torpedo hits ship (video)

[Sloppy Joe2]

http://images.military.com/Shock/0,,SA_TorpedoTest_092104,00.html
probably need your help with changing the address hood if you could help hope you all enjoy and hope it hasnt been posted :D

[Corpse]

Should be able to download it from this link.

http://www.military.com/Video/TorpedoTest_092104.wmv 642.6Kb.

[Sloppy Joe2]

thank you corpse :hug: woot :D

[Corpse]

No worries mate. p-)

[hood]

wow. so anyone know what a typical counter-measure is for a ship that knows a torpedo is coming at it? I remember seeing those turbulence generators that were dropped in the 'hunt for red october' movie, but is that type of thing employed for regular ships?

[Hadamar]

http://img202.exs.cx/img202/6610/torpedodefence1mt.jpg


Torpedo Defence: What Are the Chances?
Angela Sherman, Steve Howick. Military Technology. Bonn: Jun 2004.Vol.28, Iss. 6; pg. 88, 3 pgs

The vulnerability of both surface vessels and submarines to torpedo attack has been tragically and graphically illustrated in many conflicts over the past century. The introduction and progressive development of increasingly sophisticated anti-torpedo defence systems offers a way to at least reduce vulnerability, and thus guarantee a sufficient level of survivability through maintaining or regaining control of the underwater battlespace.

The combination of submarine and torpedo is a prime example of disruptive technology which in that vibrant period of naval technological development in the second half of the 19th century opened up a hitherto unknown dimension in naval warfare. A failure to recognise the full potential of this development and, later, inter-war complacency led twice to a near strangulation of the United Kingdom's supply lines in two World Wars.

No such complacency or lack of recognition of the torpedo/submarine threat followed the end of WW2 and during the Cold War much emphasis was placed in Western naval preparations on anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Nevertheless there was an imbalance in these preparations with the greatest effort being placed on locating and destroying the submarine platform rather than looking at countering the torpedo itself. There is an obvious logic to that approach - take out the submarine and you take out an entire weapon load and a submarine lifetime of missions - but that is of no comfort to the hapless target of the one that got away as inevitably some would!

Diversity of Threat

The torpedo is a diverse threat. First generation, straight-running torpedoes are still in service around the world and remain an effective threat, especially if deployed in a salvo. The first of the acoustic homers had electric propulsion and are therefore quiet and difficult to detect, and moreover they tend also to use passive sonars. More modern acoustic homing torpedoes may be very quiet electrically propelled or alternatively be thermally powered; the latter is noisy but is also very fast. To compound the variations further, either type may be wire guided by its parent platform. Finally, wake homing torpedoes home on their target by detecting and following the wake of the surface vessel, and are extremely difficult to detect in the hostile environment astern of the ship.

Furthermore, the trend in torpedo control and data processing is increasingly softwarebased. This results in individual weapons that are relatively easily tailored by the end customers. Threat information is then both difficult to obtain initially, but even more difficult to maintain current. Future torpedo trends can be seen to lie in speed, reduction in noise output, improved guidance and better countermeasure resistance.

To compound the diversity of the threat, torpedoes can be launched from diverse launch platforms: submarines, including both nuclear and conventional boats; all surface ships including fast patrol craft; and both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. A variety of launch mechanisms also further increase the diversity.

The operational environment is also diverse, and can be characterised as deep, shallow or littoral. Within these environments there is wide diversity dependant on the temperature, salinity and other factors which greatly affects the acoustic performance of many aspects of the system.

There are also the added complications of the requirements of ship fitting, especially for retrofits where a very wide range of ship classes need to be considered. The scenarios that the system has to be used in will also vary as will the approach to situations taken by individual nations.

Defining a Solution

The technical challenge of torpedo defence has always been a daunting one, even when torpedoes were in their infancy and had relatively modest performance. The early efforts at protection of vessels while at anchor during both World Wars, based on the suspension of nets from booms around the vessel were reasonably successful, but with the proliferation of weapons and with the technical advances in those weapons the need for more robust defences has increased.

The requirement has developed for costeffective protection at acceptable false alarm rates against a wide range of weapons. The requirement has largely been driven by the Western navies seeking to provide risk mitigation in the age of diminishing military budgets. Other nations are now also looking to protect their expensive assets as all are beginning to appreciate the effective insurance that countermeasures systems can provide at comparatively low cost.

In the past countermeasures have largely been re-active to the existing threat, but with the proliferation of weapons and the accompanying diversity of capability, defensive capabilities have needed to become robust against a wide range of weapons. While it has been possible to develop countermeasures to specific threats and that remains the case, limitations in torpedo detection classification and localisation have until recently limited the robustness of any system. Recent developments in towed array architecture and DCL algorithms by QinetiQ (formerly DERA) have now provided the route to effective torpedo defence systems.

The technology advances in recent years have also enabled the development by QinetiQ of ODIN (Fig. 1), a modelling capability that provides detailed representation of the battlespace to high fidelity. The benefits from this have allowed detailed interactions between weapon and countermeasures to be understood more fully and from this has grown the understanding of the requirement for survivability of the platforms. It has also provided system effectiveness assessment and validation in diverse scenarios.

The resulting solution for torpedo defence has been shown to be an automated, fully integrated system, comprising a layered defence capability provided by:

* A towed array sonar capable of detecting the incoming weapon at sufficient range to provide a sufficient time line for the defence system to successfully react;

* Detection, classification and localisation algorithms, providing threat evaluation and tactical advice at acceptable false alarm rates;

* A range of expendable countermeasure stores;

* A towed countermeasure system;

* Expendable countermeasure launcher;

* Simulation model for system acceptance and training.

Additionally, other sub-systems such as integration facilities and operator displays will be required to effect the total system.

Maintaining Control

The survivability of a ship under torpedo attack is critically dependent on always maintaining, or quickly regaining control of the underwater battlespace.

The stages in an anti-torpedo engagement can be envisaged as shown in Fig.2. Control of the battlespace is achieved in the initial stages of an encounter by preventing the enemy from gaining a fire control solution. To some extent this can be achieved by signature management, but it can also be obtained by the use of anti-platform countermeasures, aimed at jamming the on-board sonars. In the secondary volume of defence, when a weapon has already been launched, control must be regained by countering the threat weapon. This can be achieved with varying effectiveness using a variety of countermeasure techniques. For the straight-running threat simple manoeuvre may be sufficient, but with the advent of the acoustic homing torpedo, the development of towed or/and expendable noise makers was seen as a solution.

The increasing sophistication in torpedoes, together with the proliferation of the weapons world-wide has prompted the development of more sophisticated countermeasures and more importantly the development of a systems solution to the problem. The requirement for a systems approach has become essential to provide speed of response and adaptability to the diverse threat whip h is increasingly capable of counter-countermeasures. Denial of the enemy's ability to re-attack is a further option that should not be iqnored.

In the inner zone, the last stages of a weapon attack, it is still possible to continue deploying those countermeasures as used in the middle game, but there is now an added imperative to stop the torpedo dead in the water. While normally requirements are for total survivability, at this stage of the encounter, the levels of acceptable damage are likely to change. Damage caused by an explosion to the side of a vessel is rarely likely to sink it, whereas an explosion directly under the keel almost certainly will.

This "last ditch" requirement has driven programmes for the so-called "hard-kill" systems currently under development and procurement in several countries.

Countermeasures Options

Expendable anti-weapon countermeasures can provide a defensive capability as a standalone capability. However, without an ability to localise the threat, the number of countermeasures deployed against a single weapon can be high. Currently available expendable acoustic countermeasures operate primarily either as jammers or as alternative targets, the latter being known as decoys, echo-repeaters or lures. Essentially these operate by offering alternatives to the incoming weapon. Clearly an alternative target has at best a 50:50 effectiveness. This effectiveness can be increased, for example, by employing patterns of expendable countermeasures, but if this approach is taken then the requirement for accurate deployment increases in order to minimise the number of countermeasures deployed. This can only be achieved with good detection and localisation capabilities.

Alternatively a towed countermeasure can be deployed, but here another complication emerges. It is conceivable that a towed acoustic countermeasure could act as a beacon to the incoming weapon and so a requirement arises to be able to switch it on and off. Now we need to know when to switch on and off and we are back to the detection, classification and localisation requirement.

A more recent approach to provide a more robust approach to the current and future threat is the development of countermeasure signals that seek to confuse the torpedo logic. These countermeasures, known as confusers are effective against a wide range of threats and can also provide the ability to adapt to future threats. While these countermeasures offer increased effectiveness, and can be used alone, the requirement for a robust system still requires the DCL capability.

The TDCL Concept

An automated approach to the problem of surface ship torpedo defence has only been developed over the last twelve years. Systems stretching back to WW2 relied on towed devices to deter torpedoes, or continual scanning of the sea surface to watch for visible torpedo tracks. The move towards automation has not been easy with significant changes required in sonar thinking (both on sensor requirements and inboard systems). It is not surprising to note that many of the recent developments in surface ship sonars have been brought about by the need for platform self-protection against torpedoes.

Torpedo defence systems require effective Torpedo Detection, Classification and Localisation (TDCL) to facilitate early countermeasure action. Equally, the false alert performance of the TDCL sub-system should not be so high as to irritate and thus inhibit the capability of the system as a whole. These are the key factors that must be addressed in any torpedo defence system and that make the TDCL sub-system the most important issue for overall system performance.

Current-generation sonars are not optimised for TDCL purposes, and efforts to date have been mainly oriented towards optimising the performance of legacy sensors. For effective torpedo defence systems, future sonar sensors for surface ships and submarines will need to be designed with TDCL processing in mind.

The signal processing requirements for torpedo defence will have a very significant impact on the architecture and capabilities of the processing engines used within the system. Flexibility and growth potential will be very important to cope with the required capability growth. The requirements for algorithms which are required to meet the required TDCL performance, include real-time signal processing systems with flexibility to cope with the demands of different arrays and requirements.

Balance of Arguments

The torpedo threat is diverse in its capability and is readily available to an ever increasing number of nations. There are many counter-measure system design issues including:

* Desired system effectiveness;

* The balance of the capabilities required;

* Countermeasures effectiveness;

* Torpedo DCL capability;

* Tactics;

* Manoeuvres (not always possible);

* Mix of countermeasures (types, patterns);

* Threat specific (fine - if you are confident of your intelligence).

All robust countermeasure solutions require torpedo detection. The DCL sub-system is required to provide adequate range and reliability of detection together with a high probability of correct classification, and a low probability of false alarm. A tall order!

When this has been achieved the solution still has to deliver the optimised tactical solution, whether towed countermeasure, expendable store or simply a manoeuvre in a timely fashion.

And then there is the possibility of a second firing or a salvo of weapons!

The answer to the question is that the chances are high that effective torpedo defence will work for your vessels and furthermore that the answer can be tailored to your budget according to your desired system effectiveness.

There is, however, a catch - a complete torpedo defence system requires understanding that has taken the leaders in the field many years to develop and master. That understanding is essential to deliver survivability in an effective manner.

[Author Affiliation]
Angela Sherman and Capt. Steve Howick RN Rtd are members of the Marine and Acoustic Centre of QinetiQ based in South Dorset, UK. Angela has been part of the Weapons and Countermeasures group in the Sensors and Electronics Division of QinetiQ for more than 20 years, and Steve brings his experience from 35 years Royal Naval service in a variety of weapon engineering posts both at sea and ashore.


France and Italy to develop SLAT anti-torpedo system
Anonymous. Military Technology. Bonn: May 2001.Vol.25, Iss. 5; pg. 78, 1 pgs

Copyright Moench Verlagsgesellschaft mbH May 2001

The French and Italian MoDs have signed a joint contract with the EUROSLAT consortium covering development of the SLAT anti-- torpedo system to equip their respective new classes of surface combatants.

EUROSLAT, which was formally set up in November 1999 to act as prime contractor for the SLAT programme, brings together Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS) of Italy (50%) and the French companies DCN International (33%), representing the interests of French naval prime contractor DCN, and Thomson Marconi Sonar (17%). The development effort will be shared as follows:

- WASS will develop the counter-- measures package and launch system;

- TMS will be responsible for the acoustic sensors and the detection system, and

- DCN will develop the classification and system-level software.

The contract, worth around 21 million euro, is scheduled to take 32 months to complete.

SLAT will allow surface warships to detect and classify incoming torpedoes, then perform threat evaluation. The system software displays the optimal anti-torpedo response, including soft-kill effectors. SLAT interfaces with the vessel's anti-torpedo systems and countermeasures, including decoy launchers. The first vessels to be equipped with the SLAT system will be the French CHARLES DE GAULLE nuclear-power aircraft carrier, Italy's GARIBALDI STOVL aircraft carrier, and the Franco-- Italian HORIZON frigates.


anti-torpedo torpedo prototype
http://pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/trib/regional/s_291277.html

[Germaine]

Makes ppl think twice about joining the Navy, i know i wouldnt be to impressed being on a ship during a full out war

[RGRBOX]

Holy Crap!!!

[CG51]

you should see what a mk 48 will do to a ship...

[He219]

The power of the MK48 torpedo (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/viewtopic.php?t=7248&start=0&postdays=0&postorder=asc&highlight=torpedo)
;)



P.s: The TP 613 torpedo launched in the video above was off the Fast Patrol Boat forum member Guttorm served on!

http://www.22mtb.com

:D

[Milkman]

What type of ship was destroyed in that video?

[soma]

The defense is to go faster.... rofl

[hood]

Thanks for the info Hadamar. That's impressive stuff concerning the anti-torpedo torpedo. It looks like the hardest part is locking onto the rather faint sounding propulsion system of the enemy torpedo. As is demonstrated by the torpedo videos above, destroying the incoming torpedo shouldn't be difficult as even a semi-close blast should disable it because of the added shockwave from being underwater.

[JasonH]

I'd never join the navy, ****en floating coffins

[Milkman]

The defense is to go faster.... rofl

Even the fastest ship would not escape this:

F-111k "Shkval" Underwater rocket

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/shkval.htm

[hood]

Carrying a tactical nuclear warhead initiated by a timer, it would destroy the hostile submarine and the torpedo it fired.

The idea of firing a tactical nuke underwater when the target is half a mile away is pretty insane. Your own ship would most likely be damaged in the shockwave, not to mention probably suffer significantly from the electromagnetic shock. Can you imagine being without electricity when you're 600 feet down?

[Sloppy Joe2]

What type of ship was destroyed in that video? it was a destroyer escort named torrens :)

[wholagun]

a family friend from Latvia served in the Soviet navy in a submarine, Im not sure which one. he told us that it was though to get a stationed on a sub, and he had to wait a long time including going into the infantry temporarly. Eventually he got onto a sub - i can't rember his role in the sub though. He told my dad and I that some ppl who always dreamt of being on subs hated it. He said you have the be the right kind of person and have ice in your blood along with nerves of steel, in order to make peace with God and youself that you can die in a tin can with out any hope of escape. He said its small crowded and the conditions get to some men causing them stress to the brink of crazyness. Even the tests you undergo before going into a sub to see if your fit and if you can hack it, despite going through these tests some men still go nuts. Its the fact that you are ont he sub for months on end.

I would never go into the navy nor the airforce - there is something about having solid ground under my feet that gives me a secure feeling. If i ever get conscripted into the navy i will flat out tell them - I'll go nuts and that Im afraid of water and will not be able to preform.

[Hadamar]

This Saab Bofors page contains a video (8:45 minutes) of the Torpedo 2000, which gives a good overview of modern torpedo design.

http://www.saab.se/dynamics/node5560.asp

The sly abyss terminators
Antony Preston. Armada International. Zurich: Apr/May 1999.Vol.23, Iss. 2; pg. 34, 5 pgs

The rule of thumb which states that an anti-submarine torpedo should have a speed margin of some 50 per cent over its target imposes severe challenges for engineers, particularly when attacking nuclear submarines. Although the Soviet Navy's Project 705 Alfa type SSN was not the harbinger of an allround increase in underwater speeds, its maximum speed of 42 knots and deep diving led to massive investment in American and British torpedoes capable of running at high speed down to maximum depth. Fuel (nitrogen ester plus an oxidant) and HAP-Otto being the most successful examples. A well-guarded secret for many years was the very high performance of Swedish torpedoes from FFV (now Bofors Underwater Systems). The Tp 61 series of wire-guided heavyweights were a good 15 to 20 knots faster than American and British contemporary weapons.

Sweden: Bofors Underwater Systems remains faithful to HTP as a thermal fuel, claiming over 15 000 runs without accident, but the Tp 61 series is being replaced by Tp 62, also known as Tp 2000 or T96. This uses an advanced 7-cylinder axial-piston semi-closed cycle swashplate engine with twin sinusoidal cam, driving a pump-jet (in fact the tail-section is supplied by Marconi Electronic Systems). The Tp 62 is in production and it is estimated that the Royal Swedish Navy alone will require 600 by 2003, while Denmark and Norway are likely customers. In 1994, Alliant Techsystems bought American rights to the new engine.

[Slug69]

Carrying a tactical nuclear warhead initiated by a timer, it would destroy the hostile submarine and the torpedo it fired.

The idea of firing a tactical nuke underwater when the target is half a mile away is pretty insane. Your own ship would most likely be damaged in the shockwave, not to mention probably suffer significantly from the electromagnetic shock. Can you imagine being without electricity when you're 600 feet down?

EMP don't travel through water.

Half a mile from only a kiloton or two isn't that bad for a ship. (Would barely notice it...sonar men might want to take their earphones off though.)

The US had an anti sub/torpedo nuke in the sixties under development but it was cancelled due to one of the nuclear arms treatise. (Maybe the ABM treaty.) Can't friggin remember the name of the program but I remember it was quite catchy...hehe.

[Steve Railsback]

What type of ship was destroyed in that video? it was a destroyer escort named torrens :)

I believe that the ship that was destroyed in this video was KNM Sleipner
http://www.22mtb.com/Loggbok-bilder/uke24/sleipner.jpg


The boat firing the torpedo was KNM Jo
http://www.stud.ntnu.no/~stigarne/bilder/knmjo.jpg
(Maybe not its proudest moment in this picture)

[Sloppy Joe2]

Steve Railsback the place where i got the video said it was the destroyer escort torrens that got hit and the Australian Collins class submarine, HMAS Farncomb that fired it dont know much about the navy i only thought i was a cool video so you might be correct :D :hug:

[Steve Railsback]

The video is taken from this site belonging to the 22nd FPB Squadron
And I can really recommend the Penguin MK2 video, it just rocks!! woot woot
http://www.22mtb.com/english/index.htm

[Midav]

Nasty nsasty nsasty... ty for posting :)

[Sloppy Joe2]

steve that by far has to be one of the best avatars ever :D and a great video thank you :hug: woot

[Caesar]

HEY, what a waste!!! Canada could have bought those boats... :backhand: