2RHPZ
03-04-2005, 03:24 PM
Major tank developments 1960-2004
by Teddy H. Sanford, Jr., Burton S. Boudinot
For most armies during the 20th century, tank development was a slow process. When compared to the aircraft industry, the United States came out of World War II and Korea with tanks of marginal firepower and mobility. It was apparent that something had to be done.
In 1959, the United States Department of Defense convened a Blue Ribbon Panel that reviewed tank development and other weapons systems. The panel found that Russia was very concerned with tactical nuclear weapons, which the United States had deployed in Europe, and fully expected the United States to use them if Soviet forces were to attack. To counter the nuclear threat, the Russians planned to attack in mass and "hug" North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, thus making it difficult to use nuclear weapons. This was called the "bear hug" tactic by the Soviet Union. Once in close, Russia would have the advantage of numbers and could simply overwhelm allied forces. The panel also found that with the tremendous advantage the Russians had in tank numbers, the United States needed to engage them at maximum range to reduce their numbers before they could get in close. These findings led to developing the MBT 70, the M60A2, and the M551, all of which were armed with the 152mm M162 gun/Shillelagh missile launcher. The 152mm gun optimized the missile to penetrate enemy armor at very long ranges, although little thought was given to how this would effect conventional ammunition. In fact, it denied the possibility of developing a kinetic energy round, and the only round available for most of its service life was a very slow M409 high explosive antitank (HEAT) round that was very inaccurate at longer ranges and took a toll on the fire control system when it was fired.
All of the 152mm systems suffered from electrical problems throughout their service life because of the M409. This was especially true in the very light M551 Sheridan. The gunner would often receive a bruised forehead and nose if he did not pull back from the sight when he pulled the trigger. An interesting note is that someone on the Department of the Army staff looked at all of these "coming" 152mm systems and convinced decisionmakers that it would be very cost effective to buy out the full acquisition objective for the Shillelagh missile. This was done, and when the MBT 70 and subsequent XM803 effort died, and the M60A2 was withdrawn from service after a very short period, the Army was stuck with a huge inventory of Shillelagh missiles that were never used.
During 1969 and 1970, the M551 was eventually deployed in significant numbers to Vietnam because General Creighton Abrams, then the Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command--Vietnam wanted to learn more about its weapons system. Abrams was not a light armor vehicle advocate; in fact, he called the V-100 "a five-ton rice cooker." At the time, the Sheridan still had some 52 major deficiencies, but it was type classified so it could be deployed. There was some concern that the guidance system for the Shillelagh missile might become compromised, so it was removed prior to deployment. Other changes included adding a gun shield for the tank commander, a searchlight, an antipersonnel round, and belly armor for the driver that extended from the lower front glacis to about the middle of the vehicle. Tests at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, showed that the driver would be wounded or killed if the vehicle hit a mine. After the changes were applied, the vehicles were deployed.
The M551 also developed another problem in Vietnam: the M409 had a combustible case, which often swelled in the dampness making it difficult to load. If the case was hit with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), the results were usually catastrophic. Several hundred M551s were knocked out in Vietnam, mostly from mines.
It is interesting to note that Russia took a different approach toward tank missiles. Rather than opting for the missile, they used conventional ammunition and developed missiles that would fire through the tank gun. This started with the 125mm 2A26 gun on the T-64 series tank. The first missile firing tank was the T-64B that looked just like the T-64A, a non-missile version, but had the fire control components to fire the AT-8 Songster missile (the Russian designation was Kobra) with a range of 4,000 meters. All systems developed since then have had a missile capability, including the T-72, T-80, and T-90. These systems use the Refleks missile, which has a range of 5,000 meters, and is beyond any round fielded for the Abrams. This will not be corrected until the medium range munition (MRM) is fielded late this decade.
In late 1971, both the U.S. Congress and U.S. Army were disgusted with the German/American MBT 70 venture, the XM 803 program, and the disappointing performance of both the M551 and M60A2 weapons systems. Congress decreed that enough was enough. In February 1972, a main battle tank (MBT) task force was convened at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The task force was not without guidance. The Fort Knox Armor Center Team had produced a white paper outlining what armor branch wanted in a new tank. Nothing super technical; it should weigh about 55 tons, mount a 105mm high velocity gun system, and have a high-mobility chassis. Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL), Aberdeen Proving Grounds, told the task force that the new "XM-1" was not tough enough against the threat.
In the summer of 1972, Britain asked the United States to look at a new armor protection array. As a result, the Chief of Staff, Army ordered the new armor be added to the XM-1 materiel needs requirement. The XM-1 had grown in length, width, and weight. When the task force finished, it had the base concept of what was to become the world's best tank.
When the MBT task force was doing its work from February to August of 1972, the threat was the T-62 tank, which was fitted with the 115mm 2A20 Rapira smoothbore gun. This tank had an armor-piercing, fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) kinetic energy round that had a very flat trajectory and, with the tanks stadia range finder, was very effective out to about 1,600 meters. It was a good tank for its day, but nothing earthshaking, and the M68 105mm rifled gun appeared to be the appropriate gun to take on the threat. That gun had previously been applied to late versions of the old Patton-series tank, the M48A5. The big surprise came in 1974 when, in a very short time, Russia fielded its forces in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) with the T-64A. This tank, with its 125mm smoothbore gun, automatic loader, and what was later to be determined unconventional armor, was a wake-up call.
For the rest of the 1970s and the early 1980s, considerable emphasis was put on determining what Russia was doing with tanks. When the T-72 was introduced in the late 1970s, it took some time to realize that it was really a low-tech tank, rather than a tank that could top the high-tech T-64A. The T-72 was really built to replace the many T-55 tanks in Russia's inventory and could be manufactured in large numbers from the tank factory at Nizhny Tagil.
During this time, there was considerable discussion about the 105mm M68 gun's adequacy as gathered intelligence and target development by BRL all seemed to suggest that Russia's tanks were very tough targets. Further, the tank's 125mm gun fired more accurately at longer distances than the M68 gun. Tougher targets and a need for a longer range capability combined to bring forth the 120mm smoothbore gun.
The need for a better gun was confirmed by the user's 120mm M1E1 Tank Armament Review Group that met at Fort Knox from September of 1982 to January 1983. While not a part of this group, BRL had a major impact on the decision regarding the work they had done in translating intelligence data and analysis from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the American Committee for Inoperable Systems into target arrays representative of Soviet tanks. Conclusions and recommendations all favored going forward with the 120mm, which was subsequently used on the M1A1 tank.
The Germans had been developing a 120mm smoothbore system and it was adopted by the United States. The idea that it was done as an offset to the E3 advanced warning and control system (AWACS) is not true, and it was not yielding to foreign pressure. It would have taken too long and been too costly to go through a development cycle with the gun and its associated ammunition, and it was logical to adopt the German gun. There may have been some offset credits, but the user community at Fort Knox came up with the requirements for the new gun. This was validated by concurring decisions by the U.S. Army Armor Center, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Chief of Staff, Army. The Germans also had developed some excellent ammunition for the new gun, and this was the subject of a technology transfer to the United States where Honeywell Defense began producing the ammunition. Simply stating, "The Abrams with the 120mm gun, the M1A1 tank, has been a success," is an understatement. It performed well in both the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraqi War of 2003 where it remains in combat to this day.
As to whether a 105mm gun could have done the job, the answer is, "no!" Modem tanks have great base armor, but also enjoy the protection of explosive reactive armor (ERA). These externally applied "boxes" explode to change the path of incoming kinetic-energy or chemical-energy rounds. By changing the direction of the round's path, it significantly reduces the amount of armor that it can penetrate. The old M900 KE round for the 105mm gun would have very little capability against such a threat. The threat also continues to evolve.
One of the most interesting developments is the new Chinese type-98 main battle tank that just entered production. This tank appears to have received a great deal of its technology from Europe, and it is threatening. It is certainly possible that this tank could find its way to export market places, such as Iran or Syria, and must be considered as a probable future opponent.
As to process, there are many players and the discussion never ends but remains in a constant state of investigation. Current discussions over manned combat systems for the future combat system (FCS) are every bit as spirited as past discussions. The Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (UAMBL), Fort Knox, is carrying out many of the functions that were performed by the MBT task force in the 1970s, but in this case, it is examining the entire U.S. Army structure and equipment needs, rather than a single system.
As a descendent of the tank, the proposed mounted combat system (MCS) is once more examining armament options. Can a light system equipped with a 105mm gun and joint and network fires get the job done in the 21st century or will a larger gun be required to take care of emerging threats? TRADOC determines what field soldiers need to be successful; program managers determine how best to meet these needs; and industry produces the final product. There is always a degree of tension between the three as programs progress, but only through this give-and-take process do we get a product that will benefit the service and the Nation.
Retired Lieutenant Colonel Burton S. Boudinot is a combat veteran of both the Korean War and Vietnam. He devoted several years of his career to researching, developing, testing, and evaluating armor and cavalry systems. He was a member of the main battle tank task force, which established the original requirement for the Abrams main battle tank. He served in various command and staff positions throughout his career, to include chief, Armor Test Division, U.S. Army Armor and Engineer Board, Fort Knox, KY; and editor in chief, ARMOR Magazine, Fort Knox.
Retired Lieutenant Colonel Teddy H. Sanford Jr. served two combat tours in Vietnam. He dedicated many years of his career to the research, development, testing, and evaluation of armor and cavalry systems. He assisted in the development of the combat mission profile for the XM-1 in support of the main battle tank task force. During his distinguished career, he also served on the tank desk in the Ground Weapons Systems Branch, Assistant Vice Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency.
by Teddy H. Sanford, Jr., Burton S. Boudinot
For most armies during the 20th century, tank development was a slow process. When compared to the aircraft industry, the United States came out of World War II and Korea with tanks of marginal firepower and mobility. It was apparent that something had to be done.
In 1959, the United States Department of Defense convened a Blue Ribbon Panel that reviewed tank development and other weapons systems. The panel found that Russia was very concerned with tactical nuclear weapons, which the United States had deployed in Europe, and fully expected the United States to use them if Soviet forces were to attack. To counter the nuclear threat, the Russians planned to attack in mass and "hug" North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, thus making it difficult to use nuclear weapons. This was called the "bear hug" tactic by the Soviet Union. Once in close, Russia would have the advantage of numbers and could simply overwhelm allied forces. The panel also found that with the tremendous advantage the Russians had in tank numbers, the United States needed to engage them at maximum range to reduce their numbers before they could get in close. These findings led to developing the MBT 70, the M60A2, and the M551, all of which were armed with the 152mm M162 gun/Shillelagh missile launcher. The 152mm gun optimized the missile to penetrate enemy armor at very long ranges, although little thought was given to how this would effect conventional ammunition. In fact, it denied the possibility of developing a kinetic energy round, and the only round available for most of its service life was a very slow M409 high explosive antitank (HEAT) round that was very inaccurate at longer ranges and took a toll on the fire control system when it was fired.
All of the 152mm systems suffered from electrical problems throughout their service life because of the M409. This was especially true in the very light M551 Sheridan. The gunner would often receive a bruised forehead and nose if he did not pull back from the sight when he pulled the trigger. An interesting note is that someone on the Department of the Army staff looked at all of these "coming" 152mm systems and convinced decisionmakers that it would be very cost effective to buy out the full acquisition objective for the Shillelagh missile. This was done, and when the MBT 70 and subsequent XM803 effort died, and the M60A2 was withdrawn from service after a very short period, the Army was stuck with a huge inventory of Shillelagh missiles that were never used.
During 1969 and 1970, the M551 was eventually deployed in significant numbers to Vietnam because General Creighton Abrams, then the Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command--Vietnam wanted to learn more about its weapons system. Abrams was not a light armor vehicle advocate; in fact, he called the V-100 "a five-ton rice cooker." At the time, the Sheridan still had some 52 major deficiencies, but it was type classified so it could be deployed. There was some concern that the guidance system for the Shillelagh missile might become compromised, so it was removed prior to deployment. Other changes included adding a gun shield for the tank commander, a searchlight, an antipersonnel round, and belly armor for the driver that extended from the lower front glacis to about the middle of the vehicle. Tests at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, showed that the driver would be wounded or killed if the vehicle hit a mine. After the changes were applied, the vehicles were deployed.
The M551 also developed another problem in Vietnam: the M409 had a combustible case, which often swelled in the dampness making it difficult to load. If the case was hit with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), the results were usually catastrophic. Several hundred M551s were knocked out in Vietnam, mostly from mines.
It is interesting to note that Russia took a different approach toward tank missiles. Rather than opting for the missile, they used conventional ammunition and developed missiles that would fire through the tank gun. This started with the 125mm 2A26 gun on the T-64 series tank. The first missile firing tank was the T-64B that looked just like the T-64A, a non-missile version, but had the fire control components to fire the AT-8 Songster missile (the Russian designation was Kobra) with a range of 4,000 meters. All systems developed since then have had a missile capability, including the T-72, T-80, and T-90. These systems use the Refleks missile, which has a range of 5,000 meters, and is beyond any round fielded for the Abrams. This will not be corrected until the medium range munition (MRM) is fielded late this decade.
In late 1971, both the U.S. Congress and U.S. Army were disgusted with the German/American MBT 70 venture, the XM 803 program, and the disappointing performance of both the M551 and M60A2 weapons systems. Congress decreed that enough was enough. In February 1972, a main battle tank (MBT) task force was convened at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The task force was not without guidance. The Fort Knox Armor Center Team had produced a white paper outlining what armor branch wanted in a new tank. Nothing super technical; it should weigh about 55 tons, mount a 105mm high velocity gun system, and have a high-mobility chassis. Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL), Aberdeen Proving Grounds, told the task force that the new "XM-1" was not tough enough against the threat.
In the summer of 1972, Britain asked the United States to look at a new armor protection array. As a result, the Chief of Staff, Army ordered the new armor be added to the XM-1 materiel needs requirement. The XM-1 had grown in length, width, and weight. When the task force finished, it had the base concept of what was to become the world's best tank.
When the MBT task force was doing its work from February to August of 1972, the threat was the T-62 tank, which was fitted with the 115mm 2A20 Rapira smoothbore gun. This tank had an armor-piercing, fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) kinetic energy round that had a very flat trajectory and, with the tanks stadia range finder, was very effective out to about 1,600 meters. It was a good tank for its day, but nothing earthshaking, and the M68 105mm rifled gun appeared to be the appropriate gun to take on the threat. That gun had previously been applied to late versions of the old Patton-series tank, the M48A5. The big surprise came in 1974 when, in a very short time, Russia fielded its forces in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) with the T-64A. This tank, with its 125mm smoothbore gun, automatic loader, and what was later to be determined unconventional armor, was a wake-up call.
For the rest of the 1970s and the early 1980s, considerable emphasis was put on determining what Russia was doing with tanks. When the T-72 was introduced in the late 1970s, it took some time to realize that it was really a low-tech tank, rather than a tank that could top the high-tech T-64A. The T-72 was really built to replace the many T-55 tanks in Russia's inventory and could be manufactured in large numbers from the tank factory at Nizhny Tagil.
During this time, there was considerable discussion about the 105mm M68 gun's adequacy as gathered intelligence and target development by BRL all seemed to suggest that Russia's tanks were very tough targets. Further, the tank's 125mm gun fired more accurately at longer distances than the M68 gun. Tougher targets and a need for a longer range capability combined to bring forth the 120mm smoothbore gun.
The need for a better gun was confirmed by the user's 120mm M1E1 Tank Armament Review Group that met at Fort Knox from September of 1982 to January 1983. While not a part of this group, BRL had a major impact on the decision regarding the work they had done in translating intelligence data and analysis from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the American Committee for Inoperable Systems into target arrays representative of Soviet tanks. Conclusions and recommendations all favored going forward with the 120mm, which was subsequently used on the M1A1 tank.
The Germans had been developing a 120mm smoothbore system and it was adopted by the United States. The idea that it was done as an offset to the E3 advanced warning and control system (AWACS) is not true, and it was not yielding to foreign pressure. It would have taken too long and been too costly to go through a development cycle with the gun and its associated ammunition, and it was logical to adopt the German gun. There may have been some offset credits, but the user community at Fort Knox came up with the requirements for the new gun. This was validated by concurring decisions by the U.S. Army Armor Center, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Chief of Staff, Army. The Germans also had developed some excellent ammunition for the new gun, and this was the subject of a technology transfer to the United States where Honeywell Defense began producing the ammunition. Simply stating, "The Abrams with the 120mm gun, the M1A1 tank, has been a success," is an understatement. It performed well in both the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraqi War of 2003 where it remains in combat to this day.
As to whether a 105mm gun could have done the job, the answer is, "no!" Modem tanks have great base armor, but also enjoy the protection of explosive reactive armor (ERA). These externally applied "boxes" explode to change the path of incoming kinetic-energy or chemical-energy rounds. By changing the direction of the round's path, it significantly reduces the amount of armor that it can penetrate. The old M900 KE round for the 105mm gun would have very little capability against such a threat. The threat also continues to evolve.
One of the most interesting developments is the new Chinese type-98 main battle tank that just entered production. This tank appears to have received a great deal of its technology from Europe, and it is threatening. It is certainly possible that this tank could find its way to export market places, such as Iran or Syria, and must be considered as a probable future opponent.
As to process, there are many players and the discussion never ends but remains in a constant state of investigation. Current discussions over manned combat systems for the future combat system (FCS) are every bit as spirited as past discussions. The Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (UAMBL), Fort Knox, is carrying out many of the functions that were performed by the MBT task force in the 1970s, but in this case, it is examining the entire U.S. Army structure and equipment needs, rather than a single system.
As a descendent of the tank, the proposed mounted combat system (MCS) is once more examining armament options. Can a light system equipped with a 105mm gun and joint and network fires get the job done in the 21st century or will a larger gun be required to take care of emerging threats? TRADOC determines what field soldiers need to be successful; program managers determine how best to meet these needs; and industry produces the final product. There is always a degree of tension between the three as programs progress, but only through this give-and-take process do we get a product that will benefit the service and the Nation.
Retired Lieutenant Colonel Burton S. Boudinot is a combat veteran of both the Korean War and Vietnam. He devoted several years of his career to researching, developing, testing, and evaluating armor and cavalry systems. He was a member of the main battle tank task force, which established the original requirement for the Abrams main battle tank. He served in various command and staff positions throughout his career, to include chief, Armor Test Division, U.S. Army Armor and Engineer Board, Fort Knox, KY; and editor in chief, ARMOR Magazine, Fort Knox.
Retired Lieutenant Colonel Teddy H. Sanford Jr. served two combat tours in Vietnam. He dedicated many years of his career to the research, development, testing, and evaluation of armor and cavalry systems. He assisted in the development of the combat mission profile for the XM-1 in support of the main battle tank task force. During his distinguished career, he also served on the tank desk in the Ground Weapons Systems Branch, Assistant Vice Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency.