2RHPZ
10-03-2004, 04:16 AM
Company operations during the establishment of stability operations in Baghdad
"Units may have to conduct operations in environments that do not involve traditional combat. A unit may also be utilized in a stability or support operation at the successful conclusion of a combat mission. While stability and support operations can occur anywhere, they will most likely occur in an urban environment. During a stability operation or support operation, units perform many activities not necessarily contained in its mission essential task list." (1)
In May 2003, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division arrived in Baghdad as peace operations began replacing the high-intensity conflict operations of the 3d Infantry Division and U.S. Marines. Until the majority of the units were physically within the city limits, commanders were unsure of the task organization their units would assume and of the sectors in Baghdad they would control. This article outlines some essential tasks and lessons learned from one armor company's assumption of mission in Baghdad, Iraq. These essential tasks include task organization, relief in place, forward operating base recon and establishment, command post operations, and establishing the neighborhood advisory council (NAC).
The 2d Battalion, 37th (2,37) Armor Regiment arrived in Baghdad and began conducting relief in place and simultaneously establishing systems. Leaders at the company level and below began operations by assuming the mission and commander's intent of the force in place, which allowed the battalion staff to get their feet on the ground and become familiar with operations prior to tasking units.
Predeployment
A Company, 2-37 (A/2-37) Armor's train-up at home station consisted of level one gunnery, company and platoon situational training exercise (STX) lanes, and a combat training center live fire. During deployment preparation, the company also conducted focused military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and stability operations and support operations training, to include checkpoint operations, cordon and search, react to ambush, and many other tasks the company was likely to encounter.
The situation in Iraq continued to develop during the training and deployment process; therefore, leaders could not focus on any particular sector, specific mission, or task organization. Focusing on soldier-level tasks allowed flexibility in the training schedule during a time when conflicting requirements were common.
The company was deploying from the cool temperate climate of Central Europe to the oppressive heat of the Kuwaiti and Iraqi deserts. Increased water intake prior to deployment, ensuring soldiers are eating three meals a day despite a decreased appetite, and constant supervision by leaders will lower the likelihood of heat casualties.
During the staging period in Camp Udairi Kuwait, the most useful and motivational training for the soldiers was the short-range marksmanship (SRM) training that is operated by contractors. These experts (former special operations noncommissioned officers) led the tankers through the basics of SRM in the wide-expanse of the Kuwaiti firing ranges. The ability to shoot the M4 or M16 accurately while standing, advancing, and sidestepping laterally, as well as inside buildings, is critical during enemy confrontation. Most company firefights were less than 150 meters.
While still in Kuwait, company and battalion commanders benefited from eavesdropping on the division and corps battle update briefs. Listening to the kinds of engagements, hotspots, and other issues concerning operations in Baghdad allowed commanders to become familiar with the operational environment and begin building a broad plan on how to execute missions in that environment.
Task Organization
The task organization for the company (and the battalion) was uncertain until arriving in Baghdad. Once they arrived in Baghdad, 2-37 Armor was cross-attached to the 2d Light Cavalry Regiment (2LCR) to provide heavy armor assets to the high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) of the LCR. The 2-37 Armor cross-attached one tank company to 1st Squadron, 2LCR while the battalion received one troop from the same squadron. The task force commander attached one scout platoon to A/2-37 Armor from his new cavalry troop and provided the troop with one platoon of tanks.
The tank company commander's effective employment of this scout platoon hinged on several factors and can best be determined using mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). The company's mission on arriving in May was to conduct combat operations in a sector of Baghdad and provide security and stability to allow reconstruction efforts to begin (mission statements must change depending on the operational environment just as in high-intensity conflict operations).
The enemy consisted of Baathists, former regime loyalists, and common criminals attempting to undermine coalition forces' authority through guerrilla attacks, using the local population as its camouflage. The terrain on which the company would be conducting its mission is built-up urban terrain with a mix of residential streets in linear and rectangular pattern, highways, and a limited number of neighborhoods with "rayed" streets. (2) Trafficability depended on location, but also on time of day. Civilian traffic cycles need to be considered (although not exclusively) for determining whether tanks or wheels will roll on a mission. Building size varied from one-floor shack houses, two-story mansions, and multilevel apartment and office buildings. Troops available were one headquarters section, two tank platoons, and one scout platoon with eight M1026s. The medic (red-cross covered) and maintenance M113s were also sliced to the platoons to provide flexibility to transport raid teams or evacuate wounded personnel. Time available for the mission is one year or until mission complete.
To provide each subordinate maneuver element the flexibility to conduct the varied missions required for combat and support operations and stability operations, the scout platoon was broken down by section and cross-attached to each of the remaining two tank platoons and the headquarters tank section (the scout platoon leader and platoon sergeant controlled two remaining scout sections and the headquarters tank crews). This task organization provided each platoon with the ability to conduct the full spectrum of operations, to include zone recons (formerly known as presence patrols), raids, and other activities related to light operations. It also allowed each platoon to conduct missions, such as fixed checkpoints, fixed-site security, zone recons (during hours of light traffic), quick reaction forces (QRF) for raids, cordon missions, and other activities, with the heavy armor of the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. During the occasional task force-level operations, the task organization was adjusted to give the scouts more consolidated manpower for raids and building clearing, and allow the tankers to concentrate on outer-cordon security.
Cross training 19Ds and 19Ks on each other's respective tasks improved the company's ability to accomplish missions with this unique task organization. HMMWV driver's training was an ongoing event and curfew hours were a perfect time to train new soldiers on driving in realistic terrain. Select scouts could also conduct tank crew gunnery skills training to be qualified on tank weapons systems. Eventually, the line between scout and tanker within the company blurred because everyone executed similar missions. The scout platoon's integration was a welcome event and a pure tank company could not have been as successful without the scout platoon's skills, experience, and leadership. This task organization also allowed for an easier rotation of red, amber, and green cycles during the yearlong mission. Rotating these duties is an excellent way to mitigate complacency by varying the soldiers' mission and tasks.
Relief In Place
Relief in place is an essential task of assuming any long-term mission in the stability operations and support operations environments. The time frame of the relief in place varies depending on mission requirements. The relief in place is a leader-intensive mission that needs to have a clear focus culminating in a commander's assessment. A/2-37 Armor's tasks included:
* Fully immersing into the outgoing company's everyday operations, focusing on getting every soldier into sector with his counterpart.
* Platoon leaders and company commanders meeting with community leaders in sector.
* Assessing the status of all elements of the sector's infrastructure, to include electricity, water, police, schools, hospitals, and demographics.
* Providing the task force commander with a comprehensive commander's assessment and recommended plan of action to meet the higher command's intent.
* To relieve the 3d Infantry Division outgoing company as quickly as possible to allow them to reconsolidate, refit, and prepare for redeployment.
Most leaders are familiar with the basic concept and intent of the relief in place from missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Leaders must ensure everyone is comfortable with the tasks they will be required to accomplish for the next several months. The earlier the commander can arrange patrols into sector and get soldiers immersed in the operational environment, the more confident they will be when the training wheels come off and transfer of authority is complete. Task force staff and leaders will most likely not supervise the relief in place closely because they will be busy learning their jobs and becoming familiar with the multiple sectors under task force control. Company leaders must provide clear guidance and initiative for a successful relief in place.
Company leaders will be required to meet with community leaders and influential Iraqis in sector to minimize confusion among the populace by identifying the responsible authority in sector and establish close relationships necessary for stability operations and support operations. Visits to all pertinent centers of gravity in the sector will familiarize leaders with these areas and help build the template for future patrols and humanitarian projects. Political party headquarters, community leaders, and tribal leaders all have influence in sector and can serve as force multipliers when conducting operations by spreading information on coalition projects and positive propaganda. Community leaders legitimize their positions and increase their clout by being seen with coalition forces and participating in reconstruction projects.
Properly assessing the state of the infrastructure in sector is obviously key to reconstruction efforts and building the local populace's trust. The residents of the sector will expect miraculous speed in re-establishing electricity, sewage, water treatment, and security. At first glance, the commander will believe that he cannot influence city-level issues such as power and water. In reality, some problems were fixed by replacing common generator parts or wire, or by the coalition simply supervising the station's management at the local site. The residents can provide some insight into the state of basic utilities, although nothing can replace a visit to the actual power substation, sewage department, or water-pumping facility. Producing electricity may be a theater-level problem solved at higher echelons, but local commanders can improve distribution of available electricity, garbage trucks, and clean water. Assessing the competence of city workers and agencies is also vital to improving services since many workers were employed by the former regime based solely on party affiliation and not technical expertise.
Forward Operating Base Establishment and Life Support
Mission requirements may require the company to establish a forward operating base (FOB) away from the task force headquarters. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations In Urban Terrain, provides an excellent list of planning factors and work priorities for establishing a company FOB. (3) When deciding whether to establish an FOB, the following issues were considered:
* The company's sector was located away from the task force headquarters along a main supply route.
* The proposed FOB site was already manned (but not developed) by the outgoing company in charge of the sector and was tied in to the perimeter of another brigade's FOB.
* The proximity to the company's sector allowed informants, community leaders, and police access (after the required security search) to meet with company leaders and discuss issues concerning crime and reconstruction.
* The pre-existing buildings located within the FOB allowed soldiers improved quality of living and a measure of comfort conducive to a long-term mission.
Establishing the FOB and the relief in place should occur simultaneously. The first sergeant and the company commander should do a joint reconnaissance and assessment of the viability of the site. The first sergeant can provide a realistic expectation of the site's potential for improvement and can direct work priorities while the commander concentrates on relief in place and familiarization of the sector. The first sergeant also decides where each platoon will live and how many soldiers can safely occupy each room since not all the room sizes are the same. Separating sleeping areas for noncommissioned officers (NCOs), officers, and soldiers must be considered if space is available. A little privacy and time away from the platoon sergeant and platoon leader is important to a soldier enduring a yearlong deployment and is vital to maintaining a healthy command climate and good morale. This, of course, does not excuse leaders from conducting regular health and welfare inspections and regularly supervising soldiers' living areas.
Establishing observation points and direct-fire planning can be conducted exactly as in a high-intensity conflict environment, with particular attention to fighting-position construction, wire communications, wire obstacle emplacement, barriers to protect from drive-by shootings, and lighting. Observation posts (OPs) were used to cover the portion of the perimeter the company manned. The OPs used wire and FM communications to cross talk and communicate with the command post. The commander of the relief used a Motorola radio to communicate with the OPs and the command post (CP) without having to stay at the CP. An FOB defense plan was also devised, which required increased manning at the OPs, and a wheeled and armored QRF to counterattack enemy forces or provide medical assistance and security to casualties outside the perimeter. Using an M1A1 tank at an OP is not only an advantage for its thermal capabilities, multiple weapons capability, and excellent armor, but also a psychological deterrent to would-be attackers. The Iraqis still respect the capabilities (true and exaggerated) of the Abrams, and placing a tank section on a perimeter or near a soft target greatly reduces the possibility of an attack. Each OP must have the basic equipment required by doctrine to be effective such as maps, sector sketches, fire plans, and binoculars. Coolers and overhead shade are also required during the summer months.
The company's battle rhythm will also be an important aspect of conducting sustained operations that will last up to a year. The task organization was adjusted to allow for three platoons to rotate red-, amber-, and green-cycle duties. The red platoon was responsible for force protection duties, dining facility/day room cleaning, serving during meals, logistics and commander escort duty, and improvement projects inside the FOB. The amber platoon was in charge of fixed-site security at remote locations, and last minute, directed missions from higher command. The green platoon focused exclusively on patrols and projects in sector. The rotations for these cycles were 1-week intervals. A week is the perfect balance between having a constant state of change and becoming stagnant and risking complacency. Guard duty and other red duties are essential tasks, but unless properly rotated into other duties, soldiers can easily become bored and careless. A weekly change of pace and operational tempo is enough to keep the company mentally alert and proficient in all company operations.
Field sanitation standards must be enforced rigorously to maintain health. The lack of working latrines, limited sources of potable water, and a preponderance of flies and other parasites can render a company combat ineffective if company leaders do not enforce hygiene discipline. One platoon took the initiative and built a burn toilet, shower (nonpotable), and washbasins out of pre-existing materials. All of the platoons cleaned up the area with the help of local hires (using funds provided by the battalion). Each element of the field sanitation kit was used in this environment--mousetraps, bug repellent, flypaper, mesh screening, lime, and bleach was consumed very quickly, so purchase a surplus of these items.
After establishing security, company battle rhythm, and addressing field sanitation issues, leaders prioritized other projects for improving the company FOB:
* Establishing the company command post inside an existing structure.
* Repairing the looted and damaged electrical system.
* Obtaining air conditioning for sleeping areas.
* Furnishing another existing building as the company dining facility/day room.
Repairing the electrical system was a joint effort between locally hired electricians (some with questionable technical skills) and a member of the company who happened to be a former generator mechanic and licensed electrician. Overhauling the wiring and circuit breakers was necessary to manage the load produced by the air conditioners. The battalion's purchase of a 100-kilowatt generator provided the company with enough power to run the air conditioners and power the FOB when the city's power grid was down.
A separate structure for the dining facility and the day room allowed soldiers to eat their meals away from their sleeping areas (minimizing vermin and parasites in the rooms) and provided company leaders a separate place to inspect soldiers and equipment. On entering the dining facility for a meal, an NCO would stand at the door and observe weapons clearing procedures and cleanliness. The communal setting of the dining facility allowed for more interaction among leaders and soldiers and also provided a family dinner time atmosphere that increased in importance during the holidays or special events such as birthdays or promotions.
Other contracts secured for improving the company FOB included overhead shade for the HMMWV line (the heat caused a fail-5 message on the radios), repairing drainage and sewage lines to minimize standing water, and an internet cafe for soldiers. The company FOB did not fall into the division plan for internet kiosks, and the soldiers had limited access to morale phones and e-mail. A local national working as an interpreter had extensive computer and network knowledge and set up a cluster of five computers and a satellite internet connection in the day room. After signing the division's computer-use agreement concerning restrictions and operations security measures, the soldiers used the computers for e-mail and internet calls for a low hourly fee. Adding internet kiosks was the single largest morale event for soldiers. Soldiers could now stay in touch with their families, stay updated on world events, and conduct video teleconferences with their loved ones almost daily.
The division did provide Armed Forces Network decoders and televisions just in time for football season. Commanders should assess what higher headquarters will realistically provide versus what will be resourced at their level. Internet access at the company level was a very simple and inexpensive process whereby the provider fronted the costs for all the equipment, to include surge protectors and fans to protect the computers. Usage was the only cost to soldiers and they were more than willing to spend a couple of dollars to talk to or e-mail family and friends.
Establishing and improving the company FOB is essential to a successful long-term deployment. Occupying and improving existing buildings is much easier, cheaper, and less resource-intensive than creating buildings from nothing. Soldiers can survive in any environment and will accomplish their mission while enduring a very low standard of living as shown in recent media reports. During a deployment that is going to last several months to a year, commanders will improve the morale and effectiveness of their soldiers if they can give them a comfortable place to rest, conduct maintenance, and train. Existing structures will also improve the effectiveness of a company CP and planning cell by keeping documents, tools, maps, and equipment protected from the elements.
Command Post Operations
Rapidly establishing a working company CP is crucial to stability operations and support operations in Baghdad. The company CP will bear many similarities to a CP used in a high-intensity conflict environment, but the information and tracking requirements will be much greater for a company CP in an FOB. Essential tasks to complete during the establishment of the company CP include FM communications, properly labelling all maps and battle tracking tools, a board for the information officer and civil affairs-related projects, and a method for recording end of mission reports.
The company will need a minimum of three secure nets running at any one time. To include all elements of the CP in one room, we removed the radios from the first sergeant's M113 and placed them in a large ground-floor room in one of the buildings in the FOB. The M113 stayed right outside the CP room to provide power for the radios. This required the CP NCO in charge (NCOIC)/officer in charge (OIC) to start the M 113 every two hours to keep the batteries charged. The nets used were the battalion command, company command, and force protection nets used by the entire perimeter, to include adjacent units and gate guards. The force protection net was necessary in the event that a local national visitor (council member, informant, or interpreter) was present at the gate and needed an escort to the company area. The CP also had a Motorola radio as a secondary method of communication. Two OE-254s were placed on the roof of the CP building to maximize the range for communications with battalion and the majority of downtown Baghdad for patrols in or out of sector on the company net. Baghdad has very few buildings over three stories tall and raising the base of the OE-254 to a height of 15 feet provided excellent range, out to 20 kilometers in most instances (with working power amplifiers).
As in any combat environment, proper battle tracking, situational awareness, and command and control are key to any successful military operation. The first and most important element of a successful CP is the capabilities of the soldier behind the radio. During operations in Baghdad, at a minimum, one NCO or officer was always on duty in the CP. Too many units put young privates and specialists on radio watch/CP duty, who do not have the experience, authority, or confidence to make maneuver decisions or answer complex questions to higher units about operations in sector. At any given time, there may be four or five maneuver elements in sector and the commander and first sergeant may be in a council meeting, or unable to communicate with all the elements on the ground. The CP NCOIC/OIC will provide accurate reports to battalion, accurately track all elements in sector (during a crisis event like the UN bombing this will include multiple battalions, civilian agencies, news media, and VIPs), coordinate link-up points, and alert QRF personnel. The company executive officer will take over CP duties during task force operations or mass casualty events to provide accurate assessments to the task force while the commander develops the situation on the ground and often away from the task force net.
The best map product for conducting sector operations in Baghdad is the satellite imagery (1:5,000-scale with gridlines) provided for each sector. This map was mounted in the CP and streets were labelled using white strips of paper taped to the acetate. Churches, mosques, hospitals, political party headquarters, banks, and other key facilities were also labelled. A series of checkpoints were included and a patrol went out into sector to get 10-digit grids for all the checkpoints in sector (easily identifiable intersections and squares). A list of these checkpoints and grids were given to battalion so they could assemble common graphics for the battalion and use the checkpoint system when referring to areas or points in sector. Another map useful for finding important areas across Baghdad was the tourist map the company ordered through Amazon.com. This map labelled many key facilities, hotels, and monuments, and was helpful in navigating the streets of Baghdad, especially when patrols were required to link-up outside of the assigned company sector. Baghdad's neighborhoods are broken down into sections known as "mahallas." A three-digit number similar to an area code identifies these mahallas. The locals use this numbering system often when describing events in certain areas. Because of this, labelling the map with each of the mahallas is very important. The 1st Armored Division's terrain team was also helpful in providing special maps covering specific areas in sector.
The popularity of the satellite imagery cannot be overstated. The imagery provided resolution that allowed leaders to plan raids and cordons for individual houses, and its large size allowed for easy battle tracking. Properly labelling the map also allows for quick identification of key sites and familiarization with the sector.
"Units may have to conduct operations in environments that do not involve traditional combat. A unit may also be utilized in a stability or support operation at the successful conclusion of a combat mission. While stability and support operations can occur anywhere, they will most likely occur in an urban environment. During a stability operation or support operation, units perform many activities not necessarily contained in its mission essential task list." (1)
In May 2003, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division arrived in Baghdad as peace operations began replacing the high-intensity conflict operations of the 3d Infantry Division and U.S. Marines. Until the majority of the units were physically within the city limits, commanders were unsure of the task organization their units would assume and of the sectors in Baghdad they would control. This article outlines some essential tasks and lessons learned from one armor company's assumption of mission in Baghdad, Iraq. These essential tasks include task organization, relief in place, forward operating base recon and establishment, command post operations, and establishing the neighborhood advisory council (NAC).
The 2d Battalion, 37th (2,37) Armor Regiment arrived in Baghdad and began conducting relief in place and simultaneously establishing systems. Leaders at the company level and below began operations by assuming the mission and commander's intent of the force in place, which allowed the battalion staff to get their feet on the ground and become familiar with operations prior to tasking units.
Predeployment
A Company, 2-37 (A/2-37) Armor's train-up at home station consisted of level one gunnery, company and platoon situational training exercise (STX) lanes, and a combat training center live fire. During deployment preparation, the company also conducted focused military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and stability operations and support operations training, to include checkpoint operations, cordon and search, react to ambush, and many other tasks the company was likely to encounter.
The situation in Iraq continued to develop during the training and deployment process; therefore, leaders could not focus on any particular sector, specific mission, or task organization. Focusing on soldier-level tasks allowed flexibility in the training schedule during a time when conflicting requirements were common.
The company was deploying from the cool temperate climate of Central Europe to the oppressive heat of the Kuwaiti and Iraqi deserts. Increased water intake prior to deployment, ensuring soldiers are eating three meals a day despite a decreased appetite, and constant supervision by leaders will lower the likelihood of heat casualties.
During the staging period in Camp Udairi Kuwait, the most useful and motivational training for the soldiers was the short-range marksmanship (SRM) training that is operated by contractors. These experts (former special operations noncommissioned officers) led the tankers through the basics of SRM in the wide-expanse of the Kuwaiti firing ranges. The ability to shoot the M4 or M16 accurately while standing, advancing, and sidestepping laterally, as well as inside buildings, is critical during enemy confrontation. Most company firefights were less than 150 meters.
While still in Kuwait, company and battalion commanders benefited from eavesdropping on the division and corps battle update briefs. Listening to the kinds of engagements, hotspots, and other issues concerning operations in Baghdad allowed commanders to become familiar with the operational environment and begin building a broad plan on how to execute missions in that environment.
Task Organization
The task organization for the company (and the battalion) was uncertain until arriving in Baghdad. Once they arrived in Baghdad, 2-37 Armor was cross-attached to the 2d Light Cavalry Regiment (2LCR) to provide heavy armor assets to the high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) of the LCR. The 2-37 Armor cross-attached one tank company to 1st Squadron, 2LCR while the battalion received one troop from the same squadron. The task force commander attached one scout platoon to A/2-37 Armor from his new cavalry troop and provided the troop with one platoon of tanks.
The tank company commander's effective employment of this scout platoon hinged on several factors and can best be determined using mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). The company's mission on arriving in May was to conduct combat operations in a sector of Baghdad and provide security and stability to allow reconstruction efforts to begin (mission statements must change depending on the operational environment just as in high-intensity conflict operations).
The enemy consisted of Baathists, former regime loyalists, and common criminals attempting to undermine coalition forces' authority through guerrilla attacks, using the local population as its camouflage. The terrain on which the company would be conducting its mission is built-up urban terrain with a mix of residential streets in linear and rectangular pattern, highways, and a limited number of neighborhoods with "rayed" streets. (2) Trafficability depended on location, but also on time of day. Civilian traffic cycles need to be considered (although not exclusively) for determining whether tanks or wheels will roll on a mission. Building size varied from one-floor shack houses, two-story mansions, and multilevel apartment and office buildings. Troops available were one headquarters section, two tank platoons, and one scout platoon with eight M1026s. The medic (red-cross covered) and maintenance M113s were also sliced to the platoons to provide flexibility to transport raid teams or evacuate wounded personnel. Time available for the mission is one year or until mission complete.
To provide each subordinate maneuver element the flexibility to conduct the varied missions required for combat and support operations and stability operations, the scout platoon was broken down by section and cross-attached to each of the remaining two tank platoons and the headquarters tank section (the scout platoon leader and platoon sergeant controlled two remaining scout sections and the headquarters tank crews). This task organization provided each platoon with the ability to conduct the full spectrum of operations, to include zone recons (formerly known as presence patrols), raids, and other activities related to light operations. It also allowed each platoon to conduct missions, such as fixed checkpoints, fixed-site security, zone recons (during hours of light traffic), quick reaction forces (QRF) for raids, cordon missions, and other activities, with the heavy armor of the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. During the occasional task force-level operations, the task organization was adjusted to give the scouts more consolidated manpower for raids and building clearing, and allow the tankers to concentrate on outer-cordon security.
Cross training 19Ds and 19Ks on each other's respective tasks improved the company's ability to accomplish missions with this unique task organization. HMMWV driver's training was an ongoing event and curfew hours were a perfect time to train new soldiers on driving in realistic terrain. Select scouts could also conduct tank crew gunnery skills training to be qualified on tank weapons systems. Eventually, the line between scout and tanker within the company blurred because everyone executed similar missions. The scout platoon's integration was a welcome event and a pure tank company could not have been as successful without the scout platoon's skills, experience, and leadership. This task organization also allowed for an easier rotation of red, amber, and green cycles during the yearlong mission. Rotating these duties is an excellent way to mitigate complacency by varying the soldiers' mission and tasks.
Relief In Place
Relief in place is an essential task of assuming any long-term mission in the stability operations and support operations environments. The time frame of the relief in place varies depending on mission requirements. The relief in place is a leader-intensive mission that needs to have a clear focus culminating in a commander's assessment. A/2-37 Armor's tasks included:
* Fully immersing into the outgoing company's everyday operations, focusing on getting every soldier into sector with his counterpart.
* Platoon leaders and company commanders meeting with community leaders in sector.
* Assessing the status of all elements of the sector's infrastructure, to include electricity, water, police, schools, hospitals, and demographics.
* Providing the task force commander with a comprehensive commander's assessment and recommended plan of action to meet the higher command's intent.
* To relieve the 3d Infantry Division outgoing company as quickly as possible to allow them to reconsolidate, refit, and prepare for redeployment.
Most leaders are familiar with the basic concept and intent of the relief in place from missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Leaders must ensure everyone is comfortable with the tasks they will be required to accomplish for the next several months. The earlier the commander can arrange patrols into sector and get soldiers immersed in the operational environment, the more confident they will be when the training wheels come off and transfer of authority is complete. Task force staff and leaders will most likely not supervise the relief in place closely because they will be busy learning their jobs and becoming familiar with the multiple sectors under task force control. Company leaders must provide clear guidance and initiative for a successful relief in place.
Company leaders will be required to meet with community leaders and influential Iraqis in sector to minimize confusion among the populace by identifying the responsible authority in sector and establish close relationships necessary for stability operations and support operations. Visits to all pertinent centers of gravity in the sector will familiarize leaders with these areas and help build the template for future patrols and humanitarian projects. Political party headquarters, community leaders, and tribal leaders all have influence in sector and can serve as force multipliers when conducting operations by spreading information on coalition projects and positive propaganda. Community leaders legitimize their positions and increase their clout by being seen with coalition forces and participating in reconstruction projects.
Properly assessing the state of the infrastructure in sector is obviously key to reconstruction efforts and building the local populace's trust. The residents of the sector will expect miraculous speed in re-establishing electricity, sewage, water treatment, and security. At first glance, the commander will believe that he cannot influence city-level issues such as power and water. In reality, some problems were fixed by replacing common generator parts or wire, or by the coalition simply supervising the station's management at the local site. The residents can provide some insight into the state of basic utilities, although nothing can replace a visit to the actual power substation, sewage department, or water-pumping facility. Producing electricity may be a theater-level problem solved at higher echelons, but local commanders can improve distribution of available electricity, garbage trucks, and clean water. Assessing the competence of city workers and agencies is also vital to improving services since many workers were employed by the former regime based solely on party affiliation and not technical expertise.
Forward Operating Base Establishment and Life Support
Mission requirements may require the company to establish a forward operating base (FOB) away from the task force headquarters. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations In Urban Terrain, provides an excellent list of planning factors and work priorities for establishing a company FOB. (3) When deciding whether to establish an FOB, the following issues were considered:
* The company's sector was located away from the task force headquarters along a main supply route.
* The proposed FOB site was already manned (but not developed) by the outgoing company in charge of the sector and was tied in to the perimeter of another brigade's FOB.
* The proximity to the company's sector allowed informants, community leaders, and police access (after the required security search) to meet with company leaders and discuss issues concerning crime and reconstruction.
* The pre-existing buildings located within the FOB allowed soldiers improved quality of living and a measure of comfort conducive to a long-term mission.
Establishing the FOB and the relief in place should occur simultaneously. The first sergeant and the company commander should do a joint reconnaissance and assessment of the viability of the site. The first sergeant can provide a realistic expectation of the site's potential for improvement and can direct work priorities while the commander concentrates on relief in place and familiarization of the sector. The first sergeant also decides where each platoon will live and how many soldiers can safely occupy each room since not all the room sizes are the same. Separating sleeping areas for noncommissioned officers (NCOs), officers, and soldiers must be considered if space is available. A little privacy and time away from the platoon sergeant and platoon leader is important to a soldier enduring a yearlong deployment and is vital to maintaining a healthy command climate and good morale. This, of course, does not excuse leaders from conducting regular health and welfare inspections and regularly supervising soldiers' living areas.
Establishing observation points and direct-fire planning can be conducted exactly as in a high-intensity conflict environment, with particular attention to fighting-position construction, wire communications, wire obstacle emplacement, barriers to protect from drive-by shootings, and lighting. Observation posts (OPs) were used to cover the portion of the perimeter the company manned. The OPs used wire and FM communications to cross talk and communicate with the command post. The commander of the relief used a Motorola radio to communicate with the OPs and the command post (CP) without having to stay at the CP. An FOB defense plan was also devised, which required increased manning at the OPs, and a wheeled and armored QRF to counterattack enemy forces or provide medical assistance and security to casualties outside the perimeter. Using an M1A1 tank at an OP is not only an advantage for its thermal capabilities, multiple weapons capability, and excellent armor, but also a psychological deterrent to would-be attackers. The Iraqis still respect the capabilities (true and exaggerated) of the Abrams, and placing a tank section on a perimeter or near a soft target greatly reduces the possibility of an attack. Each OP must have the basic equipment required by doctrine to be effective such as maps, sector sketches, fire plans, and binoculars. Coolers and overhead shade are also required during the summer months.
The company's battle rhythm will also be an important aspect of conducting sustained operations that will last up to a year. The task organization was adjusted to allow for three platoons to rotate red-, amber-, and green-cycle duties. The red platoon was responsible for force protection duties, dining facility/day room cleaning, serving during meals, logistics and commander escort duty, and improvement projects inside the FOB. The amber platoon was in charge of fixed-site security at remote locations, and last minute, directed missions from higher command. The green platoon focused exclusively on patrols and projects in sector. The rotations for these cycles were 1-week intervals. A week is the perfect balance between having a constant state of change and becoming stagnant and risking complacency. Guard duty and other red duties are essential tasks, but unless properly rotated into other duties, soldiers can easily become bored and careless. A weekly change of pace and operational tempo is enough to keep the company mentally alert and proficient in all company operations.
Field sanitation standards must be enforced rigorously to maintain health. The lack of working latrines, limited sources of potable water, and a preponderance of flies and other parasites can render a company combat ineffective if company leaders do not enforce hygiene discipline. One platoon took the initiative and built a burn toilet, shower (nonpotable), and washbasins out of pre-existing materials. All of the platoons cleaned up the area with the help of local hires (using funds provided by the battalion). Each element of the field sanitation kit was used in this environment--mousetraps, bug repellent, flypaper, mesh screening, lime, and bleach was consumed very quickly, so purchase a surplus of these items.
After establishing security, company battle rhythm, and addressing field sanitation issues, leaders prioritized other projects for improving the company FOB:
* Establishing the company command post inside an existing structure.
* Repairing the looted and damaged electrical system.
* Obtaining air conditioning for sleeping areas.
* Furnishing another existing building as the company dining facility/day room.
Repairing the electrical system was a joint effort between locally hired electricians (some with questionable technical skills) and a member of the company who happened to be a former generator mechanic and licensed electrician. Overhauling the wiring and circuit breakers was necessary to manage the load produced by the air conditioners. The battalion's purchase of a 100-kilowatt generator provided the company with enough power to run the air conditioners and power the FOB when the city's power grid was down.
A separate structure for the dining facility and the day room allowed soldiers to eat their meals away from their sleeping areas (minimizing vermin and parasites in the rooms) and provided company leaders a separate place to inspect soldiers and equipment. On entering the dining facility for a meal, an NCO would stand at the door and observe weapons clearing procedures and cleanliness. The communal setting of the dining facility allowed for more interaction among leaders and soldiers and also provided a family dinner time atmosphere that increased in importance during the holidays or special events such as birthdays or promotions.
Other contracts secured for improving the company FOB included overhead shade for the HMMWV line (the heat caused a fail-5 message on the radios), repairing drainage and sewage lines to minimize standing water, and an internet cafe for soldiers. The company FOB did not fall into the division plan for internet kiosks, and the soldiers had limited access to morale phones and e-mail. A local national working as an interpreter had extensive computer and network knowledge and set up a cluster of five computers and a satellite internet connection in the day room. After signing the division's computer-use agreement concerning restrictions and operations security measures, the soldiers used the computers for e-mail and internet calls for a low hourly fee. Adding internet kiosks was the single largest morale event for soldiers. Soldiers could now stay in touch with their families, stay updated on world events, and conduct video teleconferences with their loved ones almost daily.
The division did provide Armed Forces Network decoders and televisions just in time for football season. Commanders should assess what higher headquarters will realistically provide versus what will be resourced at their level. Internet access at the company level was a very simple and inexpensive process whereby the provider fronted the costs for all the equipment, to include surge protectors and fans to protect the computers. Usage was the only cost to soldiers and they were more than willing to spend a couple of dollars to talk to or e-mail family and friends.
Establishing and improving the company FOB is essential to a successful long-term deployment. Occupying and improving existing buildings is much easier, cheaper, and less resource-intensive than creating buildings from nothing. Soldiers can survive in any environment and will accomplish their mission while enduring a very low standard of living as shown in recent media reports. During a deployment that is going to last several months to a year, commanders will improve the morale and effectiveness of their soldiers if they can give them a comfortable place to rest, conduct maintenance, and train. Existing structures will also improve the effectiveness of a company CP and planning cell by keeping documents, tools, maps, and equipment protected from the elements.
Command Post Operations
Rapidly establishing a working company CP is crucial to stability operations and support operations in Baghdad. The company CP will bear many similarities to a CP used in a high-intensity conflict environment, but the information and tracking requirements will be much greater for a company CP in an FOB. Essential tasks to complete during the establishment of the company CP include FM communications, properly labelling all maps and battle tracking tools, a board for the information officer and civil affairs-related projects, and a method for recording end of mission reports.
The company will need a minimum of three secure nets running at any one time. To include all elements of the CP in one room, we removed the radios from the first sergeant's M113 and placed them in a large ground-floor room in one of the buildings in the FOB. The M113 stayed right outside the CP room to provide power for the radios. This required the CP NCO in charge (NCOIC)/officer in charge (OIC) to start the M 113 every two hours to keep the batteries charged. The nets used were the battalion command, company command, and force protection nets used by the entire perimeter, to include adjacent units and gate guards. The force protection net was necessary in the event that a local national visitor (council member, informant, or interpreter) was present at the gate and needed an escort to the company area. The CP also had a Motorola radio as a secondary method of communication. Two OE-254s were placed on the roof of the CP building to maximize the range for communications with battalion and the majority of downtown Baghdad for patrols in or out of sector on the company net. Baghdad has very few buildings over three stories tall and raising the base of the OE-254 to a height of 15 feet provided excellent range, out to 20 kilometers in most instances (with working power amplifiers).
As in any combat environment, proper battle tracking, situational awareness, and command and control are key to any successful military operation. The first and most important element of a successful CP is the capabilities of the soldier behind the radio. During operations in Baghdad, at a minimum, one NCO or officer was always on duty in the CP. Too many units put young privates and specialists on radio watch/CP duty, who do not have the experience, authority, or confidence to make maneuver decisions or answer complex questions to higher units about operations in sector. At any given time, there may be four or five maneuver elements in sector and the commander and first sergeant may be in a council meeting, or unable to communicate with all the elements on the ground. The CP NCOIC/OIC will provide accurate reports to battalion, accurately track all elements in sector (during a crisis event like the UN bombing this will include multiple battalions, civilian agencies, news media, and VIPs), coordinate link-up points, and alert QRF personnel. The company executive officer will take over CP duties during task force operations or mass casualty events to provide accurate assessments to the task force while the commander develops the situation on the ground and often away from the task force net.
The best map product for conducting sector operations in Baghdad is the satellite imagery (1:5,000-scale with gridlines) provided for each sector. This map was mounted in the CP and streets were labelled using white strips of paper taped to the acetate. Churches, mosques, hospitals, political party headquarters, banks, and other key facilities were also labelled. A series of checkpoints were included and a patrol went out into sector to get 10-digit grids for all the checkpoints in sector (easily identifiable intersections and squares). A list of these checkpoints and grids were given to battalion so they could assemble common graphics for the battalion and use the checkpoint system when referring to areas or points in sector. Another map useful for finding important areas across Baghdad was the tourist map the company ordered through Amazon.com. This map labelled many key facilities, hotels, and monuments, and was helpful in navigating the streets of Baghdad, especially when patrols were required to link-up outside of the assigned company sector. Baghdad's neighborhoods are broken down into sections known as "mahallas." A three-digit number similar to an area code identifies these mahallas. The locals use this numbering system often when describing events in certain areas. Because of this, labelling the map with each of the mahallas is very important. The 1st Armored Division's terrain team was also helpful in providing special maps covering specific areas in sector.
The popularity of the satellite imagery cannot be overstated. The imagery provided resolution that allowed leaders to plan raids and cordons for individual houses, and its large size allowed for easy battle tracking. Properly labelling the map also allows for quick identification of key sites and familiarization with the sector.