2RHPZ
10-03-2004, 05:09 AM
'Steel Tigers' should rethink lessons learned from Russian EOD - Letter to the Editor
I read with interest 1LT John DeRosa's "Task Force Steel Tigers; in the March-April 2003 issue of ARMOR. His effort to find lessons from the Russian 13th Tactical Group's experience in Chechnya is laudable and shared by soldiers throughout the Army. However, one aspect of those lessons is to be taken with extreme caution; that being those gleaned from the discussion on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activities. Soldiers who assume U.S. Army EOD tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are similar to those found in 1LT DeRosa's article as practiced by Russians are significantly mistaken. Some important points must be noted.
Army EOD doctrine is found in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 9-15, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service and Unit Operations, May 1996, (currently being replaced by FM 4-30.5). Performing missions designed to enhance a commander's mobility, security, survivability, logistics, and intelligence, focus our doctrine on preserving combat power. Editorial space prevents a full discussion on EOD tasks that fall into that category. Suffice to say that the roles described in 1LT DeRosa's article fall so far out of the parameters of the Army EOD soldier's role that to call them "nontraditional" as the author does, is a dangerous oversimplification.
Another difference between U.S. Army and Russian army EOD forces is in our institutional alignment. Our EOD soldiers are proud members of the ordnance corps. Although we work well on the battlefield with our comrades in the engineer corps, we are not engineers and we do not entertain thoughts of performing engineer missions. Others that attempt to perform our missions do so at their own peril. Those activities described in the article are solely within the realm of the combat engineer. Employing U.S. Army EOD assets to reduce structures and obstacles on the battlefield would be a negligent misuse of a small corps of specially trained soldiers--EOD soldiers. While both engineer and EOD soldiers, along with others, such as ammunition specialists and Special Forces, are trained in the use of explosives, only EOD soldiers receive specific training regarding the identification and functioning of explosive ordnance. The identification, render safe, and disposal of munitions require a special course of study and a dedicated career path. Those who believe that all skills requiring the use of explosives are interchangeable are headed down a path guaranteed to cause military misfortune, a lesson that unfortunately requires reinforcement in every conflict, including Operation Iraqi Freedom. Like many military lessons, this one is often learned with an accompanying loss of life.
Using lessons learned from foreign military operations has great utility and is well established in our military history. All soldiers are encouraged to learn from others. The author states that the lessons learned from the Russian 13th Tactical Group have been placed in the Steel Tigers' military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) tool bag. I sincerely hope that when it comes to using explosive ordnance disposal assets that this is not the case. Rather, the more useful course of action would be for armored and cavalry soldiers to seek out their supporting EOD unit to learn directly how the specialized capabilities of these highly trained soldiers can help assure battlefield success.
JAMES H. CLIFFORD
Command Sergeant Major
United States Army
I read with interest 1LT John DeRosa's "Task Force Steel Tigers; in the March-April 2003 issue of ARMOR. His effort to find lessons from the Russian 13th Tactical Group's experience in Chechnya is laudable and shared by soldiers throughout the Army. However, one aspect of those lessons is to be taken with extreme caution; that being those gleaned from the discussion on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activities. Soldiers who assume U.S. Army EOD tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are similar to those found in 1LT DeRosa's article as practiced by Russians are significantly mistaken. Some important points must be noted.
Army EOD doctrine is found in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 9-15, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service and Unit Operations, May 1996, (currently being replaced by FM 4-30.5). Performing missions designed to enhance a commander's mobility, security, survivability, logistics, and intelligence, focus our doctrine on preserving combat power. Editorial space prevents a full discussion on EOD tasks that fall into that category. Suffice to say that the roles described in 1LT DeRosa's article fall so far out of the parameters of the Army EOD soldier's role that to call them "nontraditional" as the author does, is a dangerous oversimplification.
Another difference between U.S. Army and Russian army EOD forces is in our institutional alignment. Our EOD soldiers are proud members of the ordnance corps. Although we work well on the battlefield with our comrades in the engineer corps, we are not engineers and we do not entertain thoughts of performing engineer missions. Others that attempt to perform our missions do so at their own peril. Those activities described in the article are solely within the realm of the combat engineer. Employing U.S. Army EOD assets to reduce structures and obstacles on the battlefield would be a negligent misuse of a small corps of specially trained soldiers--EOD soldiers. While both engineer and EOD soldiers, along with others, such as ammunition specialists and Special Forces, are trained in the use of explosives, only EOD soldiers receive specific training regarding the identification and functioning of explosive ordnance. The identification, render safe, and disposal of munitions require a special course of study and a dedicated career path. Those who believe that all skills requiring the use of explosives are interchangeable are headed down a path guaranteed to cause military misfortune, a lesson that unfortunately requires reinforcement in every conflict, including Operation Iraqi Freedom. Like many military lessons, this one is often learned with an accompanying loss of life.
Using lessons learned from foreign military operations has great utility and is well established in our military history. All soldiers are encouraged to learn from others. The author states that the lessons learned from the Russian 13th Tactical Group have been placed in the Steel Tigers' military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) tool bag. I sincerely hope that when it comes to using explosive ordnance disposal assets that this is not the case. Rather, the more useful course of action would be for armored and cavalry soldiers to seek out their supporting EOD unit to learn directly how the specialized capabilities of these highly trained soldiers can help assure battlefield success.
JAMES H. CLIFFORD
Command Sergeant Major
United States Army