PDA

View Full Version : The Battle Of Granicus



Easy C.
08-22-2004, 01:49 AM
Granicus was the first major battle during Alexander's rule. It was also the first battle in Persia. It took place in May 334 B.C. Alexander lead his troops while the Persians were lead by Arsites, one of Darius' generals. Darius was the king of the Persian empire.

Alexander only slightly outnumbered the Persians at the time of this battle. His ground forces overwhelmingly outnumbered the Persians';the Persians had 30,000 overall ground force while Alexander had 43,000 infantry alone. However, the Persians had 15,000-16,000 cavalry, where as Alexander only had 6,000-7,000. It also must be taken into account that Darius' navy, which was Phoenician, was nearly three times larger than Alexander's and much more efficient.

Before the Battle
During a site-seeing trip on the way to Granicus, Alexander was asked if he would like to inspect Paris' lyre. Alexander refused curtly. He said that all Paris played on the instrument were,"adulterous ditties to captivate and bewitch the hearts of women". He then added,"But I would gladly see that of Achilles, to which he used to sing the glorious deeds of brave men."

In this battle, Alexander's position had similarities to that of two other military men. He was in a way like Achilles, sailing again for battle. But he also was like the Captain-General of the Hellenes, trying to get vegenance on Xerxe's invasion of Greece(he was mad at the Persians for burning many of Greece's great cities a long time ago).

An important thing on the way to the site of this battle was to cross the Narrows. He crossed them at the same point as the Athenians had in the Trojan War. The Persians offered no opposition when he did this. He then made the 300 mile march to Sestos in 20 days, a remarkably short time for an entire army. Next, with 6,000 men, he went over land to Elaeum, which is at the southern tip of the Galipoli Peninsula. There he sacrificed before the tomb of Protesilaus. Protesilaus was the first Greek in Agememnon's army to step ashore at Troy. In the tomb he prayed that his landing on Asiatic soil would be better than Protesilaus'. This prayer was not without reason;Protesilaus had been killed almost immediately, and like Protesilaus, Alexander planned to be the first on shore. After making this prayer, he built an altar at the tomb and invoked the gods for victory.

Once this was done, Alexander crossed the Darndelles in the 60 vessels Parmenio had sent down from Sestos. Alexander steered the Admiral's flagship. When the ships were halfway across the river the squadrons sacrificed a bull to Poseidon and made libation with a golden vessel, just as Xerxes had done when he crossed it. He landed on the "Achen Harbor". This is possibly present-day Rhoeteum. There he set up an alter to Athena, Hercules, and Zeus, in thanks for a safe landing. Here he prayed that"these territories might accept me as king of their own free will, without constraint".

Once he had done this, Alexander set off for Ilium. Once at Ilium, he was welcomed by a committee of local Greeks who presented him with a ceremonial gold wreath. He then offered a sacrifice at the tomb of Ajax and Achilles. Next he made an offering at the sacred hearth of Zeus of Enclosures. Legend has it that it was here that Alexander's ancestor Neoptolemus had slain Priam.

From Ilium Alexander moved north again and rejoined his army at Arisbe, a little out of the city of Abyos. From there he and his army marched north-east, following the road to Dascylium, where the Phyrgian satrap(sort of a Persian governor)had his seat of government.

The first city Alexander and his army reached was Pericte, a city in Macedonia's control. But they soon reached Lampsacus. This was controlled by Memnon like a lot of other cities in Asia Minor. There the philosopher Anaxenes, who was acting as Lampsacus' official envoy, persuaded Alexander to bypass Lampsacus.

Alexander had an extreme shortage of money, with only enough pay to last a fortnight and food to last a month. Considering these conditions, it is most likely that Anaxenes bribed Alexander with a large sum of money. Because of these conditions, Alexander's only hope was to tempt the Persians into a set battle and inflict a crushing defeat.

Arsites, the governor of Hellespontine Phyrga, sent out an appeal for help from his fellow governors. He wanted to meet with Arsamenes of Cilician and Spithridates of Lydia and Ionia. The three governors set up their base camp at Zeleia, east of the River Granicus. Here they summoned their commanders to a council of war to decide what strategy to use against Alexander.

Memnon of Rhodes, a mercenary, put forth the best suggestion. He proposed a scorched-earth policy--destroy all crops, strip the countryside, if they had to, burn down towns and villages. When he proposed this plan, Memnon made it clear that it would force the Macedonians to withdraw for lack of provisions. While this was happening, the Persians would assemble a large fleet and carry the war into Macedonia while the Macedonian army was still divided over what to do.

This was great advise, but since it came from a mercenary, whose brilliance and plain speaking was not respected by his Persian colleagues, it was not paid due attention. However, a little more tact still might have gotten Memnon all he wanted. But he went on to say that they should avoid fighting a pitched battle because the Macedonian infantry was very superior to Persia's. This hurt the Persians' dignity, and so they rejected Memnon's plan.

Since Memnon's plan was rejected, the Persians had to choose a new strategy. They decided to take a defensive strategy. This was probably second only to Memnon's plan because if the Macedonians could be lured into attacking a strongly held position over dangerous ground where the cavalry would have trouble charging and the phalanx couldn't hold formation, the invasion would end quickly.

The Persians' rejection of Memnon's plan was good for Alexander, but the Persians still had an advantage over Alexander. This was that the Persians had a choice of terrain. Once the Persians realized how badly needed battle they realized they could bring him to battle wherever and whenever they pleased.

The Persians collected all available reinforcements to prepare for the coming battle. Then they advanced to the River Granicus on the eastern bank, which had the best conditions for the Persian strategy. This spot on the river was good for the Persians because the Macedonian army would have to cross it to get to Dascylium(a spot on the river Alexander would need to get to to continue his conquests). It would be hard for him to cross the River because of its speed and depth. The Macedonians would have to cross in columns, and while the Macedonians were struggling on the bank in general disorder, they'd be highly vulnerable, and the Persians could force an engagement. Once they were at the River Granicus, the Persians drew up forces and waited.

You might remember that the Persians had far less ground forces than Alexander. Because of this, Arsites had to avoid exposing his interior infantry to open ground. For Arsites to win, he had to have a skillful use of cavalry and mercenaries.

When he they reached the River Granicus, Alexander wanted to fight. But Parmenio knew the Persians had set up a death trap. Parmenio did his best to reason with Alexander, and Alexander had to agree. So, under the cover of darkness, he and his army marched downstream until they found a suitable place to ford. Here they bivouacked, and began crossing at dawn.

What Happened in the Battle
When they found out that the Macedonians were fording, Arsites' scouts sounded the alarm. Several regiments of cavalry galloped down, trying to catch the Macedonians at a disadvantage. But by the time they got to the place Alexander had chosen to ford, there were not many Macedonians left on the western bank.

When they saw Arsites' scouts, the Macedonian phalanx formed to cover their comrades still in the river. Meanwhile, Alexander led his cavalry in a swift, outflanking charge. The Persians wisely retreated. Once they had, Alexander got the rest of his columns across, and then deployed them in battle formation.

The terrain was rich, rolling land, which was perfect for cavalry. This was good for the Persians because they had so much more cavalry than Alexander. Arsites put all of his cavalry regiments into front line, on as wide a front as possible. His entire infantry was held in reserve. He then advanced to Alexander's position.

Alexander was clad in magnificent armor he had taken from the Temple of Athena at Ilium. His shield was blazoned splendidly, and wore an extraordinary helmet with two great wings or plumes. A crowd of pages and staff officers thronged around him.

Alexander took the battle on the right flank. When they saw this, the Persians transferred some of their best troops to the center. This was just what Alexander wanted. With trumpets blowing and echoes of the "Alalalalai"battle cry, Alexander charged, leading his cavalry in wedge formation. He feinted at the enemy's left, where Memnon and Arsames were waiting. Then he suddenly swung his wedge inwards, diving at the new weakened Persian center. On the first onslaught, Alexander's spear broke, so the old Demaratus of Corinth gave him his.

While this was happening, Parmenio always was on the Persian left. He was fighting a holding action against the Medes and Bactrians on Alexander's right.

Alexander made a classic "pivot"attack, using his left flank as his axis. So what he did was, keeping his left flank stationary, he swung his right and center around it, so that now the center remained the center, but the left was the right and the right was the left.

Mathrilas, Darius' son-in-law, counter-charged at the head of his own Iranian cavalry division with 40 high ranking Persian nobles. He began to drive a similar wedge into the Macedonian center.

After this, the Persian general Mithridates hurled a javelin at Alexander. He threw it with such force that it didn't just blow through Alexander's shield but hit the cuiraso behind it. Alexander then plucked it out and sent spurs to his horse. He then drove his own spear far into Mithridates' breastplate. But Mithridates' breastplate did not break, and Alexander's spear broke of short.

Mithridates then drew out his sword for hand-to-hand fighting. Alexander, however, was not about to do that. Alexander retrieved his broken spear and jabbed it into Mithridates' face, hurling him to the ground.

As this happened, Rhosaces(a Persian) came at him from behind. He rode at Alexander from a flank with his saber with such force that it went through Alexander's helmet to the bone of his scalp. Alexander, swaying and dizzy, managed to kill Rhosaces.

Meanwhile, Spithridates, the governor of Lydia and Ionia, moved in behind Alexander. He was about to kill him when Cletus, Alexander's nurse's brother, severed Spithridates' arm at his shoulder. After this, Alexander, probably from his scalp injury, half-fainted.

While Alexander was in the half-faint, his phalanx poured through a gap in the Persian center, and had started to get rid of Arsites' native infantry. Alexander managed to struggle back onto his horse, and his companions rallied around him. During this, the enemy center began to cave in, leaving their flanks exposed.

Then Parmenio's Thessalian cavalry charged on the left. In a moment, the entire Persian line broke and fled. Their infantry, except the mercenaries, offered little resistance. The only part of the Persian army that was left was Memnon and his men. The Macedonians focused on destroying them. While the Macedonian phalanx delivered a frontal assault, his cavalry hemmed them from all sides to prevent a massive breakout. Somehow, however, Memnon managed to escape. This ended the battle.

The Persians suffered far greater casualties than the Macedonians. The Persians lost 2,500 men total, some 1,000 of them Iranians. There were different amounts of casualties reported for Alexander. The maximum for the infantry was 30, and the minimum nine. For the cavalry, the maximum was 120 and the minimum 60.

After the Battle
25 Macedonians fell"in the first charge. Alexander had a statue made of each of them. He then erected each statue somewhere near Granicus. He also erected a statue of himself, although he did not even die, let alone in first charge. This was a strange gesture that would never be repeated again.

2,000 of Memnon's mercenaries survived. After the battle they were chained like lions and sent back to forced labor, probably in the mines. This was not a very placatory gesture by Alexander. The reason he gave for it was that "they had violated Greek public opinion by fighting with the Orientals against the Greeks."

After his victory, Alexander went across the rocky, volcanic islands of Cappadocia. His victory was the start of a long campaign in Persia. It opened Asia-Minor to Alexander.

Kitsune
08-22-2004, 01:03 PM
Great post, man !

:hug:

Easy C.
08-23-2004, 04:40 AM
Thought i should definately share it. That was one of the topics for yr 11 ancient history last year at my school. I just couldnt believe how the hell Alexander defeated the persians, 13-1 for crying out loud! I think it was in that battle that Alexander's general saved him from a rather sneaky attack which nearly killed Alexander.

I probably could have shortened it a bit, but maybe next time if i can share another story of military tactical excellence.

achilles
08-23-2004, 08:22 AM
really nice post....i ll try to give some feedback as soon as possible

Easy C.
08-23-2004, 08:23 AM
;) no probs.

bishop1
08-23-2004, 04:46 PM
Score, another ancient battle

2RHPZ
08-24-2004, 08:03 AM
I will post this article here ´cause I think that is better than new thread


Evolution of Military Tactics: Phalanx V Legion


Polybius (c.200-after 118 BCE), a Greek historian, wrote how the stategy that dominated the ancient world for over 300 years and swept from Iberia in the west to the indus river had been defeated by an evolution in military philosophy

The Roman Maniple vs. The Macedonian Phalanx

The Histories, Book XVIII, Chapters 28-32:

In my sixth book I made a promise, still unfulfilled, of taking a fitting opportunity of drawing a comparison between the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their respective system of tactics, and pointing out how they differ for better or worse from each other. I will now endeavor by a reference to actual facts to fulfil that promise. For since in former times the Macedonian tactics proved themselves by experience capable of conquering those of Asia and Greece; while the Roman tactics sufficed to conquer the nations of Africa and all those of Western Europe; and since in our own day there have been numerous opportunities of comparing the men as well as their tactics, it will be, I think, a useful and worthy task to investigate their differences, and discover why it is that the Romans conquer and carry off the palm from their enemies in the operations of war: that we may not put it all down to Fortune, and congratulate them on their good luck, as the thoughtless of mankind do; but, from a knowledge of the true causes, may give their leaders the tribute of praise and admiration which they deserve.

Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hannibal and the defeats which they sustained in them, I need say no more. It was not owing to their arms or their tactics, but to the skill and genius of Hannibal that they met with those defeats: and that I made quite clear in my account of the battles themselves. And my contention is supported by two facts. First, by the conclusion of the war: for as soon as the Romans got a general of ability comparable with that of Hannibal, victory was not long in following their banners. Secondly, Hannibal himself, being dissatisfied with the original arms of his men, and having immediately after his first victory furnished his troops with the arms of the Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the end. Pyrrhus, again, availed himself not only of the arms, but also of the troops of Italy, placing a maniple of Italians and a company of his own phalanx alternately, in his battles against the Romans. Yet even this did not enable him to win; the battles were somehow or another always indecisive.

It was necessary to speak first on these points, to anticipate any instances which might seem to make against my theory. I will now return to my comparison.

Many considerations may easily convince us that, if only the phalanx has its proper formation and strength, nothing can resist it face to face or withstand its charge. For as a man in close order of battle occupies a space of three feet; and as the length of the sarissae are sixteen cubits according to the original design, which has been reduced in practice to fourteen; and as of these fourteen four must be deducted, to allow for the weight in front; it follows clearly that each hoplite will have ten cubits of his sarissa projecting beyond his body, when he lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the enemy: hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth rank will have their sarissae projecting farther beyond the front rank than the men of the fifth, yet even these last will have two cubits of their sarissae beyond the front rank; if only the phalanx is properly formed and the men close up properly both flank and rear, like the description in Homer:

So buckler pressed on buckler; helm on helm; And man on man; and waving horse-hair plumes In polished head-piece mingled, as they swayed In order: in such serried rank they stood. [Iliad, 13.131]



And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front of each man of the front rank there will be five sarissae projecting to distances varying by a descending scale of two cubits.

With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to imagine what the appearance and strength of the whole phalanx is likely to be, when, with lowered sarissae, it advances to the charge sixteen deep. Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth are unable to reach with their sarissae far enough to take actual part in the fighting. They, therefore, do not lower them, but hold them with the points inclined upwards over the shoulders of the ranks in front of them, to shield the heads of the whole phalanx; for the sarissae are so closely serried, that they repel missiles which have carried over the front ranks and might fall upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks, however, during an advance, press forward those in front by the weight of their bodies; and thus make the charge very forcible, and at the same time render it impossible for the front ranks to face about.

Such is the arrangement, general and detailed of the phalanx. It remains now to compare with it the peculiarities and distinctive features of the Roman arms and tactics. Now, a Roman soldier in full armor also requires a space of three square feet. But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man---because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing---it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear if he is to do his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force his way through easily---seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigor to the use of their swords. Therefore, it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength.

Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but maneuvers for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.

For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished facts. The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course, those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately.

The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well-equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others.

I thought it necessary to discuss this subject at some length, because at the actual time of the occurrence many Greeks supposed when the Macedonians were beaten that it was incredible; and many will afterwards be at a loss to account for the inferiority of the phalanx to the Roman system of arming.

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/polybius-maniple.html

Easy C.
08-24-2004, 08:36 AM
Yeah well the phalanx formation has been very popular throughtout history. The Spartans back in the 3rd Century really used it to their advantage. They basically became a standing army, and a very militaristic state with unbelievably well-trained and disciplined soldiers. Due to the fact Sparta needed more land they thought it would be good to invade the Messenians. This again should be something i should have posted, you see by the time of the second Messenian war, like Alexander the Spartan army was outnumbered greatly, 10-1 at some stage. The idea of the Phalanx was simple, you shield urself and march forward (of course being a hoplite you have the advantage of a long pole with a sharp bronze point on the end of it). If someone if front of u happened to drop, you simply take his place. An excellent formation.

bishop1
08-24-2004, 01:09 PM
That was an awesome post, but IMO a few thing need to be pointed out. To Easy Company, the Spartans invaded Messinia around the 8th century B.C., and it was because of their situation with the Helots why Lyckourgus made up the new constitution, with every male being a soldier etc..., because they always had to be on guard with the Messenians right next door. They developed the Phalanx at right about the same time, but by the 2nd Century, Sparta was nothing more than a second rate power, contributing pretty much nothing to Greece since late in the 4th Century. But i must also say, the Macedonian Phalanx was a "retarded" phalanx. It didnt work how the Spartans or the Sacred Band perfected, because in the clasical phalanx the first 3 rows fought, with the rest (usually 8 rows deep) pushed the men in the front. And with the Sacred Band that defeated the Spartans, they deepend their ranks to 50 deep, so you had about 47 guys in the back pushing the first 3. I dont know much about the Macedonian phalanx, but with the rear rows hoding their spears up, it seems hard to imagine them being able to push forward, therefore sinewhat defeating the purpose of the true phalanx. As a side not, the Spartans probably could have faird better against the Romans ionstead of the Macedon, because of their high level of training, and the way the were so mobile they might could fiard better than the Macedonians, if they hadnt had gotten crazy beforehand and screwed themselves into defeat so many times.

achilles
08-24-2004, 11:53 PM
Yeah well the phalanx formation has been very popular throughtout history. The Spartans back in the 3rd Century really used it to their advantage. They basically became a standing army, and a very militaristic state with unbelievably well-trained and disciplined soldiers. Due to the fact Sparta needed more land they thought it would be good to invade the Messenians. This again should be something i should have posted, you see by the time of the second Messenian war, like Alexander the Spartan army was outnumbered greatly, 10-1 at some stage. The idea of the Phalanx was simple, you shield urself and march forward (of course being a hoplite you have the advantage of a long pole with a sharp bronze point on the end of it). If someone if front of u happened to drop, you simply take his place. An excellent formation.

You re right. The Greek phalanx goes centuries back before Alexander...

http://digilander.libero.it/tepec/falange.htm

Began at about 700BC...for more check the link.

Easy C.
08-25-2004, 04:47 AM
regarding bishops post. Yeh i forgot about some things on the spartans, i actually just completed the section on Spartans in Ancient History at school. I was typing down what i thought i could remember (obviously should have looked at my notes).

Thanks for correcting me ;)

bishop1
08-25-2004, 12:09 PM
No prob, its just cool someone else here is intreasted in Sparta, it seems odd so few people around here are intreasted in them, when the idea of western military doctrine and discipline came from them, pretty much.
If you havent read it pick up Gates of Fire by Steven Pressfield ASAP, it ends at the battle of Thermopalyea, but follows the live of periokio type squire, not really a helot, but definatly not an equal either, but its an awesome book, portrays the Spartan way of life very accuaratly from what i can tell, and the battle is insane.