2RHPZ
08-23-2004, 04:49 PM
This is very rare article and I am happy to bring him for you who are interested.
The interview was conducted by Endo Ryu and first appeared in Rekishi Gunzou in November 2000. It was translated by Gernot Hassenflug of Kyoto. On his website, Gernot noted that: "in line with Japanese practice, names are given in order of family name followed by first name. Ranks are given in Japanese, and places and battles are referred to by their Japanese names. I have added notes with explanations in various places." He warned that there may be ambiguities and translating errors in the text.
His first campaign was on 8 December 1941, his last battle was fought on 17 August 1945. An Imperial Japanese Navy pilot who fought throughout the Pacific right from the outset of the war until two days after Japan's surrender tells his story.
"The characteristics of a fighter pilot.... Actually, I cannot really give a good description. I suppose, in a fighter, when it comes to an air battle, there are so many areas where individual decisions are important that it is easier for those who possess a good deal of individualism. But on the other hand, if you look at the people on the ground, at the base, and try to categorize and label which are which, you will surely go wrong.
But, take for example people who are used to the air pressure at ground level. If they climb a mountain in the 5000m range, it is said that their lung function is cut by as much as 50%. In a fighter, you go up to that altitude in one go. In addition, you need to keep you cool, and your ability to make accurate judgments. If we try to state the basic requirements of a fighter pilot, perhaps we can say something like that.
However, at that time there was no accurate or detailed analysis from physiological data, so the only method was for the instructor to go up with the trainee pilot and judge as a whole his flying capabilities, marksmanship and general composure and behaviour and decide from there whether he was sharp, useful and so forth. This is something that the instructors would deduce from their years of experience."
This is how Komachi Sadamu, Reisen pilot who fought through the whole war from Pearl Harbor until the surrender over virtually the entire Pacific Theatre, answered our impudent question "What makes a fighter pilot?"
When we visited Mr. Komachi at his offices of the company Grande Town (building industry) which he manages in Ota-ku, Tokyo, we noticed that next to the company logo was a plaque titled "Reisen Tojoin-kai" (Reisen Pilots Association). The Association is a social or friendship club formed in 1974 made up of former Reisen pilots. Komachi is vice-president and has arranged his offices to double as a meeting venue. "Currently there are 778 members, and if you include the 51 supporting members made up of family members of former pilots, and Reisen fans, then we have a total of 829 members. The youngest member is 72, and the oldest are in their late 80's. Each year we just get fewer and fewer. We are thinking of dissolving the group in three years time, you know." Mr. Komachi turns 80 this year. Even as members retire one by one from the Association, his eyes even now still sparkle, while his large frame rests upright and proper (Note: 180cm tall, at the time considered exceptional).
And so Mr. Komachi began to speak slowly, in a low but clear voice, of his life as a Reisen fighter pilot.
"In those days, our education was thus that boys became soldiers when they grew up, so I too vaguely wanted to become a soldier. So in 1938 I joined the Kaihei-dan (Note: pre-war each naval base had a land-based naval regiment, (rikujo-butai)). Fighter pilots were the cream of that age, and I had no idea whatsover whether I would be suitable. Nevertheless I persevered and graduated from the kaihei-dan the following year to join immediately the 49th pilot class at Kasumigaseki."
After that, Mr. Komachi went through about a year of intense training before gong on to join the carrier wing on board the Akagi in October 1940. In May 1941 he was transferred to the Shokaku air group, and it was as a member of this carrier's complement that he took part in the attack on Pearl Harbor. "It was very strange that the entire Kido-butai should rendezvous at Hitokappu-wan in Etorofu. We thought it was a large-scale training exercise or something ...
According to plan, one day all flying group members gathered on board the Akagi where we heard from the commander for the first time of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor.
A little before that I had already thought something was odd. Without our notice, the carrier's passageways, usually filled with all sorts of baggage and cargo had been meticulously cleaned and many crates of beer were stacked up. After leaving base we drank beer every day as though racing to finish the huge stock! Perhaps because of the peculiar excitement we experienced, but no matter that we drank like fish, we did not get drunk at all. In fact, it was as though our perceptions became more clear."
8 December 1941 dawned. On the day of the Pearl Harbor attack (Hawaii kogeki sakusen), Mr. Komachi was not part of the strike force, but instead was a member of the task force air cover to protect against incoming attacks. For Komachi Sadamu, this was his first combat operation.
The work of the carrier-based Reisen pilots was broadly divided into two categories, attack and garrison. Garrison was air cover for the fleet like what Mr. Komaki took part in that day. Attack consisted of close escort of the carrier-launched strike force to protect them from enemy fighters, and attainment of air superiority over the enemy fleet.
"Taking part in one or the other was decided on a rotation basis. I was of the opinion that air cover for the fleet was the more difficult of the two. In attack, simply put, once the bombing mission is fulfilled you can immediately withdraw. During withdrawal it is true that a a very dangerous part of the job is to eliminate enemy fighters chasing the retiring attack force. But during the latter half of the war, the dangers of fleet air cover became much greater than this.
In the general case, 6 or 9 planes were delegated for this duty (a unit of fighters was 9 planes, ikko chutai), whereas the enemy attack could easily be 100 planes, so we had our hands full trying to keep ourselves in one piece. On top of that, because it was our duty to protect the carriers, we could not even think of disengaging and escaping.
For us on the spot, we always wanted to increase the fleet air cover even at the expense of the attack force, but the top level folks who decided on the make-up of strikes always seemed eager to devote as much as possible of the fighter force to the attack. The reason was, these people had never done the work that we did, fighting way above them, you know. We were always conscious of this dilemma."
Fleet air cover included not only the threat of enemy planes but also the risk of being shot down by the fleet anti-aircraft fire. "There were many times when I knew that some of the gunners down there were shooting directly at me. Those guys were also very scared, and anything that flew near they took to be an enemy and shot at it. (laughter) But you know, when you are in earnest, these things happen, and we never complained about it even once. So therefore, when carrying out fleet air cover, to concentrate only on the enemy planes is very dangerous." That was a side issue. Actually, what Mr. Komachi considered the greatest problem in the field was the Reisen's abysmal radio gear.
"You know, can you believe that while we were carrying out fleet air cover we could not even communicate properly with the carriers directly below us! For example, in the morning a squadron of scout planes would be launched in a fan formation to ascertain whether or not there was an enemy air strike coming our way. So let's suppose one of the planed sent news of a contact from some direction. These messages were tapped out in Morse and could be received a long distance away. If this message was received, it was immediately known on which bearing the enemy was.
If this information could have been passed on directly to the fleet air cover Reisens, the friendly fighters woudl have the time and opportunity to position themselves between the enemy and the fleet, perhaps some 30 or 40 miles distant, and intercept the enemy there, giving time for three or four attacks at least, scattering the attacking force and dissipating their attacking power. But, our radio gear was completely unusable, so the information stopped at the commander on board the flagship and never reached us.
As air cover we flew in huge circles over the fleet. At times enemy attack force arrived while we were on the diametrically opposite side of the fleet! At times like that we dearly wished for a radio by which we could have been told that the enemy was not here but there.
So now, you know, when I get into a taxi, I have some mixed emotions when I hear the news from the taxi head office arriving, giving route, next destination and other useful information so clearly. In that war, if the lives of the Reisen pilots had been worth just a little more to the Navy general staff, they could easily have devoted some resources to improving our radio equipment I think. Even now, when I think about it I want to stamp my feet in frustration!"
As the war progressed, the difference in aircraft development capability between Japan and the USA became marked. Take for example the specifications of the Reisen Type 52 and the Grumman F6F Hellcat, both introduced in 1943. The differences are glaring. The F6F's engine is 2100hp versus the Reisen's 1130hp, while top speed was 611km/h against the Reisen's 565km/h. Japan's prized Reisen had by then already been developmentally completely outclassed.
"The time which the Reisen was feared as a high performance fighter was during the first one, two years. We, who experienced air combat, felt the difference between our aicraft and the enemy most clearly, and in fact we had access to the relevant data before we even went into combat against them. The specifications were written in various magazines. So for example, if the engine is 2000hp, okay so we know it is twice that of the Reisen. The fuel load also three times? Well, then we could estimate that the Reisen's range advantage too was gone....etc. And indeed, when we did meet the enemy planes, they were full of confidence! (laughter) Up until then they had been very afraid of us, but now they became full of fight.
The early Reisen's greatest trump had been its small turning radius. In large-scale air combat we used all kinds of tactics to lure the enemy into a dogfight. And finally, the enemy stopped fighting on our terms, and with power and speed they carried out with all their strength frontal attacks and disengaged before we could turn after them.
In that situation, we could not compete. Our only tactic then was to spot the enemy first and before they had prepared themselves attack and vanquish them."
Also, in air combat there are some well-known ironclad rules, such as that one should already be above the enemy and have the sun behind oneself before beginning the attack. For this rate of climb, and therefore power and speed are necessary, but the propeller-driven Reisen of the time used to lose power dramatically above 8000m.
"The engine began to lose power suddenly from around 5000m. 8000m was definitely the limit of its capabilities. Above that the fighter was extremely unresponsive, making big control movements necessary. Unlike bombers which fly straight to their targets, fighter combat involves control movements to the extremes. At around 5000m or 6000m there was still sufficient air resistance to bank or roll. But at 7000m or 8000m this was no longer possible. Moving the control stick too much theatened to stall the engine.
Therefore, taking into account also our own decrease in capability with altitude, the Reisen's maximum effective altitude for combat was around 5000m or 6000m, ideally we thought that we should stay between 3000m and 5000m."
However, the USA military succeeded in the development of aircraft with better and better high altitude performance that the Reisen could only dream of.
"When during air combat we reached altitudes of 7000m or 8000m, the Reisen began to behave very badly, whereas on the enemy planes two-stage boosters (turbochargers) kicked in, the fuel injection ratio was boosted again to impede the drop in performance with altitude.
Especially the twin-tailed P-38 Lightning was always aiming for higher altitudes. When we were battling with, say, F6F's and had achieved a superior position, then from way up high suddenly would plummet down a Lightning. From about 1943 it became the norm for the enemy to employ this form of combination attack. That was one further reason why the Reisen began to suffer so badly at this point.
I seem to recall that at the end the Reisen also had a little more boost, but no matter what small improvements were carried out, in total we have to admit that the Reisen's performance remained virtually unchanged throughout the war."
From the difference in development capability between the enemy and us, the disaster of our radio equipment and so on, it may appear that this was due solely to a technological gap between us and them. But in reality, there was a common weakness throughout the war in the military general staff, Mr. Komachi asserts.
"In one word, this pointless fixation on mind over matter philosophy (Note: seishin-shugi) and as its result, the tendency to view (Note: or have contempt for) life lightly. This was the prevalent dogma in the military general staff at the time. That is what I feel.
For example, it was unavoidable that due to the difference in technological skill there should be a performance difference of some kind between US and our aircraft. But the fitting or lack of armour of the pilot comes from the difference in attitude towards human life, way before technology. Frankly speaking, while enemy aircraft had armour in many places around the cockpit, the Reisen had as good as no such protection.
Furthermore, we heard that US aircraft had rubber coated fuel tanks, and sure enough, no matter how much we hit them we got the impression that there was never any fuel leakage. Now, while we very much wanted the same sort of protection fitted to our own aircraft, in the eyes of the military general staff this was cowardice, and so quite out of the question."
For Mr. Komachi, who experienced air combat every day, day in day out, there was doubtless no day on which he was not aware of the the proximity of his own death. But for the sake of his own life, for the sake of the life of his family and of the future of his country, he continued to fight. In fact, it was precisely because of his strong overriding will to live that he could continue to risk his life and fight on.
"For example, due to the fact that we could not make use of our radio gear, there were I think many many cases where pilots could not get a bearing on their carrier after combat and ended up missing in action, in other words ditching in the sea.
After completion of combat over the Pacific, with no islands at all to show the way, there was no way of telling which direction and for how many hours to fly in order to return safely. That is a pretty damned situation."
Actually, Mr. Komachi and his comrades repeatedly informed the general staff of the problem, but the reply was invariably, "A fighter plane does not fight with its radio. How many aircraft can you shoot down with a radio set?", completely missing the point.
Mr. Komachi's opinion was that main and most important reason for the lack of flexibility of the the Japanese military illustrated by the above was the ghost of the "Victory in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese War (Note: Nisshin, Nichiro no Shori)", which was still very deeply rooted even during the Second World War.
"During the initial phase of the Pacific war, with the attack on Peark Harbor, the battle of the Malaysian Sea (Note: Japanese history records the sinking of the Repulse and Prince of Wales as the Battle of the Malaysian Sea) and others, even though aircraft had achieved such an incredible degree of success, the military staff admirals and generals above Mr. Yamamoto Isoroku, all leftovers from the Meiji era, possessed an awareness regarding aircraft that amounted to no more than an inkling. Like the absurd argument of how one could possibly fight with a radio set, likewise aircraft were not seen as the able to destroyer the enemy, that would always be the realm of the big guns of the battleships.
And so, finally it came to tying bombs to our planes and going out to die. No matter how you think about it, it was a tragedy for the planes and for the pilots who were forced to man them."
Incidentally, fighter plane enthusiasts often have a tendency to praise famous wartime pilots, referring to them as kings of shootdowns or aces of the sky (Note: in Japanese, aces are referred to either by the english word 'ace' written in katakana, or more fancifully as gekitsui-o, or o-sora no ace). Mr. Komachi, however, deplored this, saying, "I don't care for those expressions".
"First of all, we lost the war. People of such a country cannot possibly feel happy when they are referred to as kings of shootdowns or aces. And then, secondly, we pilots, and our foes too, fought in deadly earnest to protect our families and our homeland, we did not fight to settle a personal score. Therefore, the thing is, I do not want people to use game score expressions, you know.
There are many tales of pilots painting stars on the their planes' fuselages to designate the number of downed enemy. Yes, for sure it looks really neat (laughter), but those were tales from the very early relaxed part of the war. As the war became desperate, such things were just no longer around. There was incessant restructuring of units, and transfer between them, and planes too changed all the time. It was not possible to keep an aircraft for personal use and so on, and also no time to paint star marks."
As planes changed all the time, naturally each plane picked up and mixed the peculiarities of the various pilots.
The interview was conducted by Endo Ryu and first appeared in Rekishi Gunzou in November 2000. It was translated by Gernot Hassenflug of Kyoto. On his website, Gernot noted that: "in line with Japanese practice, names are given in order of family name followed by first name. Ranks are given in Japanese, and places and battles are referred to by their Japanese names. I have added notes with explanations in various places." He warned that there may be ambiguities and translating errors in the text.
His first campaign was on 8 December 1941, his last battle was fought on 17 August 1945. An Imperial Japanese Navy pilot who fought throughout the Pacific right from the outset of the war until two days after Japan's surrender tells his story.
"The characteristics of a fighter pilot.... Actually, I cannot really give a good description. I suppose, in a fighter, when it comes to an air battle, there are so many areas where individual decisions are important that it is easier for those who possess a good deal of individualism. But on the other hand, if you look at the people on the ground, at the base, and try to categorize and label which are which, you will surely go wrong.
But, take for example people who are used to the air pressure at ground level. If they climb a mountain in the 5000m range, it is said that their lung function is cut by as much as 50%. In a fighter, you go up to that altitude in one go. In addition, you need to keep you cool, and your ability to make accurate judgments. If we try to state the basic requirements of a fighter pilot, perhaps we can say something like that.
However, at that time there was no accurate or detailed analysis from physiological data, so the only method was for the instructor to go up with the trainee pilot and judge as a whole his flying capabilities, marksmanship and general composure and behaviour and decide from there whether he was sharp, useful and so forth. This is something that the instructors would deduce from their years of experience."
This is how Komachi Sadamu, Reisen pilot who fought through the whole war from Pearl Harbor until the surrender over virtually the entire Pacific Theatre, answered our impudent question "What makes a fighter pilot?"
When we visited Mr. Komachi at his offices of the company Grande Town (building industry) which he manages in Ota-ku, Tokyo, we noticed that next to the company logo was a plaque titled "Reisen Tojoin-kai" (Reisen Pilots Association). The Association is a social or friendship club formed in 1974 made up of former Reisen pilots. Komachi is vice-president and has arranged his offices to double as a meeting venue. "Currently there are 778 members, and if you include the 51 supporting members made up of family members of former pilots, and Reisen fans, then we have a total of 829 members. The youngest member is 72, and the oldest are in their late 80's. Each year we just get fewer and fewer. We are thinking of dissolving the group in three years time, you know." Mr. Komachi turns 80 this year. Even as members retire one by one from the Association, his eyes even now still sparkle, while his large frame rests upright and proper (Note: 180cm tall, at the time considered exceptional).
And so Mr. Komachi began to speak slowly, in a low but clear voice, of his life as a Reisen fighter pilot.
"In those days, our education was thus that boys became soldiers when they grew up, so I too vaguely wanted to become a soldier. So in 1938 I joined the Kaihei-dan (Note: pre-war each naval base had a land-based naval regiment, (rikujo-butai)). Fighter pilots were the cream of that age, and I had no idea whatsover whether I would be suitable. Nevertheless I persevered and graduated from the kaihei-dan the following year to join immediately the 49th pilot class at Kasumigaseki."
After that, Mr. Komachi went through about a year of intense training before gong on to join the carrier wing on board the Akagi in October 1940. In May 1941 he was transferred to the Shokaku air group, and it was as a member of this carrier's complement that he took part in the attack on Pearl Harbor. "It was very strange that the entire Kido-butai should rendezvous at Hitokappu-wan in Etorofu. We thought it was a large-scale training exercise or something ...
According to plan, one day all flying group members gathered on board the Akagi where we heard from the commander for the first time of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor.
A little before that I had already thought something was odd. Without our notice, the carrier's passageways, usually filled with all sorts of baggage and cargo had been meticulously cleaned and many crates of beer were stacked up. After leaving base we drank beer every day as though racing to finish the huge stock! Perhaps because of the peculiar excitement we experienced, but no matter that we drank like fish, we did not get drunk at all. In fact, it was as though our perceptions became more clear."
8 December 1941 dawned. On the day of the Pearl Harbor attack (Hawaii kogeki sakusen), Mr. Komachi was not part of the strike force, but instead was a member of the task force air cover to protect against incoming attacks. For Komachi Sadamu, this was his first combat operation.
The work of the carrier-based Reisen pilots was broadly divided into two categories, attack and garrison. Garrison was air cover for the fleet like what Mr. Komaki took part in that day. Attack consisted of close escort of the carrier-launched strike force to protect them from enemy fighters, and attainment of air superiority over the enemy fleet.
"Taking part in one or the other was decided on a rotation basis. I was of the opinion that air cover for the fleet was the more difficult of the two. In attack, simply put, once the bombing mission is fulfilled you can immediately withdraw. During withdrawal it is true that a a very dangerous part of the job is to eliminate enemy fighters chasing the retiring attack force. But during the latter half of the war, the dangers of fleet air cover became much greater than this.
In the general case, 6 or 9 planes were delegated for this duty (a unit of fighters was 9 planes, ikko chutai), whereas the enemy attack could easily be 100 planes, so we had our hands full trying to keep ourselves in one piece. On top of that, because it was our duty to protect the carriers, we could not even think of disengaging and escaping.
For us on the spot, we always wanted to increase the fleet air cover even at the expense of the attack force, but the top level folks who decided on the make-up of strikes always seemed eager to devote as much as possible of the fighter force to the attack. The reason was, these people had never done the work that we did, fighting way above them, you know. We were always conscious of this dilemma."
Fleet air cover included not only the threat of enemy planes but also the risk of being shot down by the fleet anti-aircraft fire. "There were many times when I knew that some of the gunners down there were shooting directly at me. Those guys were also very scared, and anything that flew near they took to be an enemy and shot at it. (laughter) But you know, when you are in earnest, these things happen, and we never complained about it even once. So therefore, when carrying out fleet air cover, to concentrate only on the enemy planes is very dangerous." That was a side issue. Actually, what Mr. Komachi considered the greatest problem in the field was the Reisen's abysmal radio gear.
"You know, can you believe that while we were carrying out fleet air cover we could not even communicate properly with the carriers directly below us! For example, in the morning a squadron of scout planes would be launched in a fan formation to ascertain whether or not there was an enemy air strike coming our way. So let's suppose one of the planed sent news of a contact from some direction. These messages were tapped out in Morse and could be received a long distance away. If this message was received, it was immediately known on which bearing the enemy was.
If this information could have been passed on directly to the fleet air cover Reisens, the friendly fighters woudl have the time and opportunity to position themselves between the enemy and the fleet, perhaps some 30 or 40 miles distant, and intercept the enemy there, giving time for three or four attacks at least, scattering the attacking force and dissipating their attacking power. But, our radio gear was completely unusable, so the information stopped at the commander on board the flagship and never reached us.
As air cover we flew in huge circles over the fleet. At times enemy attack force arrived while we were on the diametrically opposite side of the fleet! At times like that we dearly wished for a radio by which we could have been told that the enemy was not here but there.
So now, you know, when I get into a taxi, I have some mixed emotions when I hear the news from the taxi head office arriving, giving route, next destination and other useful information so clearly. In that war, if the lives of the Reisen pilots had been worth just a little more to the Navy general staff, they could easily have devoted some resources to improving our radio equipment I think. Even now, when I think about it I want to stamp my feet in frustration!"
As the war progressed, the difference in aircraft development capability between Japan and the USA became marked. Take for example the specifications of the Reisen Type 52 and the Grumman F6F Hellcat, both introduced in 1943. The differences are glaring. The F6F's engine is 2100hp versus the Reisen's 1130hp, while top speed was 611km/h against the Reisen's 565km/h. Japan's prized Reisen had by then already been developmentally completely outclassed.
"The time which the Reisen was feared as a high performance fighter was during the first one, two years. We, who experienced air combat, felt the difference between our aicraft and the enemy most clearly, and in fact we had access to the relevant data before we even went into combat against them. The specifications were written in various magazines. So for example, if the engine is 2000hp, okay so we know it is twice that of the Reisen. The fuel load also three times? Well, then we could estimate that the Reisen's range advantage too was gone....etc. And indeed, when we did meet the enemy planes, they were full of confidence! (laughter) Up until then they had been very afraid of us, but now they became full of fight.
The early Reisen's greatest trump had been its small turning radius. In large-scale air combat we used all kinds of tactics to lure the enemy into a dogfight. And finally, the enemy stopped fighting on our terms, and with power and speed they carried out with all their strength frontal attacks and disengaged before we could turn after them.
In that situation, we could not compete. Our only tactic then was to spot the enemy first and before they had prepared themselves attack and vanquish them."
Also, in air combat there are some well-known ironclad rules, such as that one should already be above the enemy and have the sun behind oneself before beginning the attack. For this rate of climb, and therefore power and speed are necessary, but the propeller-driven Reisen of the time used to lose power dramatically above 8000m.
"The engine began to lose power suddenly from around 5000m. 8000m was definitely the limit of its capabilities. Above that the fighter was extremely unresponsive, making big control movements necessary. Unlike bombers which fly straight to their targets, fighter combat involves control movements to the extremes. At around 5000m or 6000m there was still sufficient air resistance to bank or roll. But at 7000m or 8000m this was no longer possible. Moving the control stick too much theatened to stall the engine.
Therefore, taking into account also our own decrease in capability with altitude, the Reisen's maximum effective altitude for combat was around 5000m or 6000m, ideally we thought that we should stay between 3000m and 5000m."
However, the USA military succeeded in the development of aircraft with better and better high altitude performance that the Reisen could only dream of.
"When during air combat we reached altitudes of 7000m or 8000m, the Reisen began to behave very badly, whereas on the enemy planes two-stage boosters (turbochargers) kicked in, the fuel injection ratio was boosted again to impede the drop in performance with altitude.
Especially the twin-tailed P-38 Lightning was always aiming for higher altitudes. When we were battling with, say, F6F's and had achieved a superior position, then from way up high suddenly would plummet down a Lightning. From about 1943 it became the norm for the enemy to employ this form of combination attack. That was one further reason why the Reisen began to suffer so badly at this point.
I seem to recall that at the end the Reisen also had a little more boost, but no matter what small improvements were carried out, in total we have to admit that the Reisen's performance remained virtually unchanged throughout the war."
From the difference in development capability between the enemy and us, the disaster of our radio equipment and so on, it may appear that this was due solely to a technological gap between us and them. But in reality, there was a common weakness throughout the war in the military general staff, Mr. Komachi asserts.
"In one word, this pointless fixation on mind over matter philosophy (Note: seishin-shugi) and as its result, the tendency to view (Note: or have contempt for) life lightly. This was the prevalent dogma in the military general staff at the time. That is what I feel.
For example, it was unavoidable that due to the difference in technological skill there should be a performance difference of some kind between US and our aircraft. But the fitting or lack of armour of the pilot comes from the difference in attitude towards human life, way before technology. Frankly speaking, while enemy aircraft had armour in many places around the cockpit, the Reisen had as good as no such protection.
Furthermore, we heard that US aircraft had rubber coated fuel tanks, and sure enough, no matter how much we hit them we got the impression that there was never any fuel leakage. Now, while we very much wanted the same sort of protection fitted to our own aircraft, in the eyes of the military general staff this was cowardice, and so quite out of the question."
For Mr. Komachi, who experienced air combat every day, day in day out, there was doubtless no day on which he was not aware of the the proximity of his own death. But for the sake of his own life, for the sake of the life of his family and of the future of his country, he continued to fight. In fact, it was precisely because of his strong overriding will to live that he could continue to risk his life and fight on.
"For example, due to the fact that we could not make use of our radio gear, there were I think many many cases where pilots could not get a bearing on their carrier after combat and ended up missing in action, in other words ditching in the sea.
After completion of combat over the Pacific, with no islands at all to show the way, there was no way of telling which direction and for how many hours to fly in order to return safely. That is a pretty damned situation."
Actually, Mr. Komachi and his comrades repeatedly informed the general staff of the problem, but the reply was invariably, "A fighter plane does not fight with its radio. How many aircraft can you shoot down with a radio set?", completely missing the point.
Mr. Komachi's opinion was that main and most important reason for the lack of flexibility of the the Japanese military illustrated by the above was the ghost of the "Victory in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese War (Note: Nisshin, Nichiro no Shori)", which was still very deeply rooted even during the Second World War.
"During the initial phase of the Pacific war, with the attack on Peark Harbor, the battle of the Malaysian Sea (Note: Japanese history records the sinking of the Repulse and Prince of Wales as the Battle of the Malaysian Sea) and others, even though aircraft had achieved such an incredible degree of success, the military staff admirals and generals above Mr. Yamamoto Isoroku, all leftovers from the Meiji era, possessed an awareness regarding aircraft that amounted to no more than an inkling. Like the absurd argument of how one could possibly fight with a radio set, likewise aircraft were not seen as the able to destroyer the enemy, that would always be the realm of the big guns of the battleships.
And so, finally it came to tying bombs to our planes and going out to die. No matter how you think about it, it was a tragedy for the planes and for the pilots who were forced to man them."
Incidentally, fighter plane enthusiasts often have a tendency to praise famous wartime pilots, referring to them as kings of shootdowns or aces of the sky (Note: in Japanese, aces are referred to either by the english word 'ace' written in katakana, or more fancifully as gekitsui-o, or o-sora no ace). Mr. Komachi, however, deplored this, saying, "I don't care for those expressions".
"First of all, we lost the war. People of such a country cannot possibly feel happy when they are referred to as kings of shootdowns or aces. And then, secondly, we pilots, and our foes too, fought in deadly earnest to protect our families and our homeland, we did not fight to settle a personal score. Therefore, the thing is, I do not want people to use game score expressions, you know.
There are many tales of pilots painting stars on the their planes' fuselages to designate the number of downed enemy. Yes, for sure it looks really neat (laughter), but those were tales from the very early relaxed part of the war. As the war became desperate, such things were just no longer around. There was incessant restructuring of units, and transfer between them, and planes too changed all the time. It was not possible to keep an aircraft for personal use and so on, and also no time to paint star marks."
As planes changed all the time, naturally each plane picked up and mixed the peculiarities of the various pilots.