2RHPZ
03-04-2005, 03:22 PM
Task Force Iron Dukes campaign for Najaf
by Pat White
On 22 April 2004, Task Force (TF) 2d Battalion, 37th Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, the 'Iron Dukes,' assumed mission from 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, in the holy city of An Najaf, Iraq. The enemy, known as Muqtada's militia, controlled An Najaf and neighboring Al Kufa. The mission statement appeared simple: destroy the militia and restore order to An Najaf/Kufa to allow transition of authority to a legitimate Iraqi government; and, on order, transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi security forces (ISF).
When the fighting stopped and the smoke cleared on 4 June 2004, TF Iron Dukes had battled nonstop for five weeks and broken the enemy's will to fight, destroying over 600 militia and wounding countless others, capturing or destroying all types and calibers of weapons, successfully detaining two top aides to Muqtada al-Sadr, and seizing weapons caches in the holy cemetery and Sahla Mosque.
For the Iron Dukes, the road to An Najaf began on 28 May 2003. The Iron Dukes were cross attached to the 'Dragoons,' 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). The Dukes accepted enhancement of light cavalry troop and one detached tank company. For the next 10 months, the Dukes would perform combat missions, peacekeeping missions, and recruit and train 500 Iraqi police and an Iraqi civil defense corps battalion in southern Baghdad.
Between 4 April and 10 April 2004, the Dukes fought in Sadr City, Baghdad, under tactical control of 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry, followed by fights in Al Kut on 17 April. These actions successfully prepared the Iron Dukes for one of the most intense urban battles since the Iraq ground war in 2003.
The fighting in Najaf began on 28 April 2004. Available combat potential for the fight included: two M1A1 Abrams integrated management (AIMS) organic tank companies, comprised of companies Aggressor and Crusader; two light cavalry troops, made up of Apache Troop, 1st Squadron, and Iron Troop, 3d Squadron; one Paladin battery with fire-finder radar, Assassin, 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery; one military police (MP) company (minus), Warbear, 2175th Battalion, Missouri National Guard; one MP platoon, Renegade, 66th MP company, Fort Lewis, Washington; one light combat engineer company (CEC), 84th CEC, 2d ACR; one psychological operations team; two civil affairs teams; an electronic warfare platoon; and an organic headquarters and headquarters company.
The task force organized forces into four maneuver teams, as shown in Figure 1. These forces were arrayed across the battle-space in three forward operating bases (FOBs), separated by approximately 40 kilometers. Headquarters and headquarters company (minus) operated from FOB Duke, a dusty patch of ground in the middle of the desert. One tank team and the Paladin battery were located at FOB Hotel on the northern outskirts of An Najaf. The rest of the task force collocated with an El Salvadorian battalion in the heart of An Najaf at FOB Baker/Golf. The task force also integrated into operations aerial scout weapons teams (OH-58D Kiowa Warriors), an AC-130 gunship, F-16 Fighting Falcons, unmanned aerial vehicles, Iraqi counter-terrorism forces, and an operational detachment A (ODA) team already operating in An Najaf.
The enemy was made up of trained and untrained militia. The trained militia members were organized into four companies. Two companies were employed as defensive companies and controlled key terrain around the Ali Shrine and Kufa mosque, while two companies were employed as attack companies throughout Kufa and Najaf.
The untrained militia roamed the streets and executed 'opportunity attacks' on coalition patrols and Iraqi citizens. Additionally, throughout the city, Sadr lieutenants resided with personal security detachments, and almost every mosque and school was being used as a cache for weapons or mortar firing points.
Again, the mission statement appeared simple. In reality, the task force would be challenged daily, balancing application of force with the complexities of the battlefield. First and foremost, consideration had to be given to collateral damage on holy sites, including the Imam Ali Shrine, which is a religious symbol for over 5 million Shi'ite worldwide and headquarters for Ayatollah Sistani, Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and more than 500 militia fighters; and the Kufa Mosque, which is second only in religious significance to the Ali Shrine and is the stronghold of the militia with more than 600 fighters.
To the north of the Ali Shrine, lies the largest Shia burial ground in the world. This area was infested with insurgents from the Ali Shrine and Kufa, and was used as a weapons cache, and as the task force would later learn, a sensitive site requiring precision fires.
This article shares lessons learned and methods developed during the fight in Najaf/Kufa. Although, the fight will never be labeled a modern 72 Easting, or spearhead into Iraq by the 3d Infantry Division, the intensity, tempo, and constraints have application for future employment of armor forces in urban terrain.
Tempo and Campaigning
Understand the complexity of the battlefield. In the case of Najaf and Kufa, considering political backlash from damaging holy sites and creating unnecessary collateral damage was paramount in all planning and execution. Soldiers were well aware of the cascading effects a hole in the golden dome or a city block razed during counter fire would have on the Shia population; in essence, defeating the campaign's purpose. From the onset, these constraints became a leader challenge and commanders executed to perfection. Soldiers adapted engagement techniques and chose appropriate weapons systems to destroy the threat, with little or no damage to significant holy sites. The staff identified holy sites during the military decisionmaking process and planned around them by using precision fires, nonlethal fires, or bypassing the site.
Have a plan. On this complex battlefield, tempo is probably the most important factor a staff and commander consider when developing the campaign plan. Do not be overzealous; realize you will lose equipment, soldiers to wounded in action, and energy as you continue to fight, day after day. Take the end state, and shape your plan. In Najaf, we focused on three areas, and integrated these areas into continuous attacks.
We concentrated first on the militia--keep up the pressure, stay flexible, and remain unpredictable. We focused secondly on Madhi leaders--target them and choose the right time to attack, such as at a time when the enemy is depending on public leadership. The task force conducted spoiling attacks on Fridays (prayer day) to disrupt al-Sadr's movement between Najaf and Kufa. On two such occasions, Sadr was forced to send his second in charge to speak at Friday prayers in Kufa, and on one occasion, the task force captured his personal aide. Even when unsuccessful in capturing high-value targets, the fact the task force disrupted enemy movement and communications became crucial for follow-on missions. For example, about two weeks into the campaign, the task force began targeting Muqtada and his top three lieutenants. Our end state was capture, but in the process, we found that we directly affected the enemy's ability to coordinate, communicate, and maintain the initiative, which allowed the task force freedom of maneuver throughout the area of operation. Finally, we concentrated on weapons caches. We specifically targeted enemy supply lines and ammunition caches.
In effect, these three areas caused the militia to fight in multiple directions, and forced him to choose priorities. By forcing the enemy to make choices, we gained the initiative, forcing the enemy to consolidate his forces to protect his high payoff targets, allowing the task force to focus on destroying the militia. If a commander fails to campaign, the task force can easily become mired in reactive mode and lose focus on the end state.
Watch your soldiers and equipment. We have the best soldiers in the world, and they are 'can do' all the time. Rely on platoon leaders and platoon sergeants to gauge soldier effectiveness. We stared hard and aggressive, and within a week, we were losing the attention-to-detail battle. We began pacing operations so that a troop/company had a 12-hour period in which to rest and refit. The campaign plan took this timeline into consideration, and allowed the company/troop to execute company-level offensive operations as well as task force operations. The task force chaplain and medical platoon are also excellent sources for determining the effect of continuous operations on soldiers.
The battalion maintenance office and battalion maintenance technician are important in predicting Class IX needs and surging mechanics. Over the first three weeks, task force tanks began chewing up track, hubs, and road arms. The task force XO sent up a red flare and we received phenomenal support from 1st Armored Division and theater assets.
Precision Engagement, Lethal Fires, and Shaping the Battlefield
The most precise weapons system in the task force was the M1A1 main battle tank. The coaxial-mounted M240 machine gun is precision at its best. Outrange the enemy RPG gunner and you can conduct precision recon-by-fire in urban terrain while minimizing collateral damage. The tank also has the most accurate and deadly system available--the 120mm main gun. Tank commanders learned early on that firing a multipurpose antitank (MPAT) round, a high-explosive antitank (HEAT) round, or an obstacle-reducing (OR) round immediately silenced enemy massed formations due to tremendous psychological effects. A tank can fire a main gun round through a window and destroy the enemy while damaging only one room, minimizing collateral damage. Tanks can also create entry points for scouts or infantry by firing a main gun round into the wall of a school or directly into the side of a building. OR and MPAT rounds are effective in destroying hasty obstacles, and the task force even used the MPAT round to suppress enemy dismounts on the street.
The task force relied on main gun after experiencing the effects of the tank commander's .50-caliber in close urban terrain. Armor piercing incendiary (API) .50-caliber rounds are devastating and accurate, but cause a significant amount of collateral damage. The API round will pass through four to five buildings without slowing down. The round demolishes concrete structures and sets flammable materials, such as palm and date trees, ablaze. During one fight, an RPG gunner was hiding behind an Alaska barrier, which is concrete, reinforced with rebar, and 12 feet high, and instead of using a main gun round, he shot 50 rounds of API into the base of the Alaska barrier, killing the RPG gunner and clearing the area.
During rehearsals, commanders focused on weapons system employment, integrating fire control measures, such as main gun tight from target reference point (TRP) 1 to 2, and .50-cal tight TRP 3. You still have the loader's M240 for suppressive fires down alleyways, and each loader and tank commander carried M4s on top of the turret, which we used multiple times in killing or suppressing an enemy rifleman or intercepting an RPG approaching the tank from an adjacent alleyway.
Snipers are critical in the urban fight. This is common sense, but a tank battalion does not have snipers, so we developed our own by using soldiers that were 'long shooters' or we integrated trained snipers from an attached light cavalry troop. In Najaf and Kufa, we could not position snipers in town unless the area was cleared and supporting forces were available for extraction. Our method was to move into an area, clear a building, drop the team, and continue forward movement. The sniper team was assigned specific targets, and time on station. Snipers were very effective in destroying RPG gunners along the walls of the mosque or in the minarets.
Use every combat system available. During the Dukes' five-week fight in Najaf/Kufa, the task force employed AC-130 gunships, Kiowa Warriors with Hellfire missiles, and Copperhead, as well as variable time (VT) and time fuse delayed (TFD) 155mm and 120mm. Each had a specific purpose built into the plan. AC-130 fires were deadly for clearing bunkers, destroying RPG gunners in the palm groves, and in canalizing the enemy. After the first few engagements, the enemy decided it was not wise to stay outside while the sound of the AC-130 circled overhead. We used this advantage in either driving the enemy back inside to allow us closer maneuver, or keeping him off station while an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) located a strongpoint, passed grid location, then called in the AC-130 to destroy his strongpoint.
The Kiowa Warrior has a fantastic weapons platform. When resourced with Hellfire, a commander can engage those hard-to-reach targets. Additionally, an armed UAV becomes the weapon of choice when engaging an enemy moving around urban terrain. During one of the task force's last battles, an enemy mortar man, using a pickup truck with a 82mm mortar in the back, was conducting attacks on FOB Golf. The UAV was brought in; it identified, followed, and when conditions were right, destroyed the mortar, mortar man, and truck, with absolutely no collateral damage.
Paladin fires were critical to our success. We fired all types of munitions. Later in the campaign, the enemy developed his own methods to counter traditional 'fire for effect' high explosive rounds. The enemy would remain inside buildings or along the roofs of sensitive targets. On occasion, we would engage enemy on rooftops or engage an enemy mortar man near a built-up area with VT. In one instance, there were enemy RPG gunners and riflemen across the river inside a second-story building preventing a troop from maneuvering into a support-by-fire (SBF) position. Six TFD rounds later, the troop established the SBF and the mission continued with the enemy destroyed.
Early in the campaign we used Copperhead with OH-58D to destroy bunkers along narrow streets and in palm groves. The system works, with practice, and allows the maneuver commander freedom of movement along lateral routes. The task force also had an opportunity to employ an Iraqi counter-terrorism force, which was impressive. The enemy believed the coalition would not enter mosques because their information operations campaign had convinced them of such. The enemy's information was correct! The coalition did not enter the mosque--the Iraqi counterterrorism force did, destroying five enemy riflemen and locating and confiscating a cache of mortars, RPGs, AK47s, and hand grenades.
The impact of nonlethal fires is integral to any campaign. The task force was well armed with a tactical psychological team (TPT), two civil affairs (CA) teams, two attack/bomb dog teams, PROPHET, engineers, and several media sources. For example, the task force would target neighborhoods identified by electronic warfare assets that indicated local people were undecided on coalition support. We would move in and project a positive message with the TPT, followed by CA teams, who developed projects on the ground. We also sent in the TPT and CA teams during the 'mitigation phase' of operations to assess public sentiment and collect information on collateral damage.
The bomb/attack dog teams were used on every operation involving suspected arms caches or mortar firing positions, and the engineers were critical in building force protection around FOBs, Iraqi police stations, and other highly sensitive targets. The task force also used the engineers to recover jersey barriers employed by the enemy along trench lines and to fill in enemy trench lines and fighting positions.
The media should be treated like family because they target the international community and keep higher echelons of command happy. The information provided before and immediately following the operation determined how successful the story got out. Normally, the task force commander briefly described the operation, concept and target, and placed the reporters in a vehicle (M1114 or M113), which trailed one of the companies. After the fight, a quick recap of what happened, maybe an interview for clarification, and the story is done. In some instances, commanders need to 'go live' during a fight, to ensure the press does not make assumptions. In all cases, treating the press with dignity and respect paid huge dividends.
Combat Leaders
Lead by example. In urban terrain, commanders discover that to visualize the battlefield, they absolutely have to be in the middle of the fight. A commander can best gauge intensity and tempo by being in the middle of the decisive effort and the company's main effort. This has implications, and subordinate commanders will need a while to become familiar with this course of action, but it was successfully employed in Najaf.
Never be without communications. Commanders have a need to dismount in urban terrain--yes, even tank battalion commanders. Get caught without corns while on the ground and you instantly lose situational understanding and the information passed on the command net between crosstalking company commanders.
Rule one: The command net is the command net. This takes practice. The main function of the command net is to facilitate commanders' crosstalk. The tactical operations center (TOC) monitors and passes necessary intelligence updates or announces combat multipliers arriving, but it should not be used for the battalion XO, battalion $3, and battalion commander to carry on conversations about the fight.
Rule two: During the fight, the visible commander on the battlefield helps steady the force. This is not as obvious as one might think--based on personal experience, it is a learned skill. It is much harder for a commander to be present and commanding during the fight, than when executing simulations or training at combat training centers. Commanders must be mentally prepared before the fight, visualize where they want to be to influence the fight, then adjust fire if the fight shifts.
Confidence and demeanor. Never doubt yourself, your commanders, or your soldiers. Maintain confidence in your equipment and the ability of your entire team to keep combat systems in the fight. We train on intent, and we succeed by sticking to what works. A leader who micromanages in battle will produce disastrous results. Let your subordinate commanders develop and execute their plan in conjunction with your commanders intent; no matter how much you want to, do not tell a subordinate how to "suck the egg."
Know your subordinates' abilities--can do; can't do (but really can). This is something that is developed over time. Commanders already have an 80-percent solution on how subordinate commanders react under stress. The battlefield reveals how they react to success or to losing a soldier. Learn and apply this knowledge in future fights. An aggressive commander may push too far when success is achieved quickly in his sector, not seeing the entire battlefield. A commander may even hesitate if he loses a soldier or vehicle, not understanding the impact of this delay on adjacent units. Most of these issues should be addressed in the task force combined-arms rehearsal, but the task force commander will ultimately make his decisions based on an intimate understanding of his subordinate's capabilities and limitations.
The three most important lessons learned in the fight for Najaf will be applicable in future battles. Commanders and staffs must first develop a campaign plan, taking into consideration a realistic timeline for achieving the end state, then visualizing the pace or tempo required to sustain the fight. Consideration must be given to combat potential, applied in a deliberate fashion, and integrated into the campaign's end state. Additionally, the U.S. Army's combat systems are unbeatable. Every system applies precision and becomes deadly when properly employed with a little ingenuity. Finally, combat leaders bring everything together. Technically and tactically proficient commanders and soldiers win the day, but they are not tireless, and they will make mistakes. A commander must constantly gauge the effectiveness of his soldiers and leaders, a knowledge gained through experience and trust.
The fight for Najaf was an intense and bloody affair. The five-week battle again validated that our soldiers and leaders are the best in the world, we have the best equipment, and doctrine is just that, doctrine! Most importantly, the Najaf fight proved armor remains relevant and is a lethal force in urban terrain.
Lieutenant Colonel Pat White is currently the G3, 1st Armored Division (1AD), Wiesbaden, Germany. He received a B.A. from Claremont College and an M.S. from Central Michigan University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and Joint Professional Officer Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, Task Force (TF) Iron Dukes, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor, 1AD, Operation Iraqi Freedom; chief, current operations, J3, Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA.; $3 and XO, 2d Battalion, 70th Armor Regiment, 3d Brigade, 1AD, Fort Riley, KS; opposing force tank company commander, D Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, GE; and commander, C Company, 2d Battalion, 32d Armor Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1AD, Kirchgoens, GE.
by Pat White
On 22 April 2004, Task Force (TF) 2d Battalion, 37th Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, the 'Iron Dukes,' assumed mission from 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, in the holy city of An Najaf, Iraq. The enemy, known as Muqtada's militia, controlled An Najaf and neighboring Al Kufa. The mission statement appeared simple: destroy the militia and restore order to An Najaf/Kufa to allow transition of authority to a legitimate Iraqi government; and, on order, transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi security forces (ISF).
When the fighting stopped and the smoke cleared on 4 June 2004, TF Iron Dukes had battled nonstop for five weeks and broken the enemy's will to fight, destroying over 600 militia and wounding countless others, capturing or destroying all types and calibers of weapons, successfully detaining two top aides to Muqtada al-Sadr, and seizing weapons caches in the holy cemetery and Sahla Mosque.
For the Iron Dukes, the road to An Najaf began on 28 May 2003. The Iron Dukes were cross attached to the 'Dragoons,' 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). The Dukes accepted enhancement of light cavalry troop and one detached tank company. For the next 10 months, the Dukes would perform combat missions, peacekeeping missions, and recruit and train 500 Iraqi police and an Iraqi civil defense corps battalion in southern Baghdad.
Between 4 April and 10 April 2004, the Dukes fought in Sadr City, Baghdad, under tactical control of 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry, followed by fights in Al Kut on 17 April. These actions successfully prepared the Iron Dukes for one of the most intense urban battles since the Iraq ground war in 2003.
The fighting in Najaf began on 28 April 2004. Available combat potential for the fight included: two M1A1 Abrams integrated management (AIMS) organic tank companies, comprised of companies Aggressor and Crusader; two light cavalry troops, made up of Apache Troop, 1st Squadron, and Iron Troop, 3d Squadron; one Paladin battery with fire-finder radar, Assassin, 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery; one military police (MP) company (minus), Warbear, 2175th Battalion, Missouri National Guard; one MP platoon, Renegade, 66th MP company, Fort Lewis, Washington; one light combat engineer company (CEC), 84th CEC, 2d ACR; one psychological operations team; two civil affairs teams; an electronic warfare platoon; and an organic headquarters and headquarters company.
The task force organized forces into four maneuver teams, as shown in Figure 1. These forces were arrayed across the battle-space in three forward operating bases (FOBs), separated by approximately 40 kilometers. Headquarters and headquarters company (minus) operated from FOB Duke, a dusty patch of ground in the middle of the desert. One tank team and the Paladin battery were located at FOB Hotel on the northern outskirts of An Najaf. The rest of the task force collocated with an El Salvadorian battalion in the heart of An Najaf at FOB Baker/Golf. The task force also integrated into operations aerial scout weapons teams (OH-58D Kiowa Warriors), an AC-130 gunship, F-16 Fighting Falcons, unmanned aerial vehicles, Iraqi counter-terrorism forces, and an operational detachment A (ODA) team already operating in An Najaf.
The enemy was made up of trained and untrained militia. The trained militia members were organized into four companies. Two companies were employed as defensive companies and controlled key terrain around the Ali Shrine and Kufa mosque, while two companies were employed as attack companies throughout Kufa and Najaf.
The untrained militia roamed the streets and executed 'opportunity attacks' on coalition patrols and Iraqi citizens. Additionally, throughout the city, Sadr lieutenants resided with personal security detachments, and almost every mosque and school was being used as a cache for weapons or mortar firing points.
Again, the mission statement appeared simple. In reality, the task force would be challenged daily, balancing application of force with the complexities of the battlefield. First and foremost, consideration had to be given to collateral damage on holy sites, including the Imam Ali Shrine, which is a religious symbol for over 5 million Shi'ite worldwide and headquarters for Ayatollah Sistani, Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and more than 500 militia fighters; and the Kufa Mosque, which is second only in religious significance to the Ali Shrine and is the stronghold of the militia with more than 600 fighters.
To the north of the Ali Shrine, lies the largest Shia burial ground in the world. This area was infested with insurgents from the Ali Shrine and Kufa, and was used as a weapons cache, and as the task force would later learn, a sensitive site requiring precision fires.
This article shares lessons learned and methods developed during the fight in Najaf/Kufa. Although, the fight will never be labeled a modern 72 Easting, or spearhead into Iraq by the 3d Infantry Division, the intensity, tempo, and constraints have application for future employment of armor forces in urban terrain.
Tempo and Campaigning
Understand the complexity of the battlefield. In the case of Najaf and Kufa, considering political backlash from damaging holy sites and creating unnecessary collateral damage was paramount in all planning and execution. Soldiers were well aware of the cascading effects a hole in the golden dome or a city block razed during counter fire would have on the Shia population; in essence, defeating the campaign's purpose. From the onset, these constraints became a leader challenge and commanders executed to perfection. Soldiers adapted engagement techniques and chose appropriate weapons systems to destroy the threat, with little or no damage to significant holy sites. The staff identified holy sites during the military decisionmaking process and planned around them by using precision fires, nonlethal fires, or bypassing the site.
Have a plan. On this complex battlefield, tempo is probably the most important factor a staff and commander consider when developing the campaign plan. Do not be overzealous; realize you will lose equipment, soldiers to wounded in action, and energy as you continue to fight, day after day. Take the end state, and shape your plan. In Najaf, we focused on three areas, and integrated these areas into continuous attacks.
We concentrated first on the militia--keep up the pressure, stay flexible, and remain unpredictable. We focused secondly on Madhi leaders--target them and choose the right time to attack, such as at a time when the enemy is depending on public leadership. The task force conducted spoiling attacks on Fridays (prayer day) to disrupt al-Sadr's movement between Najaf and Kufa. On two such occasions, Sadr was forced to send his second in charge to speak at Friday prayers in Kufa, and on one occasion, the task force captured his personal aide. Even when unsuccessful in capturing high-value targets, the fact the task force disrupted enemy movement and communications became crucial for follow-on missions. For example, about two weeks into the campaign, the task force began targeting Muqtada and his top three lieutenants. Our end state was capture, but in the process, we found that we directly affected the enemy's ability to coordinate, communicate, and maintain the initiative, which allowed the task force freedom of maneuver throughout the area of operation. Finally, we concentrated on weapons caches. We specifically targeted enemy supply lines and ammunition caches.
In effect, these three areas caused the militia to fight in multiple directions, and forced him to choose priorities. By forcing the enemy to make choices, we gained the initiative, forcing the enemy to consolidate his forces to protect his high payoff targets, allowing the task force to focus on destroying the militia. If a commander fails to campaign, the task force can easily become mired in reactive mode and lose focus on the end state.
Watch your soldiers and equipment. We have the best soldiers in the world, and they are 'can do' all the time. Rely on platoon leaders and platoon sergeants to gauge soldier effectiveness. We stared hard and aggressive, and within a week, we were losing the attention-to-detail battle. We began pacing operations so that a troop/company had a 12-hour period in which to rest and refit. The campaign plan took this timeline into consideration, and allowed the company/troop to execute company-level offensive operations as well as task force operations. The task force chaplain and medical platoon are also excellent sources for determining the effect of continuous operations on soldiers.
The battalion maintenance office and battalion maintenance technician are important in predicting Class IX needs and surging mechanics. Over the first three weeks, task force tanks began chewing up track, hubs, and road arms. The task force XO sent up a red flare and we received phenomenal support from 1st Armored Division and theater assets.
Precision Engagement, Lethal Fires, and Shaping the Battlefield
The most precise weapons system in the task force was the M1A1 main battle tank. The coaxial-mounted M240 machine gun is precision at its best. Outrange the enemy RPG gunner and you can conduct precision recon-by-fire in urban terrain while minimizing collateral damage. The tank also has the most accurate and deadly system available--the 120mm main gun. Tank commanders learned early on that firing a multipurpose antitank (MPAT) round, a high-explosive antitank (HEAT) round, or an obstacle-reducing (OR) round immediately silenced enemy massed formations due to tremendous psychological effects. A tank can fire a main gun round through a window and destroy the enemy while damaging only one room, minimizing collateral damage. Tanks can also create entry points for scouts or infantry by firing a main gun round into the wall of a school or directly into the side of a building. OR and MPAT rounds are effective in destroying hasty obstacles, and the task force even used the MPAT round to suppress enemy dismounts on the street.
The task force relied on main gun after experiencing the effects of the tank commander's .50-caliber in close urban terrain. Armor piercing incendiary (API) .50-caliber rounds are devastating and accurate, but cause a significant amount of collateral damage. The API round will pass through four to five buildings without slowing down. The round demolishes concrete structures and sets flammable materials, such as palm and date trees, ablaze. During one fight, an RPG gunner was hiding behind an Alaska barrier, which is concrete, reinforced with rebar, and 12 feet high, and instead of using a main gun round, he shot 50 rounds of API into the base of the Alaska barrier, killing the RPG gunner and clearing the area.
During rehearsals, commanders focused on weapons system employment, integrating fire control measures, such as main gun tight from target reference point (TRP) 1 to 2, and .50-cal tight TRP 3. You still have the loader's M240 for suppressive fires down alleyways, and each loader and tank commander carried M4s on top of the turret, which we used multiple times in killing or suppressing an enemy rifleman or intercepting an RPG approaching the tank from an adjacent alleyway.
Snipers are critical in the urban fight. This is common sense, but a tank battalion does not have snipers, so we developed our own by using soldiers that were 'long shooters' or we integrated trained snipers from an attached light cavalry troop. In Najaf and Kufa, we could not position snipers in town unless the area was cleared and supporting forces were available for extraction. Our method was to move into an area, clear a building, drop the team, and continue forward movement. The sniper team was assigned specific targets, and time on station. Snipers were very effective in destroying RPG gunners along the walls of the mosque or in the minarets.
Use every combat system available. During the Dukes' five-week fight in Najaf/Kufa, the task force employed AC-130 gunships, Kiowa Warriors with Hellfire missiles, and Copperhead, as well as variable time (VT) and time fuse delayed (TFD) 155mm and 120mm. Each had a specific purpose built into the plan. AC-130 fires were deadly for clearing bunkers, destroying RPG gunners in the palm groves, and in canalizing the enemy. After the first few engagements, the enemy decided it was not wise to stay outside while the sound of the AC-130 circled overhead. We used this advantage in either driving the enemy back inside to allow us closer maneuver, or keeping him off station while an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) located a strongpoint, passed grid location, then called in the AC-130 to destroy his strongpoint.
The Kiowa Warrior has a fantastic weapons platform. When resourced with Hellfire, a commander can engage those hard-to-reach targets. Additionally, an armed UAV becomes the weapon of choice when engaging an enemy moving around urban terrain. During one of the task force's last battles, an enemy mortar man, using a pickup truck with a 82mm mortar in the back, was conducting attacks on FOB Golf. The UAV was brought in; it identified, followed, and when conditions were right, destroyed the mortar, mortar man, and truck, with absolutely no collateral damage.
Paladin fires were critical to our success. We fired all types of munitions. Later in the campaign, the enemy developed his own methods to counter traditional 'fire for effect' high explosive rounds. The enemy would remain inside buildings or along the roofs of sensitive targets. On occasion, we would engage enemy on rooftops or engage an enemy mortar man near a built-up area with VT. In one instance, there were enemy RPG gunners and riflemen across the river inside a second-story building preventing a troop from maneuvering into a support-by-fire (SBF) position. Six TFD rounds later, the troop established the SBF and the mission continued with the enemy destroyed.
Early in the campaign we used Copperhead with OH-58D to destroy bunkers along narrow streets and in palm groves. The system works, with practice, and allows the maneuver commander freedom of movement along lateral routes. The task force also had an opportunity to employ an Iraqi counter-terrorism force, which was impressive. The enemy believed the coalition would not enter mosques because their information operations campaign had convinced them of such. The enemy's information was correct! The coalition did not enter the mosque--the Iraqi counterterrorism force did, destroying five enemy riflemen and locating and confiscating a cache of mortars, RPGs, AK47s, and hand grenades.
The impact of nonlethal fires is integral to any campaign. The task force was well armed with a tactical psychological team (TPT), two civil affairs (CA) teams, two attack/bomb dog teams, PROPHET, engineers, and several media sources. For example, the task force would target neighborhoods identified by electronic warfare assets that indicated local people were undecided on coalition support. We would move in and project a positive message with the TPT, followed by CA teams, who developed projects on the ground. We also sent in the TPT and CA teams during the 'mitigation phase' of operations to assess public sentiment and collect information on collateral damage.
The bomb/attack dog teams were used on every operation involving suspected arms caches or mortar firing positions, and the engineers were critical in building force protection around FOBs, Iraqi police stations, and other highly sensitive targets. The task force also used the engineers to recover jersey barriers employed by the enemy along trench lines and to fill in enemy trench lines and fighting positions.
The media should be treated like family because they target the international community and keep higher echelons of command happy. The information provided before and immediately following the operation determined how successful the story got out. Normally, the task force commander briefly described the operation, concept and target, and placed the reporters in a vehicle (M1114 or M113), which trailed one of the companies. After the fight, a quick recap of what happened, maybe an interview for clarification, and the story is done. In some instances, commanders need to 'go live' during a fight, to ensure the press does not make assumptions. In all cases, treating the press with dignity and respect paid huge dividends.
Combat Leaders
Lead by example. In urban terrain, commanders discover that to visualize the battlefield, they absolutely have to be in the middle of the fight. A commander can best gauge intensity and tempo by being in the middle of the decisive effort and the company's main effort. This has implications, and subordinate commanders will need a while to become familiar with this course of action, but it was successfully employed in Najaf.
Never be without communications. Commanders have a need to dismount in urban terrain--yes, even tank battalion commanders. Get caught without corns while on the ground and you instantly lose situational understanding and the information passed on the command net between crosstalking company commanders.
Rule one: The command net is the command net. This takes practice. The main function of the command net is to facilitate commanders' crosstalk. The tactical operations center (TOC) monitors and passes necessary intelligence updates or announces combat multipliers arriving, but it should not be used for the battalion XO, battalion $3, and battalion commander to carry on conversations about the fight.
Rule two: During the fight, the visible commander on the battlefield helps steady the force. This is not as obvious as one might think--based on personal experience, it is a learned skill. It is much harder for a commander to be present and commanding during the fight, than when executing simulations or training at combat training centers. Commanders must be mentally prepared before the fight, visualize where they want to be to influence the fight, then adjust fire if the fight shifts.
Confidence and demeanor. Never doubt yourself, your commanders, or your soldiers. Maintain confidence in your equipment and the ability of your entire team to keep combat systems in the fight. We train on intent, and we succeed by sticking to what works. A leader who micromanages in battle will produce disastrous results. Let your subordinate commanders develop and execute their plan in conjunction with your commanders intent; no matter how much you want to, do not tell a subordinate how to "suck the egg."
Know your subordinates' abilities--can do; can't do (but really can). This is something that is developed over time. Commanders already have an 80-percent solution on how subordinate commanders react under stress. The battlefield reveals how they react to success or to losing a soldier. Learn and apply this knowledge in future fights. An aggressive commander may push too far when success is achieved quickly in his sector, not seeing the entire battlefield. A commander may even hesitate if he loses a soldier or vehicle, not understanding the impact of this delay on adjacent units. Most of these issues should be addressed in the task force combined-arms rehearsal, but the task force commander will ultimately make his decisions based on an intimate understanding of his subordinate's capabilities and limitations.
The three most important lessons learned in the fight for Najaf will be applicable in future battles. Commanders and staffs must first develop a campaign plan, taking into consideration a realistic timeline for achieving the end state, then visualizing the pace or tempo required to sustain the fight. Consideration must be given to combat potential, applied in a deliberate fashion, and integrated into the campaign's end state. Additionally, the U.S. Army's combat systems are unbeatable. Every system applies precision and becomes deadly when properly employed with a little ingenuity. Finally, combat leaders bring everything together. Technically and tactically proficient commanders and soldiers win the day, but they are not tireless, and they will make mistakes. A commander must constantly gauge the effectiveness of his soldiers and leaders, a knowledge gained through experience and trust.
The fight for Najaf was an intense and bloody affair. The five-week battle again validated that our soldiers and leaders are the best in the world, we have the best equipment, and doctrine is just that, doctrine! Most importantly, the Najaf fight proved armor remains relevant and is a lethal force in urban terrain.
Lieutenant Colonel Pat White is currently the G3, 1st Armored Division (1AD), Wiesbaden, Germany. He received a B.A. from Claremont College and an M.S. from Central Michigan University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and Joint Professional Officer Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, Task Force (TF) Iron Dukes, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor, 1AD, Operation Iraqi Freedom; chief, current operations, J3, Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA.; $3 and XO, 2d Battalion, 70th Armor Regiment, 3d Brigade, 1AD, Fort Riley, KS; opposing force tank company commander, D Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, GE; and commander, C Company, 2d Battalion, 32d Armor Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1AD, Kirchgoens, GE.