The annihilation of idf 87th armored battalion in 1973 war

[shelata]

The story of the annihilation of IDF armored battalion no 87th as stated here by the Israelies, clarifies lot of facts about the Yum Kippur War. It shows the high price which was paid by IDF during this war. The losses that were encountered by IDF extended till the End of Dec 1973. It shows as well that IDF canal crossing operation targetted surrounding both 2nd & 3rd Egyptian armies ( not the 3rd only) . It proves that till the ceasefire date of the 22nd of Oct, IDF could not achieve the armies surrounding targets which was fullfilled partially against the 3rd army on the 24th of OCT. IDF failed to apply the same against the 2nd army.
The fate of the 87th battalion is symbolic as it proves the success of the Egyptian army which is briefed in the following paragraph that was written by IDF history department:-



from the point of view of the State of Israel, the failure lay in the fact that the war was not
prevented and in losing it: the Arab states succeeded in forcing the IDF's withdrawal in the political settlements that came in the wake of the war and to achieve more than they would have had they not gone to war.


Here is the story:-
The battalion CO was Lieutenant-Colonel Ben-Zion (Bentzi) Carmeli, aveteran of the six day war. Company commanders were: "A" company - Captain Rafael (Rafi) Mitzafon, "B" company - Captain Rafael (Rafi) Bar-Lev, and "C" company - Captain Yigal Abiri. Captain Israel Zohar commanded the jeep company, "D".


The battalion consisted of 24 tanks - Patton M60A1 - and 36 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers. The unit underwent several weeks of rigorous training at "Ze'elim", the main army training facility, and participated three months later in a large divisional exercise. The former division CO, Major-General Shemuel Gonen (Gorodish) had been assigned GOC Southern Command and the new division CO was the former GOC Southern Command, Major-General (Res.) Ariel (Arik) Sharon.


In the morning hours of October 6th 1973 - Yom Kippur when it was clear to the General Staff and the government that war with Egypt and Syria was going to break out during the day, the reserve IDF units were mobilized including the 87th together with the entire 143rd armored division.

In the afternoon hours of October7th, the 87th assembled a few kilometers south-west of Tasa, on the road code-named "Akavish" (Spider), leading from Tasa to the north-eastern "corner" of the Great Bitter Lake and took up positions on a sandy ridge overlooking the area of Deversoir located to the North of the point where the Suez Canal joins the northern extremity of the Great Bitter Lake.

The next morning , October 8th, a counter-attack was launched by the Southern Command, lead by the 162nd armored division under the command of Major-General Adan, against the bridgehead of the Egyptian 2nd army. The initial reports which seemed to indicate success for the 162nd caused Southern Command to order General Sharon to move the 143rd armored division hastily southward in order to attack the Egyptian 3rd army. As this movement would leave a key area exposed, the deputy CO of the division, Colonel Jackie Even, after having obtained approval from General Sharon, ordered the 87th recon battalion to hold positions on the sandy hill area code-named "Hamadia" - an area controlling the designated future crossing point of the Suez Canal.


Positioned alone on the "Hamadia" sandy ridge, the 87th came under heavy attack by outnumbering Egyptian forces, and at 15:30 the tank of Lieutenant-Colonel Carmeli


was hit directly by a heavy mortar shell.


Carmeli, who was standing exposed in the turret, was killed instantly by shrapnel, and a tank platoon commander injured.

The 87th continued to hold the line, under the command of the CO of "A" company, Captain Rafi Mitzafon.



Later that day it became clear to Southern Command that the counterattack by General Adan's division had failed and General Sharon was ordered to turn the 143 rd back to its former position. Just at the right moment, the tanks of the 600th armored brigade, rushing at full speed, appeared in the "Hamadia" area to relieve the hard pressured 87th and to drive the Egyptians back. The 87th withdrew a couple of kilometers from the battle zone in order to reorganize.




On the evening of October 8th, while the 87th was refueling and rearming, a soft-spoken young major reported to the unit HQ. This was Yoav Brom, just having received his orders from the HQ of the 14th armored brigade to take over the command of the 87th which now had been attached to the brigade.





Yoav had been on vacation abroad when war broke out, and had returned to Israel on the first flight possible. His quiet professional attitude inspired everybody in the unit, which soon regained its fighting spirit in spite of the loss of their former and highly respected commander.




On October the 9th the 87th was ordered to perform a scouting mission after dark in order to locate weak points along the sector border between the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd armies. Finding such a corridor could be utilized in a future breakthrough to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and crossing and establishing of a bridgehead on the western bank.



In addition the 87th was ordered to locate, if possible, survivors from the IDF strongholds on the eastern Canal bank. At nighttime, after a long move in the dunes, the task force of three companies and medical and ordnance platoons reached the bank of the Great Bitter Lake. The enemy forces could be clearly observed, while the 87th remained undiscovered by the Egyptians.




Before dawn the 87th returned undisturbed through the dunes, completing a mission that was vital for the planning of the future breakthrough and crossing of the Canal.




On October 14th, shortly after sunrise, the Egyptian army launched an attack along the entire front line. The Egyptian 21st armored division, equipped with Russian T-62 tanks, attacked in the sector of the 143rd armored division.



In the ensuing battle the Egyptian forces were pushed back with heavy losses. At the end of the day 200 Egyptian tanks had been destroyed and the 143rd division lost 20 tanks. The tanks of the 87th battalion launched a successful counterattack against the southern flank



of the Egyptian division, inflicting serious damage and causing confusion in the enemy lines. But price paid by the 87th was heavy: seven warriors had been killed during the day and many more injured, including the commanders of "A" and "C" companies. They were replaced by two junior officers, Captain Assaf Avizohar ("A") and Lieutenant Itzik Kahana ("C").






Following the success in crushing the Egyptian attack, the 143

rd division issued battle orders, on the morning of October 15th, for Operation "Abirei Lev" (Hebrew for "Stouthearted" or "Knights of Heart"). The orders included:

1: To lead a storm attack on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal close to the northerntip of the Great Bitter Lake



2: To establish a bridgehead on the western bank of the Canal by the 247th paratrooper brigade crossing in rubber dinghies.


3: To expand the bridgehead by armored vehicles being ferried over the Canal by barges and special amphibious tank transporters.


4:To extend and expand the battle on the western bank by two more armored divisions crossing the Canal on floating bridges, in order to surround the two Egyptian armies on both banks of the canal.
The 87th, still attached to the 14th armored brigade, was ordered to lead the attack, taking advantage of its experience from the scouting mission on October 9th. Shortly before H-Hour, which was set at 1800 hrs, the commanding officer of the 14th Brigade, Colonel Amnon Reshef, addressed the warriors of the 87th.
He emphasized the importance of the unit's mission – to lead the brigade, the division,



Southern Command, and in fact the entire IDF in an attack that could (and indeed would) change the course of the war, transferring the battle into the enemy's homeland encircling the 3rd Egyptian army and launching pressure on the 2nd army, which was stuck in its October 14th position. The Colonel's address was recorded by a military correspondant attached to the 14th brigade and the recording has been preserved until today.



The 87th was ordered to reach the area designated for the launching of the Canal crossing by going westward along the sector border between the two Egyptian armies (the same path the unit had identified on its scouting mission), then northwards along the road that runs parallel to the Canal, and finally westwards towards the bank of the Canal in a three-****ged movement. "B" company was ordered to lead the unit and to take up the northernmost position, "C" company would follow and hold the center, and finally "A" company, accompanied by the medical and ordnanplatoons, would deploy in the southern position, in the actual area of the Canal crossing. Three tank and three paratrooper battalions were to follow the 87th and attack the southern flank of the 2nd Army. The paratroopers of the 247th brigade would follow to establish the bridgehead on the western bank of the Canal.
The initial phase of the operation caught the Egyptians by total surprise, and the 87th reached its designated positions undiscovered, receiving only sporadic and uncoordinated fire, mainly from small arms. Unluckily, one armor-piercing 5.56 mm bullet hit the APC of Captain Dov Dechter, injured him in the back of the neck and left "A" Company without deputy CO.







( continued in the following post)

[shelata]

By then, the Egyptian forces had recovered from the surprise, and the 184th tank battalion was met with heavy anti-tank fire and suffered severe losses, especially in the vicinity of the strategically important road junction "Tirtur-Lexicon". North of this junction and East of the Lexicon road was an area, traversed by numerous deep irrigation canals, nicknamed "The Chinese Farm". This was actually an experimental agricultural farm built before the Six Day War using Japanese equipment . When the Israeli forces reached this area after the 1967 war, the Japanese inscriptions on the equipment were mistaken for Chinese letters, hence the name. Holding the "Tirtur-Lexicon" junction and the surrounding key area, including the "Chinese Farm", was obligatory in order to control the transport of the heavy bridging equipment for the crossing of the Canal.
When it became clear around 0300 hrs on October 16th that "Tirtur-Lexicon" was still controlled by the Egyptians, the 87th was ordered to launch an attack on the junction from the west. Almost at the beginning of the attack the 87th came under heavy tank and missile fire. A small unit of four tanks and few APC's, lead by the battalion CO, Major Yoav Brom, did actually reach and pass the junction, but then his tank was hit and he was killed instantly. The tanks of the CO's of "A" and "C" companies were both hit, the one of "C" destroyed. The two company commanders were injured, but reached the medical platoon that had followed the tanks eastward on "Tirtur", and were treated and evacuated. Further to the north, "B" company, which had been ordered to join and assist the 79th armored battalion, had many casualties, including the company commander, Captain Bar-Lev who was killed when his tank was hit and exploded, the driver being the only survivor.


Dawn of October 16th found the unit fighting for its existence as a coherent combat unit. At that stage 87th had lost its commander as well as many officers in key positions and only few tanks remained serviceable. One APC, carrying injured soldiers from the night battle at the center section of the "Chinese Farm" to the unit's medical platoon situated on "Tirtur", was ambushed by the Egyptians, who killed all the defenseless wounded soldiers.
A transmission with a horrible significancewas broadcast over the battalion network by the battalion's deputy CO: "'Shikma' stations ('Shikma' was the battalion's call sign), this is Sunray Minor - who is still alive - report in order - over".
More than anything else, this one cruel sentence told the fate of the gallant warriors of the 87th. Altogether, 25 warriors were killed during the heroic night battle and scores were injured.
Later in the morning, a tank with a brigade commander's mark appeared in the area where the remaining vehicles of the 87 th had gathered. This was the tank of Colonel Reshef of the 14th brigade. After having assessed the situation, he decided to reassign the remaining warriors of the 87th to other units of the brigade.
From this moment, the morning of October 16th, the number "87" disappeared from the order of battle of the 143rd division and was erased from the boards of the Command Posts.
Nevertheless, the warriors of the 87th continued the fight within their new units, mainly the 184th and the 79th tank Battalions, until the cease-fire.
Five tanks (joined later by a sixth - "A" company's CO's tank that was hit and damaged during the night battle) - joined the 79th as "H" Company, and the remaining APC's including the medical platoon and most of the HQ company, joined the 184th..


On October 17th, "H" company, commanded by lieutenant Yair Litvitz, participated in a successful battle in the division's southern sector area against the 25th tank brigade of the Egyptian 3rd army trying to interfere with the Canal crossing.



On October 18th, the 184th battalion participated in the final and successful effort to gain control of the key area around the "Tirtur-Lexicon" junction, but the crews of the 87th again paid a price of 6 more APC warriors who were killed in this action.



On October 21st, the former CO of "A" company, Captain Rafi Mitzafon, who had been injured and evacuated to hospital from where he "escaped", was killed while serving as deputy CO of a battalion within the 600th brigade.



The dispersed warriors of the 87th continued the battle on the western bank of the Suez
Canal, almost reaching Ismailia, when cease-fire was announced on October 22nd at 1900 hrs..


In the last minutes before the fighting ceased, 3 tanks from the 87th, attached to the 48th paratroop battalion, were hit and burned in the southern sector of Ismailia, 4 crewmen being killed.


Several weeks later, the 87th was re-created as a light reconnaissance unit of the 143rd division, with APC's and jeeps, including jeeps carrying TOW anti-tank missile launchers. The new CO was lieutenant-Colonel Amatzia ("Patzi") Chen, a seasoned veteran who commanded the famous "Shaked" reconnaissance unit during the "War of Attrition" following the Six Day War. "Shaked" veterans and many of the 87th's warriors joined together to form this unit, that performed reconnaissance and patrols in the whole division sector.


During this activity, the 87th suffered its last casualty, a young APC driver who was killed by a direct hit by an anti-tank missile on December 12th.


A few days later Major Gdaliahu Bendor replaced Patzi as Unit Commander and served in this capacity until the withdrawal of IDF forces from Egypt and the inactivation and disbandment of the battalion. Thus, he became the last commanding officer of the 87th.


General Sharon wrote in a letter to the veterans of the 87th:
"At the moment of the cease cease-fire, when I was standing in the outskirts of Ismailia watching the last tanks of the 87



th burning, I saw before my eyes the unit's wariors as I saw them on the day of Yom Kippur. I remembered the expresion of resolve on their faces, and knew now that they had not failed. Many of them did not live to see the end of the war, but they were the men made the end , of the war possible. I have known many batalions throughout my military career; the 87th was among the finest.



PS ( I should add to the above that the Egyptian formations that participated in the subsequent annihilation of the 87th battalion included units of the 16th div, Paratrooper brigades 152, 182 together with Saaka groups 29, 39)

[GiladS]

Shelata, it would be nice if you could state your sources, especially in regards to the "quote" of the IDF history department.

As for the symbolism of the 87th Reconnaissance Battalion, I guess it's all in the eye of the beholder.

The battalion did sustain heavy losses on the 14th of October but as mentioned in your own post, this battalion was a part of the 14th Brigade of the 143th Division which almost completly eliminated the 1st and 14th Brigades (some 200-250 Egyptian T-62s destroyed or taken out of service) of the Egyptian 21st Armored Division on that same day.

You mention that the IDF partially achieved it's goals with the crossing of the Suez Canal. Well even so this partial achievement of crossing into Africa and "only" encircling the 3rd Army (tens of thousands of Egyptian soldiers who relied on Israel as not to starve or die of thirst) had snatched a decisive victory out of Egypt's hands.

P.S
I believe there's a picture laying around on the forum of the IDF medevac APC which was hit by Egyptian AT teams while evacuating wounded from the "Chinese Farm".

Other than that you have provided some very heroic stories about this battalion, again I'd be interested in the source which you used.

[GiladS]

Dawn of October 16th found the unit fighting for its existence as a coherent combat unit. At that stage 87th had lost its commander as well as many officers in key positions and only few tanks remained serviceable. One APC, carrying injured soldiers from the night battle at the center section of the "Chinese Farm" to the unit's medical platoon situated on "Tirtur", was ambushed by the Egyptians, who killed all the defenseless wounded soldiers.


http://img36.imageshack.us/img36/161/s20apc.jpg (http://img36.imageshack.us/i/s20apc.jpg/)

May their memory not be forgotten.

[shelata]

Shelata, it would be nice if you could state your sources, especially in regards to the "quote" of the IDF history departmentSorry. Here it is
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/the-yom-kippur-war-the-idf-version-1.34160


The battalion did sustain heavy losses on the 14th of October but as mentioned in your own post, this battalion was a part of the 14th Brigade of the 143th Division which almost completly eliminated the 1st and 14th Brigades (some 200-250 Egyptian T-62s destroyed or taken out of service) of the Egyptian 21st Armored Division on that same day The tanks losses of IDF on the Egyptian front may be equal or more than the Egyptian tanks losses. Between the 6th & the 9th of OCT, IDF lost more than 400 tanks. In the chineese farm Sharon declared that his division lost 100 Tanks. More, were destroyed in the subseuent days.
Sharon stated that in the night of the 17th of OCT his div lost 300 troops.


Other than that you have provided some very heroic stories about this battalion, again I'd be interested in the source which you used IT is an Israeili site. Here it is:-
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:2yFH-a11fxUJ:www.87th.org.il/

[GiladS]

Sorry. Here it is
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/the-yom-kippur-war-the-idf-version-1.34160


Thank you.



The tanks losses of IDF on the Egyptian front may be equal or more than the Egyptian tanks losses. Between the 6th & the 9th of OCT, IDF lost more than 400 tanks. In the chineese farm Sharon declared that his division lost 100 Tanks. More, were destroyed in the subseuent days.
Sharon stated that in the night of the 17th of OCT his div lost 300 troops.


According to '... Not on a Silver Platter: A History of Israel 1900-2000' By Prof Jehuda Wallach, some 360 IDF tanks were lost on the southern front. Egypt (including the expeditionary forces from Arab/Muslim countries within its ranks) had lost some 1,000 tanks.

Now this is a tricky issue because many tanks that were hit (especially I believe those hit by RPGs and Saggers) were taken out of service yet later on repaired and returned to fight, sometimes with the same crew or a new one.



IT is an Israeili site. Here it is:-
http://webcache.googleusercontent.co...w.87th.org.il/ (http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:2yFH-a11fxUJ:www.87th.org.il/)


Thanks again.

[GiladS]

To tell you the truth, it is my humble opinion that without the Yom Kippur War Egypt wouldn't have seriously considerd a land for peace agreement.

Though the results of the war were hardly a decisive victory for Egypt, they were enough to repair the sense of honor among the Egyptian population and boost Sadat's status as a leader.

This enabled him to enter direct talks with Israel and achieve a viable land for peace agreement. He would have never managed to enter talks at the much more inferior position Egypt held following 1967 and prior to 1973.

Had Israel managed to push back all Egyptian presence on the east bank of the Suez Canal (as it managed to push back the Syrians) we might have not had a peace agreement for many years to come or even until today, as is the case with Syria.

[Grahamr117]

Israelis may be some of the most valiant and effective soldiers in the world. However, they are not immortal....

[James]

Please fix the font.

[TheEvian100]

Thinking how The Sina *****ula was used as a buffer zone between the stongest Arab nation (Egypt) and Israel, I'd think it was complete overall israeli victory even after the 80's withdrawnal. Imagine if those battles were fought in Israel proper, there's a big chance the current map of the country would even include Negev and maybe much more land.

Also the fact that Sina right now is pretty much de-militarised, in an era of satellites and advanved intel, it only works in favor of Israel.

[wigon]

I have one observation regarding historical accuracy. The article mentions Captain Detcher being hit by a 5.56mm AP round. Arab forces certainly did not use this caliber of weapon and if it was friendly fire, I have not heard of any units being issued M16's or 5.56mm Galil's during this war. Please correct me if I am wrong but I've never seen any record of 5.56mm weapons being used during this war and that only the Galil was issued after the war in 1974. Could anyone shed some light on this? Were there some Galils being "combat-tested" during this war?

[wigon]

Thinking how The Sina *****ula was used as a buffer zone between the stongest Arab nation (Egypt) and Israel, I'd think it was complete overall israeli victory even after the 80's withdrawnal. Imagine if those battles were fought in Israel proper, there's a big chance the current map of the country would even include Negev and maybe much more land.

Also the fact that Sina right now is pretty much de-militarised, in an era of satellites and advanved intel, it only works in favor of Israel.

I don't think Israel should get too complacent about Egypt. The fall of the Mubaraks could easily lead to the rise of a popular anti-Israeli Egyptian leader who will use anger against Israel as part of his rise to power. If that happens, remember that Egypt is now armed with 800+ "monkey-model" M1A1 and A2 tanks. Although not quite as heavily armored as the US tanks, they are still very tough tanks to kill and they still have very accurate fire-control systems. That along with the vastly modernized Egyptian airforce, artillery and engineering corp, and Navy and you have a vastly more developed military then what Israel faced during the 1973 War. While the Sinai is a good natural buffer, it's still one that could be crossed quickly if a future Egyptian leader decided to scrap all peace agreements with Israel. Weapons such as the F-16C, MLRS, Apache gunship, Mirage 2000, Patriot SAM's (Yes they have Block 3 Patriots) and upgraded Russian SAM's are a far cry from the ancient crap mostly used by Syria. Combine that with their M1 Abrams, upgraded IFV fleet, updated ATGM's, and overall modernized Army and you have a hell of a tough enemy. I trained with them in 1997 (Operation Eastern Castle) and I was quite impressed with their professionalism, equipment, and level of training overall. I had expected to see a rag-tag army with poor discipline, but instead I saw well disciplined and well equipped soldiers who knew what they were doing (at least their engineers). It should also be noted that they no longer use Russian fighting doctrine, but instead train regularly with the US military and employ similar fighting doctrine. So no longer can Israel expect a combersome Soviet style fighting doctrine with no leadership at Jr. levels to exploit tactical advantages. They can mostly expect very competent jr. level armor commanders who have rehearsed again and again armor and combined arms tactics against opponents like Israel.

If anything shows that Israel should not rest on its laurels, it was the last invasion of Lebanon. If a bunch of guerillas with advanced ATGM could put a hurt on the IDF, imagine what Egypt could do if it was so inclined. I know most Israelis shrug this off, but it is no joke. If Egypt goes the Islamist path like Turkey is heading towards thngs could change very rapidly for Israel (as relations have with Turkey).

[G-AWZT]

What is a "monkey model"? As in so easy to use a monkey can operate it?

[FrankBooth0]

Monkey model tends to denote a downgraded version of something, with a Tank it is usually in the form of armor components and/or advanced systems.

[G-AWZT]

Monkey model tends to denote a downgraded version of something, with a Tank it is usually in the form of armor components and/or advanced systems.



Ah I see. Never heard of that term. Thanks.

[Mastermind]

Interesting details of that era of fighting.

I am always surprised at the current re-writing of history now affecting US broacasts on the war. One documentary practically gave Egypt the hands down victory. This was obviously done in order to get the Egyptian side of the events as a trade with the Egyptian officials lending access to records...(Yes. but, only if you show that Egypt won the war...Mmmmm?)

Well, be that as it may. The totality of the Israeli victory in owning the battlefield after the action...on all fronts and even into Egypt proper.....makes the truth quite obvious. But, the propaganda from the Muslim world is getting more and more invasive. I guess once you own the TV stations and publishing houses, you own the history, don't you?

[wigon]

Yeah I hated using that term myself but apparently it's the name everyone uses on this forum at least for downgraded tanks.
With the Egyptian M1A1 and A2 models it still leaves them with still extremely heavy steel/ceramic armor (minus Depleted Uranium), a very good fire-control system (said to be identical to American tanks), and a tungsten KE-WA1 AP round that is nothing to sneeze at as it's likely still more then capable of penetrating all but the most heavily armored Israeli armored vehicles. God only knows whether or not the Egyptians might also try to place ERA bricks on their Abrams like we do on our TUSK tanks.

Here's a propaganda video of Egyptian M1A1 tank production: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VtugN1ye1cY
(the reverb on the narrator is annoying as is the music)

Here's another propaganda video where at 0:39 you see the Oliver Hazard Perry class warship (old but still alot more lethal then old Russian junk). At 0:58 you see their F-16C fighter and at 1:09 is the HAWK SAM system (old, but still nasty with its PIP-3 upgrade which I believe Egypt has). Then at 1:58 you see their Patriot SAM batteries and at 2:27 an E-3 Hawkeye AWACS system (very very big threats to the IAF). At 3:04 note the infantry using PASGT kevlar helmets, M16A2 rifles, and heavy body armor then at 3:41 the Mirage 2000. Their were some other pics like the submarine but I couldn't tell what country they were from. At any rate, that's just a small sample of the huge range of advanced weaponry that they have accumulated since the peace agreement with Israel that gave them access to juicy American weapon systems. But like smart gamblers they hedge their bets by also buying alot of French equipment and still maintain alot of older but reliable Russian equipment (like the BTR-50, T-55, T-62, etc...) along with their own production line of armored cars and wheeled APC's. Other really old SAM's like their ancient SA-2's have been extensively updated as well as the basic system still has excellent range/altitude and thus is a good platform for modern guidance systems.

So if we were to see a repeat of something like the Yom Kippur War, by no means can Israelis simply dismiss Egypt as a bunch of stupid Arabs with inferior equipment. The technology gap is only slightly in Israel's favor now and like past wars, much will rely on the legendary tactical/strategic skills of IDF commanders.... something that is questionable as to whether the IDF still maintains.

A huge ACE in the hole will be American technical expertise to counter American made weapon systems as well as the Trophy and Iron Fist systems assuming that they work as advertised. Likewise the IAF is still probably the most powerful airforce in the region while their Navy is also quite powerful. Then of course you have Israel's nukes which are one very big reason for Egypt and other Arab nations to just leave Israel alone. Plus Egypt doesn't even want Gaza even though technically that was once Egyptian territory. lol But that again can shift depending on political climates. In other words it is a certainty that Egypt remains a viable threat against Israel despite the ban on heavy armor within the Sinai.

A few years back I spoke with one Egyptian General conducting a probe on Al-Qaeda activity in the Sinai and it seemed like they are not very interested in conflict with Israel and that their main focus now is on future wars with Sudan and other nations over water resources. Israel can only hope that this is the case and that it remains so.

[wigon]

Interesting details of that era of fighting.

I am always surprised at the current re-writing of history now affecting US broacasts on the war. One documentary practically gave Egypt the hands down victory. This was obviously done in order to get the Egyptian side of the events as a trade with the Egyptian officials lending access to records...(Yes. but, only if you show that Egypt won the war...Mmmmm?)

Well, be that as it may. The totality of the Israeli victory in owning the battlefield after the action...on all fronts and even into Egypt proper.....makes the truth quite obvious. But, the propaganda from the Muslim world is getting more and more invasive. I guess once you own the TV stations and publishing houses, you own the history, don't you?

I've never seen a US documentary showing Egypt winning the war. Most Egyptian accounts are based on General Shazli's accounts which even from many Israeli perspectives, are quite accurate. In many older documentaries about the Yom Kippur War they failed to show some of the horrific tactical defeats at the onset of the war as well as at the very end during the attempt to take Suez City. To show this isn't historical revision or at least not in an inaccurate sense as these events can all be verified from Israeli sources. One area of Israeli propaganda that later documentaries dispute for example is that Israel could have taken Cairo. That was pretty much out of the question as Suez City was but a small taste of the horrific urban combat Cairo would have required in order to take that city not to mention manpower that would have exposed their flanks to a defeated but not unbroken Syrian Army. Israel ran into the problem of heavy urban warfare in Lebanon getting bogged down in Beiruit. Even during Operation Cast Lead, never was all of Gaza City under the control of the IDF.

Anyways, with that said, yes of course there is a ton of stupid Arab propaganda saying Israel has lost all of the past wars, but at the same time you have to be careful not to swallow all of the Israeli propanda if you want to get at the truth of what really happened during these various conflicts. Bottom line is that the Israel should NEVER underestimate its enemies. That is something they have done since the Yom Kippur War and it has cost them many lives.
A big example of a critical shortcoming is in something rather simple.... rifle marksmanship. Now, without question the IDF has some of the toughest and most skilled CQB fighters of any Army. However I couldn't believe it when I heard that the IDF generally don't train to shoot their rifles past 100 meters (if even that). That blew my mind. Essentially they are wasting two thirds of the potential of a superbly accurate rifle like the new Tavor rifle (as well as their older M4 carbines).
Requiring IDF infantrymen to close-in within optimal range of AK carrying opponents is a recipe for higher casualties. Simple things like enhanced rifle marksmanship could make critical differences on a modern battlefield just as superb long-range tank gunnery skills made for a huge advantage in 1968 and 1973.
Anyways... I'm sure someone from the IDF will comment on these issues. Please do not take these comments as being anti-Israeli. I am not. So please Israeli STRONG!!!1! gang back down as I'm not hear to argue about politics or trade insults. I'm primarily interested in this topic from a historical perspective and from a military perspective to deconstruct and do critical analysis on regarding how the lessons of the Yom Kippur War reflect on today's events and projected possible conflicts.

[shelata]

I've never seen a US documentary showing Egypt winning the war.Not realy. Many ÚS documents point to the following facts:-
1- IDF could not restore it 5th of OCT Canal bank posts.
2- They could not push the 2nd Egyptian army back across the canal to its 5th of OCT lines.
3- The task of surrounding the 2nd army by General Sharon division was not fullfilled. The fate of Battlaion 87th is an example of General sharoon forces losses during the accomplishment of this mession.
4- They could not push the 3rd army back across the canal to its original lines.
5- They could not occupy Suez or Ismaeilia cities & suffered heavy losses till the last hour of fighting.
6- They succeded in surrounding the 3rd army by military actions that took place after the ceasefire decision acceptance by all parties. This was declared on the 22nd, while IDF was 40 to 50 Kms away from cutting the 3rd army supply routes. During the 23rd & 24th Adan division succeded in cutting these routes.
7- IDF failed to occupy the Egyptian army posts that were threatning the logistic supplies Sinai routes to thier troops on west of the Canal. With huge losses , IDF could occupied part of the chineese farm but failed to occupy Missouri site.
8- IDF accepted on the 27th of Oct to re-supply the trapped 3rd army with logistic supplies. Accordingly, they gained nothing out of the applied siege.
9- On the 18th of Jan 1947, ie 3 months after the easefire decision, IDF withdraw to lines located at 35 kms East to the Canal without mainting any political gain.
10- Egypt goals from launching this limited war is fullfilled on the 18th of Jan.


Here is a US document
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War
DAVID T. BUCKWALTER


http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/1973.pdf


WINNERS, LOSERS, AND LESSONS


Both sides claimed victory, and both sides had a reasonable case. Israel, after being

nearly overwhelmed, staged a remarkable comeback, conquering new territory in the north and isolating an entire field army in the south. By the “numbers,” Israel won the war. Israel suffered over 11,000 total casualties (2,800 killed) and lost over 800 tanks (400 of which were later repaired) and over 100 aircraft. The Arabs combined suffered over 28,000 casualties (8,500 killed), losing over 1,850 tanks and 450 aircraft.

53 While the Arabs lost more men and equipment, the impact on Israel with a smaller population was arguably more severe.

Despite the losses, Arab claims of victory are not farfetched. In the north, the Syrians and their allies had fought the Israelis to a standstill. In the south, Israel had isolated the Egyptian Third Army, but it is not clear that the Israelis could have protected their forces on the west bank of the canal from a determined Egyptian assault and still maintain sufficient strength along the rest of the front. In the final settlements, Syria essentially maintained the status quo ante, and Egypt regained the Suez Canal. Unquestionably the best argument for an Arab victory is the changed political situation. The Arabs had accomplished their goal of upsetting the status quo, and the 1973 war was a direct antecedent of the 1979 Camp David
Accords.
Trevor Dupuy sums up the issue well:
Thus, if war is the employment of military force in support of political objectives, there can be no doubt that in strategic and political terms the Arab States - and particularly Egypt - won the war, even though the military outcome was a stalemate permitting both sides to claim military victory.

[GB_FXST]

I've never seen a US documentary showing Egypt winning the war. Most Egyptian accounts are based on General Shazli's accounts which even from many Israeli perspectives, are quite accurate. In many older documentaries about the Yom Kippur War they failed to show some of the horrific tactical defeats at the onset of the war as well as at the very end during the attempt to take Suez City. To show this isn't historical revision or at least not in an inaccurate sense as these events can all be verified from Israeli sources. One area of Israeli propaganda that later documentaries dispute for example is that Israel could have taken Cairo. That was pretty much out of the question as Suez City was but a small taste of the horrific urban combat Cairo would have required in order to take that city not to mention manpower that would have exposed their flanks to a defeated but not unbroken Syrian Army. Israel ran into the problem of heavy urban warfare in Lebanon getting bogged down in Beiruit. Even during Operation Cast Lead, never was all of Gaza City under the control of the IDF.

Anyways, with that said, yes of course there is a ton of stupid Arab propaganda saying Israel has lost all of the past wars, but at the same time you have to be careful not to swallow all of the Israeli propanda if you want to get at the truth of what really happened during these various conflicts. Bottom line is that the Israel should NEVER underestimate its enemies. That is something they have done since the Yom Kippur War and it has cost them many lives.
A big example of a critical shortcoming is in something rather simple.... rifle marksmanship. Now, without question the IDF has some of the toughest and most skilled CQB fighters of any Army. However I couldn't believe it when I heard that the IDF generally don't train to shoot their rifles past 100 meters (if even that). That blew my mind. Essentially they are wasting two thirds of the potential of a superbly accurate rifle like the new Tavor rifle (as well as their older M4 carbines).
Requiring IDF infantrymen to close-in within optimal range of AK carrying opponents is a recipe for higher casualties. Simple things like enhanced rifle marksmanship could make critical differences on a modern battlefield just as superb long-range tank gunnery skills made for a huge advantage in 1968 and 1973.
Anyways... I'm sure someone from the IDF will comment on these issues. Please do not take these comments as being anti-Israeli. I am not. So please Israeli STRONG!!!1! gang back down as I'm not hear to argue about politics or trade insults. I'm primarily interested in this topic from a historical perspective and from a military perspective to deconstruct and do critical analysis on regarding how the lessons of the Yom Kippur War reflect on today's events and projected possible conflicts.

1. Urban warfare has been a problem for all militaries.

2. The IDF was plagued by hubris leading upto 1973. However, the Yom Kippur war dispelled that sense of hubris. The Yom Kippur war also demonstrated the inherent resillence of teh IDF despite the corrosive effect of hubris. Like any complex organization, the IDF has faced a number of institutional and culture challenges over its history. While hubris is always a dangerous trap, I do not think that post '73 issues can be solely attributed to hubris. I think that the lack of political vision, strategy, poor planning and doctrine, not hubris, were the prime problems in 2006. Still, 2008 demonstrates that the IDF was quick to adapt and the quiet in the North speaks to IDF deterence, despite 2006 shortcomings.

3. One of the more recent IDF vets can speak to marksmenship in the IDF today. But, back in my day, we did train on long range marksmenship. Back then, at a platoon level, we had DM's and snipers and generally dedicated one MAG for support. I'd be surprised if this is not the case anymore. Still, the threat picture has changed and is much more complex today. Then, the majority of training was on traditional conventional warfare, with less emphasis on asymmetrical/CQB training. Today, the IDF must balance its training resource for both traditional conventional wars and asymmetrical battles. The reality is that the latter is more likely, and may thus take priority. Today, it may very well make sense to concentrate on CQB and assume that support weapons/arms will contend with longer range threats.






Not realy. Many ÚS documents point to the following facts:-
1- IDF could not restore it 5th of OCT Canal bank posts.
2- They could not push the 2nd Egyptian army back across the canal to its 5th of OCT lines.
3- The task of surrounding the 2nd army by General Sharon division was not fullfilled. The fate of Battlaion 87th is an example of General sharoon forces losses during the accomplishment of this mession.
4- They could not push the 3rd army back across the canal to its original lines.
5- They could not occupy Suez or Ismaeilia cities & suffered heavy losses till the last hour of fighting.
6- They succeded in surrounding the 3rd army by military actions that took place after the ceasefire decision acceptance by all parties. This was declared on the 22nd, while IDF was 40 to 50 Kms away from cutting the 3rd army supply routes. During the 23rd & 24th Adan division succeded in cutting these routes.
7- IDF failed to occupy the Egyptian army posts that were threatning the logistic supplies Sinai routes to thier troops on west of the Canal. With huge losses , IDF could occupied part of the chineese farm but failed to occupy Missouri site.
8- IDF accepted on the 27th of Oct to re-supply the trapped 3rd army with logistic supplies. Accordingly, they gained nothing out of the applied siege.
9- On the 18th of Jan 1947, ie 3 months after the easefire decision, IDF withdraw to lines located at 35 kms East to the Canal without mainting any political gain.
10- Egypt goals from launching this limited war is fullfilled on the 18th of Jan.


Here is a US document
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War
DAVID T. BUCKWALTER


http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/1973.pdf



WINNERS, LOSERS, AND LESSONS


Both sides claimed victory, and both sides had a reasonable case. Israel, after being

nearly overwhelmed, staged a remarkable comeback, conquering new territory in the north and isolating an entire field army in the south. By the “numbers,” Israel won the war. Israel suffered over 11,000 total casualties (2,800 killed) and lost over 800 tanks (400 of which were later repaired) and over 100 aircraft. The Arabs combined suffered over 28,000 casualties (8,500 killed), losing over 1,850 tanks and 450 aircraft.

53 While the Arabs lost more men and equipment, the impact on Israel with a smaller population was arguably more severe.


Despite the losses, Arab claims of victory are not farfetched. In the north, the Syrians and their allies had fought the Israelis to a standstill. In the south, Israel had isolated the Egyptian Third Army, but it is not clear that the Israelis could have protected their forces on the west bank of the canal from a determined Egyptian assault and still maintain sufficient strength along the rest of the front. In the final settlements, Syria essentially maintained the status quo ante, and Egypt regained the Suez Canal. Unquestionably the best argument for an Arab victory is the changed political situation. The Arabs had accomplished their goal of upsetting the status quo, and the 1973 war was a direct antecedent of the 1979 Camp David


Accords.

Trevor Dupuy sums up the issue well:





Thus, if war is the employment of military force in support of political objectives, there can be no doubt that in strategic and political terms the Arab States - and particularly Egypt - won the war, even though the military outcome was a stalemate permitting both sides to claim military victory.








Sure Egypt won the war ... except for the facts that ...

- It could not prevent the IDF from invading the West Bank
- It could not expel the IDF from the West Bank
- It could not advance beyond its beach-head on the East Bank
- It could not regain the Sinia without recognizing Israel and signing a peace-treaty

But otherwise, a resounding and overwhelming victory for sure.


Look, we can go in circles on this issue forever.

Have you read and really undestood Dupuy's quote? 1973 was not an unequivocal militray victory for Egypt. On some level, Clausewitz's dictum is turned on its head, as in this case, diplomacy was a continuation of warfare: What Egyot could not gain militarily; they gained diplomatically.

So yes, Egypt regained the Sinai. But, claims that it was some sort of glorious EAF victory or humiliating IDF defeat are simply wrong. Egypt paid a high price, militarily and politically, to regain the Sinai. The military price was so high that futire military conquest of the Sinai, let alone destruction of Israel, was no longer a viable future option. The price paid for the Sinai does not make for a glorious military victory.

Conversely, the benefits to Israel of 40 some years of peace outweigh the cost of relinquishing the Sinai. By that logic, '73 is an Israeli victory too as the war forced Egypt to sign a peace treaty.

So, you can accpet the fact that 1973 was something less than a great EAF victory.

Or, you can start another thread in 2 or 3 weeks trying to make your unsustainable points ... and we will have this conversation all over again.

[wigon]

Regarding IDF marksmanship, I was not speaking of DM's and FN-MAG gunners, but rather every rifleman. For example, in the US Army, every single soldier whether they be cooks or special operations, trains to shoot their standard issue rifle out to 300 meters. For the USMC they train out to 500 meters. Even in urban combat it's not uncommon for engagements to take place past 100 meters. While true, the DM or MAG gunner can be called into deal with the threat, this is a rather limited option when dealing with multiple targets, some of whom may be equipped with SVD rifles and PKM's. In essence, due to lack of long range proficiency, an infantry squad can find themselves very quickly at a disadvantage with only one DM per squad and only a platoon MAG gunner. Likewise a support unit may not have DM's or MAGs to call upon and might have to rely on standard issue rifles or hope that they have armor, air, or artillery support at their disposal. Having armor, air or artillery support should never be taken for granted. Furthermore in much of Lebanon the terrain is advantageous for long range marksmanship with large open fields and large hills. To me it seems like something that would require a minimal of extra financial expenditure by the IDF to improve and only slightly more time alotted for training.
That's why it just really surprises me that the IDF has refused to acknowledge the fact that they are not taking advantage of at least 2/3's of the accurate range of their weapons. This makes me wonder if Hezbollah trains any differently with their M4 and M16 rifles compared to their soldiers who are equipped with AK47's. That would be interesting to find out. Call me crazy, but if I'm given a more accurate weapon, I'm going to want to reach out and touch someone as far away as possible so as to minimize my chances of getting shot.

It reminds me of when I was a M60 gunner in my old unit in the 90's and they switched us to M249 SAW's. The M249 was ok, but I REALLY missed the insane long range accurcy of my old M60. I regarded them taking out the M60's (and not replacing them with M240's) as very foolish. Likewise if I had been told that we were no longer doing range shooting out past 100 meters I would have thought that the Army had gone insane as many guys in my unit (including myself) could hit consistently at 300 meters with no problems using the M16A2. Everyone could hit at 200 meters with no problems.
Maybe it is just an issue of optics? I've never used aim-point sights or reflex sights, but from what I understand they are inferior to iron sights for long range shooting and instead are optimized for close quarters combat. Maybe this is the case. But if so, I would hope that at the very least Negev gunners are given the chance to practice on targets past 100 meters if they are using iron sights. On the M249 SAW (similar to the Negev as it is belt-fed and 5.56mm) we trained out to 300 meters and again, it was not a major problem hitting those targets if the sights were zeroed properly.

So anyhoo... it's just an interesting issue and it won't effect me one way or another. I point it out more as something that a professional soldier in the IDF should think about if they are not given the opportunity to train to their fullest potential on their particular weapon system. Move up to something like the FN-MAG and that baby should be able to easily hit out to 600 meters and in skilled hands, out to 800 meters on a two-infantrymen sized pop-up target. This again was something I was able to do with the M60 7.62x51mm belt fed machine gun (similar to the FN-MAG).
The man receiving the marksmanship award on the top pic of this site can verify this. (SFC R. Moore):
http://www.ammoland.com/2010/03/01/army-reservist-claims-all-army-championship/
If anyone knows him, just ask him if he remembers a guy in his old reserve unit knick-named "Rambo" in his squad in 1st GC. Hehehe. He was my assistant gunner on the M60 and acted as my spotter verifying the fall of my tracer rounds using binoculars.
I only mention this because people always call B.S. when I tell them that a good belt-fed 7.62x51mm MG should with a good gunner can hit targets out to 800 meters. At 600 meters it is just devestating.
But again...if a gunner is never allowed to shoot past say 300 meters with that type of weapon, he will never know the true potential of his weapon system and the same goes with rifles if they are not allowed to shoot past 100 meters during training.

[GB_FXST]

^^^^

I am sure that others will share their thoughts and opinions on the subject marksmenship in the IDF today.

I carried a MAG, and I agree it is a very accurate platform. 7.62 NATO combined with that long heavy barrel is a good match.

During training, us MAGists were able to make some pretty long shots. At times, we competed with our platoon snipers. Still, I cannot honestly remember if we were hitting targets beyond 600 meters. I think so, but am not certain. Still, I have no doubts to the accuracy or lethality of the MAG at those ranges.

[gaijinsamurai]

133517
I have one observation regarding historical accuracy. The article mentions Captain Detcher being hit by a 5.56mm AP round. Arab forces certainly did not use this caliber of weapon and if it was friendly fire, I have not heard of any units being issued M16's or 5.56mm Galil's during this war. Please correct me if I am wrong but I've never seen any record of 5.56mm weapons being used during this war and that only the Galil was issued after the war in 1974. Could anyone shed some light on this? Were there some Galils being "combat-tested" during this war?

I have read that the design of the Galil dates back to the 1960's, but I don't think any were issued to IDF units by the time of the 1973 war. If I'm wrong, I would appreciate a correction, and even better, photos!
AFAIK, the FAL was still standard issue to infantrymen, with Uzis issued to artillerymen, armored crews, etc.

[gaijinsamurai]

Question for the Israelis, or others in the know:

I'm reading Ariel Sharon's autobiography, and in the chapters about the Yom Kippur War, Sharon expresses a lot of frustration towards Shmuel Gonen, the Southern Front commander.

When studying military history, I always try to diversify my sources of info. How accurate is Sharon's description of Gonen as an incompetent commander? Was Sharon letting personal rivalries or biases influence his assessment, or was he correct?

[Kaplanr]

Gorodish (his nickname) is the military example of the Peter Principle at work. On paper he was the outstanding commander of the also outstanding 7th Armoured Brigade during the 6 Day War and led the brigade in its breakout from Rafiah across Sinai to the canal. So the first question is, was the performance of the 1967 7th a result of his work, or his immediate predecessors - "Bren" Adan, Herzl Shafir and "Chich" Lahat?

In all fairness he was only CO of Souther Command for 3 months when war broke out, but all the evidence indicates he wasn't able to deal with strategic (and tactical) setbacks confronting the IDF in Sinai. Obviously Dado Elazar and Moshe Dayan felt the same way since they appointed Chaim Bar-Lev first as an "advisor" to Gonen, and then made Bar-Lev the CO of Southern Command keeping Gonen as his Chief of Staff. Not a vote of confidence by any yardstick.

IMHO, I think Sharon overstates his contributions to the ultimately successful efforts by the IDF to stop the Egyptians. I think he was an outstanding and brilliant tactical commander (on the ground fighting,) but I have reservations about his strategic abilities, up to and including understanding the realities on the ground. His insistence on an immediate crossing of the canal was unrealistic until the Egyptians on the East Bank had been contained and neutralized. To me the real hero of the IDF in Sinai was Avraham "Bren" Adan, former CO of the Armoured Corps, and then Co of the 162nd Div. If you have a chance, read his recounting of the war - On the Banks of Suez. To me, the differences between Sharon and Adan, are the sane as those between say, Patton and Bradley (though Sharon never reported to Adan.)

[gaijinsamurai]

Thanks, Kaplan!

It would be cool if Adan's book is available in English.

btw: Is "Adan" a common surname in Israel? When I was a university student, I knew a guy with that last name, whose dad was Israeli.

(I also know a woman with the last name "Livny". I asked her if she's related to the former Foreign Minister, and she said she didn't think so.)

[Kaplanr]

Can't say I ever ran across any Adans. I'd love an authoritative answer to how he became known as "Bren". Other than dating from WWII, I never found out why, or if it's for an obvious reason.

[gaijinsamurai]

If I see the guy (last I heard, he was working for the Oregon State Legislature), I'll ask him. He's a nice guy, but super-politically correct, and may not have any interest in military history.

[Marsh]

Hi,

Bren Adan's book is, or at least was, available in English as I have read it. Kaplanr analysis of Adan'ss contribution in Sinai compared to that of Sharon is spot on.

I think he got the nickname Bren from his role carrying the weaapon in the Palmach, bbut could be wrong.

Cheers
Marsh

[gaijinsamurai]

^
Thanks, Marsh! Actually, I ordered Adan's book last night, from Amazon. $6.50+shipping for a used hardcover, in "very good" condition!

[Kaplanr]

Back to Sharon for a minute. I did admire his being in the thick of it during 73, though I think that proves my point about his tactical abilities v. strategic sense. Maybe he could claim that since he was no longer CO of Southern Command he gets a bye, now he was just a reserve divisional commander. To his credit he was one of the architects (the others being Israel Tal and Avraham Yoffe,) of the textbook assault on Abu-Agheila, rapidly improvising the movement of his brigade as new information on Egyptian dispositions became available.

To me, his real mark was doing for the infantry and paratroops in the 50s what Israel Tal did for the Armoured Corps. in the 60s. He instilled by example and doctrine a sense of professionalism, standards and expectations. I found it odd that he and Shimon Peres always managed to overcome their political differences and respect each other's contributions to the state.

[gaijinsamurai]

Back to Sharon for a minute. I did admire his being in the thick of it during 73, though I think that proves my point about his tactical abilities v. strategic sense. Maybe he could claim that since he was no longer CO of Southern Command he gets a bye, now he was just a reserve divisional commander. To his credit he was one of the architects (the others being Israel Tal and Avraham Yoffe,) of the textbook assault on Abu-Agheila, rapidly improvising the movement of his brigade as new information on Egyptian dispositions became available.

To me, his real mark was doing for the infantry and paratroops in the 50s what Israel Tal did for the Armoured Corps. in the 60s. He instilled by example and doctrine a sense of professionalism, standards and expectations. I found it odd that he and Shimon Peres always managed to overcome their political differences and respect each other's contributions to the state.

Sounds a lot like Napoleon's Marshall Ney, in regards to his being a better tactical, rather than strategic commander, and wanting to be in the thick of things (read about Ney's actions during the Retreat from Moscow and at Waterloo).

Speaks well of him that he was able to work well with Peres. My personal opinion is that neither Sharon nor Peres were quite the ideoligical extremists they were made out to be. Sharon took a lot of heat, much of it deserved, for his heavy hand in Gaza, the 1982 Lebanon War, Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories, and actions that some say provoked the 2nd Intifada. But on the other hand, he came to realize the necessity of trying to resolve the conflict by political means, and did have a sense of concern for the well-being of the Palestinians in the occupied territories.

Likewise, Peres is seen as a dove, but a lot of people don't realize that as an IDF colonel, he was instrumental in procuring a lot of the armaments needed by the Israeli Defense Forces in the early years.

[Sumadinac]

I don't understand this arab obsession to always desperately try to find "victories" in their defeats... Its a really bizarre attitude that I cannot understand.. It seem that they have a so high opinion of themselves that their defeats always can be explained by plots or some other various reasons, but they always find excuses, it is never simply because they failed and they were just wrong.

[GiladS]

Likewise, Peres is seen as a dove, but a lot of people don't realize that as an IDF colonel, he was instrumental in procuring a lot of the armaments needed by the Israeli Defense Forces in the early years.

Peres never held a military rank as he was never drafted.

He did however hold a key position in the Ministry of Defense and as such was responsible for forging strong relations with France and the establishment of an aerospace industry in Israel.

[gaijinsamurai]

Thanks for correction, Gilad. my mistake. I'm not sure why, but for some reason, I thought he held the rank of colonel at one point. Either I mistook him for someone else and my memory is bad, or my sources were mistaken. Probably the former. Anyways, my main point was that he did a lot towards building the IDF's inventory of foreign-acquired weapons systems, and as you pointed out, helped forge strong relations with France.

[GB_FXST]

Peres never held a military rank as he was never drafted.

He did however hold a key position in the Ministry of Defense and as such was responsible for forging strong relations with France and the establishment of an aerospace industry in Israel.

He is also a central fugure in the nuclear program a product, in part, of the alliance with France.

[GiladS]

He is also a central fugure in the nuclear program a product, in part, of the alliance with France.

That's a given.

[sheytanelkebir]

I don't understand this arab obsession to always desperately try to find "victories" in their defeats... Its a really bizarre attitude that I cannot understand.. It seem that they have a so high opinion of themselves that their defeats always can be explained by plots or some other various reasons, but they always find excuses, it is never simply because they failed and they were just wrong.

Indeed, your observations are very true.
However I am rather surprised that you don't understand this particular obsession.

Perhaps the attitude to this particular "part" of the, then, ongoing egypt-israel conflict, as mentioned already, is that as a result of the 1973 "shock" to Israel (regardless of the eventual Israeli military comeback) resulted in both giving Sadat the popular mandate to seek peace from a position of strength (relative to the humiliating position of 1967), as well as Israel wishing to reduce the size and axes of its enemies...

it turned out well for both. So everyone's a winner in the end!

[Lokos]

I don't understand this arab obsession to always desperately try to find "victories" in their defeats... I

We Serbs have done the same thing throughout our history.

As does pretty much any side that has ever suffered defeat. I understand what you're saying, sort of, but the fact that the Egyptians performed far better in 1973 than in 1967 is probably the outstanding reason why there has not been a war between Egypt and Israel since.

L.

[Sumadinac]

We Serbs have done the same thing throughout our history.

As does pretty much any side that has ever suffered defeat. I understand what you're saying, sort of, but the fact that the Egyptians performed far better in 1973 than in 1967 is probably the outstanding reason why there has not been a war between Egypt and Israel since.

L.

I don't really know who are these serbs but they surely lives in twilight zone, and I don't know personnally any of them. For me and family/friends/etc, war in Krajina was a TOTAL defeat, same for Kosovo, only war in bosnia leaded to a relative success. From what I've heard and read, I can honestly say that serbs are way more rational than arabs about their fate. It must just be a question of instruction and education imo, the more you're educated, the more you're able to question yourself and admit your failures.

[GB_FXST]

We Serbs have done the same thing throughout our history.

As does pretty much any side that has ever suffered defeat. I understand what you're saying, sort of, but the fact that the Egyptians performed far better in 1973 than in 1967 is probably the outstanding reason why there has not been a war between Egypt and Israel since.

L.

Not sure I understand your point. The Syrians fought better in '73 too, and there was another war in '82. Also, do not forget the importance of Camp David to Israel-Egyptian relations.

[Sumadinac]

Not sure I understand your point. The Syrians fought better in '73 too, and there was another war in '82. Also, do not forget the importance of Camp David to Israel-Egyptian relations.

I think that he just said that because they were not defeated as fast in 73 as they were in 67, it can explain the feeling of relative "victory" of many egyptians, but finally, it is still a defeat, whatever they like it or not.

[GB_FXST]

I think that he just said that because they were not defeated as fast in 73 as they were in 67, it can explain the feeling of relative "victory" of many egyptians, but finally, it is still a defeat, whatever they like it or not.

If you are saying that behind the facade of "victory", Egypt (more precisely, Sadat) came to the realization that a military conquest of Israel (let alone Sinai) was not possible after all of the advantages of '73 - then, yes, I agree.

I think that '73 proved the futility of further war and set the stage for Camp David.

[Sumadinac]

If you are saying that behind the facade of "victory", Egypt (more precisely, Sadat) came to the realization that a military conquest of Israel (let alone Sinai) was not possible after all of the advantages of '73 - then, yes, I agree..

That's what I believe too, and I'll add that, where the egyptian can see one "victory", I rather see two defeats for egypt;

- One of the primary objective was the destruction of the state of Israel with the participation of an arab coalition, as they tried in 67: FAIL.

- If the destruction of Israel couldn't be done again, the liberation of Sinai would have appeared as a natural secondary objective imo, and even in this case: FAIL, again.

Liberation of Sinai was done years after, but that was not part of the war, it is a consequence of the war, and not even a direct consequence, because it was done years after 73, and also, it happened only because Israel wanted. Not because of any egyptian military action. If the israeli wanted to keep the Sinai, it would be still a part of Israel today.

So I persist and sign, the egyptians must be really schizophrenic to see any victory about 73' war, I won't mention that, when someone occupy a part of your territory, and give it back to you later, following an agreement and not a military action, it is not a victory, it is just a restitution, because in fact, you don't earn anything more.

[Indiana Jones]

I don't really know who are these serbs but they surely lives in twilight zone, and I don't know personnally any of them. For me and family/friends/etc, war in Krajina was a TOTAL defeat, same for Kosovo, only war in bosnia leaded to a relative success. From what I've heard and read, I can honestly say that serbs are way more rational than arabs about their fate. It must just be a question of instruction and education imo, the more you're educated, the more you're able to question yourself and admit your failures.
Lokos can certainly speak for himself, but I think what he alludes to is the construction of the Kosovo myth with its heavily soteriological narrative, ie. Lazar choosing heavenly over worldly kingdom etc, thus attaining spiritual supremacy in the face of defeat.
Although of course, for what little we know, the actual battle was tactically inconclusive.
Regards,
IJ.

[Lokos]

Not sure I understand your point

It's simple enough. The 'restoration of Arabic honor' has been a huge narrative in the Egyptian constructions of the Yom Kippur War. The simple fact that they performed to a higher level in 1973, when compared to 1967, means that the revanchist diatribes of yesteryear could gently be laid to rest.


I don't really know who are these serbs but they surely lives in twilight zone, and I don't know personnally any of them. For me and family/friends/etc, war in Krajina was a TOTAL defeat

You don't know any Serbs who make excuses for our defeats? None of your friends/family/etc ever said 'if we weren't stabbed in the back by Milosevic, we could have held the Krajina'?

What about:

'We wouldn't have lost in Bosnia if only the Croats/Muslims weren't resupplied by Germany/Iran/NATO/whoever' - never heard that one?

Or:

'We didn't actually lose the Bosnian War. Look how many more Muslim soldiers died. And we still held more territory, at the end of the war. In fact, they could never have beaten us, really.' - ?

Or:

'We were smashing the KLA, and then the Americans showed up. If they hadn't, we would have won.' -?

If we go further back...

'Look how we defeated the Austrians in 1914 and 1915! If only the treacherous Bulgarians didn't backstab us, we could have done it again!'

IJ already pointed out the Kosovo myth, which is the single finest example of this attitude.

It's not that the more recent examples didn't have a shred of truth to them. I'm merely pointing out that we, too, look for some level of victory in defeat. Be it moral, tangible or otherwise.

Believe it or not, so does everyone else. So your astonishment at the Egyptian approach to this sort of thing is misplaced. It is human nature to take positives even from ruinous disaster.


that serbs are way more rational than arabs about their fate. It must just be a question of instruction and education imo, the more you're educated, the more you're able to question yourself and admit your failures.

That's a dangerous sort of generalization, there. And a bit arrogant, too. I do not mean to cause offense by saying so.

L.

[Sumadinac]

Lokos, I agree with you, but the difference between us and egypt, is that our modern forces faced NATO 2 times in one decade, and it must be said that it is pretty hard to win when a coalition like NATO is against you, so even if I agree that the temptation to use this as an excuse is pretty high, I'm not the kind of guy that hide behind such arguments, fact is that, to the final, we loosed, so our anger.

On the contrary, Egypt loosed 4 times, against a only few millions nation, as a member of HUGE coalitions, it wasn't really our case when we were at war in the 90's, where all the neighborhood and NATO were against us. Where we can find excuses (even if as I said, it doesn't change the result), the egyptians certainly can't.

And anyway, to say that we were alone against the whole western armies in Kosovo, or that Krajina was lost because Milosevic betrayed us, are not excuses, it is just about explaining the reasons of these defeats, I never read a serb saying that we were about etirely annihilating NATO forces or some twisted stories like egyptians can say about IDF.....

[sheytanelkebir]

sumadinac, I've been to egypt and have worked with many egyptians. none of the egyptians I've met ever claimed that egypt was "victorious" in any of its wars against israel, nor does egyptian media claim such a thing (at least none that i saw). on the contrary the "opposition" media says that the lily-livered mubarak and their cohorts are the reason they can never defeat israel... and the pro-government media says "we have to make peace with israel because we can't beat them" ... so none of the discourse alludes to any "victories".

In 1967 Egypt had a massive loss, and it resulted in gamal abdel naser resigning in shame (along with all the top military commanders of egypt), that doesn't really indicate some sort of mass-delusion on their part... (milosevic certainly never resigned after over-seeing "yugoslavia" chopped up to a quarter of its old self, economic collapse, hyper inflation etc...).

Nasser only survived 1956, because the US/USSR intervention humiliated the french-english-israeli alliance, and gave him the "political" victory over their agression (and also signaled the fall from "empire" of those two countries, which was a very powerful symbolic end to their empires).

politics and war are simply different facets of the same conflict and must be taken as a whole. War is not a football match with a black-white winner and loser. The end result is what really matters ;)