CI and HUMINT operations in support of OEF

[2RHPZ]

CI and HUMINT operations in support of operation enduring freedom

Oct-Dec, 2003
by Ron Stallings, Michael Foley

Much has been learned in recent years about the value of active counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) as they relate to modern conflict. Some intelligence professionals proclaim that CI and HUMINT have accounted for more than 80 percent of the intelligence collection in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan. The introduction of the integrated 2X concept has proven itself to be a major step in the right direction. This concept incorporates management, control, and coordination measures which synchronize and deconflict CI and HUMINT in all directions throughout the theater of operations.

The "Draft" 2X Handbook continues to serve as the guide for 2X and CI and HUMINT operations in the deployed and tactical environment. Basic rules, roles, and responsibilities have proven to be "spot on." This document, coupled with experiences and lessons learned in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan, continue to produce a more refined concept. It outlines procedures and relationships involving national, strategic, and coalition CI and HUMINT assets. We clearly need to form and train tactical 2X officers and sections at various echelons throughout our military forces. Tactical CI and interrogation operations have vastly improved since the incorporation of the 2X concept.

Vital to the success in the process are the 2X, CI Coordinating Authority (CICA), and the HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) chief. Led ultimately by the 2X, who serves as the Director of CI and HUMINT activities, these three individuals are charged with coordinating, managing, deconflicting, and properly reporting--

[] CI investigations.

[] CI force protection (and HUMINT) source operations.

[] Mobile and sporadic team-level operations.

[] Interrogations and debriefing results.

[] Certain other overt HUMINT operations, as required.

[] All covert and/or special compartmented HUMINT operations.

This harmonious relationship fully incorporates the primary HUMINT analysis and requirements management and totally complements intelligence centers, especially the Coalition Joint Intelligence Support Element (C-JISE) in Afghanistan.

The XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in May 2002 to establish the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-180) headquarters. Under the Director of Intelligence, initially COL Mike Flynn and later COL Ted Nicholas, the CJ2X section was understaffed, but filled with experience and expertise. MAJ Ron Stallings, the CJ2X, with over 10 years' experience in CI and HUMINT, had commanded an interrogation company, served as a G2X in Bosnia, and as the S3 of a Tactical Exploitation Battalion. SFC Michael Foley, serving in a field grade officer position as the Task Force CICA (TFCICA), had served for over 16 years in every progressive CI role from agent, to CI Operations non-commissioned officer (NCO) in Haiti, to Special Agent in-Charge of a forward deployed INSCOM Military Intelligence Detachment, and as First Sergeant of a CI and HUMINT Company. MAJ (Ret) and former XVIII Airborne Corps G2X, Don Gardner, who was responsible for training eight Balkans rotations on CI and HUMINT operations, also deployed as a part of the team. Additionally, the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense HUMINT Service provided two very seasoned and experienced HOC Chiefs.

Prior to the arrival of CJTF-180, INSCOM's 202d Military Intelligence Battalion of the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade led the CI and HUMINT efforts. Their outstanding efforts established tactical CI and HUMINT collection and interrogation operations in Afghanistan. They had produced nearly fifteen hundred Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) in just over seven months. Their reports database was absolutely superb and was instrumental during the hand-off to CJTF-180.

Immediate CI and HUMINT challenges included improving reporting timeliness and procedures, developing and managing source administration and records, redesigning the CI and HUMINT force structure, and focusing and synchronizing all related operations throughout the theater.

With a tremendous amount of support, CJTF-180's CJ2X team acquired authorization to publish and release IIRs locally, thus reducing reporting timelines significantly. It required an incredible work ethic and unbelievable numbers of work hours from the CJ2X and TFCICA; however, their commitment to "from collection to the community in less than 12 hours" was an internal slogan. Draft reporting and CI and HUMINT products were posted to Web pages (SECRET and TOP SECRET levels) within six hours of receipt, focusing primarily on units on the ground in Afghanistan. Final IIRs followed in less than six hours and were distributed to the intelligence community via standard intelligence reporting methods (AMHS-M3). Once the CJ2X became the release authority for the theater's tactical CI and HUMINT reporting, no longer did collected information have to leave the area of operations (AO) and return prior to being released to units and intelligence analysts throughout the intelligence community. This initiative made CI and HUMINT reporting a critical player in the targeting process and helped to synchronize all intelligence efforts in theater.

Local records and source administration procedures were emplaced and controlled by the 2X section which set the stage for combined, joint, and multi-agency CI and HUMINT operations and deconfliction which followed. The TFCICA (SFC Michael Foley) created the first Theater Source Registry containing nearly three hundred active and inactive sources. He used this registry to deconflict active and inactive sources being used by all U.S. strategic and tactical CI and HUMINT collectors. Deconfliction and synchronization of operations were necessary to establish operational and technical control over theater CI and HUMINT operations and provide unity to the intelligence effort. The TFCICA put additional systems in place that led to the development of individual source files or dossiers and management. This gave the local command visibility and positive control of activities throughout the Combined Joint Operational Area (CJOA). By design, the TFCICA is the tool by which the command directs and coordinates tactical CI and source operations. With the advent of the TFCICA, the much needed structure, management, and control of CI and HUMINT source operations directly impacted the tactical commander's plans and intentions.

Standing operating procedures (SOPs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) were written and instituted; routine coordination between units and agencies occurred; reporting was standardized and localized for review, approval, and publication; collectors were given constant target focus and guidance; and CI became synchronized with HUMINT. Reporting became more accurate and timely and, most importantly, targetable and mission enhancing. Positive relationships between all CI and HUMINT organizations in theater were fostered.

The redesign of the CI and HUMINT force structure provided both direct and general support to commanders on the ground at all levels and facilitated better area coverage, responsiveness, and a balanced approach to CI and HUMINT collection management. Prior to CJTF-180's arrival CI and HUMINT collection planning and management were not synchronized with the efforts of the local intelligence collection manager. The number of CI teams in theater increased from 4x (6-to-9-soldier) teams to 9x (4-soldier) teams. The largest increase in teams went to Kandahar and the southeastern portion of the AO. The number of interrogators working in the interrogation facility increased from 7 to 15 personnel. This restructure took place with the arrival of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion and the TF Panther (3D Brigade 82D ABN DIV) from Fort Bragg, NC, but with little to no increase in the total numbers of CI and HUMINT personnel in theater.

Probably the most apparent change and most significant contribution of the 2X concept arriving with CJTF-180 was local command and control and synchronization to all CI and HUMINT operations. By design, the CJ2X coordinated and ensured CI and HUMINT support to both local commanders and national requirements. Collection efforts were aligned with the intelligence requirements of commanders (at all levels) on the ground in Afghanistan, and CI and HUMINT collection became a key player in the targeting process. CI and HUMINT reporting became a source of timely, accurate (in most cases, immediately verified by multiple other intelligence platforms), and targetable data. We also created systems to dynamically re-task CI and HUMINT sources that worked for various agencies and organizations from one location (the CJ2X section). Source operations became synchronized with interrogation operations, and tactical and strategic CI and HUMINT merged in both locations (source operations outside the wire and interrogations inside the wire).

CI and HUMINT lessons learned were numerous with CJTF-180's assumption of the OEF mission:

[] Prior to Deployment. Coordinate manning (to include national augmentation), equipment, communications, and other unique requirements (such as Intelligence Contingency Funds , Incentives, analytical and reporting tools, Collector Reporter Codes, Field Reporter Numbers and methods, operational uniform/ clothing, and critical reach-back relationships). Prior planning cannot be emphasized enough on much of these tasks. CI and HUMINT operations must be in place and operational before the warfighter hits the ground. Protecting the force is a continuous process and must be command supported.

[] Source Administration. Cut no corners when it comes to source administration and records keeping. There is no substitute for training and SOPs. Failing to maintain proper dossiers and registries is a costly mistake. Demand detailed and timely efforts in the development and maintenance of local dossiers and registries at all levels. SOPs may differ slightly between units, but regulations require these El items be maintained. They are absolutely mandatory when conducting hand-offs, deconfliction, and source validation.

[] SOPs and TTPs. Ensure these are emplaced, rehearsed, tested, and improved with performance. These operating procedures can be easily tailored to fit the requirements of various AORs.

[] CI and HUMINT Collection Management. Ensure the Collection Management Officer (CMO) in the intelligence center integrates and manages CI and HUMINT into the unit collection plan. The CMO manages the collection plan, and CI and HUMINT represents one of many pieces to the puzzle. The CMO must work closely with the embedded CI and HUMINT technicians of the intelligence center. CI and HUMINT specialists constantly track all intelligence requirements to ensure that CI and HUMINT operations are focused on the commander's priorities. The HUMINT Analysis and Requirements Cell (HARC) (requirements being the operative word) is a unique tool, organic to an intelligence center ... but guided by the 2X team and used to provide the necessary constant analysis of both CI and HUMINT information and sources. The HARC is additionally charged with ensuring that CI and HUMINT collectors are focusing on the HUMINT collection "Requirements" priorities of the commander and integrated into the overall unit collection plan. These requirements must be shared and tasked down to even passive HUMINT collectors (Civil Affairs, Military Police, Criminal Investigation Division, presence patrols, psychological operations, Medical units, information operations); this was underway in Afghanistan by late October 2002.

[] Deconfliction. Consider both active and passive HUMINT collectors throughout deconfliction of CI and HUMINT operations. This is probably the most difficult task assigned to the TFCICA and the 2X team. The standard approach is to execute deconfliction from the lowest and most internal elements outward to ultimately national and coalition collectors. Deconfliction begins with proper source administration and ends with extensive coordination and good work relationships. Three areas must be addressed on the subject of deconfliction:

* Registries and rosters.

* Meeting sites and times.

* Managing placement and access.

Once deconfliction extends beyond the borders of the standard chain of command (that is, national collectors, special operations forces, sister services, and coalition forces), working relationships and mutual objectives become critical. The process begins with requiring and managing meticulous source rosters and constantly updated operational schedules. It requires cooperation between units, agencies, and coalitions. Command support and emphasis is a must in order for deconfliction to work. Deconfliction of CI and HUMINT operations and sources is extremely difficult and frustrating to execute; therefore, it is one of the biggest challenges for the 2X and TFCICA. In Afghanistan, a tiered approach to deconfliction of sources was used. We obtained source registers from the (U.S.) tactical organizations (Army, Air Force, Marines, and the Special Operations community); deconflicted those, and created a (U.S.) theater source registry for "tactical" collectors. We continued to deconflict with (U.S.) national agencies. At this point, we had a totally deconflicted (U.S.) theater source registry. Special emphasis was placed on the selection of sources based on placement and access and level of information; that is, tactical versus strategic information. By early October 2002, we were beginning to conduct deconfliction with Coalition CI and HUMINT collectors. Once completed, we could be certain that no source was being seen, paid, or supported by multiple organizations. [Note: There is an order merit or precedence (often first come, first serve) that aids in deciding the fate of sources when there is a conflict.] Finally, this process is strictly managed by the G2X and TFCICA.

[] Screening Cell Operations. Immediately implement screening operations for local and civilian hires. For obvious force protection reasons, questioning local hires is required to determine placement or access and possible associations that would be of U.S. interest. Screening locals and civilians that operate within the wire is imperative. This requirement is often overlooked and therefore not built into our force structure. The use of CI and HUMINT soldiers as screeners supported by linguist is the preferred method of establishing screening operations. With operations ongoing and SOPs in place, the screening cell should transition to a 90 percent (civilian contractor) 10 percent military mix, with 351E as the cell officer in charge. The mission of the screening cell is not as flamboyant as conducting CI and HUMINT source operations; however, it is equally important.

[] Interrogation Facility Operations. Manage and coordinate interrogation facility operations. Detention facility and interrogations add a whole new set of challenges to the 2X team. The HOC Chief is the point man for the 2X in the management and coordination of interrogation operations. As the Defense Intelligence Agency is also the lead proponent for the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Cell (JIDC), the HOC Chief has a direct interest in the operations of the interrogation facility. The JIDC, from within the interrogation facility, functions as the national and strategic interrogations cell (non-tactical and nonmilitary organizations). The facility should be directed by intelligence requirements and should report like any other HUMINT resource.

[] Screening Released Detainees. Exploit released detainees; they make excellent candidates for leads and/or continued intelligence sources. Part of the release process (after the determination has been made to release) should include a CI screening of potential sources.

[] Effective Use of Mobile Interrogation Teams (MITs). Implement screening and interrogation operations forward (on or near the battlefield or point of capture) to reduce the chance of detaining personnel with no intelligence or target value. This method helps to eliminate overcrowding facilities, associated costs, and administrative issues. Forward screening and tactical interrogations forward allow capturing units to sift through potential detainees and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) on or near the point of capture, reducing the population to only those of intelligence, criminal, tactical, or strategic value. When an MIT is used, it should consist of only the most experienced and senior interrogators (97Es/351Es) and best qualified linguist support available. Battlefield, on-the-spot tactical screening or interrogation is not the time to educate or train young questionable soldiers, nor is it the time to assume that 97Bs can perform the mission of 97Es without prior training.

[i]MAJ Ron Stallings is currently the G2X (Director of CI/HUMINT Operations) for XVIII Airborne Corps. He recently served as the initial CJ2X for CJTF-180 in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. MAJ Stallings also served as the G2X at Multinational Division North in Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of Operation Joint Forge. He commanded an interrogation company, served as the Executive Officer and Operations Officer of a CI Company, and the S3 of a CI/HUMINT Battalion.

SFC Michael Foley is currently the NCOIC of the G2X for XVIII Airborne Corps. He recently served as the Task Force Counterintelligence Coordination Authority for CJTF-180 in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. SFC Foley previously served as the Special Agent in Charge of the Uijongbu Military Intelligence Detachment, as well as the First Sergeant of a CI and HUMINT Company in the 501st MI Brigade, Seoul Korea. Prior to his assignment in Korea, SFC Foley served as the G2/CI Officer for the 82D Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, NC.

[2RHPZ]

CI and HUMINT or HUMINT and CI or CI/HUMINT Or TAC HUMINT: - Confusing, isn't it?

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Department of Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge. What is called "foreknowledge" cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation. Now there are five sorts of secret agents...: native, inside, doubled, expendable and living. When these five types of agents are all working simultaneously and none knows their method of operation, they are the treasure of a sovereign.... He, who is not sage and wise, humane and just, cannot use secret agents. And he who is not delicate and subtle cannot get the truth out of them.... It is essential to seek out enemy agents who have come to conduct espionage against you and to bribe them to serve you.... And therefore only the enlightened sovereign and the worthy general who are able to use the most intelligent people as agents are certain to achieve great things. Secret agents are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

We are relearning these lessons taught by Sun Tzu. Since Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the U.S. Army has been in transformation. The known Warsaw Pact foe is gone and the uncertain, asymmetric, and asynchronous foe now dominates much of our thinking. The Army's mission is to fight and win wars. Thus, while the Army trains for major theater wars (MTWs), it executes military operations other than war (MOOTVV) (see Figure 1). In Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, and other less advertised deployments, tactical commanders learned that "foreknowledge" and situational awareness that leads to situational understanding depend on people talking with people. While the technical sensors available provided valuable insight, it was the low-technology "analog" aperture that gave commanders the opportunity to "see" and act inside their adversaries' decision cycles. It was people talking to people. (2) Now the Army's Military Intelligence (Ml) community is engaged in its own decision-making. (3) In some ways, Army Ml is on the horns of a dilemma. Who is the right person in our tactical formations to execute Sun Tzu's treatises? What is the right set of skills? Do we require two specialties, or one, or three? What is the right answer for the future operations that we cannot predict? What can we afford? Does anyone have the "right" answers to these questions? Many think they have the answer, but they only have opinions shaped by their experiences, and those require polishing.

Requirements drive the Army Transformation. Thus, this article will begin with some ideas on where the Army needs certain specialists and why. It will also offer some thoughts on the human intelligence (HUMINT) discipline and the intelligence function of counterintelligence (Cl). The article will conclude with a proposal for restructuring the HUMINT and Cl military occupational specialties (MOSs). This article focuses more on tactical operations than operational and strategic efforts, but much of this discussion applies to and impacts on our theater, Service, and national capabilities.

Requirements Determination

In MTWs and small-scale contingencies (SSCs), the Army requires individuals who can interrogate enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) or detainees in a foreign language, and determine the most effective technique to obtain information from these EPWs. This requirement is not resident at all echelons. In fact, it is required most at the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) or Joint Debriefing Center (JDC) organic to a Joint Task Force. At tactical echelons we need soldiers who can quickly screen EPWs for information of immediate tactical value before moving them to a JIF or JDC. Individuals trained in tactical questioning can accomplish this requirement. They do, however, require language skills or an interpreter.

In war and MOOTW, the Army will require--

* Individuals trained to debrief U.S. persons who encounter adversaries. This requirement--which requires no language skills--exists at all echelons, but is most common at the theater and Service levels.

* Individuals who can plan and execute contact and source operations. The purpose is to obtain information regarding an adversary's order of battle (OB), capabilities, plans, attitudes, and intentions. Effective operations using non-English-speaking persons require a linguist, either as the operator or interpreter. The focus is to ensure that commanders and other decision-makers under-stand the situation.

* Soldiers with the ability to detect, identify, exploit, and neutralize an adversary's attempts to obtain information about U.S. capabilities, OB, plans, and intentions. The Army must detect, investigate, arrest, convict, and punish those who commit national security crimes, such as espionage. Espionage did not end with the Cold War. There are still soldiers like James Hall, Ill, and Albert Sombolay (U.S. Army) and others like Harold Nicholson (CIA) and Earl Pills (FBI) (who were all charged with espionage). The Army requires soldiers and civilians to bring such individuals to justice using its many investigative capabilities, including polygraphs, technical measures, and informants. This requirement exists at all echelons. While having a language capability enhances our ability to be successful, soldiers can accomplish this task using an interpreter.

* Soldiers dedicated to the protection of sensitive Army programs. Force protection starts with the research and development cycle, at institutional training sites, and in major Army headquarters. If we do not protect the information in our labs, concerning our special mission units, or our operational plans, then force protection suffers and combat soldiers will pay the price.

* A technical control and support element to coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize all HUMINT and CI activities in the area of intelligence responsibility while providing an analysis capability that provides predictive intelligence products for the AOIR, area of influence, and area of interest. This requirement exists from Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to Service level.

The Discipline

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines HUMINT as "a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources." However, that is not sufficient as it leads the reader to believe that anyone can execute HUMINT. This is not true. The following is my draft definition:

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is derived from the analysis of foreign positive information collected by a trained HUMINT Collector from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human contacts and informants as a tool, and a variety of collection methods to gather information that satisfies the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and cues other collection resources.

HUMINT is a foreign intelligence activity focused on the penetration of an adversary's decision-making architecture to obtain information regarding capabilities, vulnerabilities, dispositions, plans, and intentions. HUMINT entities employ human sources or contacts (controlled and not controlled), exploit documents, and execute reconnaissance and surveillance activities to satisfy requirements regarding the adversary (see Figure 2). As Sun Tzu's essays attest, HUMINT is the oldest of our intelligence disciplines.

The Function

FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, defines CI as--

In formation gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs.

The CI and HUMINT Integrated Concept Team (ICT) chartered by the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), will recommend a new definition. Currently, the draft definition reads--

Counterintelligence counters or neutralizes intelligence collection efforts through collection, investigations, operations, analysis and production, and technical services CI includes all actions taken to detect, identify, track, exploit and neutralize the multidiscipline intelligence activities of friends, competitors, opponents, adversaries and enemies, and is the key intelligence community contributor to protect U.S. interests and equities.

In essence, CI entities have the mission of detecting, identifying, exploiting, and neutralizing our adversaries' intelligence activities. The function of countering an adversary intelligence service is also old. Archaeologists unearthed a clay tablet in Syria written in the 18th century B.C.E. with an inscription from one ruler of a city-state to another complaining that they had released spies for ransom but that payment had not come.

Doctrinally, CI is a functional area that obtains and consumes information from all sources concerning an adversary's intelligence activities (see Figure 3). Some believe that CI is a subdiscipline of HUMINT. However, if that were true, CI would only focus on counter-HUMINT operations. To provide the commander and senior decision-maker with the right intelligence, CI must look beyond HUMINT to determine the adversary threat. CI personnel detect and identify adversary intelligence activities by planning and conducting collection missions and analyzing information collected from all sources. The Army's departmental CI organization executes operations to exploit adversary intelligence activities and gather additional information, support theater and tactical objectives, and set the conditions for neutralizing the effects of adversary intelligence services. Army CI agents conduct investigations to gather the evidence required to neutralize a threat intelligence service and prosecute individuals for national secu rity crimes, such as espionage. As CI entities execute the functions of collection, operations, investigation, and analysis, commanders receive intelligence vital to their force protection programs.

Interrelationship

CI must either exploit, neutralize, or do both. Its activities span passive collection to active countermeasures. CI soldiers engage the adversary intelligence service' in a battle for data and information. According to Sir Winston Churchill, "The great thing is to get the true picture, whatever it is." Of course, commanders must not follow the model of Byzantine Emperor Justin II who, when given solid intelligence about the defenses of a besieged city, ignored it and fired his spies. Commanders and adversaries seek information to eliminate uncertainty in the conduct of operations or to gain an advantage. The BCT relies on "the true picture" to gain a positional advantage over an adversary. HUMINT and CI are shaping operations for the commander. While HUMINT contributes to information superiority by providing data and information about the adversary, CI contributes by affecting the data and information obtained by the adversary. HUMINT shapes the "Blue" forces' understanding of the "Red" forces while CI affects the Red forces' knowledge of Blue forces.

There is confusion regarding who executes the discipline of HUMINT and the CI function. Army CI agents will use many of the same techniques and skills a HUMINT operator employs. This is especially true at the tactical level where CI soldiers will execute tactical HUMINT (TAC HUMINT) operations teamed with linguists and HUMINT collectors. The confusion mounts when we use the Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO) regulation (4) to justify HUMINT contact and source-collection activities. This fact is the root of confusion in some people's minds that CI and HUMINT are the same thing. While both employ the same types of sources and use many of the same techniques, the product is different. While both satisfy the CCIR, the intent is different. The HUMINT collector obtains data germane to the adversary's organization, disposition, capabilities, and decision-making. The Cl agent collects data relevant to the adversary's intelligence activities that will influence decision-making. While the HUM INT collector's task is complete with reporting the required data (including follow-up meetings with the source or contact), the CI special agent's tasks expand after detecting and identifying adversary intelligence activities.

Future MOS Actions

The Army is at a crossroads with regard to its CI and HUMINT force. The catalyst is TAC HUMINT. The term "TAC HUMINT" refers to those operations planned and executed by U.S. Army tactical intelligence formations to satisfy requirements levied by their maneuver commanders. In today's force structure, TAC HUMINT is not a single MOS or set of skills. TAC HUMINT is the task organization of skill sets for a tactical commander.

* We should combine the HUMINT Collector MOS (97E) and the Counterintelligence Agent MOS (97B) to create a soldier who can be all the Army needs.

TAC HUMINT elements consist of CI agents, HUMINT operators, and linguists. These operations focus on developing contacts and informants who provide timely, relevant, and specific information to the combatant commanders. In most cases, the contacts and informants fill a void in the HUMINT continuum by providing excellent information relevant to the combatant commanders' CCIR that theater and national elements do not or cannot satisfy. (5) The debate is over who the TAC HUMINT soldier is. The suggestions include the ideas that-

* Both skill sets must be able to merge capabilities to satisfy tactical requirements while maintaining a separate ability to work theater-and national-level requirements.

* We should merge the specialties at the -10 and -20 skill levels, but allow a split into tracks at the -30 level.

* We should not resource a force above the tactical level.

* The only path to success is separate, but equal, MOSs.

A Course of Action (COA)

The following are my suggestions to enhance mission success and perhaps cut the confusion. If you agree, share your thoughts with the Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD), USAIC&FH (please see the contact information below). If you disagree, tell DCD why. If you do neither, accept any future decision from the Ml Proponent at Fort Huachuca with a smile and the knowledge that you had a chance to influence the decision.

In today's Army, the easy solution would be to merge 97E and 97B into a single MOS or to eliminate one and have the other assume all the critical skills. This is the easy solution because that is what we do in today's Army--eliminate and consolidate to achieve increased efficiency, sometimes at the risk of effectiveness. The Army needs soldiers who can execute contact and informant operations, perform interrogator and strategic debriefer functions, and execute Cl tasks from tactical to national levels.

MOS 97L (Translator/Interpreter) exists only in the Reserve Components (RC). We should eliminate the 97L MOS. RC soldiers currently holding this MOS would migrate to either MOS 97E or 97B. New RC recruits would enlist for MOS 97E and receive language training as part of their initial entry training (IET). They would track in the same manner as Active Component (AC) soldiers.

Editors Note: See the discussion of Military Linguists and the 97L MOS on page 65 of this issue of MIPB.

The CI and HUMINT ICT will explore various COAs associated with MOS 97E, MOS 97B, Warrant Officer areas of concentration (AOC) 351 B and 351E (CI Technician and HUMINT Collection Technician), and the Officer AOC 35E (Counterintelligence Officer). The ICT's goal is to define CI and HUMINT requirements for the Objective Force. Results of the ICT will include a series of requirements documents to drive Objective Force organizations, material solutions, and soldier MOS recommendations. One COA combines 97E and 97B at skill level 10. The current "thinking" is to use MOS 97E as the combined initial entry MOS.

Training soldiers in this initial entry MOS would focus on conducting contact and informant operations, recognizing information of CI value, executing tactical questioning of civilians, and screening EPWs and detainees with the assistance of an interpreter. We must differentiate between HUM NT contact operations and CESO to ensure both receive adequate training.

Concurrently, the field units must ensure that they conduct both types of operations to satisfy the CCIR. The career model shown in Figure 4 will eliminate the language requirement for MOS 97E at skill level 10. It allows soldiers to select a track at skill level 20. Soldiers will have a choice of staying tactical with language training, moving to HUMINT operational assignments as Strategic Debriefers, or applying as Cl Agents. Soldiers would receive additional institutional training, such as the Basic Counterintelligence Agents Course, Strategic Debriefers Course, and language training. Beginning at skill level 30, assignments would be to either MOS 97E (HUMINT Collector) or MOS 97B (Cl Agent). Figure 4 reflects an official consideration. The author, however, looks at it somewhat differently.

The COA depicted in Figure 4 combines two Warrant Officer AOCs as well. (6) This COA requires the Warrant Officer to be able to conduct and technically control TAC HUMINT operations, interrogations, strategic debriefings, investigations, counterespionage operations, CI analysis and production, CI surveillance activities, and computer-network protection operations, as well as to perform CI technical services (such as polygraph). This is "being all you can be" or using today's slogan, creating a real "army of one."

Figure 4 reflects an official consideration. The author, however, looks at it somewhat differently. In my opinion, we must retain the separate Warrant Officer tracks to ensure the development of technical experts. Warrant Officers are the technical leaders in our Ml organizations. They mentor and tutor junior enlisted personnel and NCOs on the proper planning and execution of operations. They provide the unvarnished, technically correct advice to commanders and senior intelligence officers (the "2s"). We need these technical experts to focus on specific critical skills and tasks. Combining these AOCs may be most efficient from the perspective of the number of available and qualified personnel but it will dilute the individuals' capabilities and adversely impact their effectiveness.

The Officer AOC, 35E (Counterintelligence Officer), will expand to include skills focused on leading HUMINT soldiers. In addition to serving as a Cl officer, the 35E officer must be able to plan and lead Army HUMINT collection operations at all echelons.

Some Arguments Against This Proposal

Force Developers will ask, "What does this do to the MOS pyramid?" I do not have all the empirical data required to respond to this query. We are expanding the quantity of HUMINT and CI soldiers at the tactical level while not decreasing the quantity required at theater and national levels. The consolidated MOS at skill level 10 and the expected expansion will help create a better base for the MOS pyramid. Given a few exceptions, the 97B pyramid will start at E-5.

Others may ask, "Can we recruit sufficient Warrant Officers to maintain two areas of concentration?" I believe the answer is "yes" if we concurrently scrub the requirement and authorization document with the intent of converting some Warrant Officer positions to Senior NCOs (E7). We must get the ratio between Warrant Officer and enlisted closer to 1:6 or 1:8 rather than the current 1:4 ratio. The expansion of the enlisted ranks will also help solve recruitment and ratio issues.

There will be no wars when we have the earth digitized and soldiers trained to speak the language in all countries because we only go to war where we have no maps and no linguists.

Brigadier General John W. Smith (7)

Some individuals may say, "Nethertheless, we must have linguists in our tactical units. "The Army will never have sufficient linguists for all HUMINT and Cl missions; therefore, why have a HUMINT language-dependent MOS? In the future, units must code those 97E (E-5 and above) positions that require a language. The question we must answer is, "Will the soldiers be required to maintain language proficiency to be MOS qualified?" That said, to receive language proficiency pay, the standard should be 3/3 rather than 2/2. The 97E-trained soldier will be skilled in working with an interpreter and using an automated translation device.

There may be concern that the "dual tracks inside the 97E MOS will create an unfair situation for promotions. This issue requires additional study. However, we may resolve this issue with specific guidance to promotion broads and selection criteria documented in Department of the Army (DA) pamphlets.

Some will raise the issue that current recruitment criteria for 97B and 97E are different. What will be the criteria for enlistment when all skill level 10 soldiers are in 97E? The easy answer is that the more stringent requirements of the two MOSs will apply in the future. For example, 97B requires that an individual be eligible for sensitive compartment information (SCI) access while the 97E does not. We would therefore apply the SCI requirement to all enlistees.

Final Thoughts

To reach decisions, a President needs more than data and information. A President needs real and current knowledge and analysis of the plans, intentions, and capabilities of our enemies. The last several months have shown that there is no substitute for good intelligence officers, people on the ground. These are the people who find the targets, follow our enemies, and help disrupt their evil plans. The United States must rebuild our network of human intelligence.

--President George W. Bush, 11 December 2001 (*)

While some will argue that the President's comments at the Citadel on 11 December targeted the national HUMINT organizations, some of us know that tactical formations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo collected and reported information that found its way to the White House. Now and in the future, military operations exist in an interdependent environment where tactical formations initially depend on the information provided by national agencies to establish, update, and maintain situational awareness. On the flip side, as the operation develops and deployed personnel grow in experience, the strategic entities will grow increasingly dependent on the information tactical elements provide to develop the fine-grain resolution necessary to gain a more complete understanding of the situation.

HUMINT and CI activities support shaping operations that, in turn, assist in establishing the conditions required to achieve the success of the decisive operation. HUMINT and CI are force multipliers that will make a difference to the commander's scheme of maneuver and force protection. HUMINT and CI will deliver timely, accurate, specific, and relevant information to the commander. The result is an enabled leader who now has the ability to accurately focus maneuver firepower, protection, and leadership at decisive points, which will decide the outcome of engagements and battles.

In the Objective Force, HUMINT and CI will embrace the "Quality of Firsts." HUMINT and CI will be among the "First to See" so that our leaders can be the "First to Understand." They will enable our maneuver units to be the "First to Act" and ultimately, our battles and campaigns to "Finish Decisively."

End notes

(1.) Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1963).

(2.) We must wait for the after-action reports to judge how critical HUMINT and CI are to the on-going operations in Afghanistan. We do know from media reports that HUMINT is playing a significant role.

(3.) The Commanding General, USAIC&FH, recently chartered a CI and HUMINT Integrated concept Team (ICT) to determine the requirements and write the necessary documents to transform CI and HUMINT for the Objective Force.

(4.) This regulation is AR 381-172, counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations and Low-Level Source Operations, which is classified.

(5.) Lest someone misunderstand and accuse me of not giving credit to those that serve, be assured that theater and national organizations do respond to the tactical commander's CCIR and do provide timely, specific, and relevant information to the tactical formation. My point is that they are not everywhere and cannot do it all.

(6.) The proposed single Warrant Officer AOC does not include 3510 (Area Intelligence Technician). It combines 351B (counterintelligence Technician) and 351E (Human Intelligence collection Technician).

(7.) Brigadier General John W. Smith (U.S. Army, Retired) during one of many meetings regarding MOSs 97E and 97B when he was the Deputy Commanding General, USAIc&FH.

(8.) Remarks made by President George W. Bush at The Citadel in December 2001.

Colonel Jerry Jones completed 30 years with the Army on 1 June 2000. He began his career as an Armor officer with the 1st Armored Division (lAD) at Fort Hood, Texas. After Vietnam, he served with the "Big Red One' at three Re forger exercises, 32d Army Air Defense Command (AADCOM), I AD in Germany; special mission units in the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM); U.S. Central Command J5 operations in DESERT SHIELD and STORM; and the Allied Military Intelligence Battalion in Bosnia. Colonel Jones finished his Army career at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, as the Commander, INSCOM Training and Doctrine Support (ITRADS) Detachment He was a 35F (Human Intelligence Officer) with significant 35E (Human Intelligence Officer) experience and a 6Z (Strategist). He served at all echelons from tactical to national. He is currently a DA Civilian at the USAIC&FH.