The battle of Mogadishu(Question)?

[The Dane]

I havn't read the book.. but just watched the movie again(which is supposed to be quite accurate).

There's one thing i'm wondering about.. where were the indirect fire(mortars especially) ?


Rapid firing 60 or 81mm could have made a huge differens in almost all the contacts. A ring of fire should have surrounded the downed Black Hawk's right from the start in such an enviroment untill back up on the scene arrived.. a 60mm can be used very close in on own forces and they are very precise.

Any toughts about that.. was it cause of the fear of collateral damage?(or lack of GPS/Maps for targeting) - In Fallujah the 60mm was used a lot, because it just took out the bad guys running around outside shooting, without doing damage to the interior and those(noncombattants) inside buildings.

We deployed batallions to Iraq without any mortars. We were depended on CAS and the British brigade's artillery, very stupid. That will never happen again.. our new 60mm and 120mm mortars have saved many Danish soldiers in Helmand. 'Every' dismounted patrol have at least one 60mm 'following' them today. Set up and ready to deliver fire very rapidly.. That's standard today in the Danish army.. and it works very well.

(I'm writing an article about indirect fire support in urban settings for a Danish magasin)

[gaz]

Presumably firing mortars into the area would also have prevented the helicopters that were being used from operating?

[tercio67]

Presumably firing mortars into the area would also have prevented the helicopters that were being used from operating?

Planning for deconflicting the battlespace in, area, elevation/corridor and time should not be that difficult, but that generally only works well if you plan ahead of the action and not during an action.

[The Dane]

Presumably firing mortars into the area would also have prevented the helicopters that were being used from operating?

Hmm Yeah.. That's of course right. Didn't think about that.. Thanks.

It's easy to point fingers and saying "You should have done this and that instead".. But when the first bird went down they should have haulted the air assault style and organized a robust armoured force with lots of mortars in support to get the guys out. Hmm..

Anyone got good info on airsupport during the assault on Fallujah??? Thanks.

[gaz]

It's easy to point fingers and saying "You should have done this and that instead".. But when the first bird went down they should have haulted the air assault style and organized a robust armoured force with lots of mortars in support to get the guys out. Hmm..

I don't believe the US had any armour in country by that point? Hadn't the majority of the Marines who'd made up UNITAF left by that point? The major US force left in country was then the light infantry of the 10th Mountain Division. That's why it took so long to get armoured support into to help Task Force Ranger, it had to be supplied by Pakistani and Malaysian allies which was naturally time consuming.

[Corrupt]

The crash zones/target house were around 3 miles from the airport they were operating from according to the map in the book. I'm no expert on mortars (or any of this), but I think thats beyond a 60mm range and getting towards the maximum range of an 81mm mortar. Don't know how that factors in.

Did the remaining garrison even have mortars? That would be a good start to this discussion :p

[Piirka]

Probably restrictive ROE issue too. Not likely to get green light for indirect fire into urban area.

[The Dane]

I don't believe the US had any armour in country by that point? Hadn't the majority of the Marines who'd made up UNITAF left by that point? The major US force left in country was then the light infantry of the 10th Mountain Division. That's why it took so long to get armoured support into to help Task Force Ranger, it had to be supplied by Pakistani and Malaysian allies which was naturally time consuming.

Yeah, I believe they had left, unfortunely..

Luckily that US land forces have learn now that combined arms is the way forward in urban enviroments. The second battle of Fallujah showed this(Sangin now).. And I think that the SF community has realised that conventional land forces has some qualities that can help them in their missions. Same thing in Denmark.. there's a video on youtube where a platoon of Danish army SF's(JGK) on foot, moves very fast and agressively trough a Talib stronghold/village from one side making the talibs flee out on the other side, where our Leo2's waited for them. Pure win.. they killed a large number of bad guys. And with better(like the PUMA) tactical UAS and smart mortar and artillery(like PGK and MGK) you're not that depended on CAS as in the past.

[The Dane]

Did the remaining garrison even have mortars? That would be a good start to this discussion :p

I've wondered about the same thing.. ?

[The Dane]

Probably restrictive ROE issue too. Not likely to get green light for indirect fire into urban area.

Indirect fire was used a lot in the second battle of Fallujah.. even 155mm. But new GPS's and fire control system's have of course upped the precision of both howitzer's and mortar's since 1992..

[Piirka]

Yeah, I believe they had left, unfortunely..

In September (1993) General Powell asked (Secretary of Defence Les) Aspin to approve the request of the U.S. commander in Somalia for tanks and armored vehicles for his forces. Aspin turned down the request. Shortly thereafter Aideed's forces in Mogadishu killed 18 U.S. soldiers and wounded more than 75 in attacks that also resulted in the shooting down of three U.S. helicopters and the capture of one pilot.

[Piirka]

Indirect fire was used a lot in the second battle of Fallujah.. even 155mm. But new GPS's and fire control system's have of course upped the precision of both howitzer's and mortar's since 1992..

UN-peace enforcement mission with heavy hardware in the early part of the 90's... No way. I guess even the idea would have been politically inacceptible...

[ABN MP]

In September (1993) General Powell asked (Secretary of Defence Les) Aspin to approve the request of the U.S. commander in Somalia for tanks and armored vehicles for his forces. Aspin turned down the request. Shortly thereafter Aideed's forces in Mogadishu killed 18 U.S. soldiers and wounded more than 75 in attacks that also resulted in the shooting down of three U.S. helicopters and the capture of one pilot.

Yep. Was supposed to be the 24th ID. Once the Ranger firefight happened they deployed the TF 1-64 out of the 24th ID for 6 months. I was pissed off because they took Charlie Company 3rd Eng Bn. I was in Bravo Company.

[James]

Luckily that US land forces have learn now that combined arms is the way forward in urban enviroments.

Yes, we didn't learn this until 2004. :roll:

[The Dane]

Yes, we didn't learn this until 2004. :roll:

Not really.. (text removed because it's nonsense)

Edit: Sorry.. I mean light forces with lots of boots on the ground. 'Place a soldier on every streetcorner tactics..' So, a BIG footprint.. that has been the doctrin for many years.

[James]

Not really. The doctrine has been to use mainly forces with a small 'footprint'.

I am not an expert on the battle. I do know that our forces frequently went into situations in the past with very restrictive rules of engagement. I'm also curious to learn why you think mortars would have provided better fire support than a bunch of Little Birds armed with guns and rockets. Mortars would have required an observer on the ground in a very fluid situation. Those mortars would have required a security element. This for a raid that was to last no more than an hour?

[James]

The doctrine has been to use mainly forces with a small 'footprint'.

I'm curious about this doctrine too, especially as I served in the U.S. Military in the 1990s, and 90% of what I trained for was to fight either Iraq or North Korea.

[Piirka]

I am not an expert on the battle. I do know that our forces frequently went into situations in the past with very restrictive rules of engagement. I'm also curious to learn why you think mortars would have provided better fire support than a bunch of Little Birds armed with guns and rockets. Mortars would have required an observer on the ground in a very fluid situation. Those mortars would have required a security element. This for a raid that was to last no more than an hour?

Well, what I read about it, the assault force didn't have their m-203's and humvees didn't have any agl's for fear of increased civilian casualties. For the planners to put, say, naval gunfire and carrier air on call to a living city on an UN peace enforcement mission, would have been probably thought insane and the mission had not gotten any authorization (which would not have been bad in hindsight)...

[James]

Well, what I read about it,

I went to my basic training about a month after that battle. So, I wasn't there at all, I was just a 19 year old kid who was waiting to go to USMC boot camp. Since I wasn't there, I wouldn't think to tell someone how it was.

[Piirka]

I went to my basic training about a month after that battle. So, I wasn't there at all, I was just a 19 year old kid who was waiting to go to USMC boot camp. Since I wasn't there, I wouldn't think to tell someone how it was.

Hmm... Although I replied to your message, it wasn't in any way directed against anything you wrote. Just some musings on what I came across, while looking into the subject.

[The Dane]

The mortar's can provide firesupport when you need it fast.. and the crew doesn't have fly back to base for refuelling or rearming. And you don't need a mortarspotter to call in fire. Anyone with a map(and the knowless of where you are on that map) can call in fires.. but a mortarspotter would of course be nice to have(if the fire need adjustment).
Look how fast this crew fire their rounds in Fallujah..

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeN1wfhwkrE
Could have made a huge differens at Super 6-4's crashsite.. the two Delta snipers defending the helicopter might have been more lucky?

I know that US have used combined arms in urban enviroment back in the past. But that has mainly been after realising that the light forces holding the city needed heavy firepower support. A uparmoured Humwee with TOW misssiles can deliver a heavy punch.. But a gun that can deliver the same punch with a much higher fire rate is of course better. The US army was smart to create SBCT's.. Almost perfect for urban AOR's IMO.

[Laconian]

If you think of the operation as serving a high risk arrest warrant (which is what the mission really was) as opposed to a straight up combat raid, it answers some questions also. Additionally, I'm not sure IDF assets were even available. The US mission in Somalia was completely different than the later combat operations in Iraq. Complete different mission, complete different scope.

[Dominique]

I havn't read the book.. but just watched the movie again(which is supposed to be quite accurate).

There's one thing i'm wondering about.. where were the indirect fire(mortars especially) ?


Rapid firing 60 or 81mm could have made a huge differens in almost all the contacts. A ring of fire should have surrounded the downed Black Hawk's right from the start in such an enviroment untill back up on the scene arrived.. a 60mm can be used very close in on own forces and they are very precise.

Any toughts about that.. was it cause of the fear of collateral damage?(or lack of GPS/Maps for targeting) - In Fallujah the 60mm was used a lot, because it just took out the bad guys running around outside shooting, without doing damage to the interior and those(noncombattants) inside buildings.

We deployed batallions to Iraq without any mortars. We were depended on CAS and the British brigade's artillery, very stupid. That will never happen again.. our new 60mm and 120mm mortars have saved many Danish soldiers in Helmand. 'Every' dismounted patrol have at least one 60mm 'following' them today. Set up and ready to deliver fire very rapidly.. That's standard today in the Danish army.. and it works very well.

(I'm writing an article about indirect fire support in urban settings for a Danish magasin)

One of our training NCO's was a young Batt Boy with TF Ranger. I'll holler at him during our next drill and see what he says.

[Hellfish]

I'm curious about this doctrine too, especially as I served in the U.S. Military in the 1990s, and 90% of what I trained for was to fight either Iraq or North Korea.

In the Army, we were still training to fight a Soviet army that didn't exist. Nobody wanted to admit that we were training for a war that would never happen.

[Hellfish]

The mortar's can provide firesupport when you need it fast.. and the crew doesn't have fly back to base for refuelling or rearming. And you don't need a mortarspotter to call in fire. Anyone with a map(and the knowless of where you are on that map) can call in fires.. but a mortarspotter would of course be nice to have(if the fire need adjustment).
Look how fast this crew fire their rounds in Fallujah..

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeN1wfhwkrE
Could have made a huge differens at Super 6-4's crashsite.. the two Delta snipers defending the helicopter might have been more lucky?

I know that US have used combined arms in urban enviroment back in the past. But that has mainly been after realising that the light forces holding the city needed heavy firepower support. A uparmoured Humwee with TOW misssiles can deliver a heavy punch.. But a gun that can deliver the same punch with a much higher fire rate is of course better. The US army was smart to create SBCT's.. Almost perfect for urban AOR's IMO.

You're absolutely right, however, Mogadishu was/is not Fallujah. We had weeks, if not months, to prepare Fallujah ahead of time. We got out the vast majority of civilians, had spent time rehearsing the breaching, the advance, etc. This single raid on a single building in Mogadishu over ten years earlier can't be compared or contrasted in any meaningful way, in my opinion.

As for the snipers, I don't know that they would have been any more 'lucky' if they had mortars on call or not. I'm not even sure they knew where they were went they hit the ground, and to call in and adjust fire would have removed one of them from the trigger of their weapon for a good part of the battle, never mind the response time/TOT may not have made a difference.

There was a fire support plan. The gunships.


If you think of the operation as serving a high risk arrest warrant (which is what the mission really was) as opposed to a straight up combat raid, it answers some questions also. Additionally, I'm not sure IDF assets were even available. The US mission in Somalia was completely different than the later combat operations in Iraq. Complete different mission, complete different scope.

Exactly.

[maumau]

sorry i had to enquire this from you guys i am just an amature military enthusiast but i just want to ask this how effective will motar be in an urban setting when a guy is stopping your convoy by taking shots at you from second floor of a seventh storey building?

[James]

The mortar's can provide firesupport when you need it fast.. and the crew doesn't have fly back to base for refuelling or rearming. And you don't need a mortarspotter to call in fire. Anyone with a map(and the knowless of where you are on that map) can call in fires.. but a mortarspotter would of course be nice to have(if the fire need adjustment).

If the troops on the gun line can't see what they're shooting at, you really should have a spotter, especially in environments with a lot of civilians. You might recall too that navigation was somewhat difficult in Mogadishu, with troop leaders frequently taking directions from aviation.


Look how fast this crew fire their rounds in Fallujah..

That's awesome. I don't know why you keep referencing Fallujah, it had very little in common with the raid in Mogadishu.


Could have made a huge differens at Super 6-4's crashsite.. the two Delta snipers defending the helicopter might have been more lucky?

How? I think the only guys on the ground who knew exactly where that Crash site was was the crew and the two snipers. You can't provide effective fire support if you lack knowledge of the location of both friendly and enemy units. Because of the limited distance one can often see in an urban environment, a 40mm grenade launcher is, in my opinion, a preferable choice.


I know that US have used combined arms in urban enviroment back in the past. But that has mainly been after realising that the light forces holding the city needed heavy firepower support. A uparmoured Humwee with TOW misssiles can deliver a heavy punch.. But a gun that can deliver the same punch with a much higher fire rate is of course better. The US army was smart to create SBCT's.. Almost perfect for urban AOR's IMO.

Light forces holding the city? The U.S. Army made extensive use of combined arms assaults in both the Pacific and Europe during WWII. By combined, I mean air support including everything up to heavy bombers (more frequently ground attack fighters), extensive use of artillery, armor and infantry.

I don't understand the comparison between a TOW and a mortar, they were designed for two entirely different purposes.

[Ngati Tumatauenga]

Anyone with a map(and the knowless of where you are on that map) can call in fires..

TF Ranger couldn't guide a convoy to the second crash site even with several surveillance assets stacked overhead. Several reasons for that, but one of the main ones was there WAS NO ACCURATE MAPPING available.

Having spent 6 months patrolling them, I can tell you that the streets of Mogadishu aren't laid out in a nice neat western european manner.


but a mortarspotter would of course be nice to have(if the fire need adjustment).

You dont fire any indirect weapon without the means to adjust. That's just stupid.


Could have made a huge differens at Super 6-4's crashsite.. the two Delta snipers defending the helicopter might have been more lucky?

Coulda, woulda, shoulda. I find your lines of reasoning about what you think the situation should have been, based on your complete lack of knowledge and experience, and in particular equating Shugart and Gordon's fate to "luck" offensive.

I suggest you stay away from making definative, generalised and sweeping statements about situations, times and places that you weren't actually involved in.

[HOG0317]

Hmm Yeah.. That's of course right. Didn't think about that.. Thanks.

It's easy to point fingers and saying "You should have done this and that instead".. But when the first bird went down they should have haulted the air assault style and organized a robust armoured force with lots of mortars in support to get the guys out. Hmm..

Anyone got good info on airsupport during the assault on Fallujah??? Thanks.


I went to Falluja after the 2nd push. I attended an Air support / cas class prior. For the assault Air was stacked in several layers, in a complex fire support plan. It was massively coordinated! The powerpoints were impressive... Use of Mortars at unit level according to briefing by Snipers at camp pendleton stated that mortars worked closely with Snipers and FOs. alot of the Air was above the maximum ordinate of the rounds thus it was free fire for mortars as long as you didnt lay on the increments and kept range close.
In mogadishu there was not much armor avail to use ( fall 1994)... Hell When I was there we had 8 hummers 4 of which where armored and a Duece and a half!. The Aussie SAS in the airport had 2 m113 and some pick up trucks... The nigerians had some armored cars and actually lost several to ambush outside the city.. This was Post Blackhawk down, and Fall of 1994. Our platoon had a 60 mm mortar but, it was only for use in our final defensive plan for our post.

Cheers

[LineDoggie]

Some things that need considering when using mortars in Urban environments like Mogadishu. Bare with me as its been a few years since I normally would have known these things and I was Limited in My dealings with the 11C community.

A Light, Airborne or Ranger company only has 2 M224 60mm Mortars in inventory and a 6 man section manning them under a SSG..
Danger Close is 200M from the bursting sheaf(typically linear) and the sustained rate of fire is only 20 RPM
IIRC there is no 81mm section at Bn Level in the Ranger Bn of 1993 timeframe, so the Bn is lmiited to 6 M224 total

Positioning- Where to emplace them. Not on rooftops, not on concrete directly, not inside buildings due to overpressure and weakened/damaged roofs/floors
Building Masking- heights of buildings may mask ability to hit intended targets
Magnetic inteference with compasses and aiming circle
Ammunition load. the company section does not carry itself enough ammuntion for more than an initial fire mission in light scenarios. Those rounds would be cross loaded throughout the company and need collecting at the SBF before the Assault elements LD.
the 60mm rounds ability to pentrate building roofs Not sure how good it would be while trying to keep mobs at Bay in tiny crowded streets and away from the helo.

Definite need of an experienced FO with eyes on to adjust fires.

[Bidoul33t]

I've got some PDFs about the fight and ambushes in Mogadiscio in June of the same year, a few month before "blackhawk down", in the same area by the same guys, that might interest you.

Problem is the full story of the ambush of June 17 is in french but there a more simple one in english.

(Both are official french military publication).

http://www.scribd.com/doc/98317264 (the English part is after the french there is also a part on Grozny, it's a work on urban combat)


http://www.scribd.com/doc/98317089 (that one is the most interesting, but it's only in French)

I can help if a google trad' doesn't make enough sense.

Basically it shows how the French and Italians repelled ambushes of Aideed militia but were already cutting it very close despite being in APCs and having light tanks/IFV and air support. You find every element of the Blackhawk down battle already (civilian used as shields, hospitals used as firebase, angry mobs helping to hide militia movement, rotten intel about Aidid forces, street roadblocks, etc...).

[deagle]

mortars might have limited use, unless it was targeted to a fixed location, like an ambush point or a fixed heavy gun position

it would have been effective to cover the exfil though, keeping attackers at bay while the forces escape

[James]

mortars might have limited use, unless it was targeted to a fixed location, like an ambush point or a fixed heavy gun position

it would have been effective to cover the exfil though, keeping attackers at bay while the forces escape

How would they have been effective when the mortars knew neither the location of friendly or enemy forces?

I find it interesting that a bunch of internet commandos know more than a bunch of Rangers and Delta guys. Priceless.

[Hellfish]

I've got some PDFs about the fight and ambushes in Mogadiscio in June of the same year, a few month before "blackhawk down", in the same area by the same guys, that might interest you.

Problem is the full story of the ambush of June 17 is in french but there a more simple one in english.

(Both are official french military publication).

http://www.scribd.com/doc/98317264 (the English part is after the french there is also a part on Grozny, it's a work on urban combat)


http://www.scribd.com/doc/98317089 (that one is the most interesting, but it's only in French)

I can help if a google trad' doesn't make enough sense.

Basically it shows how the French and Italians repelled ambushes of Aideed militia but were already cutting it very close despite being in APCs and having light tanks/IFV and air support. You find every element of the Blackhawk down battle already (civilian used as shields, hospitals used as firebase, angry mobs helping to hide militia movement, rotten intel about Aidid forces, street roadblocks, etc...).

Thanks for those.

[Ngati Tumatauenga]

I find it interesting that a bunch of internet commandos know more than a bunch of Rangers and Delta guys. Priceless.

As the old saying goes; "you cant educate pork". :roll: