Pep's Bandit
08-02-2004, 07:12 PM
I got this interesting artical off of isayeret.com
While it was never officially admitted, several IDF elite SF teams took active yet covert part in the Desert Storm campaign, Persian Gulf, 1991.
In August 2, 1990, the Iraqi armed forces invaded Quait and declared it as an integral part of the Iraqi state. Soon afterwards the U.S. called for the Iraqi retreat from the area, formed a very fragile coalition with several European as well as Arab countries, and started mobilizing troops and equipment to the region.
Like in the 1973 Israeli-Arab Yom Kippur War, the Israeli intelligence was caught off guard and without any worthwhile intelligence sources in the region. In order to fix that, several field agents from the Mossad - the Israeli Foreign Intelligence Gathering Service - were inserted into to Iraq and to Quait. At the same time operators from Sayeret MATKAL (Unit 767) - the IDF primary SF unit - were sent it to obtain more tactical oriented intelligence on the Iraqi army movements.
At the time, the chances for Iraq to actually attack Israel were still slim, but the Mossad agents as well as the Sayeret MATKAL operators were sent in just in case.
In January 16, 1991, a day after the UN ultimatum to Iraq expired, the U.S. began massive aerial assault against Iraqi targets. Less then 24 hours later Iraq sent 8 Scud land-to-land missiles on Israel, targeting mainly the heavily populated Tel-Aviv city area. After the Scud assault the Israeli Air Force (IAF), which was already on high alert, began preparations for a long-range retaliation attack. However, feared for the sake of its already fragile coalition, the U.S. demanded that Israel will not take any offensive measures against Iraq, and that the U.S. will make a special effort to track down and destroy the mobile Scud launchers. In return for the Israeli official non-participation in the crisis, Israel received a U.S. permission to deploy several SF teams in the American sector of the Scuds hunt, located north of the Baghdad-Amman highway and better known as the "Scud Boulevard".
The Israeli SF teams were to deploy at an absolute covert manner, without any interface what so ever with other coalition forces and without any trace that may identify them as Israeli.
Shortly after the U.S. permission was granted few teams from several different SF units were inserted to the area by CH53 transport helicopters and the operation began.
Quite ironically, the intelligence gathered by the Mossad and Sayeret MATKAL operatives, which were inserted few months earlier, was used as a bargain cheep by the Israelis in their negotiations with the Americans and was one of the main reasons why the Israelis were authorized to operate in the area.
The teams, which were sent in, were from the following units:
Sayeret Shaldag.
Sayeret Maglan.
One reserve team from Unit 669.
Sayeret MATKAL.
Few teams from classified electronic warfare and communication units.
All teams were equipped with non-Israeli oriented Land Rover jeeps, experimental dune buggies, and specially modified Swedish Husqvarna motorcycles. All vehicles were painted in desert camouflage layout and had no Israeli markings on them. Due to the long duration of the operation and the lack of any nearby support, massive auxiliary equipment and gear was also taken.
The main offensive elements of Israeli SF group were the teams from Sayeret Shaldag and Sayeret Maglan. More then half of these two units' operators participated in the Scud hunt, and were equipped with Land Rover jeeps fitted with ATGM.
On the other hand, since Sayeret MATKAL had deployed in the AO long before the rest of the units did, the unit role in the operation was more an intelligence oriented one, as the unit is originally designed to do. Part from few unavoidable incidents, Sayeret MATKAL didn't handle the offensive missions at all, and instead acted as the (LRRP and pathfinders for all of the other teams.
Once deployed to the region, the Israeli SF teams began seeking for mobile Scud launchers as well as for other high value targets. The teams stayed hidden during the day to avoid any detection by Iraqi as well as by coalitions forces, and went on Scud hunts during the night. The days were used for planning, technical maintenance and sleep.
Each mobile Scud party was composed of three elements:
A Scud Tractor-Erector-Launcher (TEL), a vehicle that carries the
missile, brings it to a standing position at the launch site and then
fire it.
A Zill truck which carry guards.
The CO Land Cruiser jeep.
Since the very presence of the Israeli teams in the area was highly classified, no air assets could be called upon for bombardment or support, and insertion/extraction as well supply flights were very complex and long. In one incident an IAF CH53 leading Israeli operators to Iraq was almost shot down by American fighter jets unaware of its identity.
The operation itself ran generally smoothly. Eventually, the Israeli teams from Sayeret Shaldag and Sayeret Maglan were able to detect and destroy several mobile Scud launchers as well as ammunition carriers and few Iraqi army front posts. Most of the kills were made by long range ATGM, but few were done by direct assaults and were the source for most of operation's injuries.
One unique and rare incident did take place in broad daylight. While a Sayeret Shaldag team was resting in its hideout inside a small creek, a Scud launcher convoy drove above the creek and made a short stopped. The team couldn't believe its good luck and since the location was far away in the desert the team decided to take the risk and to attack right from the hideout in daylight. It was a total success. The Scud group was composed of about six guards and a launching crew - no match for a much superior trained and equipped Israeli elite SF team.
Since for political reasons nobody wanted to take the chance of the Israeli teams being spotted by foreign armies washing through Quait or Iraqi lands, few days before Iraq surrendered the teams were extracted back to Israel by CH53.
The operation in whole is considered a success. While the Israeli teams' activity was a rather symbolic one and only for short few weeks period, they were very effective compared to their size and to the limited assets at their disposal. The Israeli teams also managed to gather the most valuable intelligence in the Desert Storm campaign out of all the coalition forces in the area, an intelligence, which was later passed on by Israel to the U.S. Moreover, unlike American and British patrols no Israeli patrol or hideout was ever revealed by the local Iraqis or by army patrols of any sources, and no Israeli soldiers were killed during the covert insertion.
While it was never officially admitted, several IDF elite SF teams took active yet covert part in the Desert Storm campaign, Persian Gulf, 1991.
In August 2, 1990, the Iraqi armed forces invaded Quait and declared it as an integral part of the Iraqi state. Soon afterwards the U.S. called for the Iraqi retreat from the area, formed a very fragile coalition with several European as well as Arab countries, and started mobilizing troops and equipment to the region.
Like in the 1973 Israeli-Arab Yom Kippur War, the Israeli intelligence was caught off guard and without any worthwhile intelligence sources in the region. In order to fix that, several field agents from the Mossad - the Israeli Foreign Intelligence Gathering Service - were inserted into to Iraq and to Quait. At the same time operators from Sayeret MATKAL (Unit 767) - the IDF primary SF unit - were sent it to obtain more tactical oriented intelligence on the Iraqi army movements.
At the time, the chances for Iraq to actually attack Israel were still slim, but the Mossad agents as well as the Sayeret MATKAL operators were sent in just in case.
In January 16, 1991, a day after the UN ultimatum to Iraq expired, the U.S. began massive aerial assault against Iraqi targets. Less then 24 hours later Iraq sent 8 Scud land-to-land missiles on Israel, targeting mainly the heavily populated Tel-Aviv city area. After the Scud assault the Israeli Air Force (IAF), which was already on high alert, began preparations for a long-range retaliation attack. However, feared for the sake of its already fragile coalition, the U.S. demanded that Israel will not take any offensive measures against Iraq, and that the U.S. will make a special effort to track down and destroy the mobile Scud launchers. In return for the Israeli official non-participation in the crisis, Israel received a U.S. permission to deploy several SF teams in the American sector of the Scuds hunt, located north of the Baghdad-Amman highway and better known as the "Scud Boulevard".
The Israeli SF teams were to deploy at an absolute covert manner, without any interface what so ever with other coalition forces and without any trace that may identify them as Israeli.
Shortly after the U.S. permission was granted few teams from several different SF units were inserted to the area by CH53 transport helicopters and the operation began.
Quite ironically, the intelligence gathered by the Mossad and Sayeret MATKAL operatives, which were inserted few months earlier, was used as a bargain cheep by the Israelis in their negotiations with the Americans and was one of the main reasons why the Israelis were authorized to operate in the area.
The teams, which were sent in, were from the following units:
Sayeret Shaldag.
Sayeret Maglan.
One reserve team from Unit 669.
Sayeret MATKAL.
Few teams from classified electronic warfare and communication units.
All teams were equipped with non-Israeli oriented Land Rover jeeps, experimental dune buggies, and specially modified Swedish Husqvarna motorcycles. All vehicles were painted in desert camouflage layout and had no Israeli markings on them. Due to the long duration of the operation and the lack of any nearby support, massive auxiliary equipment and gear was also taken.
The main offensive elements of Israeli SF group were the teams from Sayeret Shaldag and Sayeret Maglan. More then half of these two units' operators participated in the Scud hunt, and were equipped with Land Rover jeeps fitted with ATGM.
On the other hand, since Sayeret MATKAL had deployed in the AO long before the rest of the units did, the unit role in the operation was more an intelligence oriented one, as the unit is originally designed to do. Part from few unavoidable incidents, Sayeret MATKAL didn't handle the offensive missions at all, and instead acted as the (LRRP and pathfinders for all of the other teams.
Once deployed to the region, the Israeli SF teams began seeking for mobile Scud launchers as well as for other high value targets. The teams stayed hidden during the day to avoid any detection by Iraqi as well as by coalitions forces, and went on Scud hunts during the night. The days were used for planning, technical maintenance and sleep.
Each mobile Scud party was composed of three elements:
A Scud Tractor-Erector-Launcher (TEL), a vehicle that carries the
missile, brings it to a standing position at the launch site and then
fire it.
A Zill truck which carry guards.
The CO Land Cruiser jeep.
Since the very presence of the Israeli teams in the area was highly classified, no air assets could be called upon for bombardment or support, and insertion/extraction as well supply flights were very complex and long. In one incident an IAF CH53 leading Israeli operators to Iraq was almost shot down by American fighter jets unaware of its identity.
The operation itself ran generally smoothly. Eventually, the Israeli teams from Sayeret Shaldag and Sayeret Maglan were able to detect and destroy several mobile Scud launchers as well as ammunition carriers and few Iraqi army front posts. Most of the kills were made by long range ATGM, but few were done by direct assaults and were the source for most of operation's injuries.
One unique and rare incident did take place in broad daylight. While a Sayeret Shaldag team was resting in its hideout inside a small creek, a Scud launcher convoy drove above the creek and made a short stopped. The team couldn't believe its good luck and since the location was far away in the desert the team decided to take the risk and to attack right from the hideout in daylight. It was a total success. The Scud group was composed of about six guards and a launching crew - no match for a much superior trained and equipped Israeli elite SF team.
Since for political reasons nobody wanted to take the chance of the Israeli teams being spotted by foreign armies washing through Quait or Iraqi lands, few days before Iraq surrendered the teams were extracted back to Israel by CH53.
The operation in whole is considered a success. While the Israeli teams' activity was a rather symbolic one and only for short few weeks period, they were very effective compared to their size and to the limited assets at their disposal. The Israeli teams also managed to gather the most valuable intelligence in the Desert Storm campaign out of all the coalition forces in the area, an intelligence, which was later passed on by Israel to the U.S. Moreover, unlike American and British patrols no Israeli patrol or hideout was ever revealed by the local Iraqis or by army patrols of any sources, and no Israeli soldiers were killed during the covert insertion.