Sayeret
10-03-2004, 01:13 PM
Among the many tasks which it performs, the Soviet General Staff is charged with analyzing and exploiting its own and other armies' war experiences so that the Soviet military can better cope with the challenges of future war. It has performed this task consistently and effectively since the 1920s. The General Staff has equipped the Soviet Army (and the Red Army before it) with a superb theoretical basis upon which to plan and conduct war and military operations. It is historical irony that often political and other factors have negated the benefits of the General Staff's analytical work. The General Staff's understanding of this irony has impelled it to even greater analytical efforts as technological developments accelerate the speed of change in the military realm. Likewise, it has led to increased concern on the part of the General Staff that the fruits of its analysis not be wasted by what it may view as political frivolity.
In one of the first published analyses of American military operations in the Persian Gulf, Major General Zhivits of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Center for Operations and Strategic Studies commented that despite the initial allied success in their air operations, the war could drag on. In a 19 January interview in Izvestiya, Zhivits observed that by using the element of surprise, the United States had almost completely taken out Iraq's air defense system and command and control system, disrupting the operations of Iraqi ground forces.2 Additionally, the U.S. had gained total air superiority. All of this was accomplished while sustaining minimal losses, testifying to a high level of readiness.
For More (http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/rs-storm.htm)
In one of the first published analyses of American military operations in the Persian Gulf, Major General Zhivits of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Center for Operations and Strategic Studies commented that despite the initial allied success in their air operations, the war could drag on. In a 19 January interview in Izvestiya, Zhivits observed that by using the element of surprise, the United States had almost completely taken out Iraq's air defense system and command and control system, disrupting the operations of Iraqi ground forces.2 Additionally, the U.S. had gained total air superiority. All of this was accomplished while sustaining minimal losses, testifying to a high level of readiness.
For More (http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/rs-storm.htm)