Sayeret
01-17-2005, 07:43 PM
In and out of the Gaza Strip goes the IDF, in operation after armored operation, yet it cannot stop the Kassams.
Yes, the IDF, with its highly digital battlefield including flying cameras and electro-optic 24-hour view of the front line, has been able to foil about 70 percent of the Kassam attacks. But it cannot stop them completely, which is what the nation demands.
Some say the only way to halt the attacks is through persuasion. But in the IDF there are those who are convinced that there is an operational solution to vanquishing the Kassams, and possibly the mortar fire as well.
The key is eliminating the entire chain of Kassam rocket production. This is possible, senior officers argue, but it is contingent upon better intelligence. According to them, the intelligence community has not put enough effort into the matter.
"When we have the intelligence, the other parts come together," said a senior officer. "We can plan, coordinate and fire. That's our strongest feature. The catch is the intelligence."
The Kassam chain has three components: production, transportation and firing.
"It's hardest to hit the end of the chain," said a senior officer. This is mainly because of the independence of the rocket squads and the crudeness of the Kassam rockets, which can be easily carried and set up to go off by timers. The Kassam is small enough for a man to carry on his own under one arm, much like a stretcher.
The IDF has aerial footage of such an incident, but refuses to release it for now.
The more worthwhile targets in the Kassam war are the metalworks where they are produced and the "rocket scientists," both of which the IAF has repeatedly identified and wiped out. But the Kassams keep coming.
It appears that the IDF cannot answer some basic questions. How many Kassam engineers are there? How many production workshops are there in the Gaza Strip? Can't the IDF and Shin Bet find them and blow them up? Can't steps be taken to halt the import of the raw materials that are used to make Kassams?
"The entire intelligence community needs to work on it. It is not just up to Military Intelligence and Combat Field Intelligence," said Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Doron Tamir, a former chief Intelligence officer.
The Shin Bet is actively trying to pinpoint the network and identify its weak points for strike. But Tamir echoed what many have been saying for some time: without a presence on the ground, the sources that can be utilized by agents are weakened. The success of the Shin Bet in the West Bank is mainly a direct result of the IDF's nearly ubiquitous presence. Gaza is mostly still off-limits.
"We all know about the other types of intelligence gathering, the electro-optic and eavesdropping, but it is the Humint [spies] and the agents who bring in the intelligence. When you control the territory it is easier," Tamir told Army Radio.
IDF Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Moshe Ya'alon has instructed OC Southern Command Maj.-Gen. Dan Harel to prepare his forces, again, for a large operation to reduce the Kassam fire. The immediate impact would likely be a blow to the Kassam network. But it is generally agreed that in the long term, the IDF still won't have the improved intelligence to maintain the war on Kassams – thus leaving the senior command frustrated.
Brig.-Gen. (res.) Giora Inbar, a former IDF commander in south Lebanon, sympathizes with the generals' frustration, but he believes there is no operational solution.
"I very much identify with my comrades who remained in the IDF and need to give security to Sderot, and aren't so successful," Inbar said on Channel 1.
"It reminds me of the period in Lebanon when I was in charge of providing security for Kiryat Shmona and Metulla. We entered Lebanon, captured a large chunk of it and we had all the tools at our disposal that the IDF could use in Gaza – the jets and tanks and intelligence. Despite this, the residents of Metulla and Kiryat Shmona could not sleep soundly." That came only with a unilateral withdrawal, Inbar said.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1105992533311&apage=1
Yes, the IDF, with its highly digital battlefield including flying cameras and electro-optic 24-hour view of the front line, has been able to foil about 70 percent of the Kassam attacks. But it cannot stop them completely, which is what the nation demands.
Some say the only way to halt the attacks is through persuasion. But in the IDF there are those who are convinced that there is an operational solution to vanquishing the Kassams, and possibly the mortar fire as well.
The key is eliminating the entire chain of Kassam rocket production. This is possible, senior officers argue, but it is contingent upon better intelligence. According to them, the intelligence community has not put enough effort into the matter.
"When we have the intelligence, the other parts come together," said a senior officer. "We can plan, coordinate and fire. That's our strongest feature. The catch is the intelligence."
The Kassam chain has three components: production, transportation and firing.
"It's hardest to hit the end of the chain," said a senior officer. This is mainly because of the independence of the rocket squads and the crudeness of the Kassam rockets, which can be easily carried and set up to go off by timers. The Kassam is small enough for a man to carry on his own under one arm, much like a stretcher.
The IDF has aerial footage of such an incident, but refuses to release it for now.
The more worthwhile targets in the Kassam war are the metalworks where they are produced and the "rocket scientists," both of which the IAF has repeatedly identified and wiped out. But the Kassams keep coming.
It appears that the IDF cannot answer some basic questions. How many Kassam engineers are there? How many production workshops are there in the Gaza Strip? Can't the IDF and Shin Bet find them and blow them up? Can't steps be taken to halt the import of the raw materials that are used to make Kassams?
"The entire intelligence community needs to work on it. It is not just up to Military Intelligence and Combat Field Intelligence," said Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Doron Tamir, a former chief Intelligence officer.
The Shin Bet is actively trying to pinpoint the network and identify its weak points for strike. But Tamir echoed what many have been saying for some time: without a presence on the ground, the sources that can be utilized by agents are weakened. The success of the Shin Bet in the West Bank is mainly a direct result of the IDF's nearly ubiquitous presence. Gaza is mostly still off-limits.
"We all know about the other types of intelligence gathering, the electro-optic and eavesdropping, but it is the Humint [spies] and the agents who bring in the intelligence. When you control the territory it is easier," Tamir told Army Radio.
IDF Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Moshe Ya'alon has instructed OC Southern Command Maj.-Gen. Dan Harel to prepare his forces, again, for a large operation to reduce the Kassam fire. The immediate impact would likely be a blow to the Kassam network. But it is generally agreed that in the long term, the IDF still won't have the improved intelligence to maintain the war on Kassams – thus leaving the senior command frustrated.
Brig.-Gen. (res.) Giora Inbar, a former IDF commander in south Lebanon, sympathizes with the generals' frustration, but he believes there is no operational solution.
"I very much identify with my comrades who remained in the IDF and need to give security to Sderot, and aren't so successful," Inbar said on Channel 1.
"It reminds me of the period in Lebanon when I was in charge of providing security for Kiryat Shmona and Metulla. We entered Lebanon, captured a large chunk of it and we had all the tools at our disposal that the IDF could use in Gaza – the jets and tanks and intelligence. Despite this, the residents of Metulla and Kiryat Shmona could not sleep soundly." That came only with a unilateral withdrawal, Inbar said.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1105992533311&apage=1