Sayeret
11-20-2004, 01:04 PM
Low intensity warfare
and its implications for NATO
(written in December 1988)
INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s, military experts in the United States have been discussing a relatively new politico-military concept known as "low-intensity warfare". Although this subject, and its translation into practical measures, has received little attention in the Federal Republic of Germany, or elsewhere in Europe, high-ranking U.S. politicians and military officers regard low-intensity warfare as an extremely important development. Nor should it be forgotten that even though the new concept is only of indirect applicability to the Central European theatre, it is highly significant, both politically and militarily, for Washington's Western European allies and for NATO as a whole. Especially in conjunction with the discussion of out-of-area deployments, the significance of the U.S. low-intensity warfare doctrine can hardly be overrated, particularly when combined with the mechanisms of horizontal escalation.
General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Readiness Command (USCINCRED), has described low-intensity warfare as "the central strategic task facing the United States today".(1). William J. Olsen of the U.S. Army War College, speaking at a symposium sponsored by the U.S. Air Force, referred to low-intensity warfare as "the most urgent strategic problem" of the United States and considered it "crucial to national survival".(2). At the same symposium, two Air Force officers tersely stated, "Low-intensity conflict is the warfare of the future".(3). Secretary of State George Schultz has been quoted as observing that this is "a priority challenge" confronting the United States, "at least for the rest of this century". He added, "The future of peace and liberty may depend on how successfully we meet it".(4).
One could list many other comments by prominent U.S. political figures and military planners who view the new concept as a crucial issue of the country's foreign and military policy. While this alone does not prove that their views are correct, there can be no denying that Americans in important public positions and within the academic and defense-related community do indeed consider the role of low-intensity warfare to be of the greatest importance. It is surprising, then, that their discussions and conferences are barely taken note of in the Federal Republic of Germany or its European Allies.
But what exactly is this puzzling concept of "low-intensity warfare"? What is the definition of the term?
DEFINING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
As used by United States strategic thinkers, low-intensity warfare combines various military and non-military concepts, virtually all of which are aimed at being employed in Third World situations. In the specialized military literature, the concepts are not always precisely defined. As a result, "low-intensity warfare" (LIW) and "low-intensity conflict" (LIC) are generally used as synonyms. Related terms like "foreign internal defense", "counterinsurgency", "counterterrorism", "special warfare", "special operations", "revolutionary/counterrevolutionary warfare", "small wars", "limited wars" and others are not clearly explained. Sometimes they are employed as synonyms for LIC, sometimes as conceptual antitheses, sometimes as sub-categories. Almost every essay on LIC in a U.S. military journal begins with the result of furthering the terminological confusion.
Despite the differences, most U.S. military theoreticians divide all conceivable conflicts with military implications into three sections of a "conflict spectrum", ranging from the "lowest" conflicts (i.e. the shortest ones with least bloodshed and the least input) to a strategic nuclear war. Within this continuum of conceivable military conflicts (or political or social contests that involve the use or threat of war or military force), confrontations like World War II or a nuclear war are grouped in the category of "high-intensity conflicts/wars". Confrontations on the scale of the Korean or Vietnam wars are regarded as "medium-intensity conflicts". All confrontations remaining by their nature below the level of high- or mid-level conventional war would be "low-intensity conflicts" (LICs). Given this approach (LICs are conflicts below the level of war), it becomes clear that LIC must of necessity be an omnibus: Many different types of conflict meeting this criterion are conceivable.
LICs are conflicts which require from the U.S. point of view relatively little military input. From the perspective of the country affected, this may be completely different and also give rise to misunderstandings. At a conference sponsored by the U.S. military in January 1986, El Salvador's Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Adolfo Blandon stated that he could not accept the term "low-intensity", noting that his country's civil war was of a high intensity.(5). U.S. Army Colonel John D. Waghelstein, former head of the U.S. military advisory group in El Salvador, rightly pointed out a year earlier that LIC was "total war at the social base" of a country.(6). The criterion of "low intensity" as part of the definition thus presupposes that one adopts the perspective of the country applying the force rather than the one on which it is applied.
However, all agree that while LIC is theoretical possible in a modern industrial nation, it is a form of conflict most appropriate to the Third World. Furthermore, it can be stated that this concept can be applied only in cases where there is no direct confrontation between the superpowers, since such a confrontation, should armed conflict actually commence, could scarcely be stabilized at a LIC level. Although allied, friendly or client regimes of either side or one of the superpowers themselves may be involved, LIC theory does not allow for direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Third World.
Finally, LIC is a concept that is not of a purely military nature, even though it has been developed and propounded chiefly by the U.S. military. Instead it is an integrated political-economic-military approach, supplemented by psychological, social and diplomatic devices. Without much exaggeration it can be stated that LIC conceptually is primarily a political oriented and integrated policy approach containing military elements - and not first and foremost a military matter.
William Olsen of the U.S. Army War College states: "In actual fact, the definition of LIC should not concentrate on the military level of conflict, but on its political character... The aim is not military conquest, but social control, for whose attainment military means can be employed as an element of the struggle... The use of military force must be measured by its social and political utility. Military means are a tactical element of a strategic program that emphasizes goals and means. Though important, the use of military might is limited, while the use of diplomatic and political means may be unlimited."(7)
The U.S. Army's training manual FC 100-20, issued in May of 1986, defined low-intensity warfare (conflict) as follows: "LIC is a limited politico-military struggle to attain political, military, social, economic or psychological objectives. It is often of lengthy duration and extends from diplomatic, economic and psychological pressure to terrorism and insurgency. LIC is generally confined to a specific geographical area and is often characterized by limitations of armaments, tactics and level of force. LIC involves the actual or contemplated use of military means up to just below the threshold of battle between regular armed forces."(8)
This definition reveals two important elements: First, is the general character of LIC, with the civilian aspects also being stressed (e.g. economic pressure). This is significant because some observers misinterpret LIC as exclusively a military technique. Second, it makes clear the upper limits of use of military force beyond which the concept no longer applies. The definition also makes clear that LIC is a term embracing many types of conflict. The literature attempts to distinguish among various categories. The main ones are:
1. Counterinsurgency, i.e. the combating of insurgency;
2. Contra operations (pro-insurgency), i.e. the organization of subversion and insurgency;
3. Counterterrorism, itself a collective term for diverse concepts and instruments, all of which are aimed at the offensive, military combating of "terrorism";
4. narrowly limited, "surgical" military operations using conventional forces. This category may be applied within any of the three tactical approaches above or independent of them;
5. other operations, e.g. rescue actions, participation in international peace-keeping forces or the like.
It needs to be pointed out here that not all LIC experts would subscribe to this categorization. For example, Professor Sam Sarkesian, a political scientist, explicitly does not interpret limited conventional operations and terrorism as LIC. However, in taking this position, he definitely stands on his own. On the other hand, Sarkesian gave expression to a broad consensus when he stated: "Revolution and counterrevolution are the main categories" of LIC.(9)
U.S. RATIONALE FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
It is interesting to note the official reasons given for the increased U.S. commitment to LIC operations. On the one hand, it is argued that the military and strategic situation between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially in Central Europe, is stable. It is contended that the Soviet Union cannot gain anything from a direct attack against the United States or its NATO allies and that it is therefor trying to make a "detour" via the Third World, where there are numerous conflicts to "exploit" with a view to isolating the leading capitalist states and hemming them in. Secretary of State George Schultz has described this as an "outflanking maneuver".(10)
This argument has two interesting components: the first is the implicit (occasionally explicit) assumption that, in the fields of nuclear and conventional arms, the Soviet Union is not superior to NATO, but at most on a par, and it is for this reason that it turns to the Third World instead of attempting an eventual confrontation in Central Europe. Connected with this is the fact that the strategic situation in Central Europe is considered to be stable in the medium and long term and that, in the eyes of the United States, the main threat to Western interests today comes from the Third World. It should be noted that this line of argument has not been seriously regarded by either official security strategists or the peace movement in the Federal Republic of Germany
"...The most likely threat to U.S. interests may stem from local or regional conflicts and internal instability of allies or clients of the United States. Morocco, the Sudan, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea - up to a certain degree all allies of America or the West - are all vulnerable to internal unrest and/or external attack... Internal instability, possibly leading to a revolution, is a more probable scenario in many of these countries (than an external attack - J.H.)."(11)
At the same time U.S. military planers postulate that conflicts in Third World countries are linked to development failures. For instance, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh stated: "Anyone who studies the regions where insurgency occurs cannot fail to notice what the situations have in common: immature governments, emerging economies, population explosions and social problems, which have something to do with insufficient food supplies, poor health service and a high rate of illiteracy. This insurgency often takes place in areas with rich deposits of natural resources of considerable interest to the West. Many of these governments are susceptible to infiltration, subversion and destabilization."(12)
The alleged great importance of certain Third World regions for the capitalist countries and their simultaneous instability are thus, from this U.S. perspective, a central problem of Western foreign and security policy. Given the concurrent situation of a "nuclear cul-de-sac" between the superpowers (as an official U.S. Army document puts it), the confrontation between them is thus shifted to the Third World an "limited to low- or medium-intensity conflicts within Third World countries, as in Afghanistan and Vietnam, or to support for third parties against the other's clients" (13).
LIC is thus a reaction to a perceived strategic stalemate between the superpowers, which makes direct confrontation between them seem too risky and impracticable, encouraging a shift of venue for possible conflicts to the Third World. Quite often the Soviet Union is blamed for these tendencies and accused of deliberately employing LIC strategies as forms of low-level warfare against the United States in order to prevent the latter from responding adequately or on a large scale.
In the opinion of U.S. strategists, LIC is therefore neither harmless nor of little importance; instead, it is virtually a Soviet strategy for waging global war against the United States without the latter noticing. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger expressed this viewpoint quite clearly at a conference he arranged on the subject of low-intensity conflict in early 1986: "Today's world is in a state of war. It is not a world war, although it is taking place throughout the world. It is not a war between fully mobilized armies, although it is not less destructive... Today one in every four countries in the world is at war. In practically every case, the face of these wars is hidden behind a mask. And in practically every case, the Soviet Union and those who do the work for it are hiding behind this mask." (14)
ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF LOW_INTENSITY CONFLICT
The above formulation probably suffices to outline the fundamentals of U.S. LIC theory. It is, however, necessary to add two more factors: Firstly, LIC operations are frequent, while actual wars (i.e. medium- or high-intensity conflicts) are relatively few in number and are unlikely to increase. Since World War II, U.S. troops have been active in about 300 cases below the threshold of acute hostilities, whereas conflicts on the scale of the wars in Korea and Vietnam are rare. Secondly, U.S. planners note with regret that the military is least prepared for precisely such LIC operations. Lieutenant Colonel Vought pointed this out as early as 1977, i.e. some time before the start of a broad-based debate on low-intensity warfare.(15)
A study prepared by Kupperman Associates for the U.S. Army a few years later reaches the same conclusion: "The U.S. Army faces the dilemma that the type of conflict least likely to occur, i.e. extensive conventional confrontation between the superpowers in Europe, nonetheless dominates its thinking, training and allocation of resources. The confrontations which are most likely to attract the Army's attention are small but decisive low-intensity conflicts occurring on the periphery of the superpowers. Many of these conflicts- or protoconflicts <sic> - affect important U.S. interests, regardless of whether they have internal causes or are controlled from outside: for instance in the <Persian> Gulf, in the Caribbean, in Africa, in the South Pacific and possibly even in the United States itself. The Army is not prepared at present for such low-intensity conflicts."(16)
This reveals the general purpose of the debate in low-intensity warfare: to adjust the entire foreign policy machinery of the U.S. government, not least its armed forces, in line with the changed deployment conditions. Within the military, the aims of the discussion are to define the conditions and circumstances governing "low-intensity" operations, to develop a corresponding military doctrine, to adapt military thinking within the U.S. military to these requirements and to implement the new doctrine in the recruitment and training of military personnel and in the allocation of arms and equipment to the forces.
The assumption that the U.S. military is poorly equipped for LIC operations naturally implies that war of "low" or "high" intensity differ not only in scale, but also in quality, that it is thus not just a question of "large" or "small" wars, but one of completely different kinds of conflicts. One of the differences between "low-intensity" and "medium- or high-intensity" conflicts is that the latter are mainly of a conventional military and/or nuclear nature, i.e. that the destructive potential, fire power, technological level and associated variables are the decisive criteria. In the case of "low-intensity" conflicts, they - to exaggerate slightly - are subordinated to political conditions, which means that the traditional rules of war are modified.
Medium- and high-intensity conflicts are aimed at the military destruction of concentrations of enemy forces and/or the invasion (or defense) of territory. In LIC, concentrations of enemy forces tend to be an exceptional occurrence - either because they do not exist and operations are only carried out by small groups, or because they cannot be identified or attacked. Firepower is thus of secondary importance. U.S. Air Force Colonel Cardwell comments that generally it is a case of "unconventional, socio-political, enduring and manpower-intensive warfare" and that, consequently, stamina and small-scale engagements not dependent on fire power or technology are of particular importance. "The aim is no longer to conquer and hold territory, but to maintain political and economic access to the Third World by preemptively hindering the Soviets from achieving their expansionary goals."(17)
In general, LIC situations are viewed as basically political. The proverbial struggle for the hearts and minds of a civilian population, as part of counterinsurgency campaigns, may serve as an example in this respect. Troops whose combat strength is optimized for tank battles in the Fulda Gap or for nuclear warfare are not necessarily useful in LIC situations. (A certain exception is the aforementioned "surgical", i.e. fast and highly precise operations using conventional means.) However, precisely for this reason, surgical operations are not regarded as being part of the LIC scenario by some officers. Others argue, however, that the forces so employed (as in Granada in 1983) do not perform merely combat functions, but may also serve LIC psychological, propaganda, economic or politico-demonstrative purposes before, during or after the conventional combat phase. The air raids on Libya in March and April 1986 might be regarded as examples of conventional forces employed for such purpose.
THE POLITICAL COMPONENT OF LOW_INTENSITY CONFLICT
The political character of LIC becomes particularly clear when the individual elements are examined more closely:
Counterinsurgency aims primarily at preventing, impeding or defeating anti-government forces or movements in open civil war, insurgency or similar military or paramilitary conflict. If insurgent movements in Third World Countries could be suppressed by purely, or predominantly military means, then a counterinsurgency campaign as defined in LIC would be superfluous. In LIC theory the very existence of a viable insurgent movement of any size is a sign of its political/social/economic nature, an admission that a "military solution" is either impossible or could only be attained at unacceptable cost. Counterinsurgency is first and foremost aimed at controlling the population of an affected nation. All functions --including military confrontation with guerrillas-- are directed to this objective and are instrumental in attaining it.(18)
Washington's counterinsurgency efforts aim first at the transformation (and "modernization) of the society as well as the government apparatus of a Third world country according to criteria which ensures the latter's "functioning" and simultaneously guarantees U.S. control. Secondly, it is designed to estrange the guerrilla movement (or any other form of grassroots opposition) from the population by means of politico-economic incentives and/or military coercion and geographical separation. These tasks clearly do not involve "traditional" military operations. For this reason, counterinsurgency relies strongly on elements of economic aid, development assistance, collateral psychological measures and diplomatic initiatives.
In all these attempts at "reforming" and "modernizing" the relevant Third world societies, and thus achieving a modified status quo that is stable and functioning, the military aspect of the campaigns must, of course, not be overlooked. In many cases, the military of the client country becomes the main driving force of its economic development; the U.S. military assumes key advisory and instructional functions, and participates to a certain extend in the ongoing military confrontation, as well as takes part in civic action, i.e. projects for promoting the infrastructure or supporting the population (e.g. well-drilling, medical relief, etc.). However, the diverse political/economic projects can only be executed if a modicum of military "security" can be achieved in the country. For this reason, military operations and techniques also acquire great importance. A strategic problem posed by counterinsurgency is that the military/repressive and the development/modernizing elements of a campaign often impede each other.(19)
Contra operations (pro-insurgency), as LIC activities, are likewise not primarily of a military nature, even though they may appear so on the surface. For instance, the U.S. government's integration in 1981 of former members of Somoza's National Guard into a combat force opposing the Nicaraguan government -- today the best known and "classic" case of such an operation -- was initially not aimed at the direct, military overthrow of that government by the contra units, although at the outset many U.S. military and intelligence officials actually believed /or hoped) the contras had the potential to do this against a still disorganized provisional revolutionary government ruling Nicaragua. However, once the strength of the Sandinistas was properly gauged, the contras became only one element in the overall campaign which also employed U.S. forces, both directly (electronic surveillance, overflights, etc.) and indirectly (training, threatening maneuvers and naval exercises, etc.), as well as Honduran and Salvadoran military forces and facilities.
Additionally, military action and threats were intended to disrupt Nicaragua economically, politically and socially -- in short, to create conditions that would destabilize the Nicaraguan government and the Sandinista revolution. The main aim of the strategy was -- without risking direct U.S. LIC intervention -- to deprive the government of the loyalty of the masses by exacerbating the domestic situation through coordinated military, economic, political, diplomatic and psychological pressure in order that the Sandinista revolution would not stand a chance of surviving and presenting a model capable of being emulated by other Third World dissidents. The contras were a central element of this strategy, but their attacks were on economic, political and psychological objectives rather than on military ones. They were designed to bring about conditions permitting the overthrow of the Sandinista government, without requiring direct U.S. military intervention.(20)
The U.S. defends proinsurgency operations through special public relations efforts : The so-called Reagan Doctrine established the right and duty of the United States not only to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union and of the "totalitarian threat" embodied by it (this was to be achieved by counterinsurgency and other devices), but also justifies efforts to roll back Soviet influence in the Third World. To this end, military support for anti-communist "liberation movements" (e.g. the Nicaraguan Contras, the Angolan UNITA and the Afghan Mujaheddin) was considered necessary and legitimate.(21)
Counterterrorism as an element of LIC has more a political than military purpose. LIC incorporates military forces as part of the comprehensive attack on "international terrorism". Terrorism is defined, essentially, as the use of violent means by non-military, or irregular or paramilitary groups for political purpose, especially when these are directed against civilian targets or against government troops or other security forces and facilities. The concept of counterterrorism has a wide range. Since it serves to legitimate intervention in the Third World, it is stretched to cover a variety of situations. For example, drug traffickers become "narcoterrorists".(22)
Counterterrorism is waged with particular energy by the U.S. government in Near and Middle East settings. The air raids on Libya in March and April 1986, the policy towards Iran (including during the contragate affair) and the contradictory policies vis-a-vis Lebanon and Syria are the chief examples. In all cases, far more is involved than implied by the term "the combating of terrorism".
First, for the purpose of counterterrorism, the concept of terrorism is employed in a highly selective fashion. Marxist liberation movements are always classed as "terrorist" while individuals or organizations sympathetic to U.S. policies (e.g. the Contras in Nicaragua) are never so defined
Second, actual or alleged "terrorist" individuals or organizations are assumed to be supported or directed by pariah governments -- e.g. Libya or Iran. As a result, the blame for a concrete or merely anticipated act of violence by individuals is laid not only on the perpetrators, but also on the government "behind it". It is often immaterial whether the accused government, in fact, bears responsibility or whether its alleged transgression can be proved. For instance, the acts of terrorism by Abu Nidal were sometimes imputed to Libya, sometimes to Syria and occasionally even to Iran or the Palestine Liberation Organization, without any direct proof being presented; the imputation was based solely on immediate political considerations.(23)
The third logical step is to view actions by terrorists as acts of war against the United States by the government said to be responsible.(24) In this way, the U.S. government establishes the justification for attacking the accused country as a form of "self-defense", using economic, political, diplomatic, psychological, paramilitary and military instruments in conformity with the concept of low intensity warfare. The policy mix ultimately selected is determined exclusively by considerations of efficacy and political expediency.
THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Thus far, the political nature of LIC has been stressed. However, it should be pointed out that neither the LIC concept as a whole nor its rationale are accepted without dispute by U.S. government officials and armed forces' personnel. The question of how much military weight should be lent to LIC is also the subject of some controversy. One example is the current debate over on counterterrorism within the U.S. Air Force. Lieutenant Colonel Felix Moran thinks the military response to terrorism is both wrong and futile.(25) Colonel Clarence Herrington, on the contrary argues for the use of B-52s to combat terrorists.(26) Clearly, he misses the point of LIC, but the fact remains that there is a heated debate over the priority given to, as well as the scope and the nature of, its military component.
Second, under the Reagan administration, the non-military priorities of LIC are often proclaimed, but rarely implemented. It cannot be denied that the LIC concept is, in practice, progressively being militarized. Simple "military solutions" to complex political problems are part of Reaganite thinking. The political aspect of LIC has a distinct Carter-era tinge -- it smacks of the former presidents' human rights policy (27) -- and thus runs counter to the political instincts of numerous Reaganites (cf. Senator Jesse Helms's description of land reform in El Salvador as "communist"). Furthermore, many U.S. officers have definite reservations about the civilian LIC elements (occasionally about the military ones as well) because these do not accord with their training, experience, ideology and qualifications. In sum, it can be stated that under the Reagan Administration, the political and social aspects of LIC tended to be de-emphasized in favor of the military.
Finally, even in "political" LIC programs, the military aspect is indispensable. LIC does not imply replacing "military solutions" with "political solutions", as much as eliminating the distinction between "military" and "civilian". Such clearly "non-military" conduct as strikes and demonstrations may in LIC situations be interpreted as "acts of war", while, on the other hand, the military may assume "civilian" tasks (civic action). Consequently, under LIC conditions, civilian practices tend to be militarized, and military or non-military measures, taken by the armed forces of the United States and/or the local government, will be of decisive importance for any LIC program. Ensuing local "security" by the military and the police is a consideration without which any program of pacification is bound to fail.
As has already been stated, LIC operations are, by their nature, not comparable with conventional military operations. It is therefore not surprising that regular military units are not optimally trained and equipped for these functions. This was one of the realizations that initiated the entire debate on low-intensity warfare. The U.S. units with the greatest competence in unconventional operations and low-intensity warfare are the so-called Special Operations Forces (SOF), made up from the three branches of the military. Since the beginning of the Reagan administration the SOF, and counterparts in other countries, have been considerably enlarged and given additional weapons and equipment.(28)
THE LEGACY OF VIETNAM
Low-intensity warfare theorists continue to study and draw conclusions from the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Vietnam had three consequences which military planners in Washington want to avoid in the future:
1.The war was costly in every respect. At its peak, there were over half a million U.S. troops in Vietnam.
2.More than 54,000 people were killed and the dollar cost of the war exceeded $150 billion 1967 dollars.
3.The war was lost. Despite its substantial commitment, the United States, a superpower, did not manage to defeat the impoverished developing country of Vietnam. Clearly, U.S. strategy and tactics were inappropriate, promoting military theorists to ask why this was so and what changes had to be made to prepare for future confrontations of this type.
4.In the aftermath of the war, U.S. society was so politically polarized that the government's scope for action abroad became greatly restricted.
Since the Vietnam-era, large-scale interventions by U.S. armed forces are seen by the majority of U.S. policy makers as politically divisive, as well as economically expensive, and have sought effective alternate means of maintaining U.S. dominance in the Third World. The low-intensity warfare thesis was created in order to permit an active Third World policy, including military components, without generating the high visibility exposure of "another Vietnam". Consequently, LIC campaigns are designed so that the extent of U.S. involvement is kept within proscribed limits by optimizing the quality of that involvement rather than its quantity. Compared with direct military invention, LIC is cheap and requires little manpower (since local troops in counterinsurgency, or locally-recruited contras of foreign mercenaries in pro-insurgency, provide the main force levels).
Furthermore -- and this is the decisive criterion -- LIC is more effective than conventional forms of intervention. It is better attuned to the causes of Third World conflicts; it employs, so to speak, "appropriate technology" for military tasks; and it largely avoids the counterproductive effects of direct U.S. intervention, such as the rise of nationalist solidarity among the population against foreign invaders. Thus, in general, it averts the hazards resulting from military overreaction and excessive militarization of a conflict by the United States. With the aid of specific techniques and through increased efficiency, LIC is designed to render direct U.S. intervention unnecessary.
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND U.S. PUBLIC OPINION
In addition, there are important considerations connected with U.S. domestic politics that favor the LIC option. In a recent interview, a senior official at the U.S. Department of Defense discussed the need for LIC. The following aspect was emphasized several times: "One of the main problems of U.S. foreign policy is that since Vietnam the U.S. public is no longer prepared to wage wars in the Third World."(29)
The Pentagon official went to say that this was a major impairment of the United States' capacity for action abroad because it not only prevented the exercise of certain military options, but also made the threat of large-scale military operations lack credibility. LIC was, he went on, an attempt at overcoming this difficulty. Low-intensity warfare was a kind of warfare that the United States could maintain over years in a specific Third World country at relatively low cost, without arousing public attention or concern. The relatively low inputs of manpower and material would scarcely allow the emergence of political opposition or even a polarization of U.S. society as was the case at the end of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
Deryck Eller, addressing an Air University symposium on low-intensity conflict in 1985, said, "public support is not absolutely necessary, but there must at least be a sort of benign indifference, especially on the part of the mass media. Otherwise Congress would be compelled to end the U.S. involvement, regardless of the risks. If LIC can be confined to the lower levels of force -- with very little bloodshed for the television cameras -- public support or at least benign indifference may emerge. Something as boring as Internal Defense and Development (another name for counterinsurgency) never gets into the six o'clock news, especially if it is successful."(30)
This argument is borne out by reality. If the United States simultaneously carries out in two or three dozen Third World countries economic and military aid and training programs generally avoiding the use of American combat forces, public attention is diffused and can be contained more easily than if the United States, as in Vietnam War, were to intervene directly and spectaculary with substantial force deployments and corresponding losses.
In LIC campaigns, the time factor also plays a role. In the instance of large-scale direct military intervention, domestic opposition generally grows stronger over time; when less spectacular LIC operations are carried out, the public ceases taking notice after the first flurry of interest. For example, the counterinsurgency campaign in El Salvador evolved from a highly controversial undertaking between 1981 and 1983 into a matter that was largely accepted, not least by Congress, in the 1985-87 period. This was due to certain apparent political and military success of the campaign and to the fact that the direct U.S. military intervention feared by critics was avoided.
Other LIC operations are planned and implemented with domestic considerations very much in mind. The invasion of Grenada in October 1983, the aforementioned counterterrorist air raids on Libya in spring 1986 (31), and the naval operations in the Persian Gulf which began in summer 1987, are some examples of this sensitivity to public attitudes. In terms of foreign policy, these operations may have been of very little value or even counterproductive, but from the point of view of domestic politics they served, especially the first two cases, to strengthen the popularity of the Reagan administration, while at the same time seeking to minimize the risk involved.
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE OF NATO
Low-intensity warfare concepts are primarily designed for actions in the Third World and are most often intended to govern essentially unilateral U.S. operations (possibly in collaboration with the government of the country concerned). Nonetheless, one must not overlook the fact that these concepts may have considerable secondary repercussions on the relationship between the United States and the Western European members of NATO.
First, LIC concepts are being developed at a time when the "decoupling" of the United States from its Western European allies is being increasingly discussed. U.S.-originated position papers, arguing for a greater orientation of Washington toward the Pacific and speculating on whether it would be preferable to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe or transfer them to the Middle East, reflect a changing pattern of U.S. external interests.(32) This line of reasoning also reflects a growing distance between the security goals of Western Europe and its American ally, as well as the increasing importance attached to the Third World for the assertion of Washington's role as a superpower. LIC doctrines are a military reaction to this. The underlying assumptions of the United States can be summarized as follows:
1) the strategic situation in Europe is stable;
2) there are growing differences with the Western European nations;
3) the latter are not willing to step up their own defense efforts adequately, as is required, and are exploiting the United States as guarantor power;
4) the strategic importance of the Third World (notably certain regions, such as Asia and the Middle East) is steadily rising;
5) the Soviet Union has gained considerable ground in the Third World because of Western negligence as Moscow pursues a strategy possibly aimed at "encircling" the West and severing its raw material and energy supplies.
A decrease in the U.S. commitment in Europe and greater emphasis on its efforts in the Third World would thus appear to be of the utmost importance to U.S. policy-makers. The extreme influence of the low-intensity warfare model is a symptom of this. The Kupperman study prepared for the U.S. Army stated that it is "hard to explain to the allies" that the Army "is shifting the focus of its forces in such a way that they better serve U.S. --not NATO -- policy objectives". This reorientation was tersely expressed as "interests instead of allies". A major purpose of the LIC debate was stated in no uncertain terms: The requisite changes "mean an open restructuring of our armed forces away from the Fulda Gap to the Ogaden and the Caribbean".(33)
Second, it has to be assumed that the LIC or "small war " concepts for the Third World will inevitably have an impact in the medium or long term on the structure, training and equipment of the U.S. military. If tank battles in the Fulda Gap and mega-conflicts similar to World War II are considered improbable in the future, and if jungle wars or armed encounters in hilly, forested, or otherwise fairly inaccessible terrain for operations by commandos become the rule, not adapting to such changes would be dangerous from the U.S. perspective. A study prepared in 1982 for the U.S. Army by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argues that in the early 1970s the Army had wrongly decided to "concentrate almost completely on the European battlefield". It cites a practical example: "For the highly intensive battlefields of Europe a new tank was developed which was so heavy that it was almost impossible to use it anywhere else." (34)
The post-Vietnam special concentration on possible NATO operations and the loss of versatility and flexibility in deployment options (of which the dramatic reduction of the Special Operations Forces was but one element) were to be determined by the LIC debate. The concentration on LIC, the creation of rapid deployment forces, the discussion on the introduction of light infantry divisions and relevant modifications in fleet construction programs are all clear signs that the United States is adapting to perceived changing military exigencies. As a result, the significance of the European battlefield is being modified and downgraded.
From the perspective of preparing for the possibility of conventional warfare in Europe, one might view these tendencies with skepticism. This is a reason why even within the U.S. military establishment a traditionalist faction reacts to LIC concepts with delaying tactics (quite apart from the customary rivalry between the three branches of the military). Underlying this resistance, of course, is a dispute over priorities in the future distribution of financial resources in the military sector.
Third, from the perspective of the Western European members of NATO, LIC simultaneously poses the matter of political and strategic priorities. The crucial question that they are posing is whether the U.S. should run the risk of being drawn into, or even causing, possibly lengthy military conflicts in Central America, the Middle East or Southern Africa. Again, from the Western European standpoint, this gives rise to several thoughts:
1. Is there not a danger of U.S. forces becoming tied down and thus not being available in the event of a conflict in Europe ? Indeed, this was one of Europe's lessons from Vietnam.
2. Is such U.S. involvement "worthwhile", but rather a waste of strength? Of course, differences of interest and assessment between the governments in Washington and Western Europe make themselves felt (e.g., how important is control of Nicaragua considered to be?).
3. Is the concrete strategy chosen by the United States of merit or are there not more suitable methods? (e.g., the disputes between the United States and the most Western European countries over the bombing of Libya or the increased U.S. naval presence in the Gulf).
4. Will the United States act unilaterally or consult with its NATO allies? There is the problem that the United States feels that (too close) consultation with the European allies would render it incapable of taking any action (e.g., Grenada, Libya, Nicaragua, the Persian Gulf) because they virtually always voice only misgivings, without making any active contributions of their own. The Western European allies are for their part increasingly confronted with faits accomplice which they are unable to endorse.
5. What is the potential for escalation of American LIC campaigns? Although the United States defines its operations as "low-intensity", it is not possible to guarantee in every instance that this level will not be exceeded, possibly resulting in uncontrollable escalation. Such a danger existed in the case of the attacks on Libya (where the U.S. State Department even conceded the possibility (35) ), Syria or Cuba. U.S. operations against Iran or other countries near the Soviet border likewise have such potential. The Western European NATO allies would then be in the situation of being drawn into superpower conflicts in a Third World venue in which they have no interest and on whose emergence they are unable to exert any meaningful influence.
http://www.jochen-hippler.de/Aufsatze/low-intensity_conflict/low-intensity_conflict.html
and its implications for NATO
(written in December 1988)
INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s, military experts in the United States have been discussing a relatively new politico-military concept known as "low-intensity warfare". Although this subject, and its translation into practical measures, has received little attention in the Federal Republic of Germany, or elsewhere in Europe, high-ranking U.S. politicians and military officers regard low-intensity warfare as an extremely important development. Nor should it be forgotten that even though the new concept is only of indirect applicability to the Central European theatre, it is highly significant, both politically and militarily, for Washington's Western European allies and for NATO as a whole. Especially in conjunction with the discussion of out-of-area deployments, the significance of the U.S. low-intensity warfare doctrine can hardly be overrated, particularly when combined with the mechanisms of horizontal escalation.
General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Readiness Command (USCINCRED), has described low-intensity warfare as "the central strategic task facing the United States today".(1). William J. Olsen of the U.S. Army War College, speaking at a symposium sponsored by the U.S. Air Force, referred to low-intensity warfare as "the most urgent strategic problem" of the United States and considered it "crucial to national survival".(2). At the same symposium, two Air Force officers tersely stated, "Low-intensity conflict is the warfare of the future".(3). Secretary of State George Schultz has been quoted as observing that this is "a priority challenge" confronting the United States, "at least for the rest of this century". He added, "The future of peace and liberty may depend on how successfully we meet it".(4).
One could list many other comments by prominent U.S. political figures and military planners who view the new concept as a crucial issue of the country's foreign and military policy. While this alone does not prove that their views are correct, there can be no denying that Americans in important public positions and within the academic and defense-related community do indeed consider the role of low-intensity warfare to be of the greatest importance. It is surprising, then, that their discussions and conferences are barely taken note of in the Federal Republic of Germany or its European Allies.
But what exactly is this puzzling concept of "low-intensity warfare"? What is the definition of the term?
DEFINING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
As used by United States strategic thinkers, low-intensity warfare combines various military and non-military concepts, virtually all of which are aimed at being employed in Third World situations. In the specialized military literature, the concepts are not always precisely defined. As a result, "low-intensity warfare" (LIW) and "low-intensity conflict" (LIC) are generally used as synonyms. Related terms like "foreign internal defense", "counterinsurgency", "counterterrorism", "special warfare", "special operations", "revolutionary/counterrevolutionary warfare", "small wars", "limited wars" and others are not clearly explained. Sometimes they are employed as synonyms for LIC, sometimes as conceptual antitheses, sometimes as sub-categories. Almost every essay on LIC in a U.S. military journal begins with the result of furthering the terminological confusion.
Despite the differences, most U.S. military theoreticians divide all conceivable conflicts with military implications into three sections of a "conflict spectrum", ranging from the "lowest" conflicts (i.e. the shortest ones with least bloodshed and the least input) to a strategic nuclear war. Within this continuum of conceivable military conflicts (or political or social contests that involve the use or threat of war or military force), confrontations like World War II or a nuclear war are grouped in the category of "high-intensity conflicts/wars". Confrontations on the scale of the Korean or Vietnam wars are regarded as "medium-intensity conflicts". All confrontations remaining by their nature below the level of high- or mid-level conventional war would be "low-intensity conflicts" (LICs). Given this approach (LICs are conflicts below the level of war), it becomes clear that LIC must of necessity be an omnibus: Many different types of conflict meeting this criterion are conceivable.
LICs are conflicts which require from the U.S. point of view relatively little military input. From the perspective of the country affected, this may be completely different and also give rise to misunderstandings. At a conference sponsored by the U.S. military in January 1986, El Salvador's Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Adolfo Blandon stated that he could not accept the term "low-intensity", noting that his country's civil war was of a high intensity.(5). U.S. Army Colonel John D. Waghelstein, former head of the U.S. military advisory group in El Salvador, rightly pointed out a year earlier that LIC was "total war at the social base" of a country.(6). The criterion of "low intensity" as part of the definition thus presupposes that one adopts the perspective of the country applying the force rather than the one on which it is applied.
However, all agree that while LIC is theoretical possible in a modern industrial nation, it is a form of conflict most appropriate to the Third World. Furthermore, it can be stated that this concept can be applied only in cases where there is no direct confrontation between the superpowers, since such a confrontation, should armed conflict actually commence, could scarcely be stabilized at a LIC level. Although allied, friendly or client regimes of either side or one of the superpowers themselves may be involved, LIC theory does not allow for direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Third World.
Finally, LIC is a concept that is not of a purely military nature, even though it has been developed and propounded chiefly by the U.S. military. Instead it is an integrated political-economic-military approach, supplemented by psychological, social and diplomatic devices. Without much exaggeration it can be stated that LIC conceptually is primarily a political oriented and integrated policy approach containing military elements - and not first and foremost a military matter.
William Olsen of the U.S. Army War College states: "In actual fact, the definition of LIC should not concentrate on the military level of conflict, but on its political character... The aim is not military conquest, but social control, for whose attainment military means can be employed as an element of the struggle... The use of military force must be measured by its social and political utility. Military means are a tactical element of a strategic program that emphasizes goals and means. Though important, the use of military might is limited, while the use of diplomatic and political means may be unlimited."(7)
The U.S. Army's training manual FC 100-20, issued in May of 1986, defined low-intensity warfare (conflict) as follows: "LIC is a limited politico-military struggle to attain political, military, social, economic or psychological objectives. It is often of lengthy duration and extends from diplomatic, economic and psychological pressure to terrorism and insurgency. LIC is generally confined to a specific geographical area and is often characterized by limitations of armaments, tactics and level of force. LIC involves the actual or contemplated use of military means up to just below the threshold of battle between regular armed forces."(8)
This definition reveals two important elements: First, is the general character of LIC, with the civilian aspects also being stressed (e.g. economic pressure). This is significant because some observers misinterpret LIC as exclusively a military technique. Second, it makes clear the upper limits of use of military force beyond which the concept no longer applies. The definition also makes clear that LIC is a term embracing many types of conflict. The literature attempts to distinguish among various categories. The main ones are:
1. Counterinsurgency, i.e. the combating of insurgency;
2. Contra operations (pro-insurgency), i.e. the organization of subversion and insurgency;
3. Counterterrorism, itself a collective term for diverse concepts and instruments, all of which are aimed at the offensive, military combating of "terrorism";
4. narrowly limited, "surgical" military operations using conventional forces. This category may be applied within any of the three tactical approaches above or independent of them;
5. other operations, e.g. rescue actions, participation in international peace-keeping forces or the like.
It needs to be pointed out here that not all LIC experts would subscribe to this categorization. For example, Professor Sam Sarkesian, a political scientist, explicitly does not interpret limited conventional operations and terrorism as LIC. However, in taking this position, he definitely stands on his own. On the other hand, Sarkesian gave expression to a broad consensus when he stated: "Revolution and counterrevolution are the main categories" of LIC.(9)
U.S. RATIONALE FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
It is interesting to note the official reasons given for the increased U.S. commitment to LIC operations. On the one hand, it is argued that the military and strategic situation between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially in Central Europe, is stable. It is contended that the Soviet Union cannot gain anything from a direct attack against the United States or its NATO allies and that it is therefor trying to make a "detour" via the Third World, where there are numerous conflicts to "exploit" with a view to isolating the leading capitalist states and hemming them in. Secretary of State George Schultz has described this as an "outflanking maneuver".(10)
This argument has two interesting components: the first is the implicit (occasionally explicit) assumption that, in the fields of nuclear and conventional arms, the Soviet Union is not superior to NATO, but at most on a par, and it is for this reason that it turns to the Third World instead of attempting an eventual confrontation in Central Europe. Connected with this is the fact that the strategic situation in Central Europe is considered to be stable in the medium and long term and that, in the eyes of the United States, the main threat to Western interests today comes from the Third World. It should be noted that this line of argument has not been seriously regarded by either official security strategists or the peace movement in the Federal Republic of Germany
"...The most likely threat to U.S. interests may stem from local or regional conflicts and internal instability of allies or clients of the United States. Morocco, the Sudan, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea - up to a certain degree all allies of America or the West - are all vulnerable to internal unrest and/or external attack... Internal instability, possibly leading to a revolution, is a more probable scenario in many of these countries (than an external attack - J.H.)."(11)
At the same time U.S. military planers postulate that conflicts in Third World countries are linked to development failures. For instance, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh stated: "Anyone who studies the regions where insurgency occurs cannot fail to notice what the situations have in common: immature governments, emerging economies, population explosions and social problems, which have something to do with insufficient food supplies, poor health service and a high rate of illiteracy. This insurgency often takes place in areas with rich deposits of natural resources of considerable interest to the West. Many of these governments are susceptible to infiltration, subversion and destabilization."(12)
The alleged great importance of certain Third World regions for the capitalist countries and their simultaneous instability are thus, from this U.S. perspective, a central problem of Western foreign and security policy. Given the concurrent situation of a "nuclear cul-de-sac" between the superpowers (as an official U.S. Army document puts it), the confrontation between them is thus shifted to the Third World an "limited to low- or medium-intensity conflicts within Third World countries, as in Afghanistan and Vietnam, or to support for third parties against the other's clients" (13).
LIC is thus a reaction to a perceived strategic stalemate between the superpowers, which makes direct confrontation between them seem too risky and impracticable, encouraging a shift of venue for possible conflicts to the Third World. Quite often the Soviet Union is blamed for these tendencies and accused of deliberately employing LIC strategies as forms of low-level warfare against the United States in order to prevent the latter from responding adequately or on a large scale.
In the opinion of U.S. strategists, LIC is therefore neither harmless nor of little importance; instead, it is virtually a Soviet strategy for waging global war against the United States without the latter noticing. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger expressed this viewpoint quite clearly at a conference he arranged on the subject of low-intensity conflict in early 1986: "Today's world is in a state of war. It is not a world war, although it is taking place throughout the world. It is not a war between fully mobilized armies, although it is not less destructive... Today one in every four countries in the world is at war. In practically every case, the face of these wars is hidden behind a mask. And in practically every case, the Soviet Union and those who do the work for it are hiding behind this mask." (14)
ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF LOW_INTENSITY CONFLICT
The above formulation probably suffices to outline the fundamentals of U.S. LIC theory. It is, however, necessary to add two more factors: Firstly, LIC operations are frequent, while actual wars (i.e. medium- or high-intensity conflicts) are relatively few in number and are unlikely to increase. Since World War II, U.S. troops have been active in about 300 cases below the threshold of acute hostilities, whereas conflicts on the scale of the wars in Korea and Vietnam are rare. Secondly, U.S. planners note with regret that the military is least prepared for precisely such LIC operations. Lieutenant Colonel Vought pointed this out as early as 1977, i.e. some time before the start of a broad-based debate on low-intensity warfare.(15)
A study prepared by Kupperman Associates for the U.S. Army a few years later reaches the same conclusion: "The U.S. Army faces the dilemma that the type of conflict least likely to occur, i.e. extensive conventional confrontation between the superpowers in Europe, nonetheless dominates its thinking, training and allocation of resources. The confrontations which are most likely to attract the Army's attention are small but decisive low-intensity conflicts occurring on the periphery of the superpowers. Many of these conflicts- or protoconflicts <sic> - affect important U.S. interests, regardless of whether they have internal causes or are controlled from outside: for instance in the <Persian> Gulf, in the Caribbean, in Africa, in the South Pacific and possibly even in the United States itself. The Army is not prepared at present for such low-intensity conflicts."(16)
This reveals the general purpose of the debate in low-intensity warfare: to adjust the entire foreign policy machinery of the U.S. government, not least its armed forces, in line with the changed deployment conditions. Within the military, the aims of the discussion are to define the conditions and circumstances governing "low-intensity" operations, to develop a corresponding military doctrine, to adapt military thinking within the U.S. military to these requirements and to implement the new doctrine in the recruitment and training of military personnel and in the allocation of arms and equipment to the forces.
The assumption that the U.S. military is poorly equipped for LIC operations naturally implies that war of "low" or "high" intensity differ not only in scale, but also in quality, that it is thus not just a question of "large" or "small" wars, but one of completely different kinds of conflicts. One of the differences between "low-intensity" and "medium- or high-intensity" conflicts is that the latter are mainly of a conventional military and/or nuclear nature, i.e. that the destructive potential, fire power, technological level and associated variables are the decisive criteria. In the case of "low-intensity" conflicts, they - to exaggerate slightly - are subordinated to political conditions, which means that the traditional rules of war are modified.
Medium- and high-intensity conflicts are aimed at the military destruction of concentrations of enemy forces and/or the invasion (or defense) of territory. In LIC, concentrations of enemy forces tend to be an exceptional occurrence - either because they do not exist and operations are only carried out by small groups, or because they cannot be identified or attacked. Firepower is thus of secondary importance. U.S. Air Force Colonel Cardwell comments that generally it is a case of "unconventional, socio-political, enduring and manpower-intensive warfare" and that, consequently, stamina and small-scale engagements not dependent on fire power or technology are of particular importance. "The aim is no longer to conquer and hold territory, but to maintain political and economic access to the Third World by preemptively hindering the Soviets from achieving their expansionary goals."(17)
In general, LIC situations are viewed as basically political. The proverbial struggle for the hearts and minds of a civilian population, as part of counterinsurgency campaigns, may serve as an example in this respect. Troops whose combat strength is optimized for tank battles in the Fulda Gap or for nuclear warfare are not necessarily useful in LIC situations. (A certain exception is the aforementioned "surgical", i.e. fast and highly precise operations using conventional means.) However, precisely for this reason, surgical operations are not regarded as being part of the LIC scenario by some officers. Others argue, however, that the forces so employed (as in Granada in 1983) do not perform merely combat functions, but may also serve LIC psychological, propaganda, economic or politico-demonstrative purposes before, during or after the conventional combat phase. The air raids on Libya in March and April 1986 might be regarded as examples of conventional forces employed for such purpose.
THE POLITICAL COMPONENT OF LOW_INTENSITY CONFLICT
The political character of LIC becomes particularly clear when the individual elements are examined more closely:
Counterinsurgency aims primarily at preventing, impeding or defeating anti-government forces or movements in open civil war, insurgency or similar military or paramilitary conflict. If insurgent movements in Third World Countries could be suppressed by purely, or predominantly military means, then a counterinsurgency campaign as defined in LIC would be superfluous. In LIC theory the very existence of a viable insurgent movement of any size is a sign of its political/social/economic nature, an admission that a "military solution" is either impossible or could only be attained at unacceptable cost. Counterinsurgency is first and foremost aimed at controlling the population of an affected nation. All functions --including military confrontation with guerrillas-- are directed to this objective and are instrumental in attaining it.(18)
Washington's counterinsurgency efforts aim first at the transformation (and "modernization) of the society as well as the government apparatus of a Third world country according to criteria which ensures the latter's "functioning" and simultaneously guarantees U.S. control. Secondly, it is designed to estrange the guerrilla movement (or any other form of grassroots opposition) from the population by means of politico-economic incentives and/or military coercion and geographical separation. These tasks clearly do not involve "traditional" military operations. For this reason, counterinsurgency relies strongly on elements of economic aid, development assistance, collateral psychological measures and diplomatic initiatives.
In all these attempts at "reforming" and "modernizing" the relevant Third world societies, and thus achieving a modified status quo that is stable and functioning, the military aspect of the campaigns must, of course, not be overlooked. In many cases, the military of the client country becomes the main driving force of its economic development; the U.S. military assumes key advisory and instructional functions, and participates to a certain extend in the ongoing military confrontation, as well as takes part in civic action, i.e. projects for promoting the infrastructure or supporting the population (e.g. well-drilling, medical relief, etc.). However, the diverse political/economic projects can only be executed if a modicum of military "security" can be achieved in the country. For this reason, military operations and techniques also acquire great importance. A strategic problem posed by counterinsurgency is that the military/repressive and the development/modernizing elements of a campaign often impede each other.(19)
Contra operations (pro-insurgency), as LIC activities, are likewise not primarily of a military nature, even though they may appear so on the surface. For instance, the U.S. government's integration in 1981 of former members of Somoza's National Guard into a combat force opposing the Nicaraguan government -- today the best known and "classic" case of such an operation -- was initially not aimed at the direct, military overthrow of that government by the contra units, although at the outset many U.S. military and intelligence officials actually believed /or hoped) the contras had the potential to do this against a still disorganized provisional revolutionary government ruling Nicaragua. However, once the strength of the Sandinistas was properly gauged, the contras became only one element in the overall campaign which also employed U.S. forces, both directly (electronic surveillance, overflights, etc.) and indirectly (training, threatening maneuvers and naval exercises, etc.), as well as Honduran and Salvadoran military forces and facilities.
Additionally, military action and threats were intended to disrupt Nicaragua economically, politically and socially -- in short, to create conditions that would destabilize the Nicaraguan government and the Sandinista revolution. The main aim of the strategy was -- without risking direct U.S. LIC intervention -- to deprive the government of the loyalty of the masses by exacerbating the domestic situation through coordinated military, economic, political, diplomatic and psychological pressure in order that the Sandinista revolution would not stand a chance of surviving and presenting a model capable of being emulated by other Third World dissidents. The contras were a central element of this strategy, but their attacks were on economic, political and psychological objectives rather than on military ones. They were designed to bring about conditions permitting the overthrow of the Sandinista government, without requiring direct U.S. military intervention.(20)
The U.S. defends proinsurgency operations through special public relations efforts : The so-called Reagan Doctrine established the right and duty of the United States not only to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union and of the "totalitarian threat" embodied by it (this was to be achieved by counterinsurgency and other devices), but also justifies efforts to roll back Soviet influence in the Third World. To this end, military support for anti-communist "liberation movements" (e.g. the Nicaraguan Contras, the Angolan UNITA and the Afghan Mujaheddin) was considered necessary and legitimate.(21)
Counterterrorism as an element of LIC has more a political than military purpose. LIC incorporates military forces as part of the comprehensive attack on "international terrorism". Terrorism is defined, essentially, as the use of violent means by non-military, or irregular or paramilitary groups for political purpose, especially when these are directed against civilian targets or against government troops or other security forces and facilities. The concept of counterterrorism has a wide range. Since it serves to legitimate intervention in the Third World, it is stretched to cover a variety of situations. For example, drug traffickers become "narcoterrorists".(22)
Counterterrorism is waged with particular energy by the U.S. government in Near and Middle East settings. The air raids on Libya in March and April 1986, the policy towards Iran (including during the contragate affair) and the contradictory policies vis-a-vis Lebanon and Syria are the chief examples. In all cases, far more is involved than implied by the term "the combating of terrorism".
First, for the purpose of counterterrorism, the concept of terrorism is employed in a highly selective fashion. Marxist liberation movements are always classed as "terrorist" while individuals or organizations sympathetic to U.S. policies (e.g. the Contras in Nicaragua) are never so defined
Second, actual or alleged "terrorist" individuals or organizations are assumed to be supported or directed by pariah governments -- e.g. Libya or Iran. As a result, the blame for a concrete or merely anticipated act of violence by individuals is laid not only on the perpetrators, but also on the government "behind it". It is often immaterial whether the accused government, in fact, bears responsibility or whether its alleged transgression can be proved. For instance, the acts of terrorism by Abu Nidal were sometimes imputed to Libya, sometimes to Syria and occasionally even to Iran or the Palestine Liberation Organization, without any direct proof being presented; the imputation was based solely on immediate political considerations.(23)
The third logical step is to view actions by terrorists as acts of war against the United States by the government said to be responsible.(24) In this way, the U.S. government establishes the justification for attacking the accused country as a form of "self-defense", using economic, political, diplomatic, psychological, paramilitary and military instruments in conformity with the concept of low intensity warfare. The policy mix ultimately selected is determined exclusively by considerations of efficacy and political expediency.
THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Thus far, the political nature of LIC has been stressed. However, it should be pointed out that neither the LIC concept as a whole nor its rationale are accepted without dispute by U.S. government officials and armed forces' personnel. The question of how much military weight should be lent to LIC is also the subject of some controversy. One example is the current debate over on counterterrorism within the U.S. Air Force. Lieutenant Colonel Felix Moran thinks the military response to terrorism is both wrong and futile.(25) Colonel Clarence Herrington, on the contrary argues for the use of B-52s to combat terrorists.(26) Clearly, he misses the point of LIC, but the fact remains that there is a heated debate over the priority given to, as well as the scope and the nature of, its military component.
Second, under the Reagan administration, the non-military priorities of LIC are often proclaimed, but rarely implemented. It cannot be denied that the LIC concept is, in practice, progressively being militarized. Simple "military solutions" to complex political problems are part of Reaganite thinking. The political aspect of LIC has a distinct Carter-era tinge -- it smacks of the former presidents' human rights policy (27) -- and thus runs counter to the political instincts of numerous Reaganites (cf. Senator Jesse Helms's description of land reform in El Salvador as "communist"). Furthermore, many U.S. officers have definite reservations about the civilian LIC elements (occasionally about the military ones as well) because these do not accord with their training, experience, ideology and qualifications. In sum, it can be stated that under the Reagan Administration, the political and social aspects of LIC tended to be de-emphasized in favor of the military.
Finally, even in "political" LIC programs, the military aspect is indispensable. LIC does not imply replacing "military solutions" with "political solutions", as much as eliminating the distinction between "military" and "civilian". Such clearly "non-military" conduct as strikes and demonstrations may in LIC situations be interpreted as "acts of war", while, on the other hand, the military may assume "civilian" tasks (civic action). Consequently, under LIC conditions, civilian practices tend to be militarized, and military or non-military measures, taken by the armed forces of the United States and/or the local government, will be of decisive importance for any LIC program. Ensuing local "security" by the military and the police is a consideration without which any program of pacification is bound to fail.
As has already been stated, LIC operations are, by their nature, not comparable with conventional military operations. It is therefore not surprising that regular military units are not optimally trained and equipped for these functions. This was one of the realizations that initiated the entire debate on low-intensity warfare. The U.S. units with the greatest competence in unconventional operations and low-intensity warfare are the so-called Special Operations Forces (SOF), made up from the three branches of the military. Since the beginning of the Reagan administration the SOF, and counterparts in other countries, have been considerably enlarged and given additional weapons and equipment.(28)
THE LEGACY OF VIETNAM
Low-intensity warfare theorists continue to study and draw conclusions from the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Vietnam had three consequences which military planners in Washington want to avoid in the future:
1.The war was costly in every respect. At its peak, there were over half a million U.S. troops in Vietnam.
2.More than 54,000 people were killed and the dollar cost of the war exceeded $150 billion 1967 dollars.
3.The war was lost. Despite its substantial commitment, the United States, a superpower, did not manage to defeat the impoverished developing country of Vietnam. Clearly, U.S. strategy and tactics were inappropriate, promoting military theorists to ask why this was so and what changes had to be made to prepare for future confrontations of this type.
4.In the aftermath of the war, U.S. society was so politically polarized that the government's scope for action abroad became greatly restricted.
Since the Vietnam-era, large-scale interventions by U.S. armed forces are seen by the majority of U.S. policy makers as politically divisive, as well as economically expensive, and have sought effective alternate means of maintaining U.S. dominance in the Third World. The low-intensity warfare thesis was created in order to permit an active Third World policy, including military components, without generating the high visibility exposure of "another Vietnam". Consequently, LIC campaigns are designed so that the extent of U.S. involvement is kept within proscribed limits by optimizing the quality of that involvement rather than its quantity. Compared with direct military invention, LIC is cheap and requires little manpower (since local troops in counterinsurgency, or locally-recruited contras of foreign mercenaries in pro-insurgency, provide the main force levels).
Furthermore -- and this is the decisive criterion -- LIC is more effective than conventional forms of intervention. It is better attuned to the causes of Third World conflicts; it employs, so to speak, "appropriate technology" for military tasks; and it largely avoids the counterproductive effects of direct U.S. intervention, such as the rise of nationalist solidarity among the population against foreign invaders. Thus, in general, it averts the hazards resulting from military overreaction and excessive militarization of a conflict by the United States. With the aid of specific techniques and through increased efficiency, LIC is designed to render direct U.S. intervention unnecessary.
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND U.S. PUBLIC OPINION
In addition, there are important considerations connected with U.S. domestic politics that favor the LIC option. In a recent interview, a senior official at the U.S. Department of Defense discussed the need for LIC. The following aspect was emphasized several times: "One of the main problems of U.S. foreign policy is that since Vietnam the U.S. public is no longer prepared to wage wars in the Third World."(29)
The Pentagon official went to say that this was a major impairment of the United States' capacity for action abroad because it not only prevented the exercise of certain military options, but also made the threat of large-scale military operations lack credibility. LIC was, he went on, an attempt at overcoming this difficulty. Low-intensity warfare was a kind of warfare that the United States could maintain over years in a specific Third World country at relatively low cost, without arousing public attention or concern. The relatively low inputs of manpower and material would scarcely allow the emergence of political opposition or even a polarization of U.S. society as was the case at the end of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
Deryck Eller, addressing an Air University symposium on low-intensity conflict in 1985, said, "public support is not absolutely necessary, but there must at least be a sort of benign indifference, especially on the part of the mass media. Otherwise Congress would be compelled to end the U.S. involvement, regardless of the risks. If LIC can be confined to the lower levels of force -- with very little bloodshed for the television cameras -- public support or at least benign indifference may emerge. Something as boring as Internal Defense and Development (another name for counterinsurgency) never gets into the six o'clock news, especially if it is successful."(30)
This argument is borne out by reality. If the United States simultaneously carries out in two or three dozen Third World countries economic and military aid and training programs generally avoiding the use of American combat forces, public attention is diffused and can be contained more easily than if the United States, as in Vietnam War, were to intervene directly and spectaculary with substantial force deployments and corresponding losses.
In LIC campaigns, the time factor also plays a role. In the instance of large-scale direct military intervention, domestic opposition generally grows stronger over time; when less spectacular LIC operations are carried out, the public ceases taking notice after the first flurry of interest. For example, the counterinsurgency campaign in El Salvador evolved from a highly controversial undertaking between 1981 and 1983 into a matter that was largely accepted, not least by Congress, in the 1985-87 period. This was due to certain apparent political and military success of the campaign and to the fact that the direct U.S. military intervention feared by critics was avoided.
Other LIC operations are planned and implemented with domestic considerations very much in mind. The invasion of Grenada in October 1983, the aforementioned counterterrorist air raids on Libya in spring 1986 (31), and the naval operations in the Persian Gulf which began in summer 1987, are some examples of this sensitivity to public attitudes. In terms of foreign policy, these operations may have been of very little value or even counterproductive, but from the point of view of domestic politics they served, especially the first two cases, to strengthen the popularity of the Reagan administration, while at the same time seeking to minimize the risk involved.
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE OF NATO
Low-intensity warfare concepts are primarily designed for actions in the Third World and are most often intended to govern essentially unilateral U.S. operations (possibly in collaboration with the government of the country concerned). Nonetheless, one must not overlook the fact that these concepts may have considerable secondary repercussions on the relationship between the United States and the Western European members of NATO.
First, LIC concepts are being developed at a time when the "decoupling" of the United States from its Western European allies is being increasingly discussed. U.S.-originated position papers, arguing for a greater orientation of Washington toward the Pacific and speculating on whether it would be preferable to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe or transfer them to the Middle East, reflect a changing pattern of U.S. external interests.(32) This line of reasoning also reflects a growing distance between the security goals of Western Europe and its American ally, as well as the increasing importance attached to the Third World for the assertion of Washington's role as a superpower. LIC doctrines are a military reaction to this. The underlying assumptions of the United States can be summarized as follows:
1) the strategic situation in Europe is stable;
2) there are growing differences with the Western European nations;
3) the latter are not willing to step up their own defense efforts adequately, as is required, and are exploiting the United States as guarantor power;
4) the strategic importance of the Third World (notably certain regions, such as Asia and the Middle East) is steadily rising;
5) the Soviet Union has gained considerable ground in the Third World because of Western negligence as Moscow pursues a strategy possibly aimed at "encircling" the West and severing its raw material and energy supplies.
A decrease in the U.S. commitment in Europe and greater emphasis on its efforts in the Third World would thus appear to be of the utmost importance to U.S. policy-makers. The extreme influence of the low-intensity warfare model is a symptom of this. The Kupperman study prepared for the U.S. Army stated that it is "hard to explain to the allies" that the Army "is shifting the focus of its forces in such a way that they better serve U.S. --not NATO -- policy objectives". This reorientation was tersely expressed as "interests instead of allies". A major purpose of the LIC debate was stated in no uncertain terms: The requisite changes "mean an open restructuring of our armed forces away from the Fulda Gap to the Ogaden and the Caribbean".(33)
Second, it has to be assumed that the LIC or "small war " concepts for the Third World will inevitably have an impact in the medium or long term on the structure, training and equipment of the U.S. military. If tank battles in the Fulda Gap and mega-conflicts similar to World War II are considered improbable in the future, and if jungle wars or armed encounters in hilly, forested, or otherwise fairly inaccessible terrain for operations by commandos become the rule, not adapting to such changes would be dangerous from the U.S. perspective. A study prepared in 1982 for the U.S. Army by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argues that in the early 1970s the Army had wrongly decided to "concentrate almost completely on the European battlefield". It cites a practical example: "For the highly intensive battlefields of Europe a new tank was developed which was so heavy that it was almost impossible to use it anywhere else." (34)
The post-Vietnam special concentration on possible NATO operations and the loss of versatility and flexibility in deployment options (of which the dramatic reduction of the Special Operations Forces was but one element) were to be determined by the LIC debate. The concentration on LIC, the creation of rapid deployment forces, the discussion on the introduction of light infantry divisions and relevant modifications in fleet construction programs are all clear signs that the United States is adapting to perceived changing military exigencies. As a result, the significance of the European battlefield is being modified and downgraded.
From the perspective of preparing for the possibility of conventional warfare in Europe, one might view these tendencies with skepticism. This is a reason why even within the U.S. military establishment a traditionalist faction reacts to LIC concepts with delaying tactics (quite apart from the customary rivalry between the three branches of the military). Underlying this resistance, of course, is a dispute over priorities in the future distribution of financial resources in the military sector.
Third, from the perspective of the Western European members of NATO, LIC simultaneously poses the matter of political and strategic priorities. The crucial question that they are posing is whether the U.S. should run the risk of being drawn into, or even causing, possibly lengthy military conflicts in Central America, the Middle East or Southern Africa. Again, from the Western European standpoint, this gives rise to several thoughts:
1. Is there not a danger of U.S. forces becoming tied down and thus not being available in the event of a conflict in Europe ? Indeed, this was one of Europe's lessons from Vietnam.
2. Is such U.S. involvement "worthwhile", but rather a waste of strength? Of course, differences of interest and assessment between the governments in Washington and Western Europe make themselves felt (e.g., how important is control of Nicaragua considered to be?).
3. Is the concrete strategy chosen by the United States of merit or are there not more suitable methods? (e.g., the disputes between the United States and the most Western European countries over the bombing of Libya or the increased U.S. naval presence in the Gulf).
4. Will the United States act unilaterally or consult with its NATO allies? There is the problem that the United States feels that (too close) consultation with the European allies would render it incapable of taking any action (e.g., Grenada, Libya, Nicaragua, the Persian Gulf) because they virtually always voice only misgivings, without making any active contributions of their own. The Western European allies are for their part increasingly confronted with faits accomplice which they are unable to endorse.
5. What is the potential for escalation of American LIC campaigns? Although the United States defines its operations as "low-intensity", it is not possible to guarantee in every instance that this level will not be exceeded, possibly resulting in uncontrollable escalation. Such a danger existed in the case of the attacks on Libya (where the U.S. State Department even conceded the possibility (35) ), Syria or Cuba. U.S. operations against Iran or other countries near the Soviet border likewise have such potential. The Western European NATO allies would then be in the situation of being drawn into superpower conflicts in a Third World venue in which they have no interest and on whose emergence they are unable to exert any meaningful influence.
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