2RHPZ
11-23-2004, 06:16 PM
New developments in Chinese strategic psychological warfare
April, 2003
Chinese military analysts have meticulously studied the use of armed force during the 1991 Gulf War and during the fight for Kosovo. They have noted with great interest the integration of military strikes and psychological-warfare activities, and the increased strategic role that the mass media played during both operations. (1)
To highlight the apparent shifting emphasis toward psychological warfare for officers of the People's Liberation Army, or PLA, the prominent Chinese military journal China Military Science has published six articles on psychological warfare during the last two years: (2) "On PSYWAR in Recent High-Tech Local Wars," by Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping; "The Doctrine of Psychological Operations in Ancient China," by Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng; "Focus on Psychological War Against the Background of Grand Strategy," and "Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy," both written by Xu Hezhen; "Comparison of Psychological Warfare between China and the West," by Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong; and "On Defense in Modern Psychological Warfare," by Li Yuankui, Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli.
With the exception of Wu Juncang, Zhang Qiancheng, Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong, the authors of the six articles are identified as being instructors at the Shijiazhuang Ground Forces Command Academy, which indicates that the academy has an active and influential psychological-warfare department. In fact, judging by the tone of some of the articles, they could have been lifted directly from lectures presented during the academy's psychological-warfare courses.
The authors suggest that at the strategic level, China's psychological-warfare operations will be characterized by coercion, which will take the form of intimidation achieved through demonstrations and shows of force. (Their suggestion supports a recent Pentagon finding that viewed Chinese coercion as the greatest threat to Taiwan.)
At the tactical level, the articles suggest that the Chinese are interested in offsetting their current deficiencies by procuring advanced psychological-warfare equipment and by developing advanced deployment techniques. The advanced equipment would include unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, fitted with loudspeakers and capable of distributing "talking leaflets."
The articles also underscore the differences in the cultural and subjective-cognition patterns of Oriental and Western minds. Those differences lead the Chinese to apply the principles of psychological warfare differently from the West. If the U.S. is to see "eye to eye" with the Chinese and truly understand their psychological-warfare methodology, it is vital that we comprehend those differences. Finally, the articles provide recommendations about the PLA's future psychological-warfare requirements. From the discussion in all six articles, it is clear that China is working hard to develop its psychological-warfare capabilities for peacetime and wartime uses.
History of Chinese PSYOP
In "The Doctrine of Psychological Operations in Ancient China," Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng note that China's history of psychological operations goes back more than 4,000 years. The authors point out that during the period 2100-256 B.C., psychological operations were part of such historical events as the Zhuolu War (Zhuolu is a county in Hebei Province), during which "victory could not be achieved with weapons"; the Tang Oath, under which Chinese swore to do everything possible to spread propaganda; and the Mu Oath, which prohibited the killing of enemy soldiers who surrendered or who were taken as prisoners of war--a psychological operation for that time period. Schemes for sowing deception and creating false impressions and expectations represented the acme of psychological operations during the period. (3)
According to Wu and Zhang, those early psychological experiences culminated in Sun Tzu's Art of War, which describes the main objective of war as defeating the enemy without having to fight; the main essence of war as attacking the enemy's strategy; the main principle of war as contending for control of hearts, minds and morale; and the main idea of war as focusing on the enemy commander's decision-making skills and personal traits. Ancient Chinese psychological-operations doctrine also focused on attacking the enemy's strategy and diplomacy; on conducting demonstrations and seeking dominance; on ignoring luck and dispelling doubt; on making threats; and on adhering to the Tao, the philosophy and system of religion based on the teachings of Lao-tzu during the sixth century B.C. (4)
Wu and Zhang indicate that Taoism, which coupled hardness with softness in warfare, was not the only influence on the theory of psychological operations in ancient China. Other influences were military studies; Confucianism, which stressed the idea of "just wars"; and the study of the I Ching (Book of Changes), which stressed the idea of yin and yang (hardness and softness) being coupled to each other and thereby changing each other. The I Ching formed an important theoretical foundation of psychological-operations doctrine in ancient China (5) that continues to influence subjective cognition patterns in China today.
According to Wu and Zhang, the Qin (221-206 B.C.) and Han (206 B.C.-8 A.D. and 25-220 A.D.) periods of Chinese history witnessed other types of psychological operations. The Qin period used the diplomatic psychological-operations strategy of maintaining friendly relations with distant enemies while attacking the enemy nearby. The Han dynasty raised psychological operations to a new level by integrating their political, economic and military aspects.
The authors note the Three Kingdoms (220-280 A.D.) and the Two Jins (263-420 A.D.) for the diversity of their psychological-operations theory. Both dynasties believed that attacking the enemy's psychological state was more effective than attacking his cities; therefore, they favored psychological operations over combat operations with troops. The Ming (1368-1662) and Qing (1662-1912) dynasties, on the other hand, allowed Chinese psychological-operations doctrine to stagnate. (6)
Ancient Chinese books discuss the psychological-operations experiences of their time. For example, the Six Arts of War notes that in a command structure of 72 men, 19 (26 percent) were psychological-operations personnel responsible for controlling morale: Five were to tout the army's strength; four were to tout the army's fame in order to destroy the enemy's confidence; eight were to scout out the enemy's mood and intent; and two were to confuse the people by exploiting their beliefs in gods and spirits. The book also instructs Chinese soldiers to protect their morale by ignoring rumors, by disregarding luck and by avoiding any dealings with omens or superstitions. The Six Arts also tells soldiers to sap enemy morale, to string enemy nerves, and to strike terror in the enemy. Wu and Zhang discuss two ancient tales that hint at the creativity of the Chinese in accomplishing these tasks. In the first tale, Chinese soldiers tied reed pipes to kites and flew the kites at night. The kites made a wailing sound that, in the darkness, unnerved the enemy. In the second tale, Chinese soldiers painted oxen in odd colors and tied oil-soaked reeds to the tails of the oxen. The soldiers lit the reeds and sent the enraged animals charging through the enemy camp at night, causing terror among the enemy soldiers. (7)
Wu and Zhang note that the Six Arts also refers to another key psychological aspect that should be attacked--the mind of the enemy's commanding general. While the Six Arts discusses the psychological condition of the commander at the strategic and tactical levels differently, it lists intelligence, temperament and moral character as the three main characteristics required of a Chinese commander. (8) The book also lists 10 psychological weaknesses of commanders that must be exploited. Those weaknesses include being brave, treating death too lightly, being impatient and thinking too quickly.
According to Wu and Zhang, the Marxist concept of the "dialectic"--the process of change brought about by the conflict of opposing forces--had a significant impact on the development of ancient Chinese psychological-operations theory, although that fact was not "discovered" until the advent of Marxism. The authors note that ancient doctrine involved many categories of contradictions, out of which evolved many of the principles and methods of psychological operations. (9) Although ancient, Sun Zi's Art of War, Wu Zi's Art of War, and Weiliao Zi and Sun Bin's Art of War provide incisive and comprehensive explanations of the objectives, principles, methods and laws of psychological operations, and their explanations are still valid.
In summarizing their understanding of ancient Chinese psychological operations, Wu and Zhang maintain that those operations were designed to achieve strategic deception, to map out a strategy, to secure victory through strategy, and to integrate military strategy and psychological attack. (10) The authors find these objectives or activities of ancient Chinese psychological-operations doctrine to be reflective of what the Chinese observed during the Gulf War and during the fight for Kosovo, further emphasizing the importance of psychological operations in the modern era.
Definitions
Each of the Chinese articles on psychological operations define the concepts of psychological warfare or psychological operations in a different way. Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng (who do not teach at the Shijiazhuang Academy) define a psychological operation as the use of various measures to influence a combat opponent's ideology, attitude, will or actions. The objective of a psychological operation is to win without fighting or to win a big victory with only a little fighting. Only by securing a favorable position in terms of politics and in terms of the nature of warfare (by making one's own reasons for waging war appear to be moral and just) can one achieve a fundamental psychological advantage. (11)
Xu Hezhen, a major general in the Chinese army and president of the Shijiazhuang Academy, defines psychological warfare as a kind of propaganda and as persuasion that uses real force as its foundation. According to Xu's definition, a group can use political, economic, scientific, military, diplomatic, ideological or cultural forces to change an opponent's national will or to influence and change an opponent's belief in, attitude toward, or hostility toward a populace, toward organizations, or toward military and government agencies. Xu's two articles stress the need for using power and intimidation as key psychological-warfare tools. (12) Regarding the importance of psychological warfare, Xu notes: "You may not be interested in psychological warfare, but psychological warfare is interested in you." (13)
According to Xu, psychological warfare is also the exploration and study of the psychological quality of the thinking practiced by a nation's strategic leadership. To the Chinese, psychological quality includes the aspects of psychological attainments and psychological character. Psychological attainments primarily reflect the level at which a person grasps and understands psychology. Psychological character is the individual human aspect, primarily the psychological character that an individual has already formed or is developing; e.g., an individual's intellect, temperament, disposition, emotions and will. (14)
Xu notes that Eastern psychological attainments are developed through education in both dialectical materialism and historical materialism, as well as through the influence and edifying effects of Eastern culture. His theory applies particularly to strategic thought, in which "how to think" is the key element and the most valuable quality. (15) Xu agrees that, in the end, the most important battles of modern psychological war will be fought over values. The superpowers, he feels, are using armed force to impose their value systems on other people. That was demonstrated during operations in Kosovo, in Xu's opinion, when politicians expressed the idea that human rights are greater than sovereign rights. (16)
After 50 years of Marxism, Xu notes, "Decadent culture has unavoidably entered China.... Foreign culture has constantly infiltrated China in the form of weapons and then at the mental and conceptual level. In particular, the value system of Western culture, with the idea of individualism at the center, a decadent lifestyle based on materialism, and a concept of gain or benefit in interpersonal relations, has produced a profound effect on certain people's values." (17)
Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong, the three other authors who are not identified as being faculty of the Shijiazhuang Academy, define psychological-warfare theory as a field of study that serves both as the point of intersection and as the boundary line between psychology and the study of strategy and tactics. In their opinion, psychological-warfare theory has a psychological foundation as well as an ideological/theoretical foundation. The latter foundation is determined by national characteristics, but the former foundation is more constant. Psychological-warfare strategy is a psychological embodiment of the orientation of a country's national and military strategies. (18)
Li Yuankui, a senior colonel at the Shijiazhuang Academy, and Lieutenants Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli (who are both master's-degree candidates), define psychological warfare as a multilevel activity that is employed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The authors perceive the targets of psychological warfare as national will, the state of social awareness, cultural traditions, a nation's economic pulse, an opponent's public sentiment, the tendencies of popular will, military morale, and the opponent's various social groups, classes and strata. Because of the increased use of information technology, the number of people who are subjected to psychological war is greater than ever before. (19) The increase in psychological-warfare targets requires the development of a people's war-defense mentality.
Li, Wang and Yang, like Xu, focus on values. They define a system of values as a system of psychological tendencies that people use to discriminate between good and bad. A system of values also provides the basis by which a person recognizes the correct way of thinking and acting. The highest strategic objective in psychological warfare, the authors note, is achieved by changing a country's fundamental social concepts and its society's sense of values. In this regard, the West uses a system of values (democracy, freedom, human rights, etc.) in a long-term attack on socialist countries. The West used the ideas of democracy and human rights to undermine the communist party in the Soviet Union, and it intends to use the same rationale for interfering in China's internal affairs. The U.S.'s strategy is to attack political, moral, social and cultural values in target countries. (20) Chinese authors are fond of quoting former U.S. President Richard Nixon's phrase, "Attacking ideas is key to affecting history" as an explanation of U.S. strategy.
Senior Colonel Wang Zhenxing and Major Yang Suping of the Shijiazhuang Academy did not define psychological warfare or psychological operations in their article.
Psychological security
A key aspect of psychological warfare is understanding the psychological characteristics of an opponent's strategic leadership and conducting psychological attacks against them. (21) Authors Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng, and Yan Jianhong discuss differences in Eastern and Western minds in order to highlight East/West variances both in the characteristics and in the laws of psychological warfare. The authors note, "Differences in environment, cultural traditions, political systems, economic strength, national-defense capability and national spiritual belief lead to a great distinction in various nations in subjective cognition, ideological basis, principles of applications and structure of organization of psychological warfare." (22)
According to the authors, even though China is a socialist country, the Marxist theory of war provides the theoretical basis for Chinese psychological warfare and gives Chinese psychological warfare its advanced, moral, open and unified nature. (23) Marxist theory regarding proletarian strategy and tactics was one of Mao Zedong's "magic weapons" during the Chinese revolution. And even though psychological warfare is characterized by active defense, China's approach emphasizes psychological attacks and the use of stratagems, particularly the use of deception activities. (24)
Marxist theory opposes peaceful evolution, which the authors assert is the basic Western tactic for subverting socialist countries. According to Wang, Ma and Yan, peaceful evolution is the process that caused the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the Chinese must not allow peaceful evolution to take place in China. The authors note that Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping developed a theory and a complete set of tactics designed to counter the Western strategy.
In "On Defense in Modern Psychological Warfare," Li, Wang and Yang emphasize that China must take the initiative in psychological-warfare defense because psychological security is now an important aspect of national security. Information and psychological factors are now political and diplomatic weapons, and their power cannot be ignored. Psychological warfare requires a low investment; it involves low risk; and it is highly effective. The greater the amount of information that is available to a population, the more opportunity there will be for conducting psychological warfare. Any corner into which information can spread can become a battlefield for psychological warfare. China must establish the strategic idea of an active psychological-warfare defense.
Active defense should include tempering the minds of the Chinese people by inoculation: allowing the people to come into contact with other ideas and, through education and guidance, enabling them to see what is wrong with those ideas. That approach will allow people to develop psychological immunity. Opening their minds up to other ideas, however, is not the same as cutting them loose. (25)
Li, Wang and Yang forecast that the main form of psychological warfare will be contests for public opinion. To be able to seize public opinion, China must develop its own independent information and media power, guide public opinion, and conduct public-opinion propaganda. The demand for information is a universal psychological need. Passive psychological defense will not suffice. Only with initiative and offense can China take the strategic initiative with regard to public opinion. Propaganda must be prepared in advance, and it must include material designed to counter the attacks that will be made against the initial release of propaganda. (26)
In "On PSYWAR in Recent High-Tech Local Wars," Wang and Yang emphasize the importance of attaining media superiority and of controlling the negative effects of media coverage. Media control will be one of the front lines in psychological wars. News broadcasts and computer technology now allow people to watch a battle in progress, as they would watch a sporting event. An event that might have been known to only a few people in the past can now be witnessed by millions. Such access to information affects public sentiment and morale. Wang and Yang accuse the West of fulfilling its hegemonic wishes by manipulating public opinion, by attaining media superiority, and by guiding people's psychological tendencies. (27) Yet all three methods are exactly what the Chinese are proud to claim elsewhere as their heritage.
According to Xu Hezhen in "Focus on Psychological War Against the Background of Grand Strategy," intimidation is a key strategy that can be used to influence both public opinion and the media. In fact, psychological war and intimidation are so difficult to tell apart that they are almost twins. Intimidation is both a strategy and a method. In modern times, the use of nonviolent intimidation, which includes alliances, media manipulation, economic sanctions, financial attack, information isolation and network attacks, has increased.
The U.S., Xu says, uses its advantage of power as the foundation of psychological war, employing arms displays, arms sales, and military exercises as intimidation. (28) In response, China must implement its own intimidation-psychological war plan that includes Chinese threat forces and mechanisms, and intimidation-psychological war strategy. (29) China should develop an elite and effective military intimidation force, fully apply all kinds of nonmilitary intimidation methods, establish a psychological-intimidation mechanism that will have strategic maneuvering as its core, and organize and apply all kinds of psychological intimidation factors, thus developing the greatest possible psychological intimidation effect. Intimidation must be established on the foundation of power; without power, intimidation is only a scarecrow. (30)
April, 2003
Chinese military analysts have meticulously studied the use of armed force during the 1991 Gulf War and during the fight for Kosovo. They have noted with great interest the integration of military strikes and psychological-warfare activities, and the increased strategic role that the mass media played during both operations. (1)
To highlight the apparent shifting emphasis toward psychological warfare for officers of the People's Liberation Army, or PLA, the prominent Chinese military journal China Military Science has published six articles on psychological warfare during the last two years: (2) "On PSYWAR in Recent High-Tech Local Wars," by Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping; "The Doctrine of Psychological Operations in Ancient China," by Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng; "Focus on Psychological War Against the Background of Grand Strategy," and "Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy," both written by Xu Hezhen; "Comparison of Psychological Warfare between China and the West," by Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong; and "On Defense in Modern Psychological Warfare," by Li Yuankui, Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli.
With the exception of Wu Juncang, Zhang Qiancheng, Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong, the authors of the six articles are identified as being instructors at the Shijiazhuang Ground Forces Command Academy, which indicates that the academy has an active and influential psychological-warfare department. In fact, judging by the tone of some of the articles, they could have been lifted directly from lectures presented during the academy's psychological-warfare courses.
The authors suggest that at the strategic level, China's psychological-warfare operations will be characterized by coercion, which will take the form of intimidation achieved through demonstrations and shows of force. (Their suggestion supports a recent Pentagon finding that viewed Chinese coercion as the greatest threat to Taiwan.)
At the tactical level, the articles suggest that the Chinese are interested in offsetting their current deficiencies by procuring advanced psychological-warfare equipment and by developing advanced deployment techniques. The advanced equipment would include unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, fitted with loudspeakers and capable of distributing "talking leaflets."
The articles also underscore the differences in the cultural and subjective-cognition patterns of Oriental and Western minds. Those differences lead the Chinese to apply the principles of psychological warfare differently from the West. If the U.S. is to see "eye to eye" with the Chinese and truly understand their psychological-warfare methodology, it is vital that we comprehend those differences. Finally, the articles provide recommendations about the PLA's future psychological-warfare requirements. From the discussion in all six articles, it is clear that China is working hard to develop its psychological-warfare capabilities for peacetime and wartime uses.
History of Chinese PSYOP
In "The Doctrine of Psychological Operations in Ancient China," Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng note that China's history of psychological operations goes back more than 4,000 years. The authors point out that during the period 2100-256 B.C., psychological operations were part of such historical events as the Zhuolu War (Zhuolu is a county in Hebei Province), during which "victory could not be achieved with weapons"; the Tang Oath, under which Chinese swore to do everything possible to spread propaganda; and the Mu Oath, which prohibited the killing of enemy soldiers who surrendered or who were taken as prisoners of war--a psychological operation for that time period. Schemes for sowing deception and creating false impressions and expectations represented the acme of psychological operations during the period. (3)
According to Wu and Zhang, those early psychological experiences culminated in Sun Tzu's Art of War, which describes the main objective of war as defeating the enemy without having to fight; the main essence of war as attacking the enemy's strategy; the main principle of war as contending for control of hearts, minds and morale; and the main idea of war as focusing on the enemy commander's decision-making skills and personal traits. Ancient Chinese psychological-operations doctrine also focused on attacking the enemy's strategy and diplomacy; on conducting demonstrations and seeking dominance; on ignoring luck and dispelling doubt; on making threats; and on adhering to the Tao, the philosophy and system of religion based on the teachings of Lao-tzu during the sixth century B.C. (4)
Wu and Zhang indicate that Taoism, which coupled hardness with softness in warfare, was not the only influence on the theory of psychological operations in ancient China. Other influences were military studies; Confucianism, which stressed the idea of "just wars"; and the study of the I Ching (Book of Changes), which stressed the idea of yin and yang (hardness and softness) being coupled to each other and thereby changing each other. The I Ching formed an important theoretical foundation of psychological-operations doctrine in ancient China (5) that continues to influence subjective cognition patterns in China today.
According to Wu and Zhang, the Qin (221-206 B.C.) and Han (206 B.C.-8 A.D. and 25-220 A.D.) periods of Chinese history witnessed other types of psychological operations. The Qin period used the diplomatic psychological-operations strategy of maintaining friendly relations with distant enemies while attacking the enemy nearby. The Han dynasty raised psychological operations to a new level by integrating their political, economic and military aspects.
The authors note the Three Kingdoms (220-280 A.D.) and the Two Jins (263-420 A.D.) for the diversity of their psychological-operations theory. Both dynasties believed that attacking the enemy's psychological state was more effective than attacking his cities; therefore, they favored psychological operations over combat operations with troops. The Ming (1368-1662) and Qing (1662-1912) dynasties, on the other hand, allowed Chinese psychological-operations doctrine to stagnate. (6)
Ancient Chinese books discuss the psychological-operations experiences of their time. For example, the Six Arts of War notes that in a command structure of 72 men, 19 (26 percent) were psychological-operations personnel responsible for controlling morale: Five were to tout the army's strength; four were to tout the army's fame in order to destroy the enemy's confidence; eight were to scout out the enemy's mood and intent; and two were to confuse the people by exploiting their beliefs in gods and spirits. The book also instructs Chinese soldiers to protect their morale by ignoring rumors, by disregarding luck and by avoiding any dealings with omens or superstitions. The Six Arts also tells soldiers to sap enemy morale, to string enemy nerves, and to strike terror in the enemy. Wu and Zhang discuss two ancient tales that hint at the creativity of the Chinese in accomplishing these tasks. In the first tale, Chinese soldiers tied reed pipes to kites and flew the kites at night. The kites made a wailing sound that, in the darkness, unnerved the enemy. In the second tale, Chinese soldiers painted oxen in odd colors and tied oil-soaked reeds to the tails of the oxen. The soldiers lit the reeds and sent the enraged animals charging through the enemy camp at night, causing terror among the enemy soldiers. (7)
Wu and Zhang note that the Six Arts also refers to another key psychological aspect that should be attacked--the mind of the enemy's commanding general. While the Six Arts discusses the psychological condition of the commander at the strategic and tactical levels differently, it lists intelligence, temperament and moral character as the three main characteristics required of a Chinese commander. (8) The book also lists 10 psychological weaknesses of commanders that must be exploited. Those weaknesses include being brave, treating death too lightly, being impatient and thinking too quickly.
According to Wu and Zhang, the Marxist concept of the "dialectic"--the process of change brought about by the conflict of opposing forces--had a significant impact on the development of ancient Chinese psychological-operations theory, although that fact was not "discovered" until the advent of Marxism. The authors note that ancient doctrine involved many categories of contradictions, out of which evolved many of the principles and methods of psychological operations. (9) Although ancient, Sun Zi's Art of War, Wu Zi's Art of War, and Weiliao Zi and Sun Bin's Art of War provide incisive and comprehensive explanations of the objectives, principles, methods and laws of psychological operations, and their explanations are still valid.
In summarizing their understanding of ancient Chinese psychological operations, Wu and Zhang maintain that those operations were designed to achieve strategic deception, to map out a strategy, to secure victory through strategy, and to integrate military strategy and psychological attack. (10) The authors find these objectives or activities of ancient Chinese psychological-operations doctrine to be reflective of what the Chinese observed during the Gulf War and during the fight for Kosovo, further emphasizing the importance of psychological operations in the modern era.
Definitions
Each of the Chinese articles on psychological operations define the concepts of psychological warfare or psychological operations in a different way. Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng (who do not teach at the Shijiazhuang Academy) define a psychological operation as the use of various measures to influence a combat opponent's ideology, attitude, will or actions. The objective of a psychological operation is to win without fighting or to win a big victory with only a little fighting. Only by securing a favorable position in terms of politics and in terms of the nature of warfare (by making one's own reasons for waging war appear to be moral and just) can one achieve a fundamental psychological advantage. (11)
Xu Hezhen, a major general in the Chinese army and president of the Shijiazhuang Academy, defines psychological warfare as a kind of propaganda and as persuasion that uses real force as its foundation. According to Xu's definition, a group can use political, economic, scientific, military, diplomatic, ideological or cultural forces to change an opponent's national will or to influence and change an opponent's belief in, attitude toward, or hostility toward a populace, toward organizations, or toward military and government agencies. Xu's two articles stress the need for using power and intimidation as key psychological-warfare tools. (12) Regarding the importance of psychological warfare, Xu notes: "You may not be interested in psychological warfare, but psychological warfare is interested in you." (13)
According to Xu, psychological warfare is also the exploration and study of the psychological quality of the thinking practiced by a nation's strategic leadership. To the Chinese, psychological quality includes the aspects of psychological attainments and psychological character. Psychological attainments primarily reflect the level at which a person grasps and understands psychology. Psychological character is the individual human aspect, primarily the psychological character that an individual has already formed or is developing; e.g., an individual's intellect, temperament, disposition, emotions and will. (14)
Xu notes that Eastern psychological attainments are developed through education in both dialectical materialism and historical materialism, as well as through the influence and edifying effects of Eastern culture. His theory applies particularly to strategic thought, in which "how to think" is the key element and the most valuable quality. (15) Xu agrees that, in the end, the most important battles of modern psychological war will be fought over values. The superpowers, he feels, are using armed force to impose their value systems on other people. That was demonstrated during operations in Kosovo, in Xu's opinion, when politicians expressed the idea that human rights are greater than sovereign rights. (16)
After 50 years of Marxism, Xu notes, "Decadent culture has unavoidably entered China.... Foreign culture has constantly infiltrated China in the form of weapons and then at the mental and conceptual level. In particular, the value system of Western culture, with the idea of individualism at the center, a decadent lifestyle based on materialism, and a concept of gain or benefit in interpersonal relations, has produced a profound effect on certain people's values." (17)
Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong, the three other authors who are not identified as being faculty of the Shijiazhuang Academy, define psychological-warfare theory as a field of study that serves both as the point of intersection and as the boundary line between psychology and the study of strategy and tactics. In their opinion, psychological-warfare theory has a psychological foundation as well as an ideological/theoretical foundation. The latter foundation is determined by national characteristics, but the former foundation is more constant. Psychological-warfare strategy is a psychological embodiment of the orientation of a country's national and military strategies. (18)
Li Yuankui, a senior colonel at the Shijiazhuang Academy, and Lieutenants Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli (who are both master's-degree candidates), define psychological warfare as a multilevel activity that is employed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The authors perceive the targets of psychological warfare as national will, the state of social awareness, cultural traditions, a nation's economic pulse, an opponent's public sentiment, the tendencies of popular will, military morale, and the opponent's various social groups, classes and strata. Because of the increased use of information technology, the number of people who are subjected to psychological war is greater than ever before. (19) The increase in psychological-warfare targets requires the development of a people's war-defense mentality.
Li, Wang and Yang, like Xu, focus on values. They define a system of values as a system of psychological tendencies that people use to discriminate between good and bad. A system of values also provides the basis by which a person recognizes the correct way of thinking and acting. The highest strategic objective in psychological warfare, the authors note, is achieved by changing a country's fundamental social concepts and its society's sense of values. In this regard, the West uses a system of values (democracy, freedom, human rights, etc.) in a long-term attack on socialist countries. The West used the ideas of democracy and human rights to undermine the communist party in the Soviet Union, and it intends to use the same rationale for interfering in China's internal affairs. The U.S.'s strategy is to attack political, moral, social and cultural values in target countries. (20) Chinese authors are fond of quoting former U.S. President Richard Nixon's phrase, "Attacking ideas is key to affecting history" as an explanation of U.S. strategy.
Senior Colonel Wang Zhenxing and Major Yang Suping of the Shijiazhuang Academy did not define psychological warfare or psychological operations in their article.
Psychological security
A key aspect of psychological warfare is understanding the psychological characteristics of an opponent's strategic leadership and conducting psychological attacks against them. (21) Authors Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng, and Yan Jianhong discuss differences in Eastern and Western minds in order to highlight East/West variances both in the characteristics and in the laws of psychological warfare. The authors note, "Differences in environment, cultural traditions, political systems, economic strength, national-defense capability and national spiritual belief lead to a great distinction in various nations in subjective cognition, ideological basis, principles of applications and structure of organization of psychological warfare." (22)
According to the authors, even though China is a socialist country, the Marxist theory of war provides the theoretical basis for Chinese psychological warfare and gives Chinese psychological warfare its advanced, moral, open and unified nature. (23) Marxist theory regarding proletarian strategy and tactics was one of Mao Zedong's "magic weapons" during the Chinese revolution. And even though psychological warfare is characterized by active defense, China's approach emphasizes psychological attacks and the use of stratagems, particularly the use of deception activities. (24)
Marxist theory opposes peaceful evolution, which the authors assert is the basic Western tactic for subverting socialist countries. According to Wang, Ma and Yan, peaceful evolution is the process that caused the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the Chinese must not allow peaceful evolution to take place in China. The authors note that Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping developed a theory and a complete set of tactics designed to counter the Western strategy.
In "On Defense in Modern Psychological Warfare," Li, Wang and Yang emphasize that China must take the initiative in psychological-warfare defense because psychological security is now an important aspect of national security. Information and psychological factors are now political and diplomatic weapons, and their power cannot be ignored. Psychological warfare requires a low investment; it involves low risk; and it is highly effective. The greater the amount of information that is available to a population, the more opportunity there will be for conducting psychological warfare. Any corner into which information can spread can become a battlefield for psychological warfare. China must establish the strategic idea of an active psychological-warfare defense.
Active defense should include tempering the minds of the Chinese people by inoculation: allowing the people to come into contact with other ideas and, through education and guidance, enabling them to see what is wrong with those ideas. That approach will allow people to develop psychological immunity. Opening their minds up to other ideas, however, is not the same as cutting them loose. (25)
Li, Wang and Yang forecast that the main form of psychological warfare will be contests for public opinion. To be able to seize public opinion, China must develop its own independent information and media power, guide public opinion, and conduct public-opinion propaganda. The demand for information is a universal psychological need. Passive psychological defense will not suffice. Only with initiative and offense can China take the strategic initiative with regard to public opinion. Propaganda must be prepared in advance, and it must include material designed to counter the attacks that will be made against the initial release of propaganda. (26)
In "On PSYWAR in Recent High-Tech Local Wars," Wang and Yang emphasize the importance of attaining media superiority and of controlling the negative effects of media coverage. Media control will be one of the front lines in psychological wars. News broadcasts and computer technology now allow people to watch a battle in progress, as they would watch a sporting event. An event that might have been known to only a few people in the past can now be witnessed by millions. Such access to information affects public sentiment and morale. Wang and Yang accuse the West of fulfilling its hegemonic wishes by manipulating public opinion, by attaining media superiority, and by guiding people's psychological tendencies. (27) Yet all three methods are exactly what the Chinese are proud to claim elsewhere as their heritage.
According to Xu Hezhen in "Focus on Psychological War Against the Background of Grand Strategy," intimidation is a key strategy that can be used to influence both public opinion and the media. In fact, psychological war and intimidation are so difficult to tell apart that they are almost twins. Intimidation is both a strategy and a method. In modern times, the use of nonviolent intimidation, which includes alliances, media manipulation, economic sanctions, financial attack, information isolation and network attacks, has increased.
The U.S., Xu says, uses its advantage of power as the foundation of psychological war, employing arms displays, arms sales, and military exercises as intimidation. (28) In response, China must implement its own intimidation-psychological war plan that includes Chinese threat forces and mechanisms, and intimidation-psychological war strategy. (29) China should develop an elite and effective military intimidation force, fully apply all kinds of nonmilitary intimidation methods, establish a psychological-intimidation mechanism that will have strategic maneuvering as its core, and organize and apply all kinds of psychological intimidation factors, thus developing the greatest possible psychological intimidation effect. Intimidation must be established on the foundation of power; without power, intimidation is only a scarecrow. (30)