Fighting the Stryker rifle company

[2RHPZ]

Fighting the Stryker rifle company

This article discusses tactical operations in the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) rifle company and provides a Stryker company commander's review of recent operations in an effort to generate discussion about capabilities and employment. This article is based on company-level training executed prior to the Stryker initial operation test and evaluation (IOT&E). During the IOT&E, the MGS platoon consisted of three, four-man Stryker antitank guided missile (ATGM) vehicles. Stryker ATGMs will continue to be used as in lieu of vehicles (ILOVs) until developmental and qualification testing of the MGS is completed and fielding begins in FY05.

A Company, Task Force 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, SBCT, was deployed from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Fort Knox, Kentucky, to begin instrumentation in preparation for the IOT&E, which is structured to validate the SBCT concept by comparing and contrasting companies from 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, 1st Brigade (SBCT), 25th Infantry Division (Light), and companies from a 10th Mountain Division battalion. Both battalions will execute similar tasks, in similar conditions, and against a similar opposing force (OPFOR).

The preparation for IOT&E focuses on four tasks: conducting a raid; conducting a perimeter defense; conducting security operations in a stabilized environment; and conducting resupply operations.

Company-level training began in March 2003 and continued through May 2003. It consisted of three separate field-training exercises (FTXs) that varied all the conditions of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilians (METT-TC). All three were well resourced and challenging. Throughout the entire exercise, the battalion sent out a tactical operations center (TOC), and a combat trains command post (CTCP) to provide command and control (C2) and logistics support. The first covered two back-to-back, 5-day iterations, where all four tasks were trained in each 5-day period. The second exercise in April began with a 180-mile road march (complete with the Stryker's add-on armor) and went into a 3-day FTX where we conducted a raid and security operations in a stabilized environment (SOSE).

The final FTX in May was the most challenging--a continuous 7-day exercise that closely resembled the 9-day iterations of the IOT&E. The OPFOR was ramped up from one rifle company, augmented with a platoon of light armored vehicle (LAV) IIIs and high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) gun trucks, to two rifle companies with a full complement of LAV IIIs, organic mortars, and a U.S. Army National Guard M1A1 tank platoon.

At times, my task organization included the battalion's engineer platoon (with its engineer squad vehicles) from the 73d Engineer Company, and the antitank platoon, with the Stryker ATGM variant, from 1st Platoon, D 52d Antitank Company. The battalion's reconnaissance platoon, mortar platoon, and sniper section supported the company operations. Company battle-space varied--at times it was 25 to 30 kilometers.

Key Differences

Understanding the SBCT structure is critical to understanding how it is employed. By leveraging technology, SBCT leaders can do more with less. At first glance, a robust 170-man company with all the elements of combined arms by modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) standards would appear to be the answer to every tactical problem faced by a company commander. Because an SBCT unit can do more, it is tasked to do more. In fact, between the digital technologies in the form of the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), the mobility provided by the Strykers, and the numbers and types of soldiers, an SBCT unit probably covers three to four times the battlespace of any other type of company. Battalion and brigade commanders have remarked that an SBCT company commander's job duties are more similar to those of a battalion commander than those of a company commander in our current force units.

This creates a "one-floor-up" profile for leaders in the SBCT. Platoon leaders now make many decisions and have access to assets that before were only available to the company commander. This carries over to every level, right down to the new soldier who is now both a rifleman and squad designated marksman (SDM) on alpha team, or a rifleman and Javelin gunner on bravo team. The agile and adaptive leader who leverages the available technology makes the SBCT work. For example, the population of the FBCB2 of confirmed enemy allows the company commander to focus combat power at the decisive point within a large battlespace. The commander does not have to own every inch of the 25 kilometers he is assigned by the battalion commander; he just has to influence the bulk of it while he dominates the key terrain as determined by METT-TC.

The ability to task organize at lower levels to accomplish specific tasks is another SBCT distinction. Because the SBCT rifle companies are organically a combined-arms unit and most SBCT vehicles have a common command and control platform in the FBCB2, habitual relationships come easier and work better. An example would be task organizing the mobile gun system (MGS) platoon to accomplish route clearance. The current interim MGS platoon consists of three ATGM ILOVs and 12 19Ks. A typical task organization for route clearance would be two ATGMs with a section of infantry, including the rifle platoon sergeant and forward observer, and a sapper squad in the engineer squad vehicle under the MGS platoon leader. The remaining ATGMs, with the platoon sergeant, are attached to the rifle platoon under the rifle platoon leader. The company now has four maneuver elements with the required combat power to accomplish their tasks.

Another example would be the quick reaction force (QRF). During security operations, three platoons are typically given tasks, which develop the area for decisive operations. One platoon is held back as the QRF to be the decisive effort. The other platoons may be escorting logistics, manning traffic controls points, or executing an ambush or hasty attack, but the QRF platoon is positioned centrally and kept on a short string to be decisive. The mobility of the Stryker and the situational awareness (SA) provided by the FBCB2 allow it to move quickly to a dominating position and be decisive. Understanding how SBCT leaders leverage digital C2 and Stryker mobility are key to understanding how the SBCT units conduct full-spectrum operations across a large battlespace.

Raids and Attacks

The flexibility of the Stryker rifle company in the offense is built into its organization. The Stryker rifle company's offensive mission capabilities are extremely diverse and lethal and include 20 various types of Strykers, organic combat multipliers, such as an MTOE sniper team, a fire support team (FIST), company mortars that have both the 120mm and 60mm systems, the MGS (we have the ATGM ILOV), a C2 architecture that includes FBCB2, amplified vehicle radio communications, all-source imagery processors, multiband integrated tactical radio systems, and the ability to field full platoons, complete with full weapons squads (1 Javelin and 1 SDM per rifle squad), to conduct dismounted operations.

Using the Stryker rifle company's flexibility, we conducted seven successful variations of raids and attacks. Below are three of the seven operations that highlight the organization's flexibility and its use of the Stryker to complete the mission.

Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Raid

The first operation was against the town of Regenberg, one of the MOUT sites at Fort Lewis. The enemy situation revealed OPFOR leaders meeting to discuss future operations. They had about a platoon-sized OPFOR local security with a mounted reinforcement (2 to 3 tech vehicles) 15 minutes away. Variables included civilians on the battlefield (COB) and a booby-trapped arms cache that had to be located. The town sat down in a bowl, which made using vehicles difficult, as surprise was critical to keep the OPFOR leaders from fleeing. Rules of engagement prevented the use mortars larger than 81mm, as well as crater-producing or incendiary munitions. To limit collateral damage from over penetration, a direction of attack was chosen that kept fires oriented south and away from the majority of the COBs.

The company scheme of maneuver relied on a dismounted infiltration to achieve surprise and fix the enemy on the objective (OBJ), then bring up the vehicles to set up blocking positions, assist in clearing the OBJ, augment security, and escort casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). The concept called for the sniper team to conduct a route recon from the planned dismount point, about 700 meters away from the OBJ, then maintain eyes on the support by fire (SBF) and assault positions with a two-man element, while the third man would linkup with the main body to act as a guide. The MGS platoon leader was in charge of the vehicles once we dismounted, and the engineer platoon would clear the route into the OBJ after we initiated contact at the assault position.

One rifle platoon was the SBF and they provided the company with freedom of maneuver. An additional weapons squad augmented the SBF, which was the mortar section using hand-held 60mm tubes with 10 rounds of ammunition each. The SBF was also tasked to dismount two M2s and bring in 2,000 rounds. Once the SBF initiated fires, the sniper team would set in on the open flank of the SBF to provide precision fires and isolate the OBJ. The other two rifle platoons would clear the OBJ (a series of six target buildings), then clear according to enemy situation. Building numbers and streets provided control measures and platoons cleared building by building, which is how most units clear the objective.

During the attack, the javelin gunner used the command launch unit to provide reconnaissance and surveillance; an SDM equipped with an M4, who was trained at the brigade SDM course, acted as a counter-sniper; once the route had been cleared, we linked up with and used infantry combat vehicles (with their remote weapons system M2s and MK-19s) to destroy fortified positions; and we used MGS platoon sergeants to employ the modified improved TOW acquisition system (MITAS) thermals of the ATGM to look deeper into the OBJ and provide information on OPFOR and COB activities once the route had been opened. These are just a few of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used during the operation.

Consolidation and Reorganization

Once the OBJ was secured, we were given a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to continue our consolidation and reorganization, but not to pull off the OBJ as planned until nongovernment organizations (NGOs) could be brought in. The first sergeant switched from providing reports from the SBF to managing CASEVAC. A medical platoon medical evacuation vehicle (MEV) and a family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV) were used to evacuate 22 casualties and a section of infantry combat vehicles (ICVs) provided the escort.

The CASEVAC used the breach made by the sappers to get the vehicles on the OBJ. The XO, who had been talking with battalion and updating the common operational picture (COP) on his FBCB2, immediately began working logistics resupply and maintenance evacuation. A senior platoon sergeant was tasked to take charge of the company's perimeter security until the first sergeant completed CASEVAC operations. A platoon leader worked the COBs and enemy prisoners of war.

Hasty Attack Against Tanks

Another attack allowed for much greater integration of the vehicles. After a 24-hour defense, the company received a FRAGO to conduct a hasty attack against a combat security observation point consisting of a tank platoon and two squads of infantry that were holding a bridge 5 kilometers (km) away. The OBJ included a rectangular drop zone (DZ) bordered by a lake on the left flank (east), a bridge and a stream on the south side, a railroad track on the west (also the right boundary), and a hardball road served as the battalion's line of departure and as our unit's probable line of deployment (PLD). The DZ was about 2.5km in length by 1.5km in width. There was a centerline road in the DZ, which served as a platoon boundary. The OPFOR was using its rifle squads on its flanks as observation and listening posts to control the two tank sections' fires and as local security. One tank attacked my infantry with coax and M2 fires while the other used main guns against Strykers.

Company scheme of maneuver called for two platoons attacking abreast, augmented by the MGS (ATGM ILOV) to clear the OBJ. One platoon would receive two ATGMs; the other would receive the sniper team and a dismounted 60mm. The third rifle platoon was the finishing force (follow and support) and would move to a flank of either platoon as needed. We had battalion mortar priority of fire (POF) with 120mm and 81mms.

TTP Against Armor

A TTP we used at the platoon level was dismounted infantry clearing forward while overwatched by their ICVs and the ATGMs. When the dismounted element reached a prominent IV fine, they would establish an overwatch with their javelins then bring the vehicles forward. This worked well, in that the javelins and the ATGMs provided redundant antitank coverage and freed up the ICVs to provide heavy weapons fire for squads and platoons when they made contact with the OPFOR infantry. When this TTP was used, the OPFOR infantry was quickly killed. The mobility and firepower of the ICV with its remote weapons station controlled by the squad leader on the ground fixed and finished the enemy before he could reposition.

In retrospect, the MGS platoon should not have been tasked down to the platoons in this instance. The platoon leaders' span of control, with squads dismounted from their vehicles and controlling the javelins, was about as much as they could handle. The company would have been better served if the MGS had been tasked to provide overwatch to prevent the enemy from employing its tanks. That would have given the MGS platoon leader room to exercise initiative, reduced the C2 burden on the rifle platoon leaders, and allowed greater survivability and effectiveness on the part of the MGS.

Raid Against Brownsville

During the final FTX, the battalion used an 11-building live fire MOUT site as part of its area of operations for force on force. Brownsville (Range 31 at Fort Lewis) is a plywood-constructed town built in a reasonably open area, similar to a bowling alley. Its buildings vary, some have two stories with stairs or ladders, and others are one-story modulars with walls separating spaces similar to a strip mall. The rear of the town abuts the small-arms impact area. There is a centerline road that runs the long axis of the town that we used as a platoon boundary, and two roads that cross the short axis were used as phase lines. The centerline road had a point obstacle consisting of wire and mines.

During this raid, the speed of the vehicles was used to take advantage of the terrain. The antitank threat was negligible given the vehicles' add-on armor (a kit of reactive armor that gives the Stryker protection up to rocket-propelled-grenade level), the situation template, and the scheme of maneuver. Initially the MGS established an SBF at about 600 meters outside the OBJ, with a squad of infantry providing its local security. The fire support officer (FSO) and XO located with the MGS. Two rifle platoons nearly simultaneously attacked the two nearest buildings on either side of the centerline road. The road served as the direct fire control measure. As the platoons passed the MGS SBE the MGS went into an observation mode. The engineer platoon (-) then went to work on the point obstacle that had to be breached to bring in logistics. The obstacle was about 300 meters from the OBJ, but the enemy's focus was no longer on the breach. The third rifle platoon was committed to reinforce success on the right flank. Snipers were attached to that platoon to act as counter-snipers.

The OPFOR was quickly overwhelmed by the two-directional attack. Many were shot from behind as they concentrated on the threat across the street. Using remote weapons system (RWS) thermals and weapons systems to provide accurate M2 fires and intelligence to the platoon leader worked great. Casualties were quickly pulled back to the platoon casualty collection point (CCP) in the rear of vehicles and treated until the company CCP was established. A platoon-sized OPFOR, with one M2 mounted on a visual modification (VISMOD), two medium machine guns, and three rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) were destroyed and the OBJ cleared in 20 minutes. The Stryker's speed, mobility, protection, and firepower were put to good use based on METT-TC.

Perimeter Defense

The perimeter defense task really applies itself to the noncontiguous battlespace in which the SBCT operates. The lines of communication are often long and must be cleared or maintained. Restrictive terrain may further affect lines of communications. Adjacent unit relationships are more digital than physical. The mobility and firepower of the SBCT company allow it to take on a larger area of operation (AO).

[2RHPZ]

Out of the five defenses we executed, the major condition differences were time, enemy, and terrain. During one defense, we had about 3 hours to conduct a hasty defense following an attack against two motorized infantry companies that had LAV IIIs and HMMWV VISMODS. While we were preparing the defense, we were also conducting CASEVAC, rearming, and refueling operations. Another defense had platoons operating out of contact with one another in restrictive terrain. This was more of a nodal defense of key intersections where traffic control points were further developed as the priority intelligence requirements were answered by the S2. Another had the company defending a 9-kilometer sector, with an engineer platoon and an antitank platoon attached. The enemy included a platoon of T-80s (replicated by M1A1s), eight BTRs (LAV IIIs), and two 150-man companies with organic mortars and artillery fire support.

Hasty Defense of a Flight Landing Strip

The hasty defense mission (3 hours preparation) of a flight landing strip (FLS) required simplicity to allow maximum planning and rehearsal at the platoon level. A rifle platoon was tasked to delay on either flank. The MGS platoon was tasked to destroy in the center, and the third rifle platoon was tasked to counterattack into a flank once the enemy main effort was determined. The engineer platoon would become the company reserve on completion of the obstacles. They were eventually used to reinforce a rifle platoon. Limited success here--the enemy bypass was contained, but most of the sappers were lost. After this lesson-learned experience, during the defense in sector that followed a few days later, we set a battle position overwatching a ford site in the rear of our sector, which worked great.

Small engagement areas, ambushes, and local counterattacks marked the FLS defense. Here the mobility of the Stryker to move soldiers and equipment kept the enemy from taking advantage of any potential successes. The FBCB2 allowed me to gain and maintain SA, then develop situational understanding and move the appropriate element to where it was needed. An example of the usefulness of FBCB2 is the linkup with the battalion reserve. About midway through the fight, the battalion reserve antitank platoon linked up with me via FBCB2, which allowed me to send graphics over 20kms of terrain hours earlier. With the battalion reserve, we killed the remaining vehicles and the enemy withdrew.

Defense TTP

Throughout all of the defenses, the vehicles' capability to pick up and move forces to the decisive point at every level, our heavy weapons' lethality, antitank systems, and mortars, along with the C2 provided by the FBCB2, allowed decisions to be made that enabled us to operate in large battlespaces and retain the initiative. The enemy's situation was transparent, as long as we retained the flexibility to move within the depth of the battlespace.

Security Operations

In an AO, it is the company commander's responsibility to secure the area. It may also include securing a higher headquarters' key assets, such as a retrans site or escorting nongovernment officials, or managing a string of traffic control points that support a larger battalion or brigade collection plan. The company commander is tasked with grasping and retaining the initiative within an AO that may be up to 12 or more square kilometers and include urban areas. He is required to do some staff work, put on his red hat, make decisions, and start figuring out what the enemy wants to do in his AO then get out in front of him.

The sequence of events starts with a recon of the AO, then movement into the AO, then finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy while sustaining operations and facilitating higher headquarters' objectives. The company commander is allowed to execute great initiative within the higher commander's intent, as opportunities are often time sensitive. Operations take on the tune of distributed platoon operations, with one platoon being the decisive effort at the time, but based on events quickly shifting to a supporting role, or vice-versa.

An example would be a platoon conducting a presence patrol with a brigade human intelligence (HUMINT) asset. They receive information that an OPFOR resupply will come into the AO from the east between 2400 hours and 0200 hours. The commander calls the battalion commander and informs him of his intent to establish an area ambush to destroy the resupply. The battalion commander calls brigade and requests ground surveillance radar and I-REMBAS (a device capable of picking up acoustical signatures) support. Another platoon conducts its troop leading procedures (TLPs) for the ambush while the platoon that conducted the patrol finishes its route (turns over responsibility for the town to the sniper team) and links up with the logistics package (LOGPAC) at the combat trains command post (CTCP). Another platoon conducts the ambush and destroys it, but turns up the grid location and linkup time for the enemy resupply site. It is now 0130 hours and undoubtedly the enemy logistics site will fold and withdraw, an opportunity exists. The QRF platoon is now tasked to conduct a hasty attack. The MGS platoon, task organized with an infantry squad, a sapper squad, and an MEV, are tasked to standby with the first sergeant for CASEVAC. Mortar POFs shifted all day. This cycle continues throughout the security operation as events dictate.

In some ways security operations resemble a search and attack; however, it is a full-spectrum task. It requires agile and adaptive leaders executing their current task and purpose, but who understand the commander's intent and recognize opportunities that appear, then self retask to meet the intent.

Continuous Operations

Throughout the FTX, the pressure of continuous operations was felt. The battalion commander made a conscious decision to operate in contemporary operating environment conditions. Attacks and defenses were executed hot on the heels of one another among the consolidation and reorganization. Almost every attack and defense we prepared for was done in the midst of a security mission. As the battalion commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) were answered, the battalion shifted its decisive effort based on the current situation and conditions. As we grew accustomed to this sustained operating tempo (OP-TEMPO) and fell into a battle rhythm, our operations fell into step with the battalion's. Standard operating procedures were developed at the lowest levels to compensate for the condensed planning time.

Company TLPs were refined. I pushed out the battalion FRAGOs via FBCB2 with a free-text warning order with company-specific information. I contacted the battalion commander to receive his guidance, issued the next FRAGO within the hour, accompanied by a company set of digital graphics that I could push to everyone in the battalion. I had a conference call with my leaders, sent out my reconnaissance, arranged for company leaders to assemble for a face-to-face and rehearsals then began movement. The eight TLPs did not change, but the methods and speed in which they were executed did to keep pace with constraints. Throughout our mission, the digitally enhanced field manual and the mobility of the Strykers allowed us to meet imposed constraints.

TTPs for Employing Company Assets

Using the fire support platoon:

* MTOE FSO and FIST. Works great as your S2 during rehearsals--can move red icons on FBCB2; is the fire support platoon leader and targeting officer; and can be tasked as your nonlethal guy, if you receive brigade assets, such as HUMINT, psychological operations, and civil affairs. The FSV is probably your company's best C2 platform; it has a ground-lasing device (GLLVD), but currently the 120mm has no precision-guided munitions (PGM) round; however, it does provide a control for 155 copperheads and close air support (CAS) laser-guided munitions, and aids in target registration. You will need a company fires net--organic forward observers (FOs), better C2 platforms, ATGM laser ranger finders, and 120mms at the company level mean a lot more fire missions.

* Mortars. The arms room concept for mortars provides a huge plus in flexibility, such as ROE, effects, better white phosphorous, and increased range to cover Stryker battlespace. During one defense, we set up 60mms for a platoon in restricted terrain with danger close obstacles, and set up the 120mms to cover our tactical obstacles in the more open areas. The 10-man mortar section can provide more of their own security as the mortar combat vehicle (MCV) has an RWS with an M2.

* Sniper team. The sniper team can be used as part of your leader's recon, and as the security element to keep eyes on the OBJ. They can be used as an economy of force on a flank, key node or rear area that you do not want to use a platoon in yet; used as an overwatch or countersniper role; used to augment the SBF; attached to a platoon for platoon missions; used as FOs or to infiltrate a COLT team made up of organic platoon FOs with the GLLVD. Our sniper team used a HMMWV from headquarters for better commo and mobility. They can also be inserted with battalion recon platoons to facilitate adjacent unit coordination. Insert early to provide reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) over company FM net in terms of last minute target refinement and/or security information during infiltration of other company elements; and they can eliminate key enemy weapons or personnel immediately prior to the assault and force the enemy to consider another direction.

Using the MGS (ATGM ILOV):

When using the MGS (ATGM ILOV) be conscious of the local security requirements. The ATGM ILOV is another C2 element you can use--task organize with sappers or infantry to do route clearance. The vehicle has great thermals for reconnaissance and surveillance and battle damage assessment. The laser range finder generates quick calls for fire. Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire guided (TOW) II A&B, TOW BB (bunker buster) missiles and MITAS provide excellent long-range precision fires against a wide variety of targets, including bunkers, armor, and snipers. The ATGM ILOV is not the MGS; survivability in restricted terrain is an issue--no fire and forget with a wire guided missile, no coaxial machine gun. The ATGM has some pluses and negatives when compared to MGS requirements. It can be used at blocking positions to isolate from outer or inner tings during raids; it can be paired with snipers or javelins for AT ambushes, forward security/ counterrecon fights; or paired with a rifle platoon as a hunter-killer combination.

Using engineers:

Sappers have a javelin per platoon; the engineer squad vehicle (ESV) has RWS with an M2; sappers have M240s; ESV has plow or roller and a pneumatic dart-style marking system that works great day or night; ESV plow and roller greatly impact ESV mobility; when we set conditions for breaching out of contact, the sappers lived and our CASEVAC got through; and sappers can easily set a blocking position and set up a hasty defense--this prevented a penetration in one of the defenses.

Using FBCB2:

FBCB2 can be used to push out short FRAGOs and graphics; FBCB2 should augment a map with graphics, not replace it; and FBCB2 reporting for logistics and sensitive items frees up the FM nets and should be SOP--set free text messages at given times in accordance with battalion SOP. The company XO is responsible for updating the COP via FBCB2. He inputs FM reports into FBCB2, which keeps the FBCB2 from being overpopulated with redundant reports. FBCB2 allows for distributed operations over the SBCT battlespace.

Using other brigade assets:

During train up, the brigade was still fielding much of its equipment, conducting training, or supporting the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, at the combat training centers. Even with all of the enhanced capabilities of the SBCT infantry company and battalion, the brigade assets, such as RSTA troops with unmanned aerial vehicle platoons, will double their effectiveness by achieving the fundamentals of full-spectrum operations.

Logistics and resupply:

* Escorts. All logistics operations need to be escorted by at least an infantry section. LOGPAC should be organized so that classes of supply are lined up in the order that supplies are to be drawn; for example, III, I, V, VII, and IX. The XO or first sergeant should escort LOGPAC and control FM flow. FBCB2 personnel and logistics statistic SOPS are critical to avoid tying up FM nets. The longer the lines of communications through bad-guy country, the more combat power is necessary for escort.

* Refueling operations. Refueling operations are generally executed service-station style, one section at a time, either in the center of the company's tactical assembly area (TAA) or on a side road with cover and concealment and a two-way exit during tactical operations where the company is spread out. The lead platoon secures the site until the last platoon can relieve in place, bottom line is security is paramount. This procedure takes about 2 hours from time of receipt of fueler.

* Treat all logistics missions like combat missions. Have a fire support plan, conduct an intel brief, and rehearse actions on contact. Ground lines of communications to the infantry companies are the primary mode.

TAA procedures/TTP:

* TAA Procedures. Quartering party--first sergeant or XO leads with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) NCO, a rifle platoon, one ATGM ILOV, and the weapons squad leaders. Company-sized TAA is 400 meters (or more depending on attachments) in diameter; restrictive terrain may call for platoon-sized TAAs in a star pattern.

* Security. Fifty-percent security per platoon is adequate as a general rule; rifle platoons use two fire team-sized observation and listening posts 100 meters out and two fire teams as a QRF inside the perimeter--either the driver or vehicle commander as up in the ICVs, ATGM crews keep 2 men up, and mortars keep one tube up. When bringing leaders to one location, increase security to 100 percent.

* MGS or ATGM variant placement. Placement varies, concentrating them in one spot makes logistics operations easier and faster, but interspacing them between rifle platoons provides good thermal coverage and better security for those variants from dismounted infantry. Company headquarters and fire support platoons are usually placed in center, although mortars may have to relocate to meet mask and overhead clearance needs.

The SBCT rifle company performs as advertised. It achieves decisive operations in the offense, defense, stability, and support, and is capable of full-spectrum operations. It dominates its battlespace through use of combat power elements--maneuver, firepower, information, protection, and leadership as applied to current conditions. The MTOE sets the framework for combined arms at the company level. The SBCT company achieves the Tenets of Army operations--initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility through mission-type orders, junior-leader initiative, and situational awareness and understanding. As Transformation continues toward equipping and training the remaining SBCTs and building the Objective Force, TTP and doctrine will continue to evolve. The fundamentals that prepare leaders to fight the conditions as defined by METT-TC will not.

CPT Robert Thornton is currently serving as commander, A Company, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Fort Lewis, WA. He is a graduate of Austin Peay State University His military education includes Infantry Officers Basic Course and Armor Captains Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including assistant S3, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Fort Lewis, WA; XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment (1-187), 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY; platoon leader, Antitank Platoon, D Company, 1-187 Infantry, Fort Campbell; and rifle platoon leader, C Company, 1-187th Infantry, Fort Campbell.

[2RHPZ]

The Stryker-equipped cavalry squadron in an urban environment

Fifteen city blocks away; a column of nine light commercial trucks dash along a city street at high speed. Each truck carries approximately six paramilitary troops, armed with AK-47s and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). They comprise, in effect, a suicide squad intent on attacking the lead company of a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) battalion on an area security mission in an urban area. In the command post for Delta Troop of the cavalry squadron (RSTA), the console operator observing the real-time video screen sees the column and modifies the tactical unmanned aerial vehicle's (TUAV's) flight pattern slightly to keep the force in camera view. He notifies the battle captain in the squadron tactical operations center (TOC) nearby, but the battle captain has been monitoring the remote viewing terminal inside the TOC and has already seen what the console operator sees. After a lightning-quick staff huddles with the S2 and the fire and effects control center, the battle captain has notified the squadron commander, S3, and brigade headquarters by FM radio, high-frequency radio, or Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). He begins to coordinate indirect fire and reconnaissance handover to ground recce troops and/or infantry scouts in the line of the enemy's march.

**********

Thus, the cavalry contributes information, turned into actionable intelligence, which initiates maneuver in the form of a blocking effort, an ambush, or a counterattack, as the SBCT commander may designate. The SBCT--designed, developed, and fielded as a transition force between the current force and the future combat systems--will fight and win in an urban operational environment, and it will do so because it will see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively. The force that enables the majority of the SBCT's ability to see first is the cavalry squadron (reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition [RSTA]).

This article examines which characteristics of the Stryker-equipped cavalry squadron (RSTA) enable it to effectively support the SBCT in an urban fight.

Cavalry in Urban Operations--How It Used to Be

Dozens of books have been written on the history of cavalry and its role in warfare. We will not attempt to reproduce those works in this brief article, so suffice it to say, that cavalry has traditionally conducted reconnaissance, surveillance, and economy of force operations. Whether the cavalry of the past fought for information or relied primarily on stealth and observation depended on the nature of a particular cavalry organization.

Heavy, armored cavalry had the punch and firepower to attack, defend, and develop a situation, and extract information using fire and maneuver. Other cavalry units, particularly during the first part of World War II (WWII), operated out of armored cars, or similar vehicles, and relied primarily on stealth and observation. But the nature of combat taught us some lessons. Major General R.W. Grow, commander of the 6th Armored Division during WWII, wrote, "Too often, our pre-World War II training directives emphasized the 'sneak and peek' method of reconnaissance. Fortunately, farsighted cavalry officers who believed that 'the mission of Cavalry is to fight' and that worthwhile information can only be gained by fighting, influenced the development of reconnaissance squadrons. (1)

Lessons learned in the early campaigns of WWII, primarily in Africa, led the Army Ground Force (AGF) to reorganize the mechanized cavalry in 1943 to give the squadron and troop the ability to fight for information. Combat in northwest Europe required cavalry reconnaisance units to perform the traditional roles of horse cavalry--defend, delay, exploit, and attack, as well as reconnaissance--reinforcing early findings that reconnaissance required fighting. (2)

Legendary World War II cavalryman, Colonel "Hap" Haszard, echoed similar thoughts during an informal reconnaissance discussion at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, with a group of observer controllers in 1988. Haszard stated that cavalry and scouts would always face situations requiring them to "fight for information." He then went on to qualify his remarks by explaining that the quality of the information gained by scouts and cavalry was "inversely proportional to the distance between the soldier's (rear end) and the ground," and "dismounted techniques must be considered essential to successful reconnaissance."

These observations can be said to apply equally to urban and countryside fighting. Yes, there are many times that scouts will fight for information in urban areas. Sometimes it is very important to know if the enemy runs when fired on, which direction he runs, and to whom he runs! And certainly a scout's survivability against small arms and RPGs is a matter of vital importance to his ability to collect information. But how the Army fights and the suite of tools used to conduct RSTA has changed since WWII. Colonel Haszard was correct when he ascertained that ultimately the scout on the ground is the deciding factor for answering the SBCT commander's combat critical information requirements (CCIR). But that scout is not alone, and in the cavalry squadron (RSTA), his abilities are magnified and his reach expanded by a host of assets.

Changes in Contact Continuum and the Operational Environment

While an infantry battalion entering a city during WWII, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War generally had some intelligence from ground scouts or air reconnaissance to guide them, frequently the maneuver turned into a movement-to-contact. With the advent of long-range acquisition systems, the improvement of sensor, the addition of echelons-above-brigade collection assets, and the use of TUAVs, the Army sought a change in the contact continuum.

In the past, an infantry battalion might enter a city with minimal intelligence information, gained almost exclusively through ground reconnaissance. Either the lead company or battalion scouts would "find" the enemy via firefight contact and deploy while in contact to develop the situation.

New doctrine defines information as an element of combat power. Today's forces seek to see the enemy first, which means before they are fired on. This may be a ground scout using a long-range, advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3), but in today's Army, it may also take the form of a Prophet team conducting a tactical communications intercept and direction-finding to the enemy's command post. The SBCT commander in an urban environment (or any other for that matter) might use his TUAV to look deep and see the enemy well in advance of the lead infantry element operating in the restricted line of sight of the city. Because he can see first, the SBCT commander can have his cavalry squadron, his brigade S2, and his military intelligence company (organic), turn that information into actionable intelligence. With that intelligence, the SBCT commander can now understand first.

Using the scenario at the beginning of this article, the commander realizes that his lead company, busy clearing buildings near the town hall, will be exposed to an imminent suicide attack. He has scouts on the ground and in buildings two, three, perhaps four, blocks away from the infantry, but the image on the TUAV and the rapid analysis of that information allows him to understand that those ground scouts cannot see the coming attack until it is too late to stop it, nor can the few scouts in position to engage mass enough firepower to block the attack, even if they see it coming. Because he understands first, the SBCT commander can now act first and maneuver out of contact to a decisive point on the urban battlefield. (3)

Since the commander has maneuvered out of contact, his forces are now poised to finish decisively and destroy the enemy suicide attackers.

The world situation has significantly changed during the past 20 years, and the operational environment reflects the likelihood that the SBCT will be fighting more frequently in urban areas, and fighting a dispersed, nontraditional enemy in a noncontiguous environment. Linear warfare has not disappeared and large major theater of war engagements will still occur. But it is the small-scale contingency, the urban conflict, the isolated pockets of resistance housed in apartment complexes and city parks that the SBCT will likely encounter. Technology will never replace ground scouts, but seeing first with technological capabilities can help the cavalry squadron (RSTA) better protect ground scouts and apply them to critical points on the urban battlefield to gain relevant information.

The TUAV provides real-time imagery along a planned and designated flight path over named areas of interest that answer the brigade commanders CCIR. In cities, the TUAV is excellent for observing rooftops, movement into and out of the city's perimeter, or gauging the size and direction of movement of large groups of people such as demonstrators or mobs. But a city still offers many places the enemy can hide, and because of high-rise structures, the TUAV cannot effectively observe.

The Prophet offers a signal-intercept and direction-finding capability and can often provide a line of bearing, or when employed as a two- or three-vehicle team, a cross-fix on the location of enemy transmitters. This information is frequently perishable, almost fleeting, and sometimes difficult to separate from the total communications traffic within an urban area. However, if frequencies are known, such as cellular phones, and the target bandwidth is narrowed, the Prophet has the capability to augment a developing intelligence picture of a given urban area.

One of the most important tools that the SBCT commander has to gather information and help make decisions in an urban fight are embedded human intelligence collectors, all the way down to the squad level in cavalry squadron (RSTA) platoons. These 97Bs are trained in tactical questioning and, depending on the intensity of the anticipated conflict, may be very valuable in identifying potential ambushes, impending demonstrations, critical government and religious sites to avoid, and other population and infrastructure-related information. Their contribution might be something as simple, yet as important, as gathering from a local citizen that the bridge the SBCT plans on using for its main attack has been mined. The human intelligence (HUMINT) information travels up its chain of communication to the SBCT's HUMINT officer, unless of course, the information is time-sensitive or units are in impending peril. In that case, a report would go directly to the threatened force.

The Stryker (Reconnaissance Variant) in the Urban Fight

Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan used horses to rapidly maneuver his infantry to decisive points on the battlefield. But when entering a town, he dismounted and fought as infantry. In modem warfare, the Stryker vehicle (infantry carrier vehicle) is the infantryman's mount. It may eat petroleum products instead of hay, but make no mistake, it is still fundamentally a mount. Yes, there may be times that infantry will remain buttoned up in their Strykers when moving through an urban area, and they may even employ the remote weapons station (RWS) from which to fight. The Infantry School has developed, and will continue to develop, techniques, tactics, and procedures that govern infantry remaining mounted or dismounting in an urban fight. Our purpose here it to discuss how the Stryker vehicle can enable the scouts of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) to conduct reconnaissance that enables the infantry to fight effectively in an urban area.

The Stryker vehicle (reconnaissance variant) brings several characteristics to the table that will make the scout's life better during an urban fight. (4) First, the Stryker offers protection from 14.5mm small-arms munitions without the addition of bolt-on antitank-guided missile armor. What this means for scouts conducting reconnaissance of a suburb that will serve as the lead battalion's foothold, is that the crew can likely survive small-arms fire if ambushed--small-arms fire that would have either killed or rendered ineffective a scout team in a high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle. Additional bolt-on armor can enhance the Stryker's protection by defeating RPG strikes, but there exists a trade-off in time to apply the armor, as well as vehicle maneuverability and transportability by airframe. Unlike the infantry variant, the reconnaissance variant of the Stryker mounts an LRAS3 in place of the RWS. Avoiding decisive engagement (as is the cavalry's mantra), that scout team might return fire, if attacked, by using its MK-19 to suppress the enemy while the team moves to a position of safety; but design-wise, the vehicle has traded the RWS for the LRAS3, thus, scouts must expose themselves to return fire. But the effective use of the suite of electronic collection tools should minimize those circumstances.

FBCB2 mounted inside the Stryker helps the crew maintain situational awareness and their presence is populated on the squadron common operational picture within the TOC, thus enabling effective command and control. In the confined space of an urban area, with many dismounts operating in and around vehicles, fratricide prevention is a key concern. The Stryker has an external communications system that will allow dismounted scouts, or infantry operating in conjunction with recce platoons, to communicate with the Stryker's intercom system. This becomes particularly important in controlling fires, from the Strykers, as well as from a mobile gun system (MGS) that might have been pushed forward in support. The dangers of collateral damage to infantry from main gun barrel blast are well documented and still remain a training and execution concern. While FBCB2 enables good situational awareness for vehicles, it does not, at present, track dismounted soldiers.

The 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry, the Army's first cavalry squadron (RSTA), discovered during training that an enhanced position locating and reporting system and FBCB2 operation was generally the most reliable form of communication when operating in an urban area. FM communications via all-source imagery processors are often spotty and sometimes unreliable, since properties, such as power, distance, and line-of-sight, while holding true in 70 to 80 percent of situations, sometimes precipitated temporary communications outages at distances as short as 200 to 300 meters. (5) Still, as noted during the recent war in Iraq, FM communications can be used to rapidly and efficiently vector dismounted infantry, MGS, or tanks in fire support to attack a given target. This will often be controlled much like a ground controller might maneuver aircraft to a target. Major Ben Watson makes an observation about tanks in support of infantry during the recent war in Iraq: "As long as the supported unit can talk directly to the tanks [or Strykers, or MGS], it is fabulous. We blocked, numbered, and phase-lined the entire city [Umm Qasr], and that system worked as well. Often, I could hear guys coordinating tank fires by saying, 'they are in building A3.' We have also just told them things like 'do you see the 2-story house with the rusty roof? The bunkers are at the base of the white house to the east of that one.'" (6)

The LRAS3 mounted on the reconnaissance variant is a tremendous "see first" tool, but its value becomes attenuated when employed in an urban environment. The LRAS3 is excellent for seeing enemy troop formations up to 25km away in broad, sweeping terrain such as the desert. But when employed in dense undergrowth, and as in the case of urban areas, the crew will have to be very creative to get the kind of observation "shots" needed to make the LRAS3 effective.

The squadron has 120mm mortars that can be employed in an urban fight. Adding 60mm mortars to the recce troops (a modification currently under consideration) would simply increase the squadron's tools. Often, in an urban fight, the 120mm creates too much damage and is sometimes less effective due to its increased minimum range and minimum safe distance. The 60mm is more portable, can be employed directly with the scout teams, and can deliver a higher volume of fire. (7)

Javelin antitank weapons in the hands of recce platoons provide an effective response to enemy armored vehicles, medium-to-heavy trucks, and in some cases, can be employed to excellent effect against bunkers and buildings.

The cavalry squadron (RSTA) has the equipment, manpower mix, and capability to effectively conduct reconnaissance in urban terrain. But like any intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission, good planning and execution must be based on sound principles. These principles apply not only to ISR operations in support of the SBCT, but also to urban reconnaissance missions in general.

Planning ISR operations in urban terrain includes:

* Conducting urban intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

* Using the "reach" of all collection assets.

* Developing a HUMINT collection plan.

* Developing a HUMINT collection matrix.

* Determining ISR objectives.

* Refining an effects plan (both lethal and nonlethal).

* Communicating the plan.

* Detailing the rules of engagement.

* Planning infiltration and exfiltration lanes.

* Preparing a medical evacuation and logistics resupply plan.

* Synchronizing aerial and ground reconnaissance.

Executing ISR operations in urban terrain includes:

* Approaching the urban area.

* Isolating/reconnoitering the area.

* Entering the area by overt patrol or infiltration.

* Conducting reconnaissance patrols.

* Collecting combat information.

* Spotting and assessing HUMINT contacts or sources.

* Occupying urban surveillance sites and operations.

* Reporting information.

* Employing effects.

* Conducting battle, target, or reconnaissance handover.

* Exploiting contacts or sources.

* Assisting in isolation. (8)

This article represents how the SBCT's primary reconnaissance capability will likely be employed in an urban environment. The first SBCT and cavalry squadron (RSTA) underwent an operational evaluation in May 2003 at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Pending Congressional approval of that evaluation, the first SBCT and its cavalry squadron (RSTA) will be subject to deployment and a real-world mission. And though we may not currently have a perfect picture as to how these units will best be organized, equipped or employed, the lessons learned and conclusions drawn will form the doctrine and training of future squadrons.

See first--timely and correct situational awareness.

Understand first--information analyzed into intelligence to create situational understanding.

Act first--maneuvering forces while out of contact.

Finish decisively--defeating the attack on the precise ground and at time of our choosing.

Notes

(1) Major General R.W. Grow, "Operation of Cavalry Recon Squadron Integral to the Armored Division," A Research Report, The Armored School, Fort Knox. Kentucky, 1949-1950. Foreword.

(2) Louis A. DiMarco, "The U.S. Army's Mechanized Cavalry Doctrine in WWII," Thesis, Master of Military Art and Science, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

(3) How scouts track locations, both enemy and friendly, in an urban area must be synchronized with how maneuver units track maneuver forces, and the traditional pattern of phase lines and checkpoints may not be sufficient in a dense urban area.

(4) One of the most attractive aspects of the SBCT it that virtually 90 percent of its vehicles are all built on a single chassis, six-wheeled, 18-ton interim armored vehicle. A variant of this basic chassis exists for various components of the SBCT, such as the reconnaissance variant for the scout, the command variation for leaders, the fire support variant, and the engineer variant.

(5) Major Michael Kasales, "Collected Squadron AAR Comments from Urban Reconnaissance FTX, SCLA," Headquarters, 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington, 5 December 2002.

(6) Major Ben T. Watson. email to various recipients, including Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, Fort Knox, Kentucky, from a Marine Expeditionary Unit operating inside Iraq, 14 April 2003.

(7) Kasales, 25.

(8) Ibid., 3.

SFC Andrew L. Barteky is a subject matter expert, Cavalry Doctrine Development, Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Developments, Fort Knox, KY. His military education includes the Scout Leaders Course and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course. During his career, he has served in various positions, to include observer controller, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; and platoon sergeant, E Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 172d Light Infantry Brigade, Fort Wainwright, AK.

[MARINO]

Goos read.