2RHPZ
10-02-2004, 02:55 AM
THE OMENS OF OP ANACONDA
by B. Raman
14. 03. 2002
The operation, code-named OP Anaconda by the US, in the Shah-e-Kot area (Arma mountains) near Gardez in the Paktia province of eastern Afghanistan involved a major confrontation between the allied forces led by the US and a mixed group of determined guerilla fighters, operating from inside a cave complex in the area.
On the side of the international coalition were about 1,200 US troops and 200 from Australia, Canada,the UK and other West European countries, reportedly assisted by about 800 Pashtuns of the area. These were subsequently joined by about 1000 Tadjiks of the Northern Alliance rushed to the area from Kabul, resulting in a strong criticism by the local Pashtun warlords of the induction of the Tadjiks into a Pashtun area. They interpreted this as an insult to their fighting prowess.
Who were pitted against the coalition troops? The answer to this is not clear. American spokesmen have described them as a mix of the remnants of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda. However, other reports, considered more independent, describe them as a moderate sized contingent of Pakistanis led by Arab instructors of the 055 Brigade of the Al Qaeda.
The Pakistanis involved in the fighting were the members of the Sunni extremist Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-Al-Islami (HUJI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). They had survived the US air strikes in Afghanistan and had managed to return to Pakistani territory. They have been re-grouped and re-trained by a team of retired officers of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment and many of them re-inducted into Eastern Afghanistan (Gardez, Wardak, Ghazni and Khost ) to resume the fight against the US troops.
One of their major objectives was to show to the Afghan people as well as to the rest of the world that contrary to the American claims of having vanquished the Taliban and damaged the Al Qaeda-inspired terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan, they were still alive and kicking.
In a report carried on March 13, 2002, the "News" of Islamabad has quoted an Afghan commander in the area as saying that most of the guerillas involved in the fighting were Pakistanis and Arabs. The fighting, often bitter, lasted 11 days at the end of which the Afghan troops claimed to have captured the area from the Pakistanis and Arabs on March 12, 2002. The "News" has quoted General Abdullah Joyenda, an Afghan commander assisting the US troops, as saying that most of the surviving Pakistanis and Arabs retreated towards the Pakistani border. The report does not say whether they have re-entered Pakistan.
For want of adequate information, it is difficult to find an acceptable answer to many questions such as: How did the fighting erupt? Did the Pakistanis and Arabs surprise the Americans or did the Americans surprise them in their hide-out? How was it that during the earlier electronic and ground sweep during and after the fighting in the Tora Bora area the presence of these remnants in this area (Shah-e-Kot) escaped notice? If they were not present in this area at that time, wherefrom did they infiltrate into this area now? From some other area of Afghanistan or from Pakistan?
There is a cloak of secrecy about the nature of the fighting and the ultimate results too. From the details filtering out of Pakistan, one could assess, with some measure of conviction, that the Americans, who suffered fatal casualties of eight of their personnel due to enemy fire directed at their helicopters, relied as they have been doing since October 7, 2001, on air power, precision-guided fire power of tremendous destructive capability and long-range ground firing capability. They avoided any ground action, which might have brought their troops into close proximity of the guerillas.
For close proximity action such as that undertaken on March 12, 2002, they depended on the Afghans in order to avoid heavy casualties for their own troops. After having softened the guerilla position on the ground through air strikes and long-range firing, they used the Afghans for finally capturing the cave complex from the control of the jehadi guerillas and for the mopping-up.
Figures of the strength of the jehadi forces pitted against the Americans and of the casualties inflicted on them widely vary. The American claim of having killed over 500 fighters of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban during the 11-day action are not corroborated by the accounts of the Afghan allies of the US who put the number of dead bodies recovered during their mopping-up on March 12 at less than 50.
Despite the paucity of reliable information filtering across the curtain imposed by the Americans, it would appear till now that Anaconda was more an embarrassing surprise for the Americans than a famous victory.
Embarrassing surprise because it proved the earlier American belief or claims of having defeated the mix of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda to have been premature. Also because Anaconda has shown, if proof was needed, that the entire war against terrorism could come unstuck if they do not deal with the dregs of the present Afghan war, who are now operating from Pakistani territory.
During the 1980s, the Pakistani territory in Balochistan, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) functioned effectively and devastatingly as the rear base for the Afghan Mujahideen and foreign,essentially Arab, mercenary groups which made the Soviet troops bleed. The very same Pakistani sanctuaries are now sought to be used by the surviving dregs of the Taliban, the Al Qaeda and the Pakistani jehadi conglomerate to frustrate the US-led campaign in the Pashtun areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan.
Instead of focussing on this, the Bush Administration is letting its attention and that of its allies be diverted to the more alluring task of turning the guns on President Saddam Hussein of Iraq. If not bin Laden, let us at least get the head of Saddam Hussein as our trophy. That seems to be the cry in Washington DC.
They may be able to get the head of Saddam, but that would not be the end of the terrorism directed against homeland America. The key to the end of the Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism against homeland America and the rest of the international community lies in the Pakistan-southern/eastern Afghanistan region and not in Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Somalia, Yemen, Georgia or Southern Philippines. Till the Pakistan/Afghanistan region is totally cleared of and sanitised against the terrorist infection, more September 11s are likely.
The warning signs are there, loud and clear, for the Americans to read if only they open their eyes fully instead of fighting the war against terrorism with their eyes half open/half closed as they have been doing now, lest, if they open them fully, they see Pakistan for what it really is, the snake pit of internationsl terrorism.
Shah-e-Kot was only one of these warning signs, but not the first. There were others before it:
* The kidnapping and brutal murder of Daniel Pearl, the American journalist.
* Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's suspension of his actions against the terrorist groups after the kidnapping.
* The release of 600 of the 2,000 arrested extremists by him on the ground that there was no evidence of their involvement in terrorism.
* The offer of an amnesty by Lt. Gen. (retd) Moinuddin Haider, Pakistan's Interior Minister, to the remaining 1,400 if they give in writing that they would not re-join the banned terrorist organisations---the easiest thing for them to do.
* The revival of sectarian violence in different cities of Pakistan despite Musharraf's ban on the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah Mohammad on August 14, 2001 and on five other terrorist organisations on January 15, 2002 including the Sunni extremist SSP and the Shia extremist Tehrik Jaffria Pakistan.
* The continuing collusion of Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment with terrorists of various hue as so vividly brought out by the Daniel Pearl case, the arrest of Omar Shaikh and Musharraf's pussy-footing on the question of his extradition, the failure to act effectively against the dregs from Afghanistan re-grouping in Pakistani sanctuaries etc.
If these warning signs are not heeded, another terrorist Pearl Harbour is likely---sooner than later.
by B. Raman
14. 03. 2002
The operation, code-named OP Anaconda by the US, in the Shah-e-Kot area (Arma mountains) near Gardez in the Paktia province of eastern Afghanistan involved a major confrontation between the allied forces led by the US and a mixed group of determined guerilla fighters, operating from inside a cave complex in the area.
On the side of the international coalition were about 1,200 US troops and 200 from Australia, Canada,the UK and other West European countries, reportedly assisted by about 800 Pashtuns of the area. These were subsequently joined by about 1000 Tadjiks of the Northern Alliance rushed to the area from Kabul, resulting in a strong criticism by the local Pashtun warlords of the induction of the Tadjiks into a Pashtun area. They interpreted this as an insult to their fighting prowess.
Who were pitted against the coalition troops? The answer to this is not clear. American spokesmen have described them as a mix of the remnants of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda. However, other reports, considered more independent, describe them as a moderate sized contingent of Pakistanis led by Arab instructors of the 055 Brigade of the Al Qaeda.
The Pakistanis involved in the fighting were the members of the Sunni extremist Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-Al-Islami (HUJI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). They had survived the US air strikes in Afghanistan and had managed to return to Pakistani territory. They have been re-grouped and re-trained by a team of retired officers of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment and many of them re-inducted into Eastern Afghanistan (Gardez, Wardak, Ghazni and Khost ) to resume the fight against the US troops.
One of their major objectives was to show to the Afghan people as well as to the rest of the world that contrary to the American claims of having vanquished the Taliban and damaged the Al Qaeda-inspired terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan, they were still alive and kicking.
In a report carried on March 13, 2002, the "News" of Islamabad has quoted an Afghan commander in the area as saying that most of the guerillas involved in the fighting were Pakistanis and Arabs. The fighting, often bitter, lasted 11 days at the end of which the Afghan troops claimed to have captured the area from the Pakistanis and Arabs on March 12, 2002. The "News" has quoted General Abdullah Joyenda, an Afghan commander assisting the US troops, as saying that most of the surviving Pakistanis and Arabs retreated towards the Pakistani border. The report does not say whether they have re-entered Pakistan.
For want of adequate information, it is difficult to find an acceptable answer to many questions such as: How did the fighting erupt? Did the Pakistanis and Arabs surprise the Americans or did the Americans surprise them in their hide-out? How was it that during the earlier electronic and ground sweep during and after the fighting in the Tora Bora area the presence of these remnants in this area (Shah-e-Kot) escaped notice? If they were not present in this area at that time, wherefrom did they infiltrate into this area now? From some other area of Afghanistan or from Pakistan?
There is a cloak of secrecy about the nature of the fighting and the ultimate results too. From the details filtering out of Pakistan, one could assess, with some measure of conviction, that the Americans, who suffered fatal casualties of eight of their personnel due to enemy fire directed at their helicopters, relied as they have been doing since October 7, 2001, on air power, precision-guided fire power of tremendous destructive capability and long-range ground firing capability. They avoided any ground action, which might have brought their troops into close proximity of the guerillas.
For close proximity action such as that undertaken on March 12, 2002, they depended on the Afghans in order to avoid heavy casualties for their own troops. After having softened the guerilla position on the ground through air strikes and long-range firing, they used the Afghans for finally capturing the cave complex from the control of the jehadi guerillas and for the mopping-up.
Figures of the strength of the jehadi forces pitted against the Americans and of the casualties inflicted on them widely vary. The American claim of having killed over 500 fighters of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban during the 11-day action are not corroborated by the accounts of the Afghan allies of the US who put the number of dead bodies recovered during their mopping-up on March 12 at less than 50.
Despite the paucity of reliable information filtering across the curtain imposed by the Americans, it would appear till now that Anaconda was more an embarrassing surprise for the Americans than a famous victory.
Embarrassing surprise because it proved the earlier American belief or claims of having defeated the mix of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda to have been premature. Also because Anaconda has shown, if proof was needed, that the entire war against terrorism could come unstuck if they do not deal with the dregs of the present Afghan war, who are now operating from Pakistani territory.
During the 1980s, the Pakistani territory in Balochistan, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) functioned effectively and devastatingly as the rear base for the Afghan Mujahideen and foreign,essentially Arab, mercenary groups which made the Soviet troops bleed. The very same Pakistani sanctuaries are now sought to be used by the surviving dregs of the Taliban, the Al Qaeda and the Pakistani jehadi conglomerate to frustrate the US-led campaign in the Pashtun areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan.
Instead of focussing on this, the Bush Administration is letting its attention and that of its allies be diverted to the more alluring task of turning the guns on President Saddam Hussein of Iraq. If not bin Laden, let us at least get the head of Saddam Hussein as our trophy. That seems to be the cry in Washington DC.
They may be able to get the head of Saddam, but that would not be the end of the terrorism directed against homeland America. The key to the end of the Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism against homeland America and the rest of the international community lies in the Pakistan-southern/eastern Afghanistan region and not in Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Somalia, Yemen, Georgia or Southern Philippines. Till the Pakistan/Afghanistan region is totally cleared of and sanitised against the terrorist infection, more September 11s are likely.
The warning signs are there, loud and clear, for the Americans to read if only they open their eyes fully instead of fighting the war against terrorism with their eyes half open/half closed as they have been doing now, lest, if they open them fully, they see Pakistan for what it really is, the snake pit of internationsl terrorism.
Shah-e-Kot was only one of these warning signs, but not the first. There were others before it:
* The kidnapping and brutal murder of Daniel Pearl, the American journalist.
* Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's suspension of his actions against the terrorist groups after the kidnapping.
* The release of 600 of the 2,000 arrested extremists by him on the ground that there was no evidence of their involvement in terrorism.
* The offer of an amnesty by Lt. Gen. (retd) Moinuddin Haider, Pakistan's Interior Minister, to the remaining 1,400 if they give in writing that they would not re-join the banned terrorist organisations---the easiest thing for them to do.
* The revival of sectarian violence in different cities of Pakistan despite Musharraf's ban on the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah Mohammad on August 14, 2001 and on five other terrorist organisations on January 15, 2002 including the Sunni extremist SSP and the Shia extremist Tehrik Jaffria Pakistan.
* The continuing collusion of Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment with terrorists of various hue as so vividly brought out by the Daniel Pearl case, the arrest of Omar Shaikh and Musharraf's pussy-footing on the question of his extradition, the failure to act effectively against the dregs from Afghanistan re-grouping in Pakistani sanctuaries etc.
If these warning signs are not heeded, another terrorist Pearl Harbour is likely---sooner than later.