2RHPZ
11-23-2004, 04:36 PM
The Arabs and the Axis: 1933-1940
Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ)
Spring, 1997
by Basheer M. Nafi
In his latest book, the Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years, Bernard Lewis has rekindled the debate over the Arabs' relations with the Axis powers during the 1930s. While it has been generally accepted that the Palestinian leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni turned toward Germany as a result of British intransigence in pursuing the Jewish national home (JNH) policy and the employment of brutal and harsh measures to suppress the Palestinian revolt of 1936-39, Lewis wrote that "as far back as 1933, immediately after Hitler's accession to power, the British-appointed Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husayni, made contact with the German consul to declare his support and offer his help."(1) Lewis explained the Arab enthusiasm for the Axis in terms of the deterioration of the Arab democratic institutions during the interwar period, the Arab ideological attraction to the German and Italian models of achieving national unity by force, and the Axis powers' opposition to Britain, France and the Jews. While paying little attention to many of the important details of that unfortunate episode in the Arab modern history and failing to verify other important facts upon which his generalizations were based, Prof. Lewis made no mention of the pro-Zionist policy of the Nazis between 1933 and 1939.
There is no doubt that certain Arab statesmen and activists, especially in the Eastern part of the Arab World, began to turn toward Germany after the outbreak of the Palestinian revolt, and the French refusal to ratify the Franco-Syrian treaty which was negotiated and initialed in Paris in 1936. The intensifying radical mood in the mashriq reached a climactic point during the Iraqi crisis in early 1941 and the subsequent Iraqi-British war, where the Arabs' siding with the Germans, or rather the Arabs' pursuit of German support, became unmistakably visible. Was this shift in Arab attitudes an expression of ideological conviction or a mere reflection of the old game of real politic? And is it true that the Palestinians initiated their first contacts with the Nazis in 1933? If so, why? Finally, what contribution, if any, did the Germans make to the Arab movement during the 1930s?
The development of the Arab radicals' relations with the Axis powers was in many respects the result of the deterioration of Arab ideological and political views of the West rather than the evolution of positive Arab views of the Axis. Germany was of course an ally of the Ottoman state during World War I, but only a few Arabists were still recalling this alliance with special sentiments in the 1930s. Among those who came to be known for their pro-German views were Shakib Arslan, who returned to his Swiss exile after a short sojourn in Syria in 1937, as well as 'Aziz All al-Misri and Muhammad Salih Harb, ministers of Ali Mahir's deposed government. A senior officer in the Ottoman army until 1915, al-Misri's fascination with Germany essentially had military roots. This fascination, however, posed no hindrance to the cultivation of amicable relations between him and the British when he was briefly appointed by Sharif Husayn to command forces of the Arab Revolt, or later during his military career in Egypt.(2) Salih Harb was a pro-Ottoman officer in the Egyptian Border Guards who defected to the Ottoman side in the Libyan liberated zone where the Germans were also active.(3) Upon the deterioration of relations between Mahir's government and the British after the outbreak of World War II, both Harb and al-Misri seemed predisposed to develop a pro-German outlook based on the belief that a German victory would lead to the freeing of Egypt from British domination. Arslan was perhaps a different case. Germany was his first exile after the Ottoman defeat, where he and his idol Anwar Pasha established ties with German Foreign Office officials.(4) But these ties were of little if any relevance to the Arab interwar movement, firstly for being on the margin of the German political machine, and secondly for the absence of a German Arab policy, even after the Nazi rise to power.
The expressions of admiration for the German model of the 1930s were equally limited to a small circle of Arab intellectuals.(5) For these Arabists, it was the efficiency of the Nazi state, its ability to free Germany from the constraints of the Versailles Peace Treaty, and to salvage the German spirit from the defeat and chaotic times of the 1920s, that had the greatest positive impact. The new Arab intellectuals, reacting to the endemic political instability of the Arab states, tended to believe that an Arab renaissance could not be accomplished without reassertion of the state power. Also related to the internalization of the German model by some Arab intellectuals was the rise of the exclusivist vision of Arab nationalism. Implicit in the over-Arabization of Arabism was a rising affirmation of an imagined absolute loyalty to the Arab umma, which reflected increasing suspicions on the part of the Arab radicals of the non-Arab minorities. The pan-Arabists' celebration of the Iraqi military's suppression of the Assyrian revolt in 1933 signaled the beginning of a trend that reached its climax in the Ba'th Party's covenant where founders of the party envisaged the expulsion of non-Arab minorities if they proved disloyal to the Arab umma.(6) But the Arab ideological scene was too complex to be translated solely in terms of fascination with German nationalism and the state model. Despite their deepening opposition to the imperialist powers, the new Arab intellectuals were by and large more exposed to Franco-British culture and political thought than to their German counterparts. What came to make a difference was the convergence of the Italo-German political encroachment, spearheaded by an aggressive propaganda campaign, with the deepening of Arab nationalist, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist feelings. To be sure, the Italian penetration of the Arab World preceded the German interest by several years.
A late entrant to the arena, Italy's ambition to join the imperialist club was first expressed in a body of literature, journals, and imperialist cultural societies.(7) In her search for a share in the economic exploits of imperialism and for national aggrandizement, Fascist Italy saw herself as the reincarnation of the Roman empire and the inheritor of its domain.(8) Not surprisingly, the Mediterranean world would become the primary target for the Italian imperialist enterprise. In September 1930, Italy's campaign to consolidate and expand her domination of Libya reached a dramatic point with the capture of Shaykh 'Umar al-Mukhtar, the Libyan resistance leader. The subsequent execution of al-Mukhtar and the widespread Italian atrocities in Libya, generated strong Arab and Islamic reactions. The most active in the anti-Italian movement was Shakib Arslan.(9) Yet, a few years later, Arslan's desperate search for a Western ally would lead to a radical shift in his views of Italy.
From the beginning of the 1930s, the Italians adopted a visible Arab-Islamic policy, aiming at dislodging the influence of their main European opponents from the Mediterranean basin. L'Italia Musulman was a policy of "peaceful" and cheap expansion that envisioned an empire built with support and consent of the Mediterranean peoples, Arabs and Muslims. Inaugurating this novel imperialist approach, the Italian king, accompanied by his wife, paid a visit to Egypt in 1933, which was meant to signal Italy's friendship and respect for the Arabs and Muslims.(10) The following year, the Italian Foreign Ministry marked the advent of wireless broadcasting power by launching the Arabic service of Radio Bari.(11) The main themes of Radio Bari's propaganda were the glorification of modern Italy, support for the Arab national struggle against the French and the British, and highlighting Italy's readiness to assist the Arab liberation movement. In late 1934-early 1935, Rome was the site of an Italian-backed Eastern Student Conference through which Mussolini's government sought to penetrate and orchestrate Muslim and Arab youth nationalist movements. This classical game of imperialist rivalry attracted the attention of a few Arab-Islamist activists, most notably Shakib Arslan and his aide and friend Ihsan al-Jabiri. In a widely resonating and highly controversial move, Arslan and al-Jabiri met with Mussolini in February 1934.(12) Faced with angry reactions from Libyan nationalists and pro-British Arab circles, Arslan justified his step in terms of attempting to improve conditions in Libya and enlisting the Italian support for the Arab national struggle.
Article (http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2501/is_n2_v19/ai_20046831) - 9 pages
Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ)
Spring, 1997
by Basheer M. Nafi
In his latest book, the Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years, Bernard Lewis has rekindled the debate over the Arabs' relations with the Axis powers during the 1930s. While it has been generally accepted that the Palestinian leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni turned toward Germany as a result of British intransigence in pursuing the Jewish national home (JNH) policy and the employment of brutal and harsh measures to suppress the Palestinian revolt of 1936-39, Lewis wrote that "as far back as 1933, immediately after Hitler's accession to power, the British-appointed Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husayni, made contact with the German consul to declare his support and offer his help."(1) Lewis explained the Arab enthusiasm for the Axis in terms of the deterioration of the Arab democratic institutions during the interwar period, the Arab ideological attraction to the German and Italian models of achieving national unity by force, and the Axis powers' opposition to Britain, France and the Jews. While paying little attention to many of the important details of that unfortunate episode in the Arab modern history and failing to verify other important facts upon which his generalizations were based, Prof. Lewis made no mention of the pro-Zionist policy of the Nazis between 1933 and 1939.
There is no doubt that certain Arab statesmen and activists, especially in the Eastern part of the Arab World, began to turn toward Germany after the outbreak of the Palestinian revolt, and the French refusal to ratify the Franco-Syrian treaty which was negotiated and initialed in Paris in 1936. The intensifying radical mood in the mashriq reached a climactic point during the Iraqi crisis in early 1941 and the subsequent Iraqi-British war, where the Arabs' siding with the Germans, or rather the Arabs' pursuit of German support, became unmistakably visible. Was this shift in Arab attitudes an expression of ideological conviction or a mere reflection of the old game of real politic? And is it true that the Palestinians initiated their first contacts with the Nazis in 1933? If so, why? Finally, what contribution, if any, did the Germans make to the Arab movement during the 1930s?
The development of the Arab radicals' relations with the Axis powers was in many respects the result of the deterioration of Arab ideological and political views of the West rather than the evolution of positive Arab views of the Axis. Germany was of course an ally of the Ottoman state during World War I, but only a few Arabists were still recalling this alliance with special sentiments in the 1930s. Among those who came to be known for their pro-German views were Shakib Arslan, who returned to his Swiss exile after a short sojourn in Syria in 1937, as well as 'Aziz All al-Misri and Muhammad Salih Harb, ministers of Ali Mahir's deposed government. A senior officer in the Ottoman army until 1915, al-Misri's fascination with Germany essentially had military roots. This fascination, however, posed no hindrance to the cultivation of amicable relations between him and the British when he was briefly appointed by Sharif Husayn to command forces of the Arab Revolt, or later during his military career in Egypt.(2) Salih Harb was a pro-Ottoman officer in the Egyptian Border Guards who defected to the Ottoman side in the Libyan liberated zone where the Germans were also active.(3) Upon the deterioration of relations between Mahir's government and the British after the outbreak of World War II, both Harb and al-Misri seemed predisposed to develop a pro-German outlook based on the belief that a German victory would lead to the freeing of Egypt from British domination. Arslan was perhaps a different case. Germany was his first exile after the Ottoman defeat, where he and his idol Anwar Pasha established ties with German Foreign Office officials.(4) But these ties were of little if any relevance to the Arab interwar movement, firstly for being on the margin of the German political machine, and secondly for the absence of a German Arab policy, even after the Nazi rise to power.
The expressions of admiration for the German model of the 1930s were equally limited to a small circle of Arab intellectuals.(5) For these Arabists, it was the efficiency of the Nazi state, its ability to free Germany from the constraints of the Versailles Peace Treaty, and to salvage the German spirit from the defeat and chaotic times of the 1920s, that had the greatest positive impact. The new Arab intellectuals, reacting to the endemic political instability of the Arab states, tended to believe that an Arab renaissance could not be accomplished without reassertion of the state power. Also related to the internalization of the German model by some Arab intellectuals was the rise of the exclusivist vision of Arab nationalism. Implicit in the over-Arabization of Arabism was a rising affirmation of an imagined absolute loyalty to the Arab umma, which reflected increasing suspicions on the part of the Arab radicals of the non-Arab minorities. The pan-Arabists' celebration of the Iraqi military's suppression of the Assyrian revolt in 1933 signaled the beginning of a trend that reached its climax in the Ba'th Party's covenant where founders of the party envisaged the expulsion of non-Arab minorities if they proved disloyal to the Arab umma.(6) But the Arab ideological scene was too complex to be translated solely in terms of fascination with German nationalism and the state model. Despite their deepening opposition to the imperialist powers, the new Arab intellectuals were by and large more exposed to Franco-British culture and political thought than to their German counterparts. What came to make a difference was the convergence of the Italo-German political encroachment, spearheaded by an aggressive propaganda campaign, with the deepening of Arab nationalist, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist feelings. To be sure, the Italian penetration of the Arab World preceded the German interest by several years.
A late entrant to the arena, Italy's ambition to join the imperialist club was first expressed in a body of literature, journals, and imperialist cultural societies.(7) In her search for a share in the economic exploits of imperialism and for national aggrandizement, Fascist Italy saw herself as the reincarnation of the Roman empire and the inheritor of its domain.(8) Not surprisingly, the Mediterranean world would become the primary target for the Italian imperialist enterprise. In September 1930, Italy's campaign to consolidate and expand her domination of Libya reached a dramatic point with the capture of Shaykh 'Umar al-Mukhtar, the Libyan resistance leader. The subsequent execution of al-Mukhtar and the widespread Italian atrocities in Libya, generated strong Arab and Islamic reactions. The most active in the anti-Italian movement was Shakib Arslan.(9) Yet, a few years later, Arslan's desperate search for a Western ally would lead to a radical shift in his views of Italy.
From the beginning of the 1930s, the Italians adopted a visible Arab-Islamic policy, aiming at dislodging the influence of their main European opponents from the Mediterranean basin. L'Italia Musulman was a policy of "peaceful" and cheap expansion that envisioned an empire built with support and consent of the Mediterranean peoples, Arabs and Muslims. Inaugurating this novel imperialist approach, the Italian king, accompanied by his wife, paid a visit to Egypt in 1933, which was meant to signal Italy's friendship and respect for the Arabs and Muslims.(10) The following year, the Italian Foreign Ministry marked the advent of wireless broadcasting power by launching the Arabic service of Radio Bari.(11) The main themes of Radio Bari's propaganda were the glorification of modern Italy, support for the Arab national struggle against the French and the British, and highlighting Italy's readiness to assist the Arab liberation movement. In late 1934-early 1935, Rome was the site of an Italian-backed Eastern Student Conference through which Mussolini's government sought to penetrate and orchestrate Muslim and Arab youth nationalist movements. This classical game of imperialist rivalry attracted the attention of a few Arab-Islamist activists, most notably Shakib Arslan and his aide and friend Ihsan al-Jabiri. In a widely resonating and highly controversial move, Arslan and al-Jabiri met with Mussolini in February 1934.(12) Faced with angry reactions from Libyan nationalists and pro-British Arab circles, Arslan justified his step in terms of attempting to improve conditions in Libya and enlisting the Italian support for the Arab national struggle.
Article (http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2501/is_n2_v19/ai_20046831) - 9 pages