2RHPZ
11-23-2004, 06:26 PM
The evolution of police intelligence operations
Sept, 2003
by Thomas P.Jr. Duggan, Eugene Matthews, Ed Lowe
The noncommissioned officer (NCO) moves cautiously through the village. Recent tensions within the village and the surrounding townships have made the mission of U.S. soldiers more difficult and dangerous. Winning the hearts and minds of the people will pose an even greater challenge to the military leadership than previously anticipated. However, armed with the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), the NCO and his squad of military policemen move down the street. With an interpreter nearby, the NCO asks one of the village leaders about recent increased enemy activity in the area and if he knows the location of the guerilla forces. With a simple nod, the village leader indicates that he knows nothing about such activity. However, he does reveal the names of a few individuals simply to appease the American patrol. Yet, he does not understand that the recent collection of information and subsequent analysis of that collection effort exposed one of the individuals whose name was provided as one of the key suspects in heavy enemy activity in another American sector. The individual's whereabouts are quickly determined and U.S. Special Forces soldiers pick him up the next day. This is police intelligence operations (PIO) in action. One would surmise that this activity occurred in Kosovo or Afghanistan. However, such a scenario could very well have taken place in Vietnam.
A pamphlet on counterinsurgency lessons learned on population and resource control dated November 1967 stated that every "U.S. division and separate brigade with the intention of operating against the VC [Vietcong] infrastructure should have a national police field force (NPFF) battalion, company, or similar unit attached and should establish a Combined Police Intelligence Operations Center." While performing traditional law enforcement and law and order missions, Army law enforcement continuously feeds essential relative data and information to higher headquarters. PIO combines the elements of human intelligence (HUMINT), criminal intelligence (CRIMINT), and police information to develop actionable intelligence products and enhance force protection.
Today, more than ever, the focus is on the success of PIO, from the local community to the global community. Many organizations still view PIO as simply statistical information gathering for areas such as traffic patterns and increase or decrease of offenses. Some believe that an agency must have a specific number of personnel or serve a population of a type, volume, or makeup in order to have or use police intelligence. While PIO should encompass statistical analysis of information, it also provides a much needed and underutilized aspect of criminal intelligence analysis. While the statistical intelligence provides vital information to the overall strategic success of an organization by identifying where resources should be focused, criminal intelligence can aid the successful prosecution or resolution of many investigations. The same keys to success are used in both strategic and operational planning, collection, analysis, and reporting. The term, which changes the focus and to a degree the success of PIO, is actionable intelligence products. Even at the tactical level, the impact of PIO on operational- and strategic-level planning and operations is often immeasurable. The following vignette reveals adherence to this theory.
During Operation Uphold Democracy (October 1994), an MP team from the 988th Military Police Company was conducting a traffic control post as part of a cordon-and-search operation in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. While performing the task, two civilians approached the MP team and informed them of criminal activity in the neighborhood. During the and the surrounding area. The team also obtained information describing the criminals and their weapons. Recognizing that the criminal activity was in fact the actions of a political/mercenary group named "FRAP," the MP team radioed the platoon leader and forwarded the field interview to higher headquarters. Two days later, a unit from the 10th Mountain Division assaulted the house, capturing weapons, ammunition, and equipment.
Approved as an MP function in October 1997, PIO supports, enhances, and contributes to the commander's force protection program, common operational picture, and situational understanding. The PIO function ensures that information collected during the conduct of the other four MP functions is provided as input to the intelligence collection effort and turned into action or reports. PIO has three components:
* Collect police information
* Conduct the police information assessment process
* Develop police intelligence products
PIO is accomplished throughout the conduct of all Army law enforcement (ALE) responsibilities including maneuver and mobility support operations (MMSO), area security (AS) operations, internment and resettlement (I/R) operations, and law and order (L&O) operations. Tactical MP commanders and their staffs should recognize the value of CRIMINT and police information resources provided by ALE while conducting PIO across the full spectrum of Army operations.
Since PIO is conducted byALE personnel, it enables the law enforcement community--regardless of geographic location--to contribute to the overall intelligence picture. PIO is a resource that supports the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and contributes to risk management as well as force protection by maintaining a steady focus on criminal intelligence aspects that traditionally have not been covered by military intelligence units. In addition, military intelligence units do not have the physical assets to collect the type of information collected under PIO. However, they play an integral part in the eventual analysis of that information, turning it into solid intelligence products that help focus commanders at all levels on the intelligence priorities.
For example, the use of pattern analysis developed through PIO allows mission commanders to direct limited resources to areas where destabilizing elements such as saboteurs, terrorists, indigenous criminals, and others opposed to U.S. interest thrive. Through cooperative efforts, ALE and host nation authorities can identify minimize, or neutralize criminal threats.
ALE staffs develop synchronized channels for information sharing and dissemination to enhance the overall intelligence collection effort. As information is received, the data is analyzed and forwarded to higher headquarters, multinational security forces, interagencies, and host nation authorities. ALE personnel must work closely with the S2/G2, civil/military operations center, and civil affairs personnel to ensure that proper security measures are applied when sharing information.
Routine development of CRIMINT includes a dedicated process of planning, collecting, evaluating, collating, analyzing, and disseminating PIO products to MP units, other military units, military intelligence units, staff sections, and civilian agencies for potential action on the information turned into intelligence.
ALE personnel develop and exchange police information and criminal intelligence with other police forces in the area of operations, to include joint and potentially coalition partners. This exchange is conducted in tactical and nontactical environments. The information is obtained through daily contact with civilians, nongovernment organizations, and private volunteer organizations and through the interaction with other law enforcement, intelligence, and security forces. PIR drives the collection effort and better paints the overall intelligence picture. The following vignette illustrates the effectiveness of PIO and forums during stability and support operations in Kosovo.
Task Force 504 MP established the Police Intelligence Collection and Analysis Council (PICAC) in support of Task Force Falcon 3B'S peacekeeping operations in Multinational Brigade (East), Kosovo. PICAC was a joint law enforcement forum with an exclusive membership of key leaders and decision makers that spanned national and international law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies to include United Nations (UN) Civil Police (UNCIVPOL); UN Border Police and UN Security; Task Force Falcon ACE chief analyst, and targeter; Criminal Investigation Division commander and investigators; and the joint law enforcement intelligence and operations officers who came together weekly for a fusion and targeting forum. The PICAC was responsible for the detention of more than a dozen "wanted" felons, to include subjects of war crimes. In fact, during one PICAC meeting a CIVPOL investigator from the Kacanik municipality mentioned a criminal's name in association with a known gang. The criminal had been convicted for attempted murder, had not served his term, and remained at large with no way to identify him. The Task Force Falcon ACE chief immediately telephoned his office to crosscheck the criminal's name in the ACE databases. Task Force Falcon ACE was able to provide a picture of the criminal during that same forum, enabling UNCIVPOL to identify and arrest the man the next day.
Insurgents, enemy agents, and enemy military units may employ a variety of criminal actions to include murder, robberies, black marketing, riots and civil disturbances, terrorist activities, counterfeiting currency, drug trafficking, and smuggling to accomplish their goals. The proactive development and processing of police information and criminal intelligence can directly and significantly contribute to the success of military intelligence in the early detection of insurgent activities.
PIO provides significant information through military intelligence channels. Specific collection and analysis efforts that may support military intelligence efforts include any information or intelligence that identifies possible indicators of offenses that might be undertaken to disrupt friendly operations.
Other efforts could include the following:
* Determining the existence of criminal elements and their connection with other criminal activities.
* Identifying international criminal activities that may disrupt the national economic, social, and political infrastructure due to the type of criminal activity and the associated bribery of government officials.
* Infiltrating government agencies, labor unions, legitimate businesses, political parties, and fraternal groups.
Certain strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence collection efforts by military and civil intelligence agencies may assist the police in accomplishing law and order operations and gathering criminal intelligence. The S2/ G2 includes this information in the basic intelligence estimate and/or counterintelligence annex. Psychological operations and civil affairs units and MP patrols are also dependent on this type of intelligence focus. Where ongoing counterintelligence investigations or sensitive counterintelligence source operations are involved, this shared information lessens duplication of effort and possible compromise of ongoing operations. Areas of mutual interest to the information collectors and those involved in the analysis process that should be included are--
* Past and present political trends of the various governmental agencies and organizations.
* The impact on, and reaction by, majority and minority socioeconomic groups.
* Taboo, mores, and national characteristics that indicate a tolerance of war, violence, crime, corruption, and revolution.
* Renewal of old taboos, mores, customs, and superstitions that can be used to influence, manipulate, or captivate elements of the population.
* Infiltration of educational institutions, established professions, unions, political organizations, fraternal and religious groups, and government positions by criminals, terrorists, political radicals, and insurgents.
* Degradation of sociopolitical institutions identified with the government or national stability.
* Movements and causes that may be initiated as peaceful and moralistic demonstrations and progress through civil disturbances to acts of anarchy, insurgency, and revolutionary warfare. PIO teams develop pattern analysis and templates (doctrinal and situational) to characterize criminal activities in the area of operations. Additionally, PIO teams maintain event matrices to describe anticipated criminal threat activities and possible courses of action. PIO teams assist the MP/Criminal Investigation Division commander to translate CCIR into HUMINT tasks, activities, and prioritization of collection efforts. Furthermore, as HUMINT tasks are completed, the raw data is collected, analyzed, interpreted, and distributed through proper channels. The process continues with the preparation of staff estimates and the development of police intelligence. PIO teams give priority to police intelligence determined to have immediate tactical or operational value.
Collective tasks that support MP functions and contribute to PIO include--
*Criminal intelligence operations.
* Maneuver and mobility support operations.
*Area security.
* Law and order operations.
* Internment and resettlement operations.
* Information dissemination.
* Police intelligence collection and reporting.
* Antiterrorism operations.
* Force protection.
* Counternarcotics operations.
* MP investigations.
After the events of 11 September 2001, the value of information and subsequently intelligence products expanded exponentially with respect to other ALE activities and operations. MP operations in recent years (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq) have proved the success of PIO and have--through the cooperation of other military units such as military intelligence, civil affairs, and interagency organizations--solidified a place for PIO as one of the five MP functions. The Interim PIO Handbook published in the summer of 2002 fully revealed the capabilities and dynamics of what PIO can bring to the supported commander. As this function continues to evolve and mature in stature, MP commanders should always identify ways to incorporate PIO into their operations--either in the tactical or nontactical environments.
Mr. Duggan is the senior PIO analyst for the Army's Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division at the U. S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
Chief Warrant Officer 2 Matthews is chief, Police Intelligence Operations, for the Army's Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division, USAMPS.
Major Lowe is the chief, Doctrine Division, USAMPS.
Sept, 2003
by Thomas P.Jr. Duggan, Eugene Matthews, Ed Lowe
The noncommissioned officer (NCO) moves cautiously through the village. Recent tensions within the village and the surrounding townships have made the mission of U.S. soldiers more difficult and dangerous. Winning the hearts and minds of the people will pose an even greater challenge to the military leadership than previously anticipated. However, armed with the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), the NCO and his squad of military policemen move down the street. With an interpreter nearby, the NCO asks one of the village leaders about recent increased enemy activity in the area and if he knows the location of the guerilla forces. With a simple nod, the village leader indicates that he knows nothing about such activity. However, he does reveal the names of a few individuals simply to appease the American patrol. Yet, he does not understand that the recent collection of information and subsequent analysis of that collection effort exposed one of the individuals whose name was provided as one of the key suspects in heavy enemy activity in another American sector. The individual's whereabouts are quickly determined and U.S. Special Forces soldiers pick him up the next day. This is police intelligence operations (PIO) in action. One would surmise that this activity occurred in Kosovo or Afghanistan. However, such a scenario could very well have taken place in Vietnam.
A pamphlet on counterinsurgency lessons learned on population and resource control dated November 1967 stated that every "U.S. division and separate brigade with the intention of operating against the VC [Vietcong] infrastructure should have a national police field force (NPFF) battalion, company, or similar unit attached and should establish a Combined Police Intelligence Operations Center." While performing traditional law enforcement and law and order missions, Army law enforcement continuously feeds essential relative data and information to higher headquarters. PIO combines the elements of human intelligence (HUMINT), criminal intelligence (CRIMINT), and police information to develop actionable intelligence products and enhance force protection.
Today, more than ever, the focus is on the success of PIO, from the local community to the global community. Many organizations still view PIO as simply statistical information gathering for areas such as traffic patterns and increase or decrease of offenses. Some believe that an agency must have a specific number of personnel or serve a population of a type, volume, or makeup in order to have or use police intelligence. While PIO should encompass statistical analysis of information, it also provides a much needed and underutilized aspect of criminal intelligence analysis. While the statistical intelligence provides vital information to the overall strategic success of an organization by identifying where resources should be focused, criminal intelligence can aid the successful prosecution or resolution of many investigations. The same keys to success are used in both strategic and operational planning, collection, analysis, and reporting. The term, which changes the focus and to a degree the success of PIO, is actionable intelligence products. Even at the tactical level, the impact of PIO on operational- and strategic-level planning and operations is often immeasurable. The following vignette reveals adherence to this theory.
During Operation Uphold Democracy (October 1994), an MP team from the 988th Military Police Company was conducting a traffic control post as part of a cordon-and-search operation in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. While performing the task, two civilians approached the MP team and informed them of criminal activity in the neighborhood. During the and the surrounding area. The team also obtained information describing the criminals and their weapons. Recognizing that the criminal activity was in fact the actions of a political/mercenary group named "FRAP," the MP team radioed the platoon leader and forwarded the field interview to higher headquarters. Two days later, a unit from the 10th Mountain Division assaulted the house, capturing weapons, ammunition, and equipment.
Approved as an MP function in October 1997, PIO supports, enhances, and contributes to the commander's force protection program, common operational picture, and situational understanding. The PIO function ensures that information collected during the conduct of the other four MP functions is provided as input to the intelligence collection effort and turned into action or reports. PIO has three components:
* Collect police information
* Conduct the police information assessment process
* Develop police intelligence products
PIO is accomplished throughout the conduct of all Army law enforcement (ALE) responsibilities including maneuver and mobility support operations (MMSO), area security (AS) operations, internment and resettlement (I/R) operations, and law and order (L&O) operations. Tactical MP commanders and their staffs should recognize the value of CRIMINT and police information resources provided by ALE while conducting PIO across the full spectrum of Army operations.
Since PIO is conducted byALE personnel, it enables the law enforcement community--regardless of geographic location--to contribute to the overall intelligence picture. PIO is a resource that supports the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and contributes to risk management as well as force protection by maintaining a steady focus on criminal intelligence aspects that traditionally have not been covered by military intelligence units. In addition, military intelligence units do not have the physical assets to collect the type of information collected under PIO. However, they play an integral part in the eventual analysis of that information, turning it into solid intelligence products that help focus commanders at all levels on the intelligence priorities.
For example, the use of pattern analysis developed through PIO allows mission commanders to direct limited resources to areas where destabilizing elements such as saboteurs, terrorists, indigenous criminals, and others opposed to U.S. interest thrive. Through cooperative efforts, ALE and host nation authorities can identify minimize, or neutralize criminal threats.
ALE staffs develop synchronized channels for information sharing and dissemination to enhance the overall intelligence collection effort. As information is received, the data is analyzed and forwarded to higher headquarters, multinational security forces, interagencies, and host nation authorities. ALE personnel must work closely with the S2/G2, civil/military operations center, and civil affairs personnel to ensure that proper security measures are applied when sharing information.
Routine development of CRIMINT includes a dedicated process of planning, collecting, evaluating, collating, analyzing, and disseminating PIO products to MP units, other military units, military intelligence units, staff sections, and civilian agencies for potential action on the information turned into intelligence.
ALE personnel develop and exchange police information and criminal intelligence with other police forces in the area of operations, to include joint and potentially coalition partners. This exchange is conducted in tactical and nontactical environments. The information is obtained through daily contact with civilians, nongovernment organizations, and private volunteer organizations and through the interaction with other law enforcement, intelligence, and security forces. PIR drives the collection effort and better paints the overall intelligence picture. The following vignette illustrates the effectiveness of PIO and forums during stability and support operations in Kosovo.
Task Force 504 MP established the Police Intelligence Collection and Analysis Council (PICAC) in support of Task Force Falcon 3B'S peacekeeping operations in Multinational Brigade (East), Kosovo. PICAC was a joint law enforcement forum with an exclusive membership of key leaders and decision makers that spanned national and international law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies to include United Nations (UN) Civil Police (UNCIVPOL); UN Border Police and UN Security; Task Force Falcon ACE chief analyst, and targeter; Criminal Investigation Division commander and investigators; and the joint law enforcement intelligence and operations officers who came together weekly for a fusion and targeting forum. The PICAC was responsible for the detention of more than a dozen "wanted" felons, to include subjects of war crimes. In fact, during one PICAC meeting a CIVPOL investigator from the Kacanik municipality mentioned a criminal's name in association with a known gang. The criminal had been convicted for attempted murder, had not served his term, and remained at large with no way to identify him. The Task Force Falcon ACE chief immediately telephoned his office to crosscheck the criminal's name in the ACE databases. Task Force Falcon ACE was able to provide a picture of the criminal during that same forum, enabling UNCIVPOL to identify and arrest the man the next day.
Insurgents, enemy agents, and enemy military units may employ a variety of criminal actions to include murder, robberies, black marketing, riots and civil disturbances, terrorist activities, counterfeiting currency, drug trafficking, and smuggling to accomplish their goals. The proactive development and processing of police information and criminal intelligence can directly and significantly contribute to the success of military intelligence in the early detection of insurgent activities.
PIO provides significant information through military intelligence channels. Specific collection and analysis efforts that may support military intelligence efforts include any information or intelligence that identifies possible indicators of offenses that might be undertaken to disrupt friendly operations.
Other efforts could include the following:
* Determining the existence of criminal elements and their connection with other criminal activities.
* Identifying international criminal activities that may disrupt the national economic, social, and political infrastructure due to the type of criminal activity and the associated bribery of government officials.
* Infiltrating government agencies, labor unions, legitimate businesses, political parties, and fraternal groups.
Certain strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence collection efforts by military and civil intelligence agencies may assist the police in accomplishing law and order operations and gathering criminal intelligence. The S2/ G2 includes this information in the basic intelligence estimate and/or counterintelligence annex. Psychological operations and civil affairs units and MP patrols are also dependent on this type of intelligence focus. Where ongoing counterintelligence investigations or sensitive counterintelligence source operations are involved, this shared information lessens duplication of effort and possible compromise of ongoing operations. Areas of mutual interest to the information collectors and those involved in the analysis process that should be included are--
* Past and present political trends of the various governmental agencies and organizations.
* The impact on, and reaction by, majority and minority socioeconomic groups.
* Taboo, mores, and national characteristics that indicate a tolerance of war, violence, crime, corruption, and revolution.
* Renewal of old taboos, mores, customs, and superstitions that can be used to influence, manipulate, or captivate elements of the population.
* Infiltration of educational institutions, established professions, unions, political organizations, fraternal and religious groups, and government positions by criminals, terrorists, political radicals, and insurgents.
* Degradation of sociopolitical institutions identified with the government or national stability.
* Movements and causes that may be initiated as peaceful and moralistic demonstrations and progress through civil disturbances to acts of anarchy, insurgency, and revolutionary warfare. PIO teams develop pattern analysis and templates (doctrinal and situational) to characterize criminal activities in the area of operations. Additionally, PIO teams maintain event matrices to describe anticipated criminal threat activities and possible courses of action. PIO teams assist the MP/Criminal Investigation Division commander to translate CCIR into HUMINT tasks, activities, and prioritization of collection efforts. Furthermore, as HUMINT tasks are completed, the raw data is collected, analyzed, interpreted, and distributed through proper channels. The process continues with the preparation of staff estimates and the development of police intelligence. PIO teams give priority to police intelligence determined to have immediate tactical or operational value.
Collective tasks that support MP functions and contribute to PIO include--
*Criminal intelligence operations.
* Maneuver and mobility support operations.
*Area security.
* Law and order operations.
* Internment and resettlement operations.
* Information dissemination.
* Police intelligence collection and reporting.
* Antiterrorism operations.
* Force protection.
* Counternarcotics operations.
* MP investigations.
After the events of 11 September 2001, the value of information and subsequently intelligence products expanded exponentially with respect to other ALE activities and operations. MP operations in recent years (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq) have proved the success of PIO and have--through the cooperation of other military units such as military intelligence, civil affairs, and interagency organizations--solidified a place for PIO as one of the five MP functions. The Interim PIO Handbook published in the summer of 2002 fully revealed the capabilities and dynamics of what PIO can bring to the supported commander. As this function continues to evolve and mature in stature, MP commanders should always identify ways to incorporate PIO into their operations--either in the tactical or nontactical environments.
Mr. Duggan is the senior PIO analyst for the Army's Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division at the U. S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
Chief Warrant Officer 2 Matthews is chief, Police Intelligence Operations, for the Army's Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division, USAMPS.
Major Lowe is the chief, Doctrine Division, USAMPS.