Sayeret
11-20-2004, 01:09 PM
Victory in Low-intensity Conflicts
by MAJ Matthew Kee Yeow Chye
Despite the end of the Cold War, the historic warming of relations between the two Koreas and the initiatives for a peace process in the Middle East, low-intensity conflict (LIC) still remains a serious threat in many countries. This is largely due to the underlying causes of bitter ethnic and religious struggles, which to this day, has remained unresolved.
There are a combination of military and political elements which ensure that LIC will continue to be the most likely form of conflict in the future. Foremost of which are the capabilities of the major powers, both nuclear and non-nuclear, and the ability to project this around the world. This development has made high-intensity conflict too costly. The other main reason - the deep social, economic, and political problems of Third World nations and the recently formed states in the Balkans, create fertile ground for developing insurgencies and other conflicts.
This paper examines why governments have such difficulty in attaining success, particularly political success, for a lasting victory in LIC.
Low-intensity Conflict Defined
Despite the effort by nations to equip their conventional military forces in the defence of their homeland, most analysts agree that the major threat or type of conflicts of the future would be low-intensity in nature.1 Military theoreticians have categorised all conceivable conflicts with military involvement into three broad groups, ranging from the lowest conflicts to a strategic nuclear war. Confrontations like WW II, the Gulf War or a nuclear war are in the "high-intensity conflicts/wars" category. Confrontations in the scale of the Korean or Vietnam wars are regarded as "medium-intensity conflicts" while all other confrontations below these levels would be classified as LIC.
In the 1970s, the US conceptualised LIC as a broad range of conflicts less intense than full-scale conventional warfare.2 They were considered low-intensity in nature because the country combating such LIC usually committed relatively limited military resources. However, the same cannot be said for the party initiating the LIC as they may involve all that they have.
The US Joint Chiefs of Staff's more definitive explanation of LIC in 1986 is as follows:
"Low-intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence. LIC involves the actual or contemplated use of military means up to just below the threshold of battle between regular armed forces".3
There are a few key elements in this definition. First, it states that the objective of LIC does not end at the military level alone but transcends to political, social, economic and even psychological levels. This is important as some observers may assume LIC as an exclusive military affair. Second, it makes clear the upper limits on the use of military force beyond which the concept no longer applies.
With so many possible types of conflicts under the LIC classification, it is not surprising that disagreements would abound when governments try to come up with measures to counter them as each conflict deserves unique treatment. To presume that a single general approach can counter such conflicts is a fallacy and the onset of defeat for governments. Although conflicts like counter-insurgency, anti-terrorism and guerrilla warfare are popularly associated to LIC, other conflicts like peacekeeping missions, drug interdiction, and contingency operations have been known to be classified as low-intensity operations as well. This paper will focus on the first three types of LIC.
It must be emphasised that LIC is not primarily a military matter. The aim is not military conquest, but social control, for whose attainment military means can be employed as a tool for resolving the conflict. Conceptually, LIC is primarily politically oriented and requires an integrated policy approach containing military elements. As such, the definition of LIC should not concentrate on the military level of conflict, but on its political character.
Winning in LIC, therefore requires an accurate understanding of what it really is.
Victory Defined
Many debates have gone into the definition of what victory in warfare means. The Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary defines 'victory' as 'a situation in which you gain complete success, for example, in defeating an opponent in a war or in any other hard struggle'. By this definition, victory in LIC would mean being able to resolve the conflicts by completely eradicating groups that wage such LIC through their removal, surrender, or by winning them over.
From the many internal wars that have been waged, it is clear that it is not easy to completely remove such insurgency or guerrilla movements once they have established themselves, as in the case of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). But is victory in LIC merely the termination of such groups, or should governments concentrate on ending the causes fought by these groups? Often the coups, revolts and revolutions may be prevented and defeated, but the causes for which these are fought for are seldom completely defeated.4 In such situations, victory may end up having only a temporal effect and hence ineffective.
The experience of LICs fought since World War II shows that many governments were ill-prepared to handle them; even for major powers like the US. War, The US tried to turn the Vietnam War into a series of conventional military operations that were more suited for the plains of Europe than the jungles of Vietnam.5 Even if the opponents in such LICs were eventually defeated, the amount of damage, casualties, suffering and political objectives created by the opponents made such victories by the governing powers meaningless.6 Hence, true victory by the governing regime, if we are to follow the definition strictly, is often difficult to achieve; if not impossible.
Victory in any conflict can come in various forms: militarily, politically or economically.7 In Clausewitz's trinity on the nature of war, he concluded that there are three main pillars that determine the success or failure of a war - the people, the military forces and the government.8 Hence, attaining military success alone may not be enough to achieve an overall success in the war against LIC. Lasting victory in LIC comes more from achieving political success rather than military or economic success. Unlike conventional wars where defeating the opposing military forces would usually secure victory for the state, the mere capture or destruction of such LIC forces would not totally remove their influence on the populace due to the existence of sympathisers. New groups would simply spring up to continue the fight since the root cause of LIC has not been resolved. The political aspects in LIC therefore take paramount importance over the military and other aspects.
Why Victory is Difficult
Many countries have fallen into the trap of handling LIC as if it were any other conventional conflict. One of the main reasons why the US failed in the Vietnam War was its failure to realise that employing conventional military tactics in an unconventional operation would be totally ineffective. Unlike conventional warfare, LIC poses some unusual problems making victory difficult to achieve.
Conventional Military Forces Not Suited for LIC
Conventional military power is often irrelevant in LIC.9 In LIC, the concentration of military forces tend to be an exceptional occurrence. This is because the operations are mainly carried out by small groups or because they cannot be easily identified, especially in terrorism. In the case of insurgency war, the insurgents know that they are no match against the country's military force as they will be easily outnumbered and outgunned. They will instead avoid decisive battle and use their military forces to gain "maximum political effect at minimum military cost".10 Firepower is thus of secondary importance.
US Air Force Colonel Cardwell comments that generally it is a case of "unconventional, social-political, enduring and manpower-intensive warfare".11 For democracies that have configured their military forces to fight a conventional war, it is often difficult for them to adapt to unconventional warfare. A case in example is the US Armed Forces which despite its military might, failed to adapt itself adequately for the unconventional setting in Vietnam, and some may argue, even in Kosovo. The common mistake is assuming that the capability to handle conventional warfare automatically equips the military force for unconventional warfare. Although conventional warfare skills can be applied in peacekeeping and contingency missions, they are ill-suited for counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operations.
The insurgents in Vietnam did not win by defeating the US on the ground; they eroded its political capability to wage war.12 Targeting the divisions within the American society for their support of the war, the North Vietnamese made it domestically impossible for the US to continue to fight. More recently, in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, President Milosevic avoided the strength of the US and NATO forces and fought instead on an asymmetrical plane to try to win the conflict. Although NATO has eventually succeeded in bringing the conflict to an end, it was not the bombing raids but other political and economic factors that led to the termination of the conflict.
In LIC, military strength is often not the decisive factor for victory. For counter-insurgency war, the skill in separating the population from the insurgents is more useful than military power.13 According to the Clausewitzian trinity, controlling the population is an important aspect for success. This can be achieved by building an effective program of incentives and disincentives to convince the population to stop supporting or accommodating the insurgents. Strong-arm tactics or employing harsh military measures may actually push the population to sympathise with the insurgents, thus nullifying any military effort taken.
Limited War Breeds Limited Success
LIC is a limited war. A full-scale war between states threatens survival, while LIC for a major power does not. An important difference between the two forms of conflicts is the acceptability of defeat. Once survival becomes an issue, defeat becomes unacceptable. In a limited war where survival of the nation is not at stake, governments have no compelling reasons to place high priority on the resolution of such conflicts over other national goals. Consequently, unlike an interstate full-scale war which becomes the pre-occupation of the entire country, nations caught up in LIC are willing to commit only limited resources to it. This frequently yields indecisive results. The problems of terrorism and insurgency have been likened to pest problems rather than a real sickness in need of permanent healing. Although the besieged country may be fighting a limited war, it may be a total war for the opponent fighting in a guerrilla or a revolutionary war. This mismatch in the level of commitment makes a clear-cut victory hard to achieve. Hence, if victory is not assured, then varying degrees of failure are possible, including outright defeat.
Military objectives must support the political objectives. Although this intention is easily seen in a full-scale war, the relationship between military success and political success in an LIC is not that straightforward. In full-scale war, as the enemy is steadily being destroyed and territories are being captured, it is easy to see the attacking country approaching closer to the political objective of causing the enemy's collapse. The ability to dictate the terms of peace becomes obvious. In LIC, this clear relationship does not exist. Tactical successes that facilitate the overall victory in a full-scale war do not necessarily produce the same results in LIC. There is no guarantee that military successes will stop the insurgents or guerrillas from attacking in the future. In fact, the guerrillas seeing themselves as fighting a full-scale war against an oppressive government, will resist more strongly and refuse to negotiate.14 Indeed, such military victories in LIC do not necessarily bring the opponents to the negotiation table to achieve the desired political outcome.
Need to Eliminate External Support
Another reason why insurgent and guerrilla groups have been able to withstand the onslaught of the more powerful military is due to the external aid it receives. Without cutting off this umbilical cord from external parties, these groups will be sustained indefinitely.15 Similarly, many terrorist groups get funds and training from foreign states. As long as the aid continues, it would be almost impossible to eliminate the subversive elements and a political compromise may be the only solution for a besieged government.
Dilemma of Governments
The types of LIC that are likely to appear in Third World countries are guerrilla, insurgency and revolutionary war. Such internal wars are a result of deep societal problems caused by maldistribution of wealth, poverty, corruption, repression, and collapse of social structure.16 Because of these deep-seated problems, the real solutions are impossible in the short-term and agonisingly difficult in the long-term. In such a condition, complete victory over the instigators may only come by implementing harsh and ruthless measures.17 However, this may be more achievable in autocratic societies where public opinion is not that important.
For democracies, such measures are unwelcomed by the public. Democratic governments, which depend on public support are unwilling to jeopardise their position in office by exacting such unpalatable measures against the insurgents or guerrillas. Often, counter-terrorism measures involve the assassination of known terrorists. Although this may be acceptable in countries like Israel where terrorist acts hit at their very existence, such acts are considered distasteful in Western democracies and would not be supported by the people. Furthermore, the insurgents or terrorists would be almost indistinguishable from the general public and any tough measures taken may result in many innocent people getting hurt. The victory that may be attained will be meaningless then.
Divisions also develop among the population as some people may support the government's efforts or call for firmer action while others may demand immediate cessation to the hostility. These divisions create a dilemma for the government trying to resolve the LIC. The government has to grapple with a need to maintain the balance between the views of the government, the people and the military force within the context of the Clausewitzian trinity of war.
As such, the need to appease the public with more acceptable yet effective measures makes it difficult, often impossible, for democracies to achieve complete success against the insurgents and guerrillas.
Lack of Stamina
One common characteristic of LIC is that it lasts a long time. Unlike conventional war where it can be terminated in a relatively short time, as in the Gulf War, it would take a long time to produce tangible results in LIC. The Huk rebellion in Philippines took up to 10 years to end. Although the IRA's ongoing fight against the British started in 1969, the Irish rebellion against the British dates back to late 18th century. The long duration reflects the complexity of the conflict, which is not merely a military confrontation but one that essentially contains a political and social dimension to the conflict.
One of the main reasons why modern democratic governments have difficulty in resolving LIC is their short term in office. With such a short term in office, politicians would be more inclined to invest their efforts in areas that bring more tangible results during their tenure. To ensure re-election and maintain public support, politicians tend to show that they have contributed positively to the community during their term of office. Unfortunately, efforts to resolve LIC does not show this as even the smallest success in LIC can take years to yield fruitful results.18 Without the determination and patience to tackle LIC, the problem is merely handed over from one administration to another, at times, without much progress.
Another significant effect of a protracted war is the risk of high casualties. As a consequence of the defeat in Vietnam, Americans began to show a low tolerance for casualties. The subsequent wars involving the US had to show a high certainty of success with low casualty rates. This was especially prevalent in the Kosovo conflict where the US was unwilling to send in ground forces for fear of sustaining casualties. Casualties have become a new centre of gravity for the US and other western democracies which can be exploited by the LIC forces.19 The LIC forces are willing to prolong the struggle and slowly bleed the government and military forces hoping that this will weaken the leaders eventually. Achieving victory in such a situation will be less meaningful if the country has lost many innocent civilians, military personnel and even political leaders in the process.
Mutual Hatred Affecting Objectivity
As LIC usually last a long time, inflicting high casualties on both sides, this gives ample reasons for both sides to hate each other. The devastation, the memory of friends and family killed in the conflict and the scepticism about living in peace with people seen as the enemy, pose insurmountable difficulties.20 The harsh treatment or torture experienced by the opponents often toughens their resolve to fight even more instead of surrendering or negotiating for peace. Such deep-rooted hatred make it difficult for the opponents to be objective when evaluating the offers of the government, no matter how accommodating they may be.
Adaptability
As the nature of warfare differs in LIC, there is a need to adapt and modify structures or methods to accommodate the variances. This may involve creating specialise forces schooled in the art of 'small wars' instead of relying on massive firepower or manoeuvre to win the war.
Although some aspects of conventional military operation can be adapted for LIC, there are many other aspects that require re-organising the forces, equipment and tactics. Some military leaders however, are resistant to effect the changes as they are unconvinced of the importance of LIC to justify the effort to train, organise, and equip for it.21 Military leaders also fear that too much effort on LIC will erode their preparedness for conventional war since their already limited resources have to be diverted for the cause.
This resistance to adapt and change for what would more likely involve the military in the future, results in the military forces being ill-prepared to handle LIC when it occurs.
Conclusion
The diverse range of LIC calls for different strategies to be deployed for an effective resolution. The government cannot go for quick fixes but must work out a robust plan to address the root cause of the problem. More importantly, the end state of what is to be achieved needs to be determined: Is complete victory desired? Is a compromise acceptable in the pursuit for peace? To resolve the issue, these fundamentals cannot be ignored.
Despite the advances in technology and progress in society, it is unclear if governments will ever be prepared to cope with LIC, since conventional military forces are inadequate, the opponents may not be rational people, and the governments themselves may be unable to stomach the realities of the nightmare.
Governments must realise that LIC is a very real threat. Proficiency in conventional warfare does not equate to the capability to handle LIC.
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol26_4/4.htm[/i]
by MAJ Matthew Kee Yeow Chye
Despite the end of the Cold War, the historic warming of relations between the two Koreas and the initiatives for a peace process in the Middle East, low-intensity conflict (LIC) still remains a serious threat in many countries. This is largely due to the underlying causes of bitter ethnic and religious struggles, which to this day, has remained unresolved.
There are a combination of military and political elements which ensure that LIC will continue to be the most likely form of conflict in the future. Foremost of which are the capabilities of the major powers, both nuclear and non-nuclear, and the ability to project this around the world. This development has made high-intensity conflict too costly. The other main reason - the deep social, economic, and political problems of Third World nations and the recently formed states in the Balkans, create fertile ground for developing insurgencies and other conflicts.
This paper examines why governments have such difficulty in attaining success, particularly political success, for a lasting victory in LIC.
Low-intensity Conflict Defined
Despite the effort by nations to equip their conventional military forces in the defence of their homeland, most analysts agree that the major threat or type of conflicts of the future would be low-intensity in nature.1 Military theoreticians have categorised all conceivable conflicts with military involvement into three broad groups, ranging from the lowest conflicts to a strategic nuclear war. Confrontations like WW II, the Gulf War or a nuclear war are in the "high-intensity conflicts/wars" category. Confrontations in the scale of the Korean or Vietnam wars are regarded as "medium-intensity conflicts" while all other confrontations below these levels would be classified as LIC.
In the 1970s, the US conceptualised LIC as a broad range of conflicts less intense than full-scale conventional warfare.2 They were considered low-intensity in nature because the country combating such LIC usually committed relatively limited military resources. However, the same cannot be said for the party initiating the LIC as they may involve all that they have.
The US Joint Chiefs of Staff's more definitive explanation of LIC in 1986 is as follows:
"Low-intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence. LIC involves the actual or contemplated use of military means up to just below the threshold of battle between regular armed forces".3
There are a few key elements in this definition. First, it states that the objective of LIC does not end at the military level alone but transcends to political, social, economic and even psychological levels. This is important as some observers may assume LIC as an exclusive military affair. Second, it makes clear the upper limits on the use of military force beyond which the concept no longer applies.
With so many possible types of conflicts under the LIC classification, it is not surprising that disagreements would abound when governments try to come up with measures to counter them as each conflict deserves unique treatment. To presume that a single general approach can counter such conflicts is a fallacy and the onset of defeat for governments. Although conflicts like counter-insurgency, anti-terrorism and guerrilla warfare are popularly associated to LIC, other conflicts like peacekeeping missions, drug interdiction, and contingency operations have been known to be classified as low-intensity operations as well. This paper will focus on the first three types of LIC.
It must be emphasised that LIC is not primarily a military matter. The aim is not military conquest, but social control, for whose attainment military means can be employed as a tool for resolving the conflict. Conceptually, LIC is primarily politically oriented and requires an integrated policy approach containing military elements. As such, the definition of LIC should not concentrate on the military level of conflict, but on its political character.
Winning in LIC, therefore requires an accurate understanding of what it really is.
Victory Defined
Many debates have gone into the definition of what victory in warfare means. The Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary defines 'victory' as 'a situation in which you gain complete success, for example, in defeating an opponent in a war or in any other hard struggle'. By this definition, victory in LIC would mean being able to resolve the conflicts by completely eradicating groups that wage such LIC through their removal, surrender, or by winning them over.
From the many internal wars that have been waged, it is clear that it is not easy to completely remove such insurgency or guerrilla movements once they have established themselves, as in the case of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). But is victory in LIC merely the termination of such groups, or should governments concentrate on ending the causes fought by these groups? Often the coups, revolts and revolutions may be prevented and defeated, but the causes for which these are fought for are seldom completely defeated.4 In such situations, victory may end up having only a temporal effect and hence ineffective.
The experience of LICs fought since World War II shows that many governments were ill-prepared to handle them; even for major powers like the US. War, The US tried to turn the Vietnam War into a series of conventional military operations that were more suited for the plains of Europe than the jungles of Vietnam.5 Even if the opponents in such LICs were eventually defeated, the amount of damage, casualties, suffering and political objectives created by the opponents made such victories by the governing powers meaningless.6 Hence, true victory by the governing regime, if we are to follow the definition strictly, is often difficult to achieve; if not impossible.
Victory in any conflict can come in various forms: militarily, politically or economically.7 In Clausewitz's trinity on the nature of war, he concluded that there are three main pillars that determine the success or failure of a war - the people, the military forces and the government.8 Hence, attaining military success alone may not be enough to achieve an overall success in the war against LIC. Lasting victory in LIC comes more from achieving political success rather than military or economic success. Unlike conventional wars where defeating the opposing military forces would usually secure victory for the state, the mere capture or destruction of such LIC forces would not totally remove their influence on the populace due to the existence of sympathisers. New groups would simply spring up to continue the fight since the root cause of LIC has not been resolved. The political aspects in LIC therefore take paramount importance over the military and other aspects.
Why Victory is Difficult
Many countries have fallen into the trap of handling LIC as if it were any other conventional conflict. One of the main reasons why the US failed in the Vietnam War was its failure to realise that employing conventional military tactics in an unconventional operation would be totally ineffective. Unlike conventional warfare, LIC poses some unusual problems making victory difficult to achieve.
Conventional Military Forces Not Suited for LIC
Conventional military power is often irrelevant in LIC.9 In LIC, the concentration of military forces tend to be an exceptional occurrence. This is because the operations are mainly carried out by small groups or because they cannot be easily identified, especially in terrorism. In the case of insurgency war, the insurgents know that they are no match against the country's military force as they will be easily outnumbered and outgunned. They will instead avoid decisive battle and use their military forces to gain "maximum political effect at minimum military cost".10 Firepower is thus of secondary importance.
US Air Force Colonel Cardwell comments that generally it is a case of "unconventional, social-political, enduring and manpower-intensive warfare".11 For democracies that have configured their military forces to fight a conventional war, it is often difficult for them to adapt to unconventional warfare. A case in example is the US Armed Forces which despite its military might, failed to adapt itself adequately for the unconventional setting in Vietnam, and some may argue, even in Kosovo. The common mistake is assuming that the capability to handle conventional warfare automatically equips the military force for unconventional warfare. Although conventional warfare skills can be applied in peacekeeping and contingency missions, they are ill-suited for counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operations.
The insurgents in Vietnam did not win by defeating the US on the ground; they eroded its political capability to wage war.12 Targeting the divisions within the American society for their support of the war, the North Vietnamese made it domestically impossible for the US to continue to fight. More recently, in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, President Milosevic avoided the strength of the US and NATO forces and fought instead on an asymmetrical plane to try to win the conflict. Although NATO has eventually succeeded in bringing the conflict to an end, it was not the bombing raids but other political and economic factors that led to the termination of the conflict.
In LIC, military strength is often not the decisive factor for victory. For counter-insurgency war, the skill in separating the population from the insurgents is more useful than military power.13 According to the Clausewitzian trinity, controlling the population is an important aspect for success. This can be achieved by building an effective program of incentives and disincentives to convince the population to stop supporting or accommodating the insurgents. Strong-arm tactics or employing harsh military measures may actually push the population to sympathise with the insurgents, thus nullifying any military effort taken.
Limited War Breeds Limited Success
LIC is a limited war. A full-scale war between states threatens survival, while LIC for a major power does not. An important difference between the two forms of conflicts is the acceptability of defeat. Once survival becomes an issue, defeat becomes unacceptable. In a limited war where survival of the nation is not at stake, governments have no compelling reasons to place high priority on the resolution of such conflicts over other national goals. Consequently, unlike an interstate full-scale war which becomes the pre-occupation of the entire country, nations caught up in LIC are willing to commit only limited resources to it. This frequently yields indecisive results. The problems of terrorism and insurgency have been likened to pest problems rather than a real sickness in need of permanent healing. Although the besieged country may be fighting a limited war, it may be a total war for the opponent fighting in a guerrilla or a revolutionary war. This mismatch in the level of commitment makes a clear-cut victory hard to achieve. Hence, if victory is not assured, then varying degrees of failure are possible, including outright defeat.
Military objectives must support the political objectives. Although this intention is easily seen in a full-scale war, the relationship between military success and political success in an LIC is not that straightforward. In full-scale war, as the enemy is steadily being destroyed and territories are being captured, it is easy to see the attacking country approaching closer to the political objective of causing the enemy's collapse. The ability to dictate the terms of peace becomes obvious. In LIC, this clear relationship does not exist. Tactical successes that facilitate the overall victory in a full-scale war do not necessarily produce the same results in LIC. There is no guarantee that military successes will stop the insurgents or guerrillas from attacking in the future. In fact, the guerrillas seeing themselves as fighting a full-scale war against an oppressive government, will resist more strongly and refuse to negotiate.14 Indeed, such military victories in LIC do not necessarily bring the opponents to the negotiation table to achieve the desired political outcome.
Need to Eliminate External Support
Another reason why insurgent and guerrilla groups have been able to withstand the onslaught of the more powerful military is due to the external aid it receives. Without cutting off this umbilical cord from external parties, these groups will be sustained indefinitely.15 Similarly, many terrorist groups get funds and training from foreign states. As long as the aid continues, it would be almost impossible to eliminate the subversive elements and a political compromise may be the only solution for a besieged government.
Dilemma of Governments
The types of LIC that are likely to appear in Third World countries are guerrilla, insurgency and revolutionary war. Such internal wars are a result of deep societal problems caused by maldistribution of wealth, poverty, corruption, repression, and collapse of social structure.16 Because of these deep-seated problems, the real solutions are impossible in the short-term and agonisingly difficult in the long-term. In such a condition, complete victory over the instigators may only come by implementing harsh and ruthless measures.17 However, this may be more achievable in autocratic societies where public opinion is not that important.
For democracies, such measures are unwelcomed by the public. Democratic governments, which depend on public support are unwilling to jeopardise their position in office by exacting such unpalatable measures against the insurgents or guerrillas. Often, counter-terrorism measures involve the assassination of known terrorists. Although this may be acceptable in countries like Israel where terrorist acts hit at their very existence, such acts are considered distasteful in Western democracies and would not be supported by the people. Furthermore, the insurgents or terrorists would be almost indistinguishable from the general public and any tough measures taken may result in many innocent people getting hurt. The victory that may be attained will be meaningless then.
Divisions also develop among the population as some people may support the government's efforts or call for firmer action while others may demand immediate cessation to the hostility. These divisions create a dilemma for the government trying to resolve the LIC. The government has to grapple with a need to maintain the balance between the views of the government, the people and the military force within the context of the Clausewitzian trinity of war.
As such, the need to appease the public with more acceptable yet effective measures makes it difficult, often impossible, for democracies to achieve complete success against the insurgents and guerrillas.
Lack of Stamina
One common characteristic of LIC is that it lasts a long time. Unlike conventional war where it can be terminated in a relatively short time, as in the Gulf War, it would take a long time to produce tangible results in LIC. The Huk rebellion in Philippines took up to 10 years to end. Although the IRA's ongoing fight against the British started in 1969, the Irish rebellion against the British dates back to late 18th century. The long duration reflects the complexity of the conflict, which is not merely a military confrontation but one that essentially contains a political and social dimension to the conflict.
One of the main reasons why modern democratic governments have difficulty in resolving LIC is their short term in office. With such a short term in office, politicians would be more inclined to invest their efforts in areas that bring more tangible results during their tenure. To ensure re-election and maintain public support, politicians tend to show that they have contributed positively to the community during their term of office. Unfortunately, efforts to resolve LIC does not show this as even the smallest success in LIC can take years to yield fruitful results.18 Without the determination and patience to tackle LIC, the problem is merely handed over from one administration to another, at times, without much progress.
Another significant effect of a protracted war is the risk of high casualties. As a consequence of the defeat in Vietnam, Americans began to show a low tolerance for casualties. The subsequent wars involving the US had to show a high certainty of success with low casualty rates. This was especially prevalent in the Kosovo conflict where the US was unwilling to send in ground forces for fear of sustaining casualties. Casualties have become a new centre of gravity for the US and other western democracies which can be exploited by the LIC forces.19 The LIC forces are willing to prolong the struggle and slowly bleed the government and military forces hoping that this will weaken the leaders eventually. Achieving victory in such a situation will be less meaningful if the country has lost many innocent civilians, military personnel and even political leaders in the process.
Mutual Hatred Affecting Objectivity
As LIC usually last a long time, inflicting high casualties on both sides, this gives ample reasons for both sides to hate each other. The devastation, the memory of friends and family killed in the conflict and the scepticism about living in peace with people seen as the enemy, pose insurmountable difficulties.20 The harsh treatment or torture experienced by the opponents often toughens their resolve to fight even more instead of surrendering or negotiating for peace. Such deep-rooted hatred make it difficult for the opponents to be objective when evaluating the offers of the government, no matter how accommodating they may be.
Adaptability
As the nature of warfare differs in LIC, there is a need to adapt and modify structures or methods to accommodate the variances. This may involve creating specialise forces schooled in the art of 'small wars' instead of relying on massive firepower or manoeuvre to win the war.
Although some aspects of conventional military operation can be adapted for LIC, there are many other aspects that require re-organising the forces, equipment and tactics. Some military leaders however, are resistant to effect the changes as they are unconvinced of the importance of LIC to justify the effort to train, organise, and equip for it.21 Military leaders also fear that too much effort on LIC will erode their preparedness for conventional war since their already limited resources have to be diverted for the cause.
This resistance to adapt and change for what would more likely involve the military in the future, results in the military forces being ill-prepared to handle LIC when it occurs.
Conclusion
The diverse range of LIC calls for different strategies to be deployed for an effective resolution. The government cannot go for quick fixes but must work out a robust plan to address the root cause of the problem. More importantly, the end state of what is to be achieved needs to be determined: Is complete victory desired? Is a compromise acceptable in the pursuit for peace? To resolve the issue, these fundamentals cannot be ignored.
Despite the advances in technology and progress in society, it is unclear if governments will ever be prepared to cope with LIC, since conventional military forces are inadequate, the opponents may not be rational people, and the governments themselves may be unable to stomach the realities of the nightmare.
Governments must realise that LIC is a very real threat. Proficiency in conventional warfare does not equate to the capability to handle LIC.
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol26_4/4.htm[/i]