11-13-2003, 01:20 AM
this is just what i get from a google search. more to come in a few minutes from internet databases ;)
National Defence/Canadian Forces-
by LCol (retd) J. Cecil Berezowski
Strategy 2020, released last summer by the Department of National Defence (DND), calls for high-quality, rapidly deployable forces that are interoperable with our allies, particularly with the United States, by the year 2020. It is seen as a strengthening of the Defence Management System from national strategy through to results.
Because of the long time lines involved in equipment procurement and integrating it into training and operations, Defence must plan ten to fifteen years ahead. This strategic planning, under the direction of the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, is totally focused on the core business of the military, its warfighting. He said that after seven years of downsizing and budget cuts, non-core activities will have to be contracted out or eliminated. Moreover, the Canadian Forces (CF) are at the point where continued across the board incremental reductions are no longer possible.
This long-term strategic planning was driven by the sharp criticism of the Auditor General that DND faces equipment rust-out within five years failing a significant budget increase. DND responded with the new Defence Planning Guidance 2000 (DGP 2000), designed to facilitate Strategy 2020.
DPG 2000 means a further reduction of present resources and capabilities to free up money for Strategy 2020 (barring the miracle of a major increase to the next Defence budget). DPG 2000 sets a five-year budget target of 23 per cent annually for capital investment.
The Canadian military vision in Strategy 2020 focuses on the conduct and character of future war. Essentially, rapidly integrating technologies are effecting massive changes in our global society, and in how business and the military operate. In the widest sense, the information age is replacing the industrial age.
In the military sphere, the application of advanced technologies is being viewed as a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Although the United States is by far the major spender in this field, Britain and Australia, Germany and France are also pursuing these developments. Canada hopes to hive onto the American effort, for leverage. The ultimate goal is modern and interoperable forces for the 2020-2025 time frame.
Their common goal today, as prescribed by NATO years ago, is standardization, rationalization and interoperability. Major advances in precision, lethality and miniaturization, to name but three, might alter significantly the way armed forces operate across the spectrum of conflict.
Canadian security interests are beset by continuing change and continued uncertainty. Contrasting with those who continue to press for "peace dividends", the Canadian Forces are today more committed outside Canada than since the end of the Korean War. International instability, fractured states, asymmetric threats (e.g. weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism and trans-national crime, etc.) along with the proliferation of conventional military technology have made the world a volatile and unpredictable place. Moreover, the international environment is becoming more technically sophisticated.
The program strives to lay the research foundation necessary for assessing the effects of the increased mobility, lethality and manoeuvrability of armed forces on future war. Foreseen is a single integrated battle space concept (the air, land, sea and space¾including the electromagnetic spectrum¾and the included friendly and enemy forces, and equipment within the area of interest) of the future.
A working group has been formed to ensure a coherent and well-defined DND/CF approach to 2020 and beyond. Areas of future focus include interoperability and common equipment standards with our allies. A joint experimentation facility is considered essential for close collaboration with the American Joint Battlelab.
Asymmetric threats to Canada in future are seen to require a national infrastructure vulnerability center to co-ordinate Canada's response, both foreign and domestic. It would include other government departments. Other areas for study include space-based capabilities such as communications and surveillance; materiel acquisition and support on the battlefield including interoperability; and, facilitating human-human interfaces, human-machine interfaces, and determining the requirement for unmanned platforms. Command and control will become flatter as information systems improve and decision-making will devolve to lower levels of command. Planners have warned that caution must be exercised to avoid either being lulled into thinking that technology offers a "silver bullet" solution, or that technology will make war a more humane practice (a push-button affair) where casualties become non-existent on our side.
The authors of the study are also fully aware that overall funding levels for DND/CF may not increase significantly between now and 2025. They go on to say that we cannot assume that the injection of a symbolic presence into future operations will afford us an operational influence. It will not.
Finally, Strategy 2020 is a long-term capability plan; it is not a capital program plan.
Critiques of Canada's Military Budget
1] End the Arms Race
Corporations and NATO Dictate Canadian Military Spending
2] Canadian Peace Alliance
Global security is the real casualty of this budget
3] Steven Staples c/o Council of Canadians
Seven Talking Points on Canada's military budget
on the release of the Federal Budget
Critiques of Canada's Military Budget
From: End the Arms Race
Date: February 29, 2000
Corporations and NATO Dictate Canadian Military Spending
Vancouver: Representatives of End the Arms Race, one of Canada's
largest and most active peace groups, say that Canada's $1.9 billion
military budget increase is determined by NATO and the global military
"This budget clearly demonstrates that democracy means nothing," says
Peter Coombes National Organizer for End the Arms Race. "The demand
for increased military spending is coming from the United States, NATO
and the corporate military lobby. It's blatantly obvious that Chretien
and Martin have abandoned the needs of Canadians in favour of the
Coombes was referring to an Angus Reid poll that shows Canadians rank
military spending as the lowest priority and prefer increased funding
for social programs, including health care and education.
This year's increase of $350 million puts Canada's military budget
back up to mid-1980 Cold War levels. Over the next four years Canada's
military will get an extra $1.9 billion dollars ($350 million 2000,
$400 for 2001, $550 for 2002 and $600 for 2003).
During the 1980s Canada more than doubled its military spending in
just ten years from $5.3 billon in 1980 to $11.9 in 1989, in real
dollar amounts. Even when accounting for inflation Canada's military
budget could be more than 10% greater than 1980. Procurement costs
nearly tripled during this period while the number of personnel fell
from 80,000 to 60,000. "Over the past decade Canadian tax payers and
soldiers paid for the mechanization of war including new frigates,
'smart bombs', and other toys for the generals," said Coombes
Canada's military spending ranks average or higher when compared in
real dollar terms to our allies and global military spending. Prime
Minister Chretien acknowledged to reporters recently that Canada is
the sixth largest military spender within NATO when ranked by real
dollars. This was a response to NATO's Secretary General who was
pressuring Canada to increase military spending. From 1980 to 1995
Canada's share of world military spending nearly doubled and with
dramatic increases last year and this year the trend will continue.
"The drive for new equipment for the military has been a tag-team
effort by Canadian weapons corporations and the military. Powerful
industry organizations such as the Aerospace Industries Association of
Canada and the Canadian Defence Industries Association have lobbied
intensely for more government contracts to replace Canada's
'crumbling' military equipment," says Steve Staples, peace researcher
and an End the Arms Race executive member.
The beneficiaries of the $1.2 billion needed to upgrade cockpit
electronics of CF-18s so that they can use the latest in 'smart bombs'
include corporate giants Bombardier Aerospace, CAE Electronics, Litton
Systems Canada, and Hughes Aircraft.
Canada's newly acquired Upholder submarines, which were purchased from
Britain will also require expensive upgrades. The costs of installing
new torpedo systems, sonar and communication equipment will costs
hundreds of millions of dollars. Corporate beneficiaries of the
program include Ballard Power Systems, which could be contracted to
install fuel cell technology to give the subs a 'near-nuclear'
capability. The largest contract expected to be announced this year is
the $2 to $3 billion Maritime Helicopter Program to buy up to 32 new
submarine-attack helicopters for the Navy's patrol frigates.
"Increasing Canada's military spending now, ten years after the Cold
War, simply makes no sense. Military spending is being used as a
corporate subsidy at the expense of the public good," added Staples.
End the Arms Race
Suite 405 - 825 Granville Street
Vancouver BC V6Z 1K9
fax 604/ 687-3277
2] Canadian Peace Alliance
For immediate release - February 29, 2000
Global security is the real casualty of this budget
"Contrary to how it looks, this is not a security budget", says Tryna
Booth, Coordinator of the Canadian Peace Alliance (CPA). "While our
war-fighting capacity has been maintained by boosting funding to the
military, we do little to address the root causes of conflict."
The Department of National Defence has the largest budget of any
federal government department. Last year, additional funding was
provided to increase the wages of military personnel. A one-time cash
infusion paid Canada's bills for its role in bombing Yugoslavia.
Together, yesterday's budget announcement and the 1999 increases will
mean that DND will have received an additional $2.3 billion in funding
On the other hand, the International Assistance Envelope (IAE), which
includes Official Development Assistance (ODA) and assistance to
countries in transition in Central and Eastern Europe, will receive a
mere $435 million over the next three years.
"Security cannot be equated with military might. Canada can most
effectively contribute to global security through increased overseas
development aid, preventative diplomacy, and humanitarian relief
efforts. These are the areas to which our security money should be
targeted," comments Booth.
With the so-called end of the Cold War, Canadians expected to see a
corresponding decrease in military spending. And even though Canadian
military spending is higher that it was just prior to the last
military build-up of 1980, the United States and NATO would have us
believe that more money is essential. However, this is contrary to the
trend of decreased military spending worldwide.
Canadians take pride in the highly publicized, people-helping-people
roles the Forces undertake, like disaster relief and humanitarian
support. However, it is not clear that they support continued high
military spending for what NATO's calls "humanitarian interventions",
taking on an increasingly offensive role as the world's police force
and even violating international law.
"In a democracy, the military should undertake only those roles
determined for it by civil society. The mandate of Canada's military
hasn't been examined in over 5 years, and it's high time for a public
review," says Judith Berlyn, CPA Co-Chair.
The military could sustain significant reductions in its budget and
still ensure that personnel are adequately compensated and that
peacekeepers are properly trained and equipped. The main change would
be to abandon the doctrine of multi-purpose, combat-capable forces in
all three military branches and to focus on certain core competencies,
such as traditional peacekeeping.
"Before allocating more money there should be a public review of the
role of the Armed Forces. Only after it has been determined what role
the military should play, in accordance with our foreign policy
objectives, can the necessary resources be directed to those ends,"
Berlyn notes. "But the Government has chosen war over peace in this
budget. Our contribution to global security should have been to
provide for the real security needs of all people, and address the
root causes of conflict," she continues.
For more information contact:
Tryna Booth (902) 422-6628 Judith Berlyn (514) 933-8134
Coordinator, Canadian Peace Alliance
5-555 rue Bloor St. W/ouest
Toronto, ON M5S 1Y6 Canada
Tel: (416) 588-5555 Fax: (416) 588-5556
3] From: "Steven D. Staples" <email@example.com> (by way of
Rycroft & Pringle <firstname.lastname@example.org>)
Seven Talking Points on Canada's military budget
on the release of the Federal Budget
February 27th, 2000
When Paul Martin brings his budget down on Monday, February 28th,
Canadian aerospace and defence corporations will likely have lots to
celebrate. If news reports are correct, the military will walk away
with $350 million in hand, most of which will be handed over to
Canadian corporations to pay for new equipment and weapons for the
This increase in military spending will be the second consecutive year
of budget increases for the military. Last year, about an extra $325
million was given to the military, mostly to cover pay increases for
soldiers. A further one-time increase of $500 million was found for
the military in 1999 to pay for Canada's role in the 78-day war
The Liberals' claw-back of the peace dividend has gone virtually
unopposed. The lack of attention paid by progressives to rising
military spending has allowed weapons corporations to lobby
effectively for greater military subsidies and defence
These talking points are being provided to you for use in media
interviews during budget week to counter this corporate grab of public
funds for weapons development and militarism. I hope that you will
find them useful.
1. Canada's military spending is in line with our NATO allies.
Despite media reports that create a perception of underfunding, Canada
is the sixth largest military spender in NATO when ranked by real
dollars (rather than relative to GDP). In fact, Canadian military
spending is still higher that it was in 1980, just prior to the last
military build-up. Spending has failed to decline at the same rate as
world military spending.
"Of course the military people around the world want their
government to put more money into the military, like any other
department within the government," [Chretien] said. He was responding
to questions . by the new Secretary General of NATO, that Canadian
defence spending is near the bottom within the alliance.
Mr. Chretien says he prefers to look at dollar totals instead of
percentages of GDP. By that measure, "we are sixth in terms of dollars
we are spending."
Sallot, Jeff "Canada doing what it can, PM says of military
The Globe and Mail 3 November 1999: A6.
2. The military wants to spend more money on "toys for the boys," even
at the expense of soldiers if necessary. While the public may be
sympathetic to the plight of underpaid soldiers, wage increases for
military personnel were made in last year's budget. This year's
increase will go toward new equipment, which has been given the
highest priority by the military brass.
"Less than 20% of the present [military] budget goes for capital
projects, General Maurice Baril, chief of the defence staff, said
yesterday. He wants to raise that to 23 percent, but he acknowledges
that will mean cutting other areas. General Baril said he might have
to trim training costs, reduce personnel or even cut some equipment in
the effort to boost capital spending."
Ward, John "Military to raise spending on new equipment." The Globe
and Mail 25 November 1999: A9.
" 'There are now 73 generals. And that makes the forces far too
at a time when it is coping with shrinking budgets and Eggleton is
floating the idea of cutting troops,' [said Scott Taylor editor of
Esprit de Corps magazine]."
Blanchfield, Mike "Arms and the (scandal-less) man." The Vancouver
Sun 15 January 2000: A21.
3. Investments in military production is an inefficient way to
stimulate the economy. Proponents of military spending suggest that it
results in net benefits to the economy. But an equal or greater
economic benefit to the economy can be made through civilian
investment in research, infrastructure, etc.
"A 1982 study that found that the effects of defense spending on
US economy were similar to those of nondefense spending. For these
reasons, one could stimulate employment and the economy with any type
of government expenditure. . Defense spending to support economic
rather than security objectives is generally an inefficient way to
accomplish national fiscal objectives or to generate "spin off"
Weida, William J. "The Economic Implications of Nuclear Weapons and
Nuclear Deterrence." Atomic Audit (Brookings 1998): 528.
4. Canadian corporations are using the old-boys network to promote
military spending and win military contracts. The revolving door
between Industry Canada, the Canadian Forces, and corporate Canada
gives the defence industry extraordinary lobbying power - unmatched by
any other industry.
"CAE Inc., one of Canada's most sophisticated high-tech companies,
has taken the unusual step of hiring a veteran civil servant as its
chief executive officer. But Derek Burney, former chief of staff to
former prime minister Brian Mulroney, former Canadian ambassador to
the United States and foreign service officer for 30 years, says that
is a perfectly natural thing to do.
'I'm good at motivating people to produce. I have a very good idea
how government works . . . My network of contacts will be very helpful
in going after government military contracts.'"
Bertin, Oliver "Ex-mandarin gets down to business at CAE." The
and Mail, 7 February 2000: B10.
"Top 10 Canadian Military Contractors 1998 (with est. total
sales for 1998).
1. General Motors of Canada Ltd. Diesel Division, London. $366
million. 2. CAE Inc., Montreal. $364 million. 3. Computing Devices
Canada Ltd., Nepean. $350 million. 4. Bombardier Inc. Montreal. $345
million. 5. SNC-Lavalin Group, Montreal. $226 million. 6. Magellan
Aerospace Corp. Mississauga. $155 million. 7. Canadian Marconi
Company, Montreal. $124 million. 8. Bell Helicopter Textron Canada
Ltd., Mirabel. $80 million. 9. Spar Aerospace Ltd., Mississauga $80
million. 10. Pratt and Whitney Canada Inc, Montreal. $60 million+" "GM
Canada again largest military contractor." Ploughshares Monitor
5. The military wastes and mismanages its money through a top-heavy
and secretive bureaucracy. Hundreds of millions of dollars are wasted
on outdated or poorly planned programs. The misuse of funds, and even
outright corruption, is exacerbated by DND's notorious secrecy and
resistance to public accountability.
"The contract to replace the Sea Kings will be worth from $2.5
billion to $3 billion, for between 24 and 35 new choppers. The problem
with the entire process is that many major policy questions have not
been answered or even asked. With the end of the Cold War, what is the
mission of a naval anti-submarine platform? . The Cold War has been
over for almost a decade, yet the thinking at DND continues to fight
the last great enemy.
To justify the major expense of the new maritime helicopters, its
mission is being defined as a platform for fishery patrol, environment
patrol and drug interdiction.. But the Liberal government is pushing
ahead with the new expensive program at the same time that it is
studying mothballing from four to six of the new patrol frigates."
Trautman, Jim "Questions about Ottawa's plans for new helicopters."
The Toronto Star, 1 January 1999.
"The Auditor General has uncovered a widespread pattern of illegal
kickbacks paid to drivers of military vehicles by service station
operators in two provinces who sold their diesel fuel to the
Department of National Defence at inflated prices.
The auditors did not provide an estimate of how much the kickback
scheme might be costing taxpayers, [but] the limited number of spot
checks uncovered cash kickbacks totalling $15,600 on fuel purchases
worth $216,700 for the military. DND bought more than $3.6 million
worth of diesel fuel during the past two years."
Sallot, Jeff "DND workers taking kickbacks, probe reveals" The
and Mail, 1 December 1999: A3.
"Businesses operating in the arms of the defence industry, as well
those in energy sectors, were apt to bribe senior civil servants and
politicians, Transparency International, a Berlin-based watchdog
organization, has found in its ground-breaking survey titled Bribery
in Business Sectors.
Most likely sectors where senior public officials would be very
to accept or extort bribes:
1. Public works contracts and construction
2. Arms and defence industry
3. Power (incl. petroleum and energy)"
Walton, Dawn "Builders most likely to bribe, report finds." The
and Mail, 21 January 2000: B5.
6. Canadians consistently place the military at the bottom of the list
of issues requiring the greatest attention from Canada's leaders.
While generally supportive of the military, the Canadian public places
far greater importance on the funding of social programs and improving
the economy than military spending.
"Thinking of the issues presently confronting Canada, which do you
feel should receive the greatest attention from Canada's leaders?
Unemployment/Jobs: 27% (Nov. 1998), 49% (July 1997), 44% (July
1996). Health Care/Medicare: 40% (Nov. 1998), 15% (July 1997), 13%
(July 1996) Defence/Military: 1% (Nov. 1998), 2% (July
1997), 1% (July 1996)
"Canadians' Public Policy Issues Agenda," Angus Reid Group, Inc.
7. Trade agreements are promoting the use of military spending to
subsidize high tech corporations. Free trade regimes such as the WTO
are limiting government's ability to provide financial assistance or
other export subsidies to corporations. However, all trade agreements
provide national security exceptions for military purposes, thus
promoting the use of greater military spending to continue subsidies
while avoiding trade challenges.
"Despite General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules that
eliminated tariff barriers between signatories on civil aircraft
products (including civil avionics and flight simulators) and that
restricted the use of government procurement, many countries use
national security exceptions to provide direct financial assistance to
their domestic industry and to impose domestic content requirements on
Government of Canada, Industry Canada. Aerospace and Defence
Electronics Overview and Prospects. Ottawa, Ontario: Government of
For more information, contact Steven Staples.
(604) 688-8846 f. (604) 688-5756
11-13-2003, 01:35 AM
AUTHOR: JONATHON GATEHOUSE
TITLE: WHY THE CANADIAN MILITARY ISN'T READY FOR A WAR
SOURCE: Maclean's 115 no39 16-18 S 30 2002
The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited.
The Iraq Campaign
AS A NATION, we sent about 650,000 to fight the First World War, enlisted more than a million men and women to battle Fascism, and committed almost 27,000 troops to a "police action" in Korea. Today, it's a struggle to keep a few hundred soldiers on the battlefield. The submarines leak, the helicopters are antiquated, and the infantry can't get the right colour of camouflage. Canada's once proud military appears to have reached the breaking point.
This year, Ottawa will spend $11.8 billion on a defence force that numbers just 60,000 people. Over the next five years, the military will also have an additional $5.1 billion to spend. But as the United States again beats the drums of war, Canada is quietly serving notice that our forces might not be in a position to join an attack on Iraq, even if we wanted to. "If we were really, really pushed, we could muster the soldiers," John McCallum, the minister of defence, told Maclean's. "How long they would stay -- that's another matter."
Ottawa has so far shown little interest in signing on for phase two of George W. Bush's war on terror, and a decision last week by Saddam Hussein to allow UN arms inspectors back into Iraq appears to have delayed any onset of hostilities. Tough talk still ruled the day -- the Bush administration released a report outlining an aggressive new defence policy that would favour pre-emptive action against terrorist groups and hostile states. But McCallum, speaking about a hypothetical Canadian participation in a U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, said Canadian Forces simply aren't ready to go back to war. "We could, but we would be stretching them and causing family problems. We already have two ships out there that could help, we would have some capability on the air front. We could send some soldiers, but we would rather not send them until six to 10 months from now."
Eight hundred infantry members returned home this summer after a six-month tour of duty in Afghanistan, and a Canadian Naval Task Group in the Arabian Gulf has been scaled back to three ships from six. Military officials worry that a quick call for another deployment will strain resources, and personnel. "They are, legitimately, very concerned about stretching people to the point where they might quit, or we are treating them very unfairly," said McCallum.
In recent years, the alarm over the crumbling state of Canada's military has been sounded so many times that it has ceased to cause any panic. Between 1993 and 1998, the Department of National Defence saw its budget slashed by 23 per cent as the federal government wrestled with the deficit. Bases were closed, equipment purchases were postponed, the military trimmed 27,000 positions, and commitments to NATO and peacekeeping were reduced. While Ottawa has returned funding to early-1990s levels, the lion's share of the new money -- $3.9 billion -- has gone to improve pay and living conditions for soldiers, sailors and air crews. Now, defence supporters are calling for a massive cash infusion to upgrade or replace the military's aging hardware. (Among the priorities: replacing the navy's 40-year-old Sea King helicopters. The Liberals cancelled a $4.4-billion chopper deal in 1993, but have yet to approve a scaled-back $3-billion version of the project.)
Last year, the auditor general found Canadian Forces now spend a full 20 per cent of their budget maintaining, managing and repairing equipment. Thousands of vacancies in key occupations such as engineers and weapons technicians remain unfilled as new recruits sit on bases awaiting specialized training. Recently, an all-party Commons defence committee recommended an immediate $2-billion budget increase for the military, and said $1 billion is needed just to maintain the status quo. A similar Senate body has called for $4 billion more a year.
The situation has reached crisis proportions, says author and military historian Jack Granatstein, co-chair of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, a defence lobby group. After suffering a decade-long bloodletting from a "thousand cuts," the anemic Canadian Forces are now on the verge of collapse, he says. The last formal review of defence policy, produced in 1994, calls for a modern, globally deployable, combat-capable military that can indefinitely maintain 4,000 troops in the field. But in reality, says Granatstein, Canada is leaning heavily on its allies just to sustain its token participation in international operations -- troops had to hitch a ride with the Americans to Afghanistan, while during the Kosovo campaign Canadian mechanics had to borrow spare parts to keep our CF-18s flying. A recently released study by the council says Canada is losing international credibility and influence, and calls for at least $1.5 billion a year more in military spending. "Military power still matters," says Granatstein. "When people talk about powerful nations, they don't mean moral power."
The situation is serious enough that some of our closest allies are publicly raising questions about Canada's military competence. Paul Cellucci, the American ambassador to Canada, says the United States is deeply grateful for the "valuable contribution" the Canadian Forces have made to the war on terror, but adds his country worries about the future of our military. "If Sept. 11 has taught us anything, it has reminded us that we live in a very dangerous world, and that having a viable military is important to all countries," says Cellucci. The Bush administration is urging Ottawa to substantially increase defence spending. The Canadian Forces need more troops, hardware that is technically compatible with advanced American equipment, and the capacity to airlift themselves to international hot spots, says the ambassador. "It seems to us you shouldn't have to rely on other countries to get your troops where they're needed," he adds.
The Americans won't say just how much more they believe Ottawa should be spending on defence, but Cellucci notes that Canada ranks toward the bottom of NATO members in terms of military spending as a percentage of gross domestic product. According to the United Nations Human Development report, Canada spent the equivalent of 1.3 per cent of its GDP on military matters in 1999, ranking seventh of the G8 countries, and well behind NATO allies like Greece, Norway and Denmark. In 1990, prior to the budget cuts, Ottawa spent two per cent of GDP on the Canadian Forces. (Canada ranks third on the UN world quality of life index, partially because we spend so little on arms and more in areas such as health and education.)
But as more and more voices join the chorus for increased funding, some critics are cautioning voters and the government to take a hard look at what we already pay so much for. Scott Taylor, editor of the military magazine Esprit de Corps, says the Canadian Forces' deep systemic problems can't be solved by a simple cash infusion. "We could give these guys $5 billion more a year and it's not going to make a difference," he says. Years of budget cuts, neglect and infighting among the services have created a climate of dysfunction, where good money is frequently thrown after bad. "Nobody wants to admit that there has been a lack of foresight," says Taylor. "You need a blueprint for the future and a management team that can put it in place." Military planners need to scale back their aspirations for big-ticket items like jets and ships, he says. "We could do a hell of a lot more operations if that was the emphasis."
Others argue that Canada has lost touch with the moral values that have traditionally shaped our world outlook. Ernie Regehr, director of Project Ploughshares, a peace and disarmament think-tank sponsored by Canada's major churches, says there is more than one method to build global security. "The other ways in which we contribute to world peace -- foreign aid, diplomacy -- have had their spending cut at least as drastically as the military has," says Regehr. Despite Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's recent appeals to Western countries to spend more on world development, Canada's record of giving remains miserly. We now spend just .25 per cent of our GNP on foreign aid, about half of what we contributed in 1991.
When Parliament reconvenes on Sept. 30, questions of military spending are sure to be high on the opposition's agenda. But the competition for an increased share of the shrinking surplus will be fierce. Liberal insiders are already talking about ambitious new initiatives for health care, the environment, major urban centres, and First Nations. Montreal's daily La Presse has even floated the idea -- since flatly denied -- that Finance Minister John Manley is considering increasing the GST to 10 per cent to pay for the raft of new programs.
With the Defence Department coming out as a winner in the last three budgets, few observers are predicting the monstrous type of funding increases military supporters say are needed. Even McCallum, a former chief economist for the Royal Bank, seems resigned to the idea of making do with what's available. "We need a significant injection of resources to be sustainable in the long term, both on the people side and on the capital side," he says. "But we're certainly not going to get $4 billion." With no magic solution on the horizon, the challenge for Canada's soldiers, air crews and sailors will be the same as it has been for a decade -- getting the job done, even if it means breaking out the chewing gum, string and duct tape.
TITLE: The Middle Ground
SOURCE: Canada and the World Backgrounder 66 no4 21-5 Ja 2001
The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited.
For decades, Canada has tried to be a helpful fixer. Our politicians and diplomats have acted as go-betweens in trying to get enemies to be less hostile towards each other. Canada invented the concept of peacekeeping, and our soldiers, flyers, and sailors have taken part in almost every peacekeeping mission the United Nations has organized. We have pushed and pushed for peaceful solutions to conflict and some of our tax dollars have funded peace research and initiatives. Most recently, we have been deeply involved in the campaign to ban landmines, and we are now at work on a similar program to control the trade in small arms and light weapons.
But, Canada has also gone to war. Our young people fought and died in two world wars (1914-18 and 1939-45). Canadians fought in the Korean War (1950-53). And, Canadian pilots took part in the Gulf War (1991), and the bombing of Yugoslavia (1999).
Canada is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and North American Aerospace Defence Command (Norad). Both organizations are always described by their spin-doctors as "defensive." But, NATO bristles with weapons and is a formidable war machine; Norad is designed to give early warning of attack so that nuclear missiles can be launched in retaliation.
Trying to keep a balance between military intervention and pressing others to negotiate peacefully calls for some very tricky diplomatic footwork. Perhaps, it's a measure of Canada's success that it is, from time to time, criticized by both sides. Our NATO allies have frequently complained that Canada doesn't pull its weight. The criticism is that our military is underfunded, and we don't spend enough on weapons. Peace activists, on the other hand, say that Canada cannot ask other nations to act peacefully while it sometimes uses its military capabilities aggressively.
It's certainly true that Canada's armed forces are in a poor state of repair. During the 1990s, the Department of National Defence took some serious budget-cutting blows. In 1994, Canada had 75,000 people under arms; six years later there were fewer than 60,000. Between 1993 and 1999, the defence budget was cut by 23%, and 21 bases were closed. At the same time, a lot of the equipment has aged and is in desperate need of replacement. The ancient Sea King helicopters are held together with bailing wire and chewing gum; the long-delayed purchase of replacements is supposed to get underway in 2001. The country's Leopard tanks are in a similar state of disrepair.
The people who wear the uniforms are feeling about as worn out and tired as their equipment. There have been stories of armed forces personnel using food banks because their salaries aren't high enough to buy groceries to feed a family. An inquiry in June 2000 heard about distraught soldiers on duty in Croatia in 1993; they were so angry and vengeful they plotted to harm senior officers who the soldiers believed to be incompetent. This followed earlier revelations that Canadian soldiers on peacekeeping duty in Somalia in 1993 beat a local teenager to death.
Also, in June 2000, The Canadian Military Journal published an article written by senior officers who had taken part in the bombing of Yugoslavia the year before. The article was highly critical of the way in which Canadian pilots were sent into combat. "Canada was the only nation [of 13 NATO air forces that took part] not equipped with anti-jam radios which forced the entire NATO air-strike effort to use single-frequency, jammable equipment," the authors wrote. They went on to point out that if the Yugoslavs had jammed that single frequency, "in all probability, Canada would have been politely told to go home." Canadian pilots also had to go into combat without night-vision goggles. The high-tech eyewear is pretty much standard equipment in other NATO air forces, but their purchase has been delayed in Canada as a cost-cutting measure.
These shortcomings are not new, but despite them the military continues to be given a lot of jobs.
The official policy of Canada's government says that our armed forces have to maintain a multipurpose, combat-capable force. In non-government language that means the military has to be ready to fight on land, sea, and air, but also to undertake the many peacekeeping duties Canada is called upon to perform. For a middle power with a vast landmass to defend and a tiny military budget, that's a tall order. The government's many critics say these tasks just can't be done on the cheap, which is what Ottawa tried to do during the 1990s.
Retired Major-General Lewis MacKenzie is very blunt in saying that Canada's politicians are placing too many demands on Canada's military. He fears this overtasking is going to have a high price. In an interview with The National Post in September 2000, General Mackenzie warned the government probably won't sit up and take notice unless there's a disaster: "It will take an operational mission where we end up with 200 dead Canadian peackeepers."
And, while Canada's armed forces are being told they have to do more with less, a whole new set of demands might be on the way.
Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian Foreign Minister, was asked by the United Nations to report on its peacekeeping operations. Mr. Brahimi gave his analysis in August 2000.
When the Cold War ended in 1991, the world changed. Peacekeepers began to find themselves in the middle of battles. Instead of patrolling quiet demilitarized zones between armies that had stood down, they were now looking down the barrels of guns. The civil war in Bosnia (1992-95) was the first time this happened, then, there was the terrible bloodbath in Rwanda (1994), and, more recently, Sierra Leone (2000).
Mr. Brahimi recommends that if UN peacekeeping methods are to be successful in the future they are going to have to involve "real" armies. That means well-trained, well-equipped units that are ready and able to use maximum force when necessary. Mr. Brahimi recommends setting up a permanent rapid-reaction force under a unified command that would operate on a warfare basis. The man-power for this force would be supplied by member states, such as Canada. It would not be a standing army but would be available for call-up and deployment within 30 days to monitor ceasefires; the force would be given 90 days to muster for a more aggressive intervention. That means the troops would have to be permanently on stand-by in a state of battle-ready preparedness.
There would be effective communications, a clear and efficient chain of command, and sufficient firepower to deal with any threat that might be encountered. This "army" would be equipped to enforce international human rights standards and maintain the rule of law. Once the fighting has been stopped, lightly armed police and civilians would take over and work to re-establish order and government.
But, Lakhdar Brahimi put his finger on the plan's biggest problem -- money. "What is wrong cannot be put right without additional resources." There is little enthusiasm among the world's rich, developed nations for funding such UN programs. This is particularly true of the United States, the world body's biggest single contributor. Several years ago, the UN brought in a "zero-growth budget" policy. This happened as a result of American pressure to reduce waste.
There's another stumbling block, also coming from Washington. The new American President, George W. Bush, is not a fan of foreign entanglements, and neither is his Secretary of State, Colin Powell. Both have been sharply critical of U.S. involvement in the Balkans. It isn't realistic to expect any rapid-reaction force to be very successful without strong U.S. support in terms of money, manpower, and arms.
Mr. Brahimi remains optimistic. "The international community spends nearly $800 billion on their armies," he says. "I'm sure they can find some little change for this organization."
Meanwhile, General MacKenzie says sending Canadian troops into hot spots with their guns blazing could be a big mistake. Our armed forces have been so busy with peacekeeping and humanitarian duties that combat training has been neglected. "There will come a day," says the general, "when the government turns to the military and says: 'Okay, we need you to fight and kill people.' And the military will raise its hand and say: 'Sorry, we don't do that any more.'"
1. Design a defence policy for Canada. The first step is to assess possible threats to the wellbeing of Canadians. Some threats to be considered might be: an invasion by the United States, global instability caused by regional conflicts or humanitarian disasters, immigrants bringing their ethnic rivalries to Canada with them, the growth of organized crime groups and the acquisition by them of weapons of mass destruction, threats to Canada's claims to sovereignty over the Arctic. Once you have assessed the threats you need to decide which are the most likely to happen and how to counter them.
2. Edward Luttwak is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In the July/August 1999 issue of Foreign Affairs, he made the case that few wars today have the potential to escalate to the point where the destruction of the world becomes possible. He argued that peace-makers, by imposing ceasefires and other agreements, "artificially freeze conflict and perpetuate a state of war indefinitely by shielding the weaker side from the consequences of refusing to make concessions for peace." He writes that he has no liking for war but that "An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This can happen when the belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively." Discuss Mr. Luttwak's ideas.
3. Suppose a leader in a far-off country begins a campaign to kill every member of an ethnic minority within the territory. Would you volunteer to join a Canadian military force to bring an end to the violence, remembering that there is a possibility that you could be killed? Discuss.
Peacekeeping missions have sometimes been hampered by the United Nations' reluctance to take sides. The idea being that the UN is neutral and its peacekeepers are there only to keep the peace.
But, often in conflicts there is a clear bad guy. Sierra Leone is an example. The Revolutionary United Front is guilty of many monstrous violations of human rights, and its leader, Foday Sankoh, is quite probably a psychopath. Few voices would be raised in protest if UN peacekeepers launched an all-out attack on such villains.
The Brahimi report on peacekeeping says that if the UN fails to take sides when there is a clear choice between right and wrong then the effectiveness of the mission is undermined. "In the worst case [neutrality] may amount to complicity with evil," the report says.
JUST A SUGGESTION
Canadian author George Woodcock had a reputation for taking on the establishment and for supporting unusual views. In his 1987 work, If I Were Prime Minister, he wrote "I would like to see Canada leaving NATO and Norad, expelling American military units from its soil, turning the armed forces into a corps devoted to cleaning up and preserving the environment, and diverting the vast sums earmarked for replacing obsolete weaponry to two important peaceful purposes: rebuilding our shipping services and our merchant marine so that our products would sail to the world in Canadian ships; and devoting a much higher proportion of the community's wealth to foreign aid, aimed at achieving a situation where the just anger of poor people would no longer remain as a threat to the world's peace."
Canada's defence policy requires that the Armed Forces be able to muster a force of 4,000 and deploy it anywhere in the world within three weeks, and then add a further 6,000 troops within three months.
VOICES OF YOUTH
Students, politicians, and experts gathered for a conference in Winnipeg in September 2000. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the effects of war on children. This is the kind of event that Canada pulls off quite well. There was no enormous publicity offensive, just young people exchanging ideas and beliefs with senior officials.
The First International Conference on War-Affected Children in Winnipeg came at the end of a consultation process. Under the leadership of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2,000 teenagers had been asked to take part in foreign-policy forums. Out of those discussions came proposals from teenagers on how to make the world a more peaceful place and one that protects children better. Some of those ideas are:
* vigorous prosecution of war criminals;
* military intervention to stop atrocities;
* avoiding the use of economic sanctions that cause hardship to civilians;
* making more money available for schooling in refugee camps and war-ravaged countries; and,
* prohibiting the production and trading of weapons, including small arms and landmines.
Canada spends 1.1% of its Gross Domestic Product on defence; the average among NATO's members is 2.1%.
Russia's President Vladimir Putin called on Canada for help in December 2000. On a visit to Ottawa, Mr. Putin expressed deep concern about American plans to build a missile defence system. Under the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the United States and Russia agreed not to attempt to build such a system. The ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of all subsequent disarmament agreements. If the United States violates that treaty by building a missile defence system the whole nuclear control and reduction program will be destabilized.
President Putin has enlisted Prime Minister Chretien as a go-between. As a military ally of the United States and as a country that is geographically between the two nuclear powers, "Canada has the full right to play a mediator role," Mr. Putin said.
Canada has often acted in this manner before. During the Vietnam War (1964-73) Canada offered what is known in the diplomatic world as a "backchannel" for communication. U.S. officials would pass information to Canada, and Canadian officials would carry these messages to the North Vietnamese for response.
All of this communication is unofficial and off-the-record. No doubt, there have been many other behind-the-scenes activities of this nature that have not yet come to light.
International Conference on War-Affected Children http://www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca/menu-e.asp
International Action Network on Small Arms http://iansa.org/
United Nations Peace Operations [Brahimi] Report http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/
AUTHOR: John Geddes
TITLE: Politics of procurement
SOURCE: Maclean's 111 no15 17 Ap 13 '98
The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited.
After years of complaining bitterly about being forced to stand on guard for Canada with embarrassingly outdated, rickety hardware, the Canadian Forces are on something of a spending spree. First came January's $790-million purchase of 15 state-of-the-art search and rescue helicopters. Now, early this week, Defence Minister Art Eggleton plans to announce that the government is buying the navy four lightly used British submarines for close to the same amount.
But while the helicopter project stirred up a lot of political noise getting off the ground, the submarine deal is expected to slip more quietly beneath the surface of Parliament Hill debate. "I think the government perceives that this sort of decision is no longer a public issue," said Ottawa defence consultant Ernie Creber.
The politics of Defence procurement have undergone a dramatic transformation. For 10 years, the military equipment budget declined even faster than the overall departmental budget--to 18 per cent of the $9.4 billion budgeted for this year from 26 per cent of $11.34 billion in military spending in 1988-1989. As well, when the Somalia affair was in the news from 1993 through to last summer, the army's reputation plummeted. Sources say government polling showed the military's approval rating among Canadians fell to a low of 26 per cent in August, 1996, from more than 40 per cent before the revelations about the torture death of a Somali teenager at the hands of Canadian troops.
Making a big military purchase in that climate--especially while other branches of government were being squeezed in the fight to wipe out the deficit--was simply not on. Then came the high-profile, highly popular military missions to help out in last year's Red River flood in Manitoba and the ice storm that struck Quebec and Eastern Ontario. Public approval rebounded--just as the deficit was disappearing. Suddenly, spending big on the army seemed more palatable.
Still, Eggleton's bid for cabinet approval last week for the submarines met some resistance. Among those who were opposed, according to Liberal sources, was Finance Minister Paul Martin. Eggleton's win over such a powerful naysayer is testimony to the government's satisfaction with the public response to the recent helicopter purchase. The Liberals had expected a damaging fallout for selecting the EH-101 --the same aircraft chosen by the Tories in a deal Jean Chrétien campaigned against in 1993 and cancelled soon after taking power. Instead, they weathered only a few days of largely harmless opposition criticism; MPs reported little backlash at the constituency level. If the submarine deal also leaves no political scars, Eggleton may push for two more big purchases: up to $1.4 billion for 411 armored personnel carriers and perhaps $2 billion for 35 naval helicopters--a sign that, at least in terms of procurement, the military may be on a roll.
this next source might be pretty good for you:
AUTHOR: MARY JANIGAN
TITLE: MILITARY MYTHS: John McCallum's troops will get more money, but that's only the beginning
SOURCE: Maclean's 116 no6 33 F 10 2003
The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited.
TO GET A REALLY good idea of John McCallum's basic problem, you only have to look at the back of our $10 bill. There is a depiction of a war memorial arch -- without the traditional statues of soldiers that usually stand beneath it. To the left, in a wash of purple ink, is a female soldier, peering through binoculars, wearing the jaunty blue beret of the United Nations peacekeeping force. It is a wistful tribute to Canada's role in world peace. And it is an illusion: today there are only 269 Canadian peacekeepers among the nearly 40,000 troops in the service of the United Nations. "Saying we are a peacekeeping nation is a rewriting of our history," says Alain Pellerin, executive director of the Conference of Defence Associations. "And peacekeeping changed in the 1990s. Look at the Balkans: there has been a lot of fighting -- and we have lost more than 20 people there. There is an element of myth to how we see our armed forces."
That myth has dogged Defence Minister McCallum since he was catapulted into his position last May from a junior finance portfolio. True, in increasing numbers, Canadians want an able military: in late November, 56 per cent told Liberal pollster Pollara Inc. that Canada should spend more on defence, the highest portion since the firm started tracking in the mid-1980s. But there has not yet been a full debate on the hard choices and expensive changes that lie ahead. When even peacekeeping in the 21st century is a dangerous task requiring combat-ready troops, when armed forces have been steadily edging into closer co-operation with the U.S., the ministry could charitably be called a public relations challenge.
McCallum has had a steep learning curve. First, the former bank economist and arts dean educated himself, talking to defence officials, academics and businessmen with military experience. Then he tackled his colleagues, lobbying the regional caucuses, forging astute bonds with Foreign Minister Bill Graham and Finance Minister John Manley. The short-term result is this month's budget: up to $1 billion will be added to the department's bottom line. At least $500 million of that will be added for 2003-2004 -- on top of current spending of $11.8 billion. That money will simply stabilize the forces. More importantly, the budget will lay out a multi-year plan to recruit trained personnel and fund new equipment. "The budget will say that Canadian troops have to focus their skill set," says an insider. "And, they need quality equipment. We cannot do it overnight -- but we are going to do it in a phased-in way with new money and a reallocation of existing money."
The cash will come as a relief to the military, which is struggling with huge maintenance budgets for aging equipment, shortages of skilled staff and depleted capital budgets that have been raided for daily expenditures. Last fall, Pellerin's group grimly itemized the needs of the services: up to 40 to 50 per cent of the army's weapons and vehicle fleets could be grounded early next year "because the purchase of spares has been inconsistent and inadequate"; the air force lost half its manpower over the last decade. The group called for an injection of at least $1.5 billion. The Senate defence committee says $4 billion is the bare minimum. "It is probably beyond the ability of the department right now to save major capabilities from collapsing over the next few years," warns Douglas Bland, chair of Queen's University's defence management studies program. "There is just this crumbling away."
But more money is only part of the solution: Canada's military must be restructured to deal with a world of high-tech threats and low-tech terrorism. To his credit, McCallum has started this process in his quest to find annual savings of $200 million. Outside experts will examine how to streamline administration and procurement. Almost $4 billion goes to non-military expenditures such as environmental cleanups. And savings will likely come from the elimination of outdated equipment such as tanks. "The challenge has changed dramatically from the Soviet Union to terrorists," McCallum told Macleans. "There are enormous challenges facing militaries around the world to adapt to the new security environment and the new technology."
That is a solid start. But the greatest challenge lies ahead: the updating of the 1994 White Paper on defence. Its basic aims will surely remain: homeland, continental and international defence. But Canada needs new master plans for both defence and foreign affairs. The good news is that McCallum and Graham are working together to diminish the traditional rivalry between their ministries. The bad news is that it would be folly to create policy before a new prime minister takes over early next year.
So the hard choices are still ahead. In an eye-opening series, the Institute for Research on Public Policy has examined the critical priorities in the "new world disorder." In one study, Bland outlined Canada's choices for military coalitions: with established groups, such as NATO in Bosnia; in "coalitions of the moment," such as our 1999 peacekeeping mission to East Timor with the Australians; or a deeper relationship with the U.S. "Choosing where in the world Canada is willing and able to act in multinational operations, including humanitarian operations, is a difficult political decision," says Bland. "Nobody ever heard of East Timor and suddenly we were there: today, the principal element of defence policy is surprise."
So far, we are tilting toward the U.S. Dalhousie University political scientists Danford Middlemiss and Denis Stairs note that we are edging toward ever-greater interoperability with U.S. forces -- with almost no national debate. Our fighter jets, for instance, which had compatibility problems on previous Gulf missions, are being upgraded to match U.S. standards in 10 areas.
McCallum's task is to hold this fort at a time when the gap between myth and reality has never been greater. Or more dangerous.
Mary Janigan's column appears every other issue.
Defending Canada.; Canada & the World Backgrounder, 1995, Vol. 60 Issue 6, About Canada p1, 4p, 1 chart
Database: Military & Government Collection
Section: About Canada
The world has changed dramatically in the last few years. The Berlin Wall has come down, Germany has been reunited, and the Soviet Union has disintegrated. These events ended the Cold War and the atmosphere of continuing crisis that had shaped relations between East and West since the end of World War II. The world that emerged, however, has not been as peaceful as most Canadians had hoped. By the early 1990s, for example, war broke out in the Persian Gulf and in the remains of Yugoslavia. More than 2,000 Canadian soldiers took part in the 1991 Gulf War and at the end of 1994, 2,700 Canadian soldiers continued to serve as United Nations peacekeepers -- a familiar, respected, but increasingly dangerous task.
While today's world situation may not threaten Canadians directly, as it did during the Cold War, neither is it more peaceful or stable. Meanwhile, the harsh economic reality of a $750 billion national debt means that Canada will cut its defence expenditures. Despite these reductions, Canada's armed forces must still strive to meet the widespread military commitments that history and geography have bestowed upon them. They continue to "stand on guard" for their country and its allies in North America and Europe. Under the banner of the United Nations, they also fulfill their peacekeeping duties in troubled regions around the world.
Reductions in military personnel and equipment will make it difficult to meet all these commitments. But the gap between political commitment and actual military capability is not unique to the post-Cold War era. It is deeply embedded in our military history, and is part of Canada's continuing defence dilemma.
An Unmilitary Power
Canada was born of a sense of threat. By 1865, the United States had become a major military power, having survived a bloody civil war which left it with one of the strongest armies of the time. Wary British colonials in Canada feared this superior military force and sought a greater sense of security through Confederation in 1867.
But the fledgling Canadian nation made no serious attempt to arm itself against a possible American invasion. Canada maintained only a small, ill-equipped and ill-trained militia that did not become a professional fighting force until the eve of World War I. There were, however, sound reasons for this: with a small population and a vast territory (9.2 million km2), Canada could never hope to defend itself against the United States with whom it shared a long and indefensible border. Rather than try to create a huge military force, Canada chose to rely on law and diplomacy to settle disputes with its neighbor to the south. Canada's leaders also reasoned that -- given Canada's geography -- only great powers could threaten this country, and only great powers could defend it. Canada, on this logic, could best defend itself through alliances with powerful protectors whose own military interests included the defence of Canada.
A Great Power Protectorate
The first of these defenders was, of course, Great Britain. British garrisons in Canada were permanently withdrawn by 1905. However, until the late 1930s, Britain remained the world's dominant naval power, and was committed to protecting our extensive shores (total coastline, including islands, 244,000 km). As British power declined, however, the role of Canada's guardian was assumed by its former rival and now good neighbor, the United States.
Just prior to World War II, the United States extended to Canada the protection of its 19th century Monroe Doctrine. This claimed the Western Hemisphere as America's backyard. During an address at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario in 1938, United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt pledged that "the United States would not stand idly by" if Canada were ever threatened by a hostile power. Since then, the defence of the United States has meant the defending of the North American continent. When America became an atomic superpower in the postwar era, it extended its nuclear shield to its northern neighbor. Canada's security is in the national interest of the United States and this has earned us a guarantee of automatic protection, a commitment that stands as the basis of Canadian defence policy today.
An Unmilitary Community
The military historian Charles Stacey once described Canada as an "unmilitary community." By this he meant that Canada has never wanted a powerful military establishment. Canadians have preferred, instead, to spend their money both on consumer goods and public services. Our lack of interest in things military stems partly from our ties to the friendly and protective great powers of Great Britain and the United States. But, it is also deeply rooted in Canada's history and culture. During both world wars, opposition to conscription, particularly in Quebec, nearly tore the country apart. Canada survived these threats to its unity, but the fact of deep divisions over the country's military role could not be ignored.
On the other hand, if war has sometimes divided us, it has also strengthened our sense of nationhood and brought us together in the face of a common threat. Fear of the giant that emerged from the American Civil War was at least partially responsible for Confederation. The two world wars also contributed greatly to Canadian national identity. Although conscription was introduced toward the end of World War II after much bitter debate, all Canadian forces sent overseas in both wars were volunteers whose patriotism inspired others. The sacrifices of Canada's soldiers played a major role in Canada's evolution into a sovereign nation.
Canada's Defence Partnerships
Of the 500,000 troops Canada contributed to the allied war effort during World War I, 60,000 never came back. In 1919, the League of Nations was organized and Canada became a founding member. World War I had ironically been called "the war to end all wars," and the League was established to guard the peace. Its goal was to maintain international security by imposing collective economic or military sanctions against .countries that threatened the peace. But Canada quickly asserted its independence at the League by declining to participate in collective security measures. This contributed to the isolationism, even more evident in the United States at that time, that finally rendered the League ineffective.
In 1931, Canada achieved sovereign nation status through the Statute of Westminster. As a member of the new British Commonwealth of Nations, Canada now had full power to make its own foreign and defence policies. Great Britain could no longer declare war on Canada's behalf. But, when World War II broke out in 1939, Canada again contributed generously to the allied effort. The loss of 45,000 soldiers further strengthened the country's resolve to defend world peace. In 1945, the United Nations was formed as the central forum for dealing with issues of world peace. As a recognized middle power, Canada used its voice in world councils to promote collective security. An early and strong advocate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Canada firmly supported the United Nations involvement in the Korean War in 1950.
But Canadian leaders chose not to maintain a large military force during peacetime as a means of deterring war. After both world wars, Canada demobilized its troops as rapidly as any of the victorious powers. While it supported NATO in the late 1940s as a bulwark against Soviet military expansion into Western Europe, it did not plan to send troops to Europe in aid of the alliance. When the call came from the United Nations requesting troops be sent to Korea, the Canadian military cupboard was almost bare. Once again, Canada found itself rapidly mobilizing: its defence budget leaped to an all-time high of 7.8% of the gross domestic product; 154 Canadian naval vessels including nine destroyers put to sea, and 27,000 Canadian soldiers (the fourth largest United Nations contingent) saw action in Korea, with 424 casualties.
NATO, however, profited most from Canada's dramatic remilitarization in 1950.
Canada deployed 10,000 troops and 12 air squadrons to Europe, and earmarked its naval forces in the Atlantic chiefly for the alliance. But the situation in Europe has changed, and the 1994 White Paper on Defence announced the recall of these troops. Canada will instead maintain its military forces at home in the event of a new security threat.
The wars in which Canada's soldiers fought during this century were not great tests of Canadian patriotism because the Canadian homeland was never clearly at risk. For Canada, these were wars of principle: Canadians believed they were defending democracy during the two world wars and supporting the notion of collective security in the Korean War and more recently in the Gulf War. But, these were also wars of commitment. In the 20th century, Canada went to war partly because of commitments to its great power benefactors. For Canada, the world wars were Britain's wars; the Korean War and the Gulf War were America's wars.
The Price of Protection
A commitment to war has been the ultimate price that Canada has paid for its protection by great powers. But, even in peacetime, Canada supported the vital security interests of its powerful allies and has continued to do its share for the common defence. This sense of commitment was captured well by Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King in his response to President Roosevelt's 1938 pledge to protect Canada. Said King, "we too have obligations as a good and friendly neighbor...."
In 1938, King and Roosevelt committed their countries to defend one another, and in 1940 the Ogdenburg Agreement created a Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). These events set the stage for closer military cooperation between Canada and the United States not only during, but after World War II.
The onset of the Cold War and ominous advances in military technology strengthened Canadian-American military collaboration. The Soviet Union had acquired nuclear weapons and long-range bomber aircraft that could reach North America. This led to the establishment of a joint command for the air defence of North America under the 1958 North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD). NORAD now became Canada's post-1945 military obligation and represented the North American counterpart to NATO. While the Soviet bomber threat receded long ago, NORAD remains a major element of Canadian defence policy.
At times, Canada's obligations under NATO and NORAD have fuelled intense domestic debates. Among the principal issues at stake has been Canada's non-nuclear defence policy. Many Canadians abhor nuclear weapons, even though they have relied upon the American nuclear deterrent for their security. Therefore, at the outset of the nuclear era, Canada announced that, while it had the technical capabilities, it would not become a nuclear power. By the late 1950s, however, in light of the Soviet Union's growing military strength, Canada's armed forces were expected to assume nuclear roles under NATO and NORAD. Indecision over this issue contributed to the defeat of the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker in 1963. While the victorious Liberals under Lester Pearson honored Canada's nuclear commitments, it would remain a subject of political controversy.
As Prime Minister in 1968, Pierre Elliot Trudeau renounced Canada's nuclear roles. That decision led to the most thorough review ever of Canada's defence policy. This review concluded that Canada's troop and equipment commitments to NATO should be significantly reduced. To the dismay of its NATO allies, in 1971 Canada halved its 10,000 strong troop presence in Europe. The review also concluded that Canada's NORAD forces should be more concerned with challenges to Canadian sovereignty in its air and coastal spaces than with Soviet bombers, a now much diminished threat to North American military security.
But the retreat from alliance was short-lived. In 1975, Canada renewed its commitment to NATO with the purchase from West Germany of 128 Leopard I main battle tanks designed for use in Central Europe. In 1983, Canada strengthened its North American defence by signing the Canada-United States Test and Evaluation Program (CANUSTEP). To the dismay of some Canadians, CANUSTEP permitted the testing by the United States of nuclear-capable cruise missiles in Canadian air space.
Such decisions are often more useful for Canada as instruments of diplomacy than as measures of military strength. They have symbolized Canada's continued commitment to its alliances even when a common enemy has not been clearly present. Canada's allies value this commitment and see it as a willingness on our part to share the burden of global military responsibilities. Moreover, Canada's military allies are amongst its closest trading partners; in return for the economic advantages this brings, they expect Canada to do its share for the common defence. The close relationship between Canada's trade and defence policies was recognized in the 1994 Defence White Paper. For example, a growing Canadian interest in the security of Asia and Latin America is anticipated, as these are regions where Canada is trying to build stronger trade links. But maintaining a military force also has benefits and consequences for the economy here at home.
Defence and the Economy
Keeping a defence force, with all the personnel, equipment, and military bases which that entails, is a costly operation, but there are benefits as well. By purchasing services and equipment and maintaining bases over the years, the federal government has helped offset regional economic disparities, particularly within the high unemployment regions of Quebec and Atlantic Canada. Expensive defence equipment programs have been frequently undertaken to provide opportunities for Canada's economy. During the Cold War years of the early 1980s, a number of labor- and capital-intensive high technology defence projects were initiated and are still continuing, despite recent defence budget cutbacks. A prime example is the $404 million contract for a fleet of 12 patrol frigates awarded in 1983 to a New Brunswick shipbuilding firm. The first vessel was delivered in 1991, the year the Soviet Union disintegrated; the last vessel is to be delivered in 1996.
This relationship which developed between defence and the economy during the Cold War has become an important one. However, the approximately 7% of the February 1994 budget earmarked for defence was down from 8% in 1991; equipment acquisitions will be cut by $15 billion over the next l 5 years; and, there is a plan to further reduce Canadian defence personnel by 25% between 1994 and 1999. By contrast, 35% of the budget is designated for health and social services. Public disappointment at the recent closing of military, bases reflects a fear of the social and economic consequences which defence cutbacks represent. Yet Canadians are also aware that in hard times public funds spent on defence are resources lost to health, welfare, and higher education.
Prospects for Peacekeeping
Peacekeeping traditionally involved the positioning of impartial forces between combatants. The best known, and perhaps most successful, of Canada's peacekeeping missions was the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East. UNEF was a Canadian idea, commanded initially by a Canadian soldier. Many in Canada saw it as an excellent example of how a middle power could offer impartial diplomacy as well as equipment and personnel to help defuse international conflicts. Peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours held for a decade between 1956-1967, and Canada's foreign minister, Lester Pearson, won the Nobel Peace Prize for proposing UNEF to the United Nations.
But UNEF left the Middle East in 1967, and war broke out once again between Arabs and Israelis. Pearson had feared this, because no peacekeeping measures had been provided for in his resolution. Peacekeeping is no longer the mere intervention of impartial forces to keep the peace, a military role that has suited an unmilitary people like Canadians. A chief dilemma of many such operations today is the marked absence in troubled regions of any peace to keep. Future missions may therefore require a post-conflict peace-building role, which will call for troops that have a mandate to fight. Because of the recent hostage situations in Somalia and the Balkans, Canada and other peacekeepers will be more selective in accepting such missions. Clearer policies are now being developed regarding division of responsibility, command structures and clear rules of engagement. This will allow both commanders and their troops to better understand their duties.
Despite this challenge, the 1994 Defence White Paper has increased by 3000 the number of Canadian soldiers that can be called upon to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations. This shows a continued Canadian commitment to what has become a logistically demanding, expensive, and dangerous military role.
Redefining our Role:
The history of Canada's defence policy is one of commitments far beyond the protection of the Canadian homeland. Our military tradition has been to support great power patrons; to defend the principle of democracy; to cultivate military alliances; to protect trading partners; and, increasingly, to participate in United Nations peacekeeping and collective security operations. It has often been important to impress Canada's friends as well as its foes.
The end of the Cold War and a shifted balance of power has given Canada and its allies a greater sense of security. But, at the same time, there have been increasing incidents of localized conflicts within and between smaller, less powerful countries which have caused tremendous upheaval, repression, and human suffering. These events raise a whole new set of questions about the responsibilities of governments and security alliances and how they should develop and deploy their military forces. Will new military strategies and practices be required to accomplish peacekeeping goals without unnecessarily endangering troops? Although these recent conflicts do not directly threaten our security, does Canada have a moral responsibility to help settle them?
The most recent White Paper on Defence reflects the belief that to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force is in the national interest. Despite a 14.2% budget cut between now and 1997, the Department of National Defence will still have the largest operating budget of any government department.
The White Paper also recognizes the challenges confronting our armed forces. The spread of advanced weapon technologies and the availability of weapons of mass destruction to so-called "rogue regimes" is a particular concern. Our international duties have included ensuring safe environments for the protection of refugees, delivery of food and medical supplies, and the provision of essential services in countries where civil order has collapsed.
Internally, we must monitor and control activities within Canadian territory, airspace, and maritime areas of jurisdiction. Special military equipment and trained personnel are called upon to assist other government departments in national search and rescue operations, fisheries protection, drug interdiction and environmental protection, and in situations involving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Military resources have, for example, been used effectively in the recurring off-shore fisheries disputes of recent years.
The far-flung and diverse military commitments which Canada has made, partly for economic and diplomatic reasons and partly because of deeply held principles, have outpaced its military capabilities. To what extent will such commitments tax the nation's economic resources? To what extent will they strengthen and enhance our nation as a whole? Finding the answers to these questions will be essential to meeting the challenge of effectively defending Canada.
Defending Canada is the ninth in a series of articles entitled ABOUT CANADA, a collaborative effort of the Centre for Canadian Studies at Mount Allison University and the Canadian Studies Program, Department of Canadian Heritage, with financial support from Mr. Charles R. Bronfman. Other recent titles in the series are: Canada and the Pacific Basin, Work and Unions, Aging and the Canadian Population, Innovation in Canada, Poverty in Canada, Multiculturalism in Canada, Canada at the Movies and The Changing Canadian Economy. The opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect federal government policy or opinion, or that of the Centre. For additional copies or further information on the series, contact the Centre for Canadian Studies, Mount Allison University, Sackville,New Brunswick, E0A 3C0 Tel: (506) 364-2350; Fax/Phone: (506) 364-2264.
Changes in Defence Budgets (in $ billion)
89- 90 91 - 92 93- 94 94- 95
11.9 13.4 15.2 16.1
11.5 12.9 12.0 11.8
*Amounts budgeted in the 1987 Defence White Paper
Source:1995 Budget Impact Statement Department of National Defence
MAP:Canadian peacekeeping operations around the world
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Source: Canada & the World Backgrounder, 1995, Vol. 60 Issue 6, p1, 4p
Volume 82, Issue 2
terrorism and terrorists
editorials and opinion pieces
How Europe and America Defend Themselves
Author: Jonathan Stevenson
After the United States was attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001, its European allies were among the first nations to express sympathy and pledge their aid in the war to come. The fact that many European countries have long experienced terrorism themselves helped ensure a great deal of transatlantic empathy and cooperation - at least at first. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom have all suffered political violence over the past 30 years and were thus predisposed to help the United States in its new struggle against al Qaeda. But the kind of terrorism these European countries have suffered - "old" terrorism - differs substantially from that suddenly faced by the United States. As time passed, these differences started to erode the thoroughgoing unity that had flourished right after September 11.
Nowhere were the differences between the European and American experiences and approach more evident than in homeland security. Even as Washington scrambled to adopt new measures to defend itself, there was notably less haste among European authorities to tighten immigration policies or improve border security. This was typified by the dispute between the French and British governments over Paris' refusal to close the Sangatte refugee camp near Calais. Since the war in Kosovo, hundreds of refugees, many of Afghan origin, had sought to flee the camp for illegal entry into the United Kingdom via the nearby Channel Tunnel. After September 11, the British and others began to worry that al Qaeda or the Taliban might infiltrate these groups and blow up one of the world's engineering wonders. Yet it took well over a year of bilateral acrimony before the camp was finally closed, in December 2002.
The good news for Washington is that Europe's lethargy in cooperating on homeland security has more to do with a difference in the way it perceives threats than with any deeper political or social divide. True, Europeans and Americans have recently clashed over particular strategic matters, such as the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, regime change in Iraq, perceived American unilateralism, and various social policies. No doubt they will continue to do so in the months to come. But these broader discrepancies between European and American approaches, profound as they may be, are unlikely to damage day-to-day, nonmilitary counterterrorism cooperation. Indeed, transatlantic coordination in the pursuit and apprehension of those who threaten the United States does not seem to have diminished, and differences in threat perceptions actually appear to be narrowing. Nevertheless, European leaders seem not fully to appreciate an insidious dynamic: that poor European homeland security is now making the United States more vulnerable, and strong U.S. homeland security is making Europe more vulnerable. Until policymakers in Europe start to focus on this reality and push to improve cooperation, countries on both sides of the Atlantic will remain at greater risk.
One of the crucial differences between the American and the European experiences with terrorism - and something that helps explain why their respective governments have taken different approaches to fighting it - has to do with the level and kind of violence involved. Most of the ethnic and nationalist terrorists who have plagued Europe over the last three decades have used their violence with restraint. This strategy allowed these groups - organizations such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque separatists of the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) -- to preserve a place at the negotiating table even while they set off the occasional bomb. And it meant that many of these groups could be tamed through political means. Indeed, many of Europe's terrorists were open to negotiation, direct conflict resolution, and other forms of accommodation. These options were epitomized by Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement of 1998 and by Paris' application of the "sanctuary doctrine" - under which terrorist-support work in France was tolerated by the government so long as operations were not actually directed at French interests themselves.
Starting in the 1970s and 1980s, however, a rise of violent activity in Europe by international terrorist groups (such as the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hezbollah) began to prove these traditional European responses to terror inadequate. Governments reacted with more robust-and effective-cooperative measures. Still, unlike the enemies the United States faces today, few terrorists in those days sought to debilitate European governments or recruit large numbers of members. And even those that did harbor global religious and ideological objectives (such as the Algerian Islamist Group, or GIA) still tended to employ "old" terrorist techniques.
Al Qaeda, on the other hand, represents a transnational threat - one very different in kind from that posed by the IRA or even newer groups such as Hamas. Al Qaeda has potentially thousands of members and no interest in bargaining with the United States or its allies. Instead, it seeks to cripple them, by inflicting mass casualties if possible, potentially with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is impossible to imagine Osama bin Laden's followers apologizing for inadvertently killing Americans - as Hamas did, after a suicide attack on Jerusalem's Hebrew University in August 2002.
And yet, even after September 11, Europe's perceptions of the threats posed by terrorism have remained different from America's - perhaps justifiably so. Both Europeans and Americans understand that the war in Afghanistan and new law-enforcement and intelligence cooperation have not spelled the end of al Qaeda. The likelihood of another catastrophic terrorist attack therefore remains high, especially when one remembers that the September 11 attacks were roughly two years in the making.
It is the United States, however, and not Europe, that will be the likely victim of such an attack. After all, it is the United States, not Europe, that maintains military assets in Saudi Arabia, broadly supports Israel, and is the chief source of the popular culture that bin Laden and his followers despise. The United States, not Europe, is al Qaeda's principal bete noire - its "far enemy" - and, consequently, its preferred target. Europe is only a secondary one, and given the power dynamic between it and the United States, this situation is unlikely to change anytime soon. Many Europeans have been quick to recognize this fact. A secret report, leaked in June 2002, revealed that EU interior ministers had agreed that although they still faced a significant threat from al Qaeda, the risk had diminished since September 11 thanks to heightened security. Even if they succeeded, future attacks would probably be aimed at American assets anyway.
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