2RHPZ
11-23-2004, 07:30 PM
The integration of aviation into special-reaction team training
March, 2002
by Cory J. Gallivan
Being the primary special-threat-response force for the U.S. Army-Hawaii (USARHAW) involves several significant challenges for the 39th MP Detachment's special-reaction team (SRT). These challenges were never clearer than during the first few hours following the 11 September terrorist attacks. USARHAW is not unlike many other military installations. It has many subinstallations and other interests located in different parts of its area of responsibility (AOR). The USARHAW SRT's main mission is to protect military personnel, family members, and installation facilities by responding to special threats targeted at U.S. military interests, according to the combating-terrorism plan.
Events on 11 September, and the military's resulting change in force protection posture, presented a number of immediate challenges for the SRT. Army Regulation 190-58, Personnel Security, requires installations to have an SRT-response capability to crisis situations within 2 hours of notification. Threat and vulnerability assessments conducted on military installations, post-11 September, suddenly found the need for the SRT to be ready to respond much quicker. The 39th was directed to get the team ready to respond on a much shorter timeline. We took a hard look at the time requirement and assessed how the current security posture limited the team's ability to meet the timeline and what SOP adjustments would have to be made to meet the new standard.
Under normal operating conditions, the 39th had 15 soldiers trained for a part-time SRT. First, the command had to ensure that there was a team available 100 percent of the time, 24 hours a day. Faced with force requirements for the simultaneous installation security and access-control missions, the command decided to maintain a minimum of one primary entry team of six and one marksman/observer team, with a built-in relief, to allow for an immediate response.
The situation on 11 September significantly affected normal operations. One of the biggest problems was altered traffic patterns. Movement on and off military installations, now very controlled and limited, quickly forced the SRT to realize that its response to installations throughout Oahu could be severely hampered by traffic and other security measures. Travel distance and traffic congestion were among the many factors that the team would have to overcome.
In the past, the SRT had conducted limited training on movement to objectives and insertion by rotary-wing aircraft. Availability of aviation assets and other resources were always factors preventing the unit from regularly conducting this kind of training. It did not take very long for the command to determine that integrating aviation into the response activity of the SRT was extremely important and the best option for overcoming the challenges it could face.
Developing a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
The 39th MP Detachment was tasked to write a new SOP and an appendix to a division operation order (OPORD) outlining clearly how to move an SRT by rotary-wing aircraft. The initial primary tasks were to--
* Ensure that the SRT was prepared to move to an objective, by air or land, with all necessary equipment.
* Configure a load plan based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available along with the supporting aviation unit.
* Conduct the coordination necessary to rehearse loading and unloading with a full combat load.
The primary task was determining who and what would be moved. First, the SRT had to be moved to an area, with the gear necessary to establish a tactical command post (CP), so it could begin response planning. Second, the team had to get to the objective to prepare for operations; therefore, the needed number of aircraft was another consideration. If just the primary team were deployed to a crisis situation, the team would need only one UH-60 aircraft--if the situation called for the entire team of 16 personnel, it would need two.
Ultimately, load plans and chalks (the term for tracking who's on which aircraft) were established to coincide with the team configuration. If the entire team moved, it would be broken down as follows:
Chalk One Chalk Two
SRT NCOIC SRT OIC
A Team Leader B Team Leader
5 Entry 3 Entry
1 Marksman 1 Marksman
1 Observer 1 Observer
This structure gave the 39th the capability of having a response force on each aircraft, for any event. If the incident called for the primary team only, the difference in the chalk would be the addition of the officer in charge (OIC) so he could get to the objective as quickly as possible to assist with the operation.
Load plans were adjusted in the event that the team deployed directly to an objective rally point and then to the entry point. The necessary gear, including battering rams, shields, ammunition, night-vision devices, and weapons systems, could be carried effectively as part of the team's uniform and standard equipment, or in several large bags. In either the 8-or 16-member configuration, the team would arrive at the objective prepared for any scenario.
The team repeatedly rehearsed boarding and exiting the aircraft to determine the best personnel (known as a "stack") and equipment configuration for different scenarios and conditions. The goal was to board the aircraft in a smooth and expedient manner (and in a configuration that ensured security at the pick-up/ landing zones [PZ/LZs]), while maintaining control of the stack and equipment. Ultimately, the team adopted the standard of boarding and exiting in a stack, with the shield man in the rear so he could exit first and provide protection. A point man was designated to lead the team onto the aircraft and would serve as the rear security element when exiting. The noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) and the team leader served as command and control and supervised the movement, and the middle team members carried the load and covered tactical angles through the entire movement.
Static load training with the UH-60 was extremely important and helpful in fixing a standard; however, the team was aware that they had to be flexible under emergency conditions. Several loading and offloading dry runs found many issues to work on.
Integrating rotary-wing aircraft into SRT operations increased capabilities tremendously. However, clear SRT guidance had to be established so the aviation personnel understood its capabilities and, therefore, how to best support its operations. This meant sitting down with the aviation personnel, mainly the pilots, and describing how an SRT is employed.
Insertion techniques, specifically rappelling operations--a skill that SRT members have to know well--were discussed first. The final SOP covered using fast roping as an insertion technique. Aviation personnel would need to be ready to assist the SRT with the right type of insertion based on the threat conditions and the operation. Although the team was trained and prepared for multiple types of insertions, the unit discovered that the decision to use a specific insertion technique would be limited by the skills and knowledge of the supporting aviation team. If the pilot was not trained to deploy a small tactical team using fast-rope techniques, it eliminated the option entirely. This highlighted the need for future SRT/aviation unit joint training exercises to ensure readiness for any situation.
A critical aviation team contribution was a detailed flight-time matrix that accounted for every possible installation and pickup to every likely HPT/LZ. This was extremely useful in calculating the overall SRT response times. Another important factor that came out of the new requirements was finding all possible PZs/LZs that could accommodate the SRT's aircraft and provide the ability to deploy with minimal risk of injury and compromise. The choice of LZ was dictated by the threat situation, among several other factors but, at a minimum, the team had to reconnoiter each to gather general notes about a particular area that could hinder the SRT operation. The team collected a series of notes about potential staging areas, CP locations, and likely avenues of approach for entry operations.
One of the most beneficial points to come from the reconnaissance was having the marksman and observers on the ground selecting areas offering them the best vantage points for engaging a threat or collecting intelligence. In the end, it was established that cover fire would have to be available in any scenario where the SRT was at risk when getting on or off aircraft.
Training
Training was the most important part of the preparation to integrate aviation into SRT operations. Realistic training, involving an SRT alert and deployment by rotary-wing aircraft, was essential. There was UH-60 support for the training exercise. The event involved just the primary entry team--one chalk and the OIC--who provided mission oversight. Since the airfield was 20 miles away, prior coordination was necessary to ensure that the exercise went smoothly.
Significant challenges for the SRT and aviation personnel centered on the--
* Ability to communicate with the aircraft.
* Specifics of marking the PZ.
* Time required to secure equipment in the aircraft.
However, once the unit completes the conversion from table of distribution and allowances to modification table of organization and equipment, all the essential organic equipment required to conduct air movement operations properly will be available.
There were several minor issues that came from the after-action review. One of the most prominent dealt with ensuring that personal gear was securely fastened on uniforms, thereby, keeping equipment from getting snatched by the rotor wash and blown out of the aircraft. Another was having the aircraft safety-harness belts readily available. The team lost some time trying to pull straps out from where they were securely tucked behind the seat frames. The most useful aspect of the rehearsals and training was the discussions with the pilots that enabled both sides to understand the intent of SRT air deployment.
This realistic training had huge payoffs. The live runs and rehearsals were ultimately necessary to test the SOP and validate the OPORD that all USARHAW supporting agencies would use for special-threat-response activity. After the training, the team members' confidence increased dramatically. They felt that they could deploy by air and execute their operation just as effectively (or more so) as they could by land. The lessons learned were incorporated into the final SRT SOP that the MP, Aviation, and Infantry battalion and brigade commanders approved.
Captain Cory Gallivan is the former 39th MP Detachment commander.
March, 2002
by Cory J. Gallivan
Being the primary special-threat-response force for the U.S. Army-Hawaii (USARHAW) involves several significant challenges for the 39th MP Detachment's special-reaction team (SRT). These challenges were never clearer than during the first few hours following the 11 September terrorist attacks. USARHAW is not unlike many other military installations. It has many subinstallations and other interests located in different parts of its area of responsibility (AOR). The USARHAW SRT's main mission is to protect military personnel, family members, and installation facilities by responding to special threats targeted at U.S. military interests, according to the combating-terrorism plan.
Events on 11 September, and the military's resulting change in force protection posture, presented a number of immediate challenges for the SRT. Army Regulation 190-58, Personnel Security, requires installations to have an SRT-response capability to crisis situations within 2 hours of notification. Threat and vulnerability assessments conducted on military installations, post-11 September, suddenly found the need for the SRT to be ready to respond much quicker. The 39th was directed to get the team ready to respond on a much shorter timeline. We took a hard look at the time requirement and assessed how the current security posture limited the team's ability to meet the timeline and what SOP adjustments would have to be made to meet the new standard.
Under normal operating conditions, the 39th had 15 soldiers trained for a part-time SRT. First, the command had to ensure that there was a team available 100 percent of the time, 24 hours a day. Faced with force requirements for the simultaneous installation security and access-control missions, the command decided to maintain a minimum of one primary entry team of six and one marksman/observer team, with a built-in relief, to allow for an immediate response.
The situation on 11 September significantly affected normal operations. One of the biggest problems was altered traffic patterns. Movement on and off military installations, now very controlled and limited, quickly forced the SRT to realize that its response to installations throughout Oahu could be severely hampered by traffic and other security measures. Travel distance and traffic congestion were among the many factors that the team would have to overcome.
In the past, the SRT had conducted limited training on movement to objectives and insertion by rotary-wing aircraft. Availability of aviation assets and other resources were always factors preventing the unit from regularly conducting this kind of training. It did not take very long for the command to determine that integrating aviation into the response activity of the SRT was extremely important and the best option for overcoming the challenges it could face.
Developing a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
The 39th MP Detachment was tasked to write a new SOP and an appendix to a division operation order (OPORD) outlining clearly how to move an SRT by rotary-wing aircraft. The initial primary tasks were to--
* Ensure that the SRT was prepared to move to an objective, by air or land, with all necessary equipment.
* Configure a load plan based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available along with the supporting aviation unit.
* Conduct the coordination necessary to rehearse loading and unloading with a full combat load.
The primary task was determining who and what would be moved. First, the SRT had to be moved to an area, with the gear necessary to establish a tactical command post (CP), so it could begin response planning. Second, the team had to get to the objective to prepare for operations; therefore, the needed number of aircraft was another consideration. If just the primary team were deployed to a crisis situation, the team would need only one UH-60 aircraft--if the situation called for the entire team of 16 personnel, it would need two.
Ultimately, load plans and chalks (the term for tracking who's on which aircraft) were established to coincide with the team configuration. If the entire team moved, it would be broken down as follows:
Chalk One Chalk Two
SRT NCOIC SRT OIC
A Team Leader B Team Leader
5 Entry 3 Entry
1 Marksman 1 Marksman
1 Observer 1 Observer
This structure gave the 39th the capability of having a response force on each aircraft, for any event. If the incident called for the primary team only, the difference in the chalk would be the addition of the officer in charge (OIC) so he could get to the objective as quickly as possible to assist with the operation.
Load plans were adjusted in the event that the team deployed directly to an objective rally point and then to the entry point. The necessary gear, including battering rams, shields, ammunition, night-vision devices, and weapons systems, could be carried effectively as part of the team's uniform and standard equipment, or in several large bags. In either the 8-or 16-member configuration, the team would arrive at the objective prepared for any scenario.
The team repeatedly rehearsed boarding and exiting the aircraft to determine the best personnel (known as a "stack") and equipment configuration for different scenarios and conditions. The goal was to board the aircraft in a smooth and expedient manner (and in a configuration that ensured security at the pick-up/ landing zones [PZ/LZs]), while maintaining control of the stack and equipment. Ultimately, the team adopted the standard of boarding and exiting in a stack, with the shield man in the rear so he could exit first and provide protection. A point man was designated to lead the team onto the aircraft and would serve as the rear security element when exiting. The noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) and the team leader served as command and control and supervised the movement, and the middle team members carried the load and covered tactical angles through the entire movement.
Static load training with the UH-60 was extremely important and helpful in fixing a standard; however, the team was aware that they had to be flexible under emergency conditions. Several loading and offloading dry runs found many issues to work on.
Integrating rotary-wing aircraft into SRT operations increased capabilities tremendously. However, clear SRT guidance had to be established so the aviation personnel understood its capabilities and, therefore, how to best support its operations. This meant sitting down with the aviation personnel, mainly the pilots, and describing how an SRT is employed.
Insertion techniques, specifically rappelling operations--a skill that SRT members have to know well--were discussed first. The final SOP covered using fast roping as an insertion technique. Aviation personnel would need to be ready to assist the SRT with the right type of insertion based on the threat conditions and the operation. Although the team was trained and prepared for multiple types of insertions, the unit discovered that the decision to use a specific insertion technique would be limited by the skills and knowledge of the supporting aviation team. If the pilot was not trained to deploy a small tactical team using fast-rope techniques, it eliminated the option entirely. This highlighted the need for future SRT/aviation unit joint training exercises to ensure readiness for any situation.
A critical aviation team contribution was a detailed flight-time matrix that accounted for every possible installation and pickup to every likely HPT/LZ. This was extremely useful in calculating the overall SRT response times. Another important factor that came out of the new requirements was finding all possible PZs/LZs that could accommodate the SRT's aircraft and provide the ability to deploy with minimal risk of injury and compromise. The choice of LZ was dictated by the threat situation, among several other factors but, at a minimum, the team had to reconnoiter each to gather general notes about a particular area that could hinder the SRT operation. The team collected a series of notes about potential staging areas, CP locations, and likely avenues of approach for entry operations.
One of the most beneficial points to come from the reconnaissance was having the marksman and observers on the ground selecting areas offering them the best vantage points for engaging a threat or collecting intelligence. In the end, it was established that cover fire would have to be available in any scenario where the SRT was at risk when getting on or off aircraft.
Training
Training was the most important part of the preparation to integrate aviation into SRT operations. Realistic training, involving an SRT alert and deployment by rotary-wing aircraft, was essential. There was UH-60 support for the training exercise. The event involved just the primary entry team--one chalk and the OIC--who provided mission oversight. Since the airfield was 20 miles away, prior coordination was necessary to ensure that the exercise went smoothly.
Significant challenges for the SRT and aviation personnel centered on the--
* Ability to communicate with the aircraft.
* Specifics of marking the PZ.
* Time required to secure equipment in the aircraft.
However, once the unit completes the conversion from table of distribution and allowances to modification table of organization and equipment, all the essential organic equipment required to conduct air movement operations properly will be available.
There were several minor issues that came from the after-action review. One of the most prominent dealt with ensuring that personal gear was securely fastened on uniforms, thereby, keeping equipment from getting snatched by the rotor wash and blown out of the aircraft. Another was having the aircraft safety-harness belts readily available. The team lost some time trying to pull straps out from where they were securely tucked behind the seat frames. The most useful aspect of the rehearsals and training was the discussions with the pilots that enabled both sides to understand the intent of SRT air deployment.
This realistic training had huge payoffs. The live runs and rehearsals were ultimately necessary to test the SOP and validate the OPORD that all USARHAW supporting agencies would use for special-threat-response activity. After the training, the team members' confidence increased dramatically. They felt that they could deploy by air and execute their operation just as effectively (or more so) as they could by land. The lessons learned were incorporated into the final SRT SOP that the MP, Aviation, and Infantry battalion and brigade commanders approved.
Captain Cory Gallivan is the former 39th MP Detachment commander.