Home Army decided to expand the scope of the Operation Tempest to include Warsaw itself. Warsaw Uprising date was set to 1 August.
On July 27, the governor of the General Government, Hans Frank called for 100,000 Polish men between the ages of 17–65 to arrive at several concentration places in Warsaw the following day. They were to be employed at construction of fortifications for the Wehrmacht in and around the city. This move was viewed by the Home Army as an attempt to neutralise the underground forces and the underground urged Warsaw inhabitants to ignore it. Fearing German reprisal actions, general Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski ordered full mobilisation of Home Army forces in Warsaw area.
Opposing forces
The Home Army forces of the Warsaw District numbered about 50 000 soldiers of whom 23 000 were equipped and combat-ready. Most of them were trained for several years in partisan warfare and urban guerrilla war, but lacked experience in prolonged day fighting. The forces were ill-equipped, especially since the decision to include Warsaw in the Operation Tempest has been made on 21 July and before that weapons and men had been shuttled east of Warsaw.
On August 1 their state of arms was as follows:
* 1 000 rifles
* 1700 pistols
* 300 machine pistols
* 60 sub-machine guns
* 7 machine guns
* 35 anti-tank guns and carbines (including several PIATs)
* 25 000 grenades
The commander of Polish forces in Warsaw was general Antoni Chruściel, codename 'Monter'.
In the course of the fighting further arms were obtained through air drops and by capture from the enemy (including several armoured vehicles). Also, the insurgents’ workshops were busy all the while producing during the uprising: 300 automatic pistols, 150 flame-throwers, 40,000 grenades, a number of mortars and bazookas, and even an armoured car.
On August 1, 1944 the German garrison of Warsaw numbered some 10 000 troops under general Rainer Stahel. Together with various units on the left bank of the Vistula river the German forces were composed of some 15 to 16 000 Wehrmacht soldiers as well as SS and police forces. However, the German forces were well-equipped and have been preparing for defence of city's nodal positions for many months. Several hundred concrete bunkers and barbed wire lines protected the buildings and areas occupied by the Germans. Also, at least 90 000 additional German troops were present in the area.
The "W" hour
The 'W' hour has been scheduled for 1 August 1700 during a briefing on 31 July around 1730. The change of 'W' hour from 2400 (in earlier plans) to 1700 proved to be a costly strategic decision, reducing the chance of surprising Germans especially since many of the Polish partisans where not trained for prolonged day fighting. The order to start the uprising reached only some of the units (around 23,000 personel) due to organisational problems.
Boy-scouts fighting in the Uprising
First moves
In several places where German units have encountered organising Polish forces fights have erupted before the 'W' hour scheduled for 1700 (around 1400 on Żoliborz, 1500 on Czerniaków, 1600 around Plac Napoleona, Hale Mirowskich, Plac Kerclego, ul. Okopowa and Mokotów).
Until the 'W' hour those separate incidents have not been connected as a part of a bigger plan. However around 1600 SS-Standartenfuher Geibel, chef of police and SS in the Warsaw District, have received a warning about the uprising from an anonymous 'lieutand of Luftwaffe', who has in turn been warned about it by a Polish women. He has alarmed units under his command, which have thus been prepared for the assault at 1700. This has drasticly reduced the element of suprise of the insurgents.
On the other hand, while Germans have been considering the possibility of an uprisng, they had no operational plans prepared for such an occasion.
Area I (Śródmieście, Stare Miasto): Units in that area has captured most of their assigned territory, but failed in capturing most objects of military importance in its area. It has thus failed in creating a central stronghold and securing communications links for other areas.
Area II (Żoliborz, Marymont, Bielany): Units here have failed in securing Żoliborz. Many units has reatreated outside of the city, into the forests.
Area III (Wola): Units here have failed in securing its territory, sustaining heavy loses. Some units have rretreated into the forests, few have remained insinde the territory.
Area IV (Ochota): Units here have failed in securing its territory and retreated into the forests.
Area V (Mokotów): Some units have retreated into the forests, others have managed to capture parts of Dolny Mokotów, which was however severed from most communications routes to other areas
Area VI (Praga): The Uprising was also started on the right bank of the Vistula. The main task of the Area VI (Obwód VI) was to seize the bridges on the river and secure the bridgeheads until the arrival of the Red Army. It was clear that, since the situation was far worse than in other areas, there were no chance for any help from the outside. After some minor initial success, the forces of lt.col. Antoni Władysław Żurowski were badly outnumbered by the German forces concentrated there. The fights were halted and the Home Army forces located in the Praga area went underground. After the Soviets finally reached the right bank of Vistula on September 10, the officers proposed recreating the pre-war 36th 'Academic Legion' infantry regiment, however they were all arrested by the NKVD and sent to Russia for interrogation.
Area VII' (Powiat Warszawski): this area consisted of territories outside Warsaw city limits. Actions here have mostly failed to capture their targets.
Zgrupowanie Kedywu Komendy Głównej: those units have secured parts of Śródmieście and Wola, achieving most success alongside the units of Area I' in the first few hours.
Many primary targets where not achieved on the first and subsequent days. Those included the early plans to capture the PAST building and failed attacks on Okecie, Pola Mokotowskie and Warszawa Gdanska train station. The area held by the insurgents have been quickly reduced in scope and severed into independend strongholds.
63 days
The Uprising reached the apogee on August 4 when the Home Army soldiers managed to establish the frontlines in the Wola and Ochota districts. However, they failed to secure the bridges over Vistula or bridgeheads on the other side of the river. Also, there were still several German pockets of resistance inside of the Polish-controlled territory. Most notable of them were the PAST skyscraper, the bridgeheads and Headquarters of the police.
On that very same day SS general Erich von dem Bach was appointed commander of all the forces fighting with the uprising and began concentrating the newly arrived troops. These included Units of Dirlewanger, Schmidt and Reinefarth. The main aim of the German forces was to break through to the German bridgeheads and then cut off the Uprising from the river by attacking both southward and northward.
Wola Massacre
On August 5 the three German groups started their advance westward, along Wolska and Górczewska streets toward the main East-West communication line of Aleje Jerozolimskie. Their advance was halted, but the Reinefarth and Dirlewanger regiments started to carry out orders of Heinrich Himmler: behind the lines special groups of SS, police and Wehrmacht went from house to house shooting all inhabitants and burning their bodies. The aim of this policy was to crush the will to fight and put the uprising to an end without having to commit to the heavy city fights. In mass executions approximately 30 000 civilians were slaughtered. At the same time the Zośka and Wacek battalions managed to capture the ruins of Warsaw Ghetto and the Warsaw concentration camp. The area became one of the main communication links of the insurgents fighting in Wola with those defending the Old Town.
On August 7 the German forces were joined by the tanks with civilians being used as human shields. After two days of heavy fights they managed to cut Wola in two and reach the Bankowy square.
Until mid September, the Germans were shooting all captured insurgents on spot. The main protagonists of the drama were Oskar Dirlewanger and Bronislaw Kaminski, who committed the most cruel atrocities. After von dem Bachs arrived in Warsaw (August 7), it became clear that atrocities only stiffened the resistance and that some political solution should be found due to the small forces at the disposal of the German commander. The aim was to gain a significant victory to show the Home Army the futility of further fighting and make them surrender. This did not succeed, but from the end of September on, some of the captured Polish soldiers were treated as POWs.
Ochota
Simultaneously to German attack on Wola, the Kaminski Brigade started its onslaught on Ochota district. The forces defending the area consisted of only two ill-equipped battalions while the Germans were aided by tanks, artillery and Goliath self-propelled mines. However, the morale of German and Russian troops fighting in the area was low and the main aim of the soldiers fighting there was to loot and rape rather than attack enemy positions. Because of that the two battalions of the Home Army managed to defend the area with heavy casualties until August 11, when they retreated toward Mokotów.
Old Town
The Old Town area (Polish Starówka or Stare Miasto) was initially weak and almost undefended. However, it posed a great threat to the German-held bridgehead of the Kierbedź bridge. Also, the Polish positions were close enough to the northern railway line and the Cytadela stronghold to prevent the Germans from effectively using them. Knowing that the Germans planned to cut the Old Town both from the north (attack along the railway line toward Vistula) and from the south (attack from the Bankowy sq. Most Kierbedzia bridge). On August 9 the German units from the Mariensztat area managed to capture the Royal Castle, but failed to drive further inland. The Home Army counter-attacked and on August 12 forced the Germans out of Bankowy sq. However, German aerial bombardment and extensive usage of tanks imposed high casualties on both the defenders of the Old Town and the civilians. One of the first buildings to be bombed was a field hospital marked with a huge symbol of the Red Cross on the roof.
Royal Castle in Warsaw in 1944
A German attack from the north was also halted with heavy casualties on both sides. Heavy city fights started in the area of Plac Bankowy with the square and the nearby barricade at Tłomackie street changing hands several times. The Germans managed to establish a link with the German forces under siege in the building of the German Garrison (Mostowski Palace) on August 15, but the huge building became a scene of heavy door-to-door and room-to-room fights. The fights lasted until August 18 when both sides withdrew from the ruins.
The no-mans-land and the covering positions of the Polish defence lines were composed of Warsaw Ghetto ruins and big open areas of Kercelak sq., Żytnia street and Leszno street. The Home Army was not well enough equipped to withstand a German armoured attack in open field. However, the main positions in the Old Town were densely urbanised and covered with small, narrow streets. Because of that, after initial successes in taking the outer rim, the German advance was halted. However, Germans amassed large numbers of artillery for the constant bombardment of the area behind Polish lines. According to von dem Bach himself the number of guns used in the bombardment was as follows:
* 220 guns of various calibres
* 1 heavy mortar Thor 610mm
* 50 Goliath self-propelled mines
* one company of Nebelwerfer 42/43
* one battery of Wurfgranate of various calibres (ranging from 150mm to 320mm)
* 4 Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive-bombers operating from the Okęcie airport 1
One of the planes was shot down by Polish troops with hand guns on August 26.
The usage of heavy artillery and constant air bombardment (the planes from Okęcie airport needed only 5 minutes to reach their targets) was to inflict heavy casualties on the civilians and destroy the city itself. This aim was expressed in direct orders of Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler and Heinz Guderian.
Plan of sewer evacuation routes to Żoliborz and Śródmieście
Despite German both technical and numerical superiority, the Old Town was held until end of August. However, situation of both the Home Army and the civilians became critical: lack of food, water and munitions made further defence of the ruins impossible. Several plans to break through the German positions in Ogród Saski park to the downtown and through the northern railroad to Żoliborz failed. On September 2 the defenders of the Old Town withdrew through the sewers. More than 5.300 men and women were evacuated using this way.
Loss of Żoliborz and Stare Miasto
The front lines stabilised for a short while, but during the upcoming days and weeks the German counteroffensive would recapture Żoliborz and Stare Miasto, splitting the area hold by insurgents into three separate sectors, connected only by underground canals.
The sewers and the barricades
The city sewer system became an important communication network for the insurgents, who used the sewers to move under the areas occupied by Germans, thus allowing contact between surrounded positions (insurgents had almost no radios). Sewers were also used as a means of evacuation of areas that couldn't be defended any longer.
Life behind the frontlines
In the first weeks of the Uprising on Polish-controlled territory, people tried to recreate normal life in their free country. Cultural life was vibrant, with theatres, post offices, newspapers and similar activities.
Near the end of the Uprising, lack of food, medicine, overcrowding and obviously German indiscriminate air and artillery assault on the city made the civilian situation more and more desperate.
Composition of smaller fighting forces
Although the vast majority of insurgents in Warsaw were members of Armia Krajowa, there was a small number of fighters who weren't members of that organisation.
In the course of the Uprising some 1 700 members of other resistance organisations joined the Uprising. Those included the Armia Ludowa, Gwardia Ludowa and Narodowe Siły Zbrojne.
Although the vast majority of soldiers who took part in the Uprising were Polish, there were also members of other nationalities fighting alongside. Among them was a number of Hungarian deserters and Italian escapees from POW camps in Poland. Also, a number of RAF and USAAF airmen who were shot down over Warsaw and kept hidden from the Germans in various places by the Home Army joined the fights. It is believed that some 25,000 Jews were hiding in Warsaw before the Uprising. The vast majority of them died together with other Polish civilians. However, many Jews (possibly as many as 1 000), including those released by Home Army from the Warsaw concentration camp (Gęsiówka), joined the Home Army. During the final stage of the battle a number of Soviet soldiers (possibly as many as 1 000, most of them members of Polish units in Soviet army) also crossed the river and fought the Germans in Powiśle area. Airdrops were carried out by allied airmen from Italy, mostly by Poles, Canadians and the British.
International situation: Poland, Europe, World
In September the eastern part of Warsaw had been captured by the Soviets. In the Praga area Polish units under command of general Zygmunt Berling (thus sometimes known as 'berlingowcy' - 'the Berling men'), the 1st Polish Army (1 Armia Wojska Polskiego) were in position. On the night of 14/15th of September three patrols from landed on the shore of Czerniaków and Powiśle areas and made contacts with Armia Krajowa forces. Under heavy German fire only small elements of main units made it ashore (I and III battalions of 9th infantry regiment, 3rd Infantry Division). At the same time the commanders of the Red Army declined to support the Polish troops with artillery, tanks or bombers.
The Germans intensified their attacks on the Home Army positions near the river to prevent any further landings, which could seriously compromise their line of defence, but weren't able to made any significant advances for several days, while Polish forces held those vital positions in preparation for new expected wave of Soviet landings. Polish units from the eastern shore attempted several more landings, and during the next few days sustained heavy losses (including destruction of all landing boats and most of other river crossing equipment). Other Soviet units limited their assistance to sporadic and insignificant artillery and air support.
Shortly after the Berling landings, the Soviets decide to postpone all plans for a river crossing in Warsaw "for at least 4 months" and soon afterwards general Berling was relived of his command. On the night of September 19, after no further attempts from the other side of the river were made and the promised evacuation of wounded did not take place, Armia Krajowa soldiers and landed elements of Wojsko Polskie were forced to begin a retreat from the positions on the bank of the river.
Out of approximately 3000 men who made it ashore only around 900 made it back to the eastern shores of Vistula, approximately 600 of them seriously wounded.
The airdrops
From August 4 the Western Allies begun supporting the Warsaw Uprising with airdrops of munitions and other supplies. Initially the air raids were carried out mostly by the Polish bomber units stationed in Bari and Brindisi in Italy. Later on at the insistence of the Polish government-in-exile they were joined by South African and British units. The drops continued September 21. The total weight of allied drops was 104 tons.
Although German air defence over the Warsaw area itself was almost non existent about 12% of the 296 planes taking part in that operations were lost. Most of the drops were made during night, and poor accuracy left many parachuted packages stranded behind Polish-controlled territory.
Monument to the Allied airmen who lost their lives over Warsaw
The Soviet Union did not give permission to the Allies for use of its airports for those supply operations and thus the planes were forced to use bases in United Kingdom and Italy which reduced their carrying weight and range. From September 13 on the Soviets begun their own airdrop raids with supplies, and dropped about 55 tons in total. The drops continued until September 28. Since the Soviet airmen did not equip the containers with parachutes, the majority of recovered packages were damaged.
Aftermath
The capitulation
On October 2 General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski has signed a capitulation of remaining Polish forces (Warszawski Korpus Armii Krajowej or Home Army Warsaw Corps) in the German headquarters in presence of general von dem Bach. According to the capitulation treaty the AK soldiers were to be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention and the civilian population was to be treated humanely.
The next day the Germans begun to disarm the Home Army soldiers. Most of them were later sent to POW camps in various part of Germany. At the same time the civilian population (approximately 700 000) has been resettled to concentration camps west of Warsaw. Many soldiers, fearing German atrocities in captivity, chose to blend into civilian population, escape Warsaw among them and continue the fight later.
Destruction of the city
After the remaining population has been expelled, the Germans started the destruction of the remnants of the city. Special groups of German engineers were dispatched to the city in order to burn and demolish the remaining buildings. According to German plans, after the war Warsaw was to be turned into a lake. The demolition squads used flame throwers and explosives to methodically destroy house after house. They paid special attention to historical monuments and places of interest: nothing was to be left of what used to be a city.
By January 1945 85% of buildings were destroyed: 25% as a result of the Uprising, 35% as result of systematic German actions after the uprising, the rest as result of the earlier Warsaw Ghetto uprising (15%) and other combat including the September 1939 campaign (10%).
Material losses were estimated at 10 455 buildings, 923 historical buildings (94 percent), 25 churches, 14 libraries including the National Library, 81 elementary schools, 64 high schools, Warsaw University and Warsaw University of Technology, and most of the historical monuments. Almost a million inhabitants lost all of their possessions. The exact amount of losses of private and public property as well as pieces of art, monuments of science and culture is unknown. However, various estimates place it at an equivalent of approximately 40 000 000 000 1939 US dollars. The municipal council of Warsaw is currently disputing whether claims for German reparations should be made.
The legacy
Due to lack of cooperation and often the active aggressive moves on the part of the Soviets and several other factors, Warsaw Uprising and Operation Tempest failed in their primary goal - to free part of Polish territories, so that a government loyal to Polish government in exile could be established there instead of a Soviet puppet state. There is no consensus among historians if that was ever possible, and if those operations had other lasting effect. Some argue that without Operation Tempest and Warsaw Uprising, Poland would end as a Soviet republic, a fate definitely worse than that of independent puppet state, and thus the Operation suceeded at least partially in being a political demonstration to Soviets and Western Allies.
Reasons for failure
There are several factors responsible for the failure, although there is no consensus about all of them nor their relative importance.
One of the main reasons for the failure of the uprising was the lack of expected support from the Soviet Red Army. Soviet assistance to the Home Army on the eastern territories was limited to small collaboration on a tactical level at best, with common incidents of shooting or imprisoning of Home Army soldiers after the area was liberated. During the Warsaw Uprisng the Red Army stood on the other bank of the Vistula River and only elements from Polish 1 Armia Wojska Polskiego has attempted to make a crossing and received an artillery support. Soviet High Command had not allowed pilots from the RAF and Polish Airforces to use Soviet landing strips. After the initial radio and leaflet propaganda campaign, the Moscow-backed Wanda radio station remained silent until the very end of the fighting. It has been argued that the Soviets deliberately allowed the Germans defeat the AK in order to eliminate a force in Poland which would oppose the communist puppet government which the Soviets planned to install in Poland. This is consistent with Soviet latter treatment of many AK soldiers, who were usually imprisoned, tortured and executed.
The decision about the start of the Uprising can be viewed more as a political one (a demonstration to show Soviets and Western Allies that Polish governement in exile has control over the country) then a military one (since a military situation was worsening, as German troops in Warsaaw were being strenghtened and fortified). The decision to start the Uprising was rushed several times - first on 20 July, when plans for Operation Tempest were changed to include Warsaw (after the series of reports on agressive actions by Soviets towards Armia Krajowa units in the eastern territories), then on 31 July when exaggerated reports of closing Russian forces convinced some decision makers that if they don't start the Uprising soon it will be too late to aid the Russians and 'make a stand'. Due to this rushed change the plans, personel and ammunition available at the time of 'W' hour in Warsaw were not optimal.
"Liberation" of the ruins
After several months of watching the city die, the Red Army finally crossed the river on January 17, 1945. The ruins of the Festung Warschau were captured in several hours with little or no opposition from the Germans.
RIP to all of them, we'll remember their sacrifice