Deuterium
11-10-2003, 01:22 PM
Pentagon Releases Candid Report On Missile Defense
By: Randy Barrett
Space News Staff Writer
U.S. Army Patriot anti-missile batteries battled poor communications, deep sand and historically short engagement times as they sought to protect American forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
A remarkable, in-depth account of the batteries and their operators during the invasion of Iraq is outlined in a recently published 109-page report entitled “Operation Iraqi Freedom Theater Air and Missile Defense History.” The report was written by the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) at Fort Bliss, Texas.
It is the first official glimpse of how the mobile missile-killing units performed during the conflict. According to the report, 1,069 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) 3, PAC 2 and GEM Plus missiles were in theater when the first incoming Iraqi missile was detected at 12:24 p.m. local time March 20, 2003, in Kuwait. That missile was successfully intercepted and destroyed. The report recounts eight other successful interceptions of Ababil-100, Al Samoud, and CSSC-3 missiles.
All in all, the report says, 23 ballistic and cruise missiles were launched against U.S. forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. One blew up on launch and four others were outside the range of Patriot batteries. The remaining nine missiles were not engaged and landed in unpopulated areas.
Nevertheless, the report’s numbers trouble Victoria Samson, a research associate with the Center for Defense Information, a think tank here. “The 32nd AAMDC claims that the Patriot made nine intercepts out of nine engagements. This seems to be the result of a rather tortuous portrayal of the facts given in their own history,” she said.
Initial Pentagon reports of the success of Patriot missiles against Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1991 Persian Gulf War turned out to be exaggerated.
Samson questioned why nine enemy missiles were not engaged during the more recent conflict. “It’s a leap of faith to assume everything worked correctly,” she said.
An Army official, who wished to speak anonymously, said the missiles that were not engaged “either did not go toward an area defended by Patriot or were launch failures.”
Samson suspects some of the Patriot batteries were not in the right place at the right time: “It should have been obvious where Patriots were needed,” she said.
More answers may be provided in two other long-anticipated reports on Patriot performance from the Army Central Command and the Inspector General. The reports have been delayed and may be released later in November, said Army officials.
The AAMDC report said Patriot operations faced stressed supply lines and myriad communications problems throughout the conflict. Crowded radio spectrum was a critical problem — at times, the only communication possible was via instant messaging.
Meanwhile, ground radars, radar-jamming planes and other friendly aircraft wreaked radio havoc on sensitive Patriot systems, perhaps causing at least one friendly fire incident near Karbala.
“In the midst of this electronic clutter, in the space of a single hour, an FA-18 was mistakenly engaged and destroyed by Patriot missiles, an Air Force attack aircraft mistakenly bombed a friendly field-artillery unit and an Army helicopter crashed. While not the proximate cause of any of these losses, it is possible electronic clutter contributed to all three.”
The report also says Patriot batteries had considerable difficulty traversing the desert — many got stuck in deep sand —and the quick deployment and frequent moves stretched their mobile capabilities. “The Patriot system is mobile in that it can move from place to place on its … wheeled vehicles. However, it was not originally designed to maneuver cross country as part of a combined arms team,” said the report.
Another critical weakness was the Patriot’s failure to detect and engage older-model cruise missiles such as the Frog-7, said the authors. Several were launched but fortunately did not hit U.S. forces. The report said “the ability of these older missiles to penetrate friendly airspace and reach their targets should serve as a warning to joint and Army leaders. While Patriot can detect and destroy cruise missiles, warning and engagement times continue to decrease. … Specifically, current Patriot/cruise missile engagements require significant airspace.”
Samson said the candid report is unusual for the Pentagon, which she noted is traditionally reticent to release any missile-defense information.
By: Randy Barrett
Space News Staff Writer
U.S. Army Patriot anti-missile batteries battled poor communications, deep sand and historically short engagement times as they sought to protect American forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
A remarkable, in-depth account of the batteries and their operators during the invasion of Iraq is outlined in a recently published 109-page report entitled “Operation Iraqi Freedom Theater Air and Missile Defense History.” The report was written by the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) at Fort Bliss, Texas.
It is the first official glimpse of how the mobile missile-killing units performed during the conflict. According to the report, 1,069 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) 3, PAC 2 and GEM Plus missiles were in theater when the first incoming Iraqi missile was detected at 12:24 p.m. local time March 20, 2003, in Kuwait. That missile was successfully intercepted and destroyed. The report recounts eight other successful interceptions of Ababil-100, Al Samoud, and CSSC-3 missiles.
All in all, the report says, 23 ballistic and cruise missiles were launched against U.S. forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. One blew up on launch and four others were outside the range of Patriot batteries. The remaining nine missiles were not engaged and landed in unpopulated areas.
Nevertheless, the report’s numbers trouble Victoria Samson, a research associate with the Center for Defense Information, a think tank here. “The 32nd AAMDC claims that the Patriot made nine intercepts out of nine engagements. This seems to be the result of a rather tortuous portrayal of the facts given in their own history,” she said.
Initial Pentagon reports of the success of Patriot missiles against Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1991 Persian Gulf War turned out to be exaggerated.
Samson questioned why nine enemy missiles were not engaged during the more recent conflict. “It’s a leap of faith to assume everything worked correctly,” she said.
An Army official, who wished to speak anonymously, said the missiles that were not engaged “either did not go toward an area defended by Patriot or were launch failures.”
Samson suspects some of the Patriot batteries were not in the right place at the right time: “It should have been obvious where Patriots were needed,” she said.
More answers may be provided in two other long-anticipated reports on Patriot performance from the Army Central Command and the Inspector General. The reports have been delayed and may be released later in November, said Army officials.
The AAMDC report said Patriot operations faced stressed supply lines and myriad communications problems throughout the conflict. Crowded radio spectrum was a critical problem — at times, the only communication possible was via instant messaging.
Meanwhile, ground radars, radar-jamming planes and other friendly aircraft wreaked radio havoc on sensitive Patriot systems, perhaps causing at least one friendly fire incident near Karbala.
“In the midst of this electronic clutter, in the space of a single hour, an FA-18 was mistakenly engaged and destroyed by Patriot missiles, an Air Force attack aircraft mistakenly bombed a friendly field-artillery unit and an Army helicopter crashed. While not the proximate cause of any of these losses, it is possible electronic clutter contributed to all three.”
The report also says Patriot batteries had considerable difficulty traversing the desert — many got stuck in deep sand —and the quick deployment and frequent moves stretched their mobile capabilities. “The Patriot system is mobile in that it can move from place to place on its … wheeled vehicles. However, it was not originally designed to maneuver cross country as part of a combined arms team,” said the report.
Another critical weakness was the Patriot’s failure to detect and engage older-model cruise missiles such as the Frog-7, said the authors. Several were launched but fortunately did not hit U.S. forces. The report said “the ability of these older missiles to penetrate friendly airspace and reach their targets should serve as a warning to joint and Army leaders. While Patriot can detect and destroy cruise missiles, warning and engagement times continue to decrease. … Specifically, current Patriot/cruise missile engagements require significant airspace.”
Samson said the candid report is unusual for the Pentagon, which she noted is traditionally reticent to release any missile-defense information.