Sayeret
03-08-2005, 01:22 AM
Poli 419n Strategic Studies.
Lecture 16: “Tactical Nuclear Warfare on Land.”
Critical Question: How useful are tactical nuclear weapons on land?
James Dunnigan, How to Make War (New York: William Morrow, 1993), 407-33
David Miller, Battlefield (London: Brian Todd, 1990), 134-139
--, Modern Warfare (New York: Arco Publishing, 1985), 188-193
Lecture:
(I). What are Tac-nukes:
_Tactical nuclear weapons are nuclear weapons designed for battlefield use: they typically have smaller warheads and flexible but shorter-range delivery systems.
_US arsenal 1984: 5,000+ tactical nuclear warheads. Also: 610 ADMs.
_EG: ADM: 1964: 163 lbs (74 kg - 26.6 kg warhead- man portable).
_Davy Crockett, fielded 1961-1971 (range: 2-4 km) 120/150mm recoilless rifle from a jeep with a 4-man crew. W54 warhead weighed 51 lbs (23.2 kg) and had a yield of 0.01 to 1 kiloton. 2,100 produced for $540 million. Bn cmdrs and lower had launch authority: it was done with a decentralized battlefield in view, though US civilian governments did not like it.
_EG: Genie + Falcon AAM: 1957 first test of nuclear unguided (10,171 Genie and 1,900 1961 Falcon manufactured).
_Problem: Soviet armoured forces resist much of the radiation: So US developed the Enhanced Radiation Bomb (ERB) or neutron bomb, in which fast neutrons would penetrate and micro-fragment the armor of Soviet tanks easily and kill the crews in a matter of days. 80% of energy release is gamma, X-ray and neutron radiation, instead of 5% with a thermonuclear device. It also leaves little residual radiation from fission contaminants, thus permitting friendly troops to operate in the battlefield shortly thereafter.
_Design: In a single stage fusion design with T+D kindling, if the depleted uranium mantle is omitted the high energy fusion neutrons are released.
_EG: US W-79 8-inch artillery round.
_1 Kt neutron bomb:
18,000 rads out to 400m: incapacitating within 5 minutes.
8,000 rads out to 650m: lethal within 48 hours.
3,000 rads out to 800m: lethal within 5 days.
650 rads out to 1,000m: high mortality rate in period of two weeks.
_10% of the physical damage of an equivalent bomb +
_One neutron bomb per company (100 soldiers).
_Variable-Yield (Dial-a-nuke): permits nuking enemy between friendly units or close to vital infrastructure.
_EG: US 155mm artillery how: variable yield: 0.05, 0.08 or 0.1 Kt.
_EG: US Honest John: 5, 10, 20, 50 Kt (held warheads loosely for NATO allies).
_Notes: (1). US tac-nukes have PALs because of their dispersion.
_(2). MBTs, APCs, SP arty, command vehicles have integral NBC protection.
(II). Tactical Nuclear Launch Systems:
_There are four types of tactical nuclear weapons:
_(1). Air droppable bombs:
_(2). Artillery-launched nuclear weapons.
_EG: Soviet tactical nuclear weapons:
_Divisional artillery:
2-S5 152mm SP gun 27km 2-5kt
2-S3 152mm SP howitzer 27km 1-5kt
_Divisional assets:
2S7 203mm SP howitzer 18km 2-5kt
2S4 240mm SP mortar 12.7km 2-5kt
_EG: US nuclear artillery:
_NATO (4,300 total):
US M109 155mm 18km 1.0kt
US M110 175mm 16.8km 0.5-10kt
_PLA:
PLA: towed 152mm howitzer (= Soviet D-1 2-S3).
Type 66 towed 152mm howitzer (= Soviet D-20).
_(3). Battlefield missiles (very hard to locate – EG: Iraq SCUDs 1991).
_EG: US Lance: 2,133 manufactured for NATO 1971-80 (110km + 1-100kt).
_EG: US Theatre missile systems: NATO: 464 GLCMs and 108 Pershing IIs.
_EG: Also US nuclear-SAM: 200 launchers.
_EG: Soviet divisional artillery: SS-21 Short Range Missile (120km + 100kt).
_(4). Human-delivered systems: Atomic Demolitions Munitions (ADM): currently withdrawn in Western arsenals.
(III). Tactical Nuclear Weapons Use:
_Points for Tactical Nuclear Targeting:
_(1). Nuclear attacks must be launched with care for friendly forces.
_(2). Recce must not only locate but keep track of targets.
_(3). Suppress enemy nuclear launches.
_(4). Target for maximize enemy destruction: hit targets in depth like headquarters.
_(5). Take advantage of the great blast radius to have area effects on dispersed units.
_(6). Limit the diminishing marginal returns of additional nuclear weapons launched.
_(7). Conduct battle damage assessment to evaluate the results of a strike.
_Points for Battlefield Survival:
_(1). Disperse friendly units:
_EG1: In the 1950s the US reorganized all its army divisions into very dispersed, decentralized and unhierarchical Pentomic divisions, but reversed the policy in the 1960s with the Vietnam war and belief that limited nuclear war was unlikely.
_EG2: US exercise (1965): disperse to 250%: division 50 km depth and 50 km frontage.
_(2). Digging friendly units in works (including taking refuge in built-up areas like cities).
_EG: It was the Tiszard report in 1946 and a British report in 1953 which indicated that dub-in troops could significantly reduce the blast effects of a nuclear weapon.
_(3). Anticipate the loss of communications during a nuclear exchange.
_(4). There will be almost no likelihood of nuclear weapons replenishment during a two-way tactical nuclear exchange, except from out-of-theatre forces.
_(5). Tactical aircraft will have limited availability as airfields will probably be wiped out. VTOL aircraft are suddenly very useful.
Model NATO attack on a Soviet Army:
100 kt: 4.6km pers; 3.2km pers cover; 2.7km trucks; 2km tanks; 900m city.
_An attack on a Soviet Army would take about 100 nuclear weapons allocated as follows:
_(1). 30 nuclear warheads would be used to destroy identified and suspected enemy means of delivering nuclear weapons, including missile, artillery and air force elements. It is very difficult to locate these forces because they are mobile.
_(2). 30 nuclear warheads would be used against headquarters units, of which there are about 30 for each of the battalions in corps. Most of these will be located using electronic means and these are consequently very difficult to distinguish from dummy radio traffic.
_(3). 20 nuclear warheads against 24 supply depots and infrastructure bottlenecks, such as bridges.
_(4). 20 nuclear warheads against those ground units that are identified (there are about 30 battalions). Half of these units will be in-depth and out of contact.
_Anticipated losses:
30,200 casualties (55% of total): 20,250 in open, and 9,950 under cover.
1,050 non-armored vehicles (10% of total).
600 armored vehicles (18% of total).
141,800 civilian casualties.
567,100 homeless civilians.
200,000 homes damaged and destroyed.
Soviet Doctrine of Use:
_The Soviet emphasis on mechanized warfare had a lot to do with surviving nuclear environments, as armored can be hermetically sealed from the outside.
_Characteristics of the Nuclear Battlefield:
_(1). Conquest of territory still matters
_(2). There is no continuous front. All round defense at all echelons.
_(3). Mobile and area defense logical as linear and point defenses vulnerable.
_(4). Camouflage, communications discipline, dummy targets, and diversion are key to avoiding strikes.
_(5). Breakthrough and hasty attacks from the march as deliberate attacks difficult.
_(6). Destruction of enemy recce elements imperative.
_(7). Nuclear environment: individual planes deployed.
_(8). Coordinating logistics is important.
_EG: 1954 Soviet nuke ex in Carpathians between two equal sides using nukes indicated that ops ground to a halt as all log sites were eliminated.
Soviet Tactical Nuclear Warfare Doctrine:
_(1). Nuclear weapons permit offensive operations at a high rate of advance, because of the rate of enemy destruction and the benefits of surprise.
_(2). Nuclear weapons complete destruction missions independently of land forces.
_(3). Nuclear fires must be exploited by maneuver forces.
_(4). Reconnaissance forces must find a path immediately after a nuclear strike and lead the other forces that must pass quickly through the contaminated area.
Soviet Tactics in the Nuclear Environment:
_(1). Isolate the battlefield, hit reserves, creation of obstacles, destroy roads.
_(2). Shift directions quickly to avoid enemy nuclear strikes.
_(3). Close with enemy troops close to avoid their nuclear strikes.
_(4). Nukes must be optimized to be used against targets of opportunity.
_(5). Use special forces and airborne to attack enemy nukes.
Applications:
(I). Cold War Central Europe:
_NATO had a first use declaration.
_EG: 1956-1957: US Army requested: 151,000: 106,000 for tactical use, 25,000 for air defense, 20,000 for allies. It was estimated that the Army would use 423 nuclear warheads a day in a tactical nuclear war not including surface-to-air missiles.
_Total losses from the use of half of the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe:
1.2 million soldiers (70% of total).
43,000 non-armored vehicles (17% of total).
15,000 armored vehicles (29% of total).
5.6 million civilian casualties.
23 million homeless civilians.
8 million homes destroyed.
30% of Germany’s economy destroyed.
_EG: US exercise (1965): only 6% daily attrition rate if nuclear yield of 35 kilotons used (as combo of tactical nuclear weapons). This was considered less than either the Napoleonic or key First World War battles.
_NATO-Warsaw Pact Simulation:
_Assumed: 21,000 nuclear missiles available:
_11,200 nuclear missiles used and 9,800 destroyed or unused in 26 days of fighting.
_Calculation: 1 nuclear volley of 54 missiles destroyed 0 to 6 bdes (0 to 30,000 soldiers) depending on enemy density. Dispersion will be the result as much by decision as by destroyed enemy concentrations, especially the initial Soviet breakthrough concentrations.
_Findings:
_Soviets will city grab knowing that if they get inside the urban areas NATO will be reluctant to nuke a city occupied by their own population.
_Nuclear attack would eliminate the Soviet air force.
_Theatre wide use of nuclear weapons: slows follow-on forces from the Soviet Union.
(II). Cold War Persian Gulf:
_Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the collapse of Iran, in 1980 the US president enunciated the Carter Doctrine which committed the US to the resistance of the entry of any third party into the Persian Gulf. It was quickly determined that a purely conventional war was infeasible, and tactical nuclear weapons would have to play a role.
_Based on 1950s Romeo option: “Retardation of Soviet advances into Western Eurasia:”
_Included nuking of Soviet infrastructure that contributed to an invasion of Iran.
_Ten Soviet divisions were expected in 1968, and it was planned to use 200 nuclear weapons against theatre targets.
_ADMs: The US looked at ADMs: calculating that the Soviet Union could move 3,000 cubic meters a day of rock, and noting that a 30 kiloton device would displace 80,000 cubic meters of earth, indicated that nuclear attacks would seriously slow a Soviet advance through the mountains for about a month (assuming all routes hit). ADMs would also produce fall-out due to groundburst. One of the options was the use of cruise missiles from the Indian Ocean position of the USN to deliver the warheads. Lance missiles, ALCMs, air-dropped bombs, and nuclear artillery was also considered for use in the Zagros mountains.
(III). Sino-Indian Border War:
_3 cases of nuke use:
_(1). Use of nuclear strike to breakthrough defense.
_Useful but requires quick exploitation to avoid counter-strike and contamination.
_(2). Use of nuclear strike to halt attack.
_Formations in the attack are more vulnerable as they are out of cover.
_(3). Use of nuclear strikes to cut logistics.
_Effect increases as the geography is infra-structurally constraining.
http://artsandscience.concordia.ca/poli419n/lectures/lecture16_txt.html
Lecture 16: “Tactical Nuclear Warfare on Land.”
Critical Question: How useful are tactical nuclear weapons on land?
James Dunnigan, How to Make War (New York: William Morrow, 1993), 407-33
David Miller, Battlefield (London: Brian Todd, 1990), 134-139
--, Modern Warfare (New York: Arco Publishing, 1985), 188-193
Lecture:
(I). What are Tac-nukes:
_Tactical nuclear weapons are nuclear weapons designed for battlefield use: they typically have smaller warheads and flexible but shorter-range delivery systems.
_US arsenal 1984: 5,000+ tactical nuclear warheads. Also: 610 ADMs.
_EG: ADM: 1964: 163 lbs (74 kg - 26.6 kg warhead- man portable).
_Davy Crockett, fielded 1961-1971 (range: 2-4 km) 120/150mm recoilless rifle from a jeep with a 4-man crew. W54 warhead weighed 51 lbs (23.2 kg) and had a yield of 0.01 to 1 kiloton. 2,100 produced for $540 million. Bn cmdrs and lower had launch authority: it was done with a decentralized battlefield in view, though US civilian governments did not like it.
_EG: Genie + Falcon AAM: 1957 first test of nuclear unguided (10,171 Genie and 1,900 1961 Falcon manufactured).
_Problem: Soviet armoured forces resist much of the radiation: So US developed the Enhanced Radiation Bomb (ERB) or neutron bomb, in which fast neutrons would penetrate and micro-fragment the armor of Soviet tanks easily and kill the crews in a matter of days. 80% of energy release is gamma, X-ray and neutron radiation, instead of 5% with a thermonuclear device. It also leaves little residual radiation from fission contaminants, thus permitting friendly troops to operate in the battlefield shortly thereafter.
_Design: In a single stage fusion design with T+D kindling, if the depleted uranium mantle is omitted the high energy fusion neutrons are released.
_EG: US W-79 8-inch artillery round.
_1 Kt neutron bomb:
18,000 rads out to 400m: incapacitating within 5 minutes.
8,000 rads out to 650m: lethal within 48 hours.
3,000 rads out to 800m: lethal within 5 days.
650 rads out to 1,000m: high mortality rate in period of two weeks.
_10% of the physical damage of an equivalent bomb +
_One neutron bomb per company (100 soldiers).
_Variable-Yield (Dial-a-nuke): permits nuking enemy between friendly units or close to vital infrastructure.
_EG: US 155mm artillery how: variable yield: 0.05, 0.08 or 0.1 Kt.
_EG: US Honest John: 5, 10, 20, 50 Kt (held warheads loosely for NATO allies).
_Notes: (1). US tac-nukes have PALs because of their dispersion.
_(2). MBTs, APCs, SP arty, command vehicles have integral NBC protection.
(II). Tactical Nuclear Launch Systems:
_There are four types of tactical nuclear weapons:
_(1). Air droppable bombs:
_(2). Artillery-launched nuclear weapons.
_EG: Soviet tactical nuclear weapons:
_Divisional artillery:
2-S5 152mm SP gun 27km 2-5kt
2-S3 152mm SP howitzer 27km 1-5kt
_Divisional assets:
2S7 203mm SP howitzer 18km 2-5kt
2S4 240mm SP mortar 12.7km 2-5kt
_EG: US nuclear artillery:
_NATO (4,300 total):
US M109 155mm 18km 1.0kt
US M110 175mm 16.8km 0.5-10kt
_PLA:
PLA: towed 152mm howitzer (= Soviet D-1 2-S3).
Type 66 towed 152mm howitzer (= Soviet D-20).
_(3). Battlefield missiles (very hard to locate – EG: Iraq SCUDs 1991).
_EG: US Lance: 2,133 manufactured for NATO 1971-80 (110km + 1-100kt).
_EG: US Theatre missile systems: NATO: 464 GLCMs and 108 Pershing IIs.
_EG: Also US nuclear-SAM: 200 launchers.
_EG: Soviet divisional artillery: SS-21 Short Range Missile (120km + 100kt).
_(4). Human-delivered systems: Atomic Demolitions Munitions (ADM): currently withdrawn in Western arsenals.
(III). Tactical Nuclear Weapons Use:
_Points for Tactical Nuclear Targeting:
_(1). Nuclear attacks must be launched with care for friendly forces.
_(2). Recce must not only locate but keep track of targets.
_(3). Suppress enemy nuclear launches.
_(4). Target for maximize enemy destruction: hit targets in depth like headquarters.
_(5). Take advantage of the great blast radius to have area effects on dispersed units.
_(6). Limit the diminishing marginal returns of additional nuclear weapons launched.
_(7). Conduct battle damage assessment to evaluate the results of a strike.
_Points for Battlefield Survival:
_(1). Disperse friendly units:
_EG1: In the 1950s the US reorganized all its army divisions into very dispersed, decentralized and unhierarchical Pentomic divisions, but reversed the policy in the 1960s with the Vietnam war and belief that limited nuclear war was unlikely.
_EG2: US exercise (1965): disperse to 250%: division 50 km depth and 50 km frontage.
_(2). Digging friendly units in works (including taking refuge in built-up areas like cities).
_EG: It was the Tiszard report in 1946 and a British report in 1953 which indicated that dub-in troops could significantly reduce the blast effects of a nuclear weapon.
_(3). Anticipate the loss of communications during a nuclear exchange.
_(4). There will be almost no likelihood of nuclear weapons replenishment during a two-way tactical nuclear exchange, except from out-of-theatre forces.
_(5). Tactical aircraft will have limited availability as airfields will probably be wiped out. VTOL aircraft are suddenly very useful.
Model NATO attack on a Soviet Army:
100 kt: 4.6km pers; 3.2km pers cover; 2.7km trucks; 2km tanks; 900m city.
_An attack on a Soviet Army would take about 100 nuclear weapons allocated as follows:
_(1). 30 nuclear warheads would be used to destroy identified and suspected enemy means of delivering nuclear weapons, including missile, artillery and air force elements. It is very difficult to locate these forces because they are mobile.
_(2). 30 nuclear warheads would be used against headquarters units, of which there are about 30 for each of the battalions in corps. Most of these will be located using electronic means and these are consequently very difficult to distinguish from dummy radio traffic.
_(3). 20 nuclear warheads against 24 supply depots and infrastructure bottlenecks, such as bridges.
_(4). 20 nuclear warheads against those ground units that are identified (there are about 30 battalions). Half of these units will be in-depth and out of contact.
_Anticipated losses:
30,200 casualties (55% of total): 20,250 in open, and 9,950 under cover.
1,050 non-armored vehicles (10% of total).
600 armored vehicles (18% of total).
141,800 civilian casualties.
567,100 homeless civilians.
200,000 homes damaged and destroyed.
Soviet Doctrine of Use:
_The Soviet emphasis on mechanized warfare had a lot to do with surviving nuclear environments, as armored can be hermetically sealed from the outside.
_Characteristics of the Nuclear Battlefield:
_(1). Conquest of territory still matters
_(2). There is no continuous front. All round defense at all echelons.
_(3). Mobile and area defense logical as linear and point defenses vulnerable.
_(4). Camouflage, communications discipline, dummy targets, and diversion are key to avoiding strikes.
_(5). Breakthrough and hasty attacks from the march as deliberate attacks difficult.
_(6). Destruction of enemy recce elements imperative.
_(7). Nuclear environment: individual planes deployed.
_(8). Coordinating logistics is important.
_EG: 1954 Soviet nuke ex in Carpathians between two equal sides using nukes indicated that ops ground to a halt as all log sites were eliminated.
Soviet Tactical Nuclear Warfare Doctrine:
_(1). Nuclear weapons permit offensive operations at a high rate of advance, because of the rate of enemy destruction and the benefits of surprise.
_(2). Nuclear weapons complete destruction missions independently of land forces.
_(3). Nuclear fires must be exploited by maneuver forces.
_(4). Reconnaissance forces must find a path immediately after a nuclear strike and lead the other forces that must pass quickly through the contaminated area.
Soviet Tactics in the Nuclear Environment:
_(1). Isolate the battlefield, hit reserves, creation of obstacles, destroy roads.
_(2). Shift directions quickly to avoid enemy nuclear strikes.
_(3). Close with enemy troops close to avoid their nuclear strikes.
_(4). Nukes must be optimized to be used against targets of opportunity.
_(5). Use special forces and airborne to attack enemy nukes.
Applications:
(I). Cold War Central Europe:
_NATO had a first use declaration.
_EG: 1956-1957: US Army requested: 151,000: 106,000 for tactical use, 25,000 for air defense, 20,000 for allies. It was estimated that the Army would use 423 nuclear warheads a day in a tactical nuclear war not including surface-to-air missiles.
_Total losses from the use of half of the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe:
1.2 million soldiers (70% of total).
43,000 non-armored vehicles (17% of total).
15,000 armored vehicles (29% of total).
5.6 million civilian casualties.
23 million homeless civilians.
8 million homes destroyed.
30% of Germany’s economy destroyed.
_EG: US exercise (1965): only 6% daily attrition rate if nuclear yield of 35 kilotons used (as combo of tactical nuclear weapons). This was considered less than either the Napoleonic or key First World War battles.
_NATO-Warsaw Pact Simulation:
_Assumed: 21,000 nuclear missiles available:
_11,200 nuclear missiles used and 9,800 destroyed or unused in 26 days of fighting.
_Calculation: 1 nuclear volley of 54 missiles destroyed 0 to 6 bdes (0 to 30,000 soldiers) depending on enemy density. Dispersion will be the result as much by decision as by destroyed enemy concentrations, especially the initial Soviet breakthrough concentrations.
_Findings:
_Soviets will city grab knowing that if they get inside the urban areas NATO will be reluctant to nuke a city occupied by their own population.
_Nuclear attack would eliminate the Soviet air force.
_Theatre wide use of nuclear weapons: slows follow-on forces from the Soviet Union.
(II). Cold War Persian Gulf:
_Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the collapse of Iran, in 1980 the US president enunciated the Carter Doctrine which committed the US to the resistance of the entry of any third party into the Persian Gulf. It was quickly determined that a purely conventional war was infeasible, and tactical nuclear weapons would have to play a role.
_Based on 1950s Romeo option: “Retardation of Soviet advances into Western Eurasia:”
_Included nuking of Soviet infrastructure that contributed to an invasion of Iran.
_Ten Soviet divisions were expected in 1968, and it was planned to use 200 nuclear weapons against theatre targets.
_ADMs: The US looked at ADMs: calculating that the Soviet Union could move 3,000 cubic meters a day of rock, and noting that a 30 kiloton device would displace 80,000 cubic meters of earth, indicated that nuclear attacks would seriously slow a Soviet advance through the mountains for about a month (assuming all routes hit). ADMs would also produce fall-out due to groundburst. One of the options was the use of cruise missiles from the Indian Ocean position of the USN to deliver the warheads. Lance missiles, ALCMs, air-dropped bombs, and nuclear artillery was also considered for use in the Zagros mountains.
(III). Sino-Indian Border War:
_3 cases of nuke use:
_(1). Use of nuclear strike to breakthrough defense.
_Useful but requires quick exploitation to avoid counter-strike and contamination.
_(2). Use of nuclear strike to halt attack.
_Formations in the attack are more vulnerable as they are out of cover.
_(3). Use of nuclear strikes to cut logistics.
_Effect increases as the geography is infra-structurally constraining.
http://artsandscience.concordia.ca/poli419n/lectures/lecture16_txt.html