France's Defeat in 1940

[ogukuo72]

Related to another topic in this forum. Not a very flattering look at the French military in 1940.

I still think that the defeat has less to do with the military per se and more to the weakness of the civilian leadership.


France's Defeat in the 1940 Campaign
by MAJ Tan Teck Guan



"Five times within a century, in 1814, 1815, 1870, 1914, and 1918, the people of Paris had heard the thunder of Prussian artillery and thrice watched the Germans parade through the streets as conquerors."

William Shirer1

The nightmares of German invasions, which had plagued France for more than a century, were to return and haunt them once again in 1940. On 1 September 1939, German troops invaded Poland. Two days later, Britain and France reluctantly declared war on Germany. Europe was once again plunged into war. The Treaty of Versailles had given Europe just 20 years of peace - a realisation of Marshal Ferinand Foch's dire prophecy of 1919.2

In the early dawn of 10 May 1940, some eight months after the declaration of war, German forces in a co-ordinated effort swept across the frontiers of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. The speed and ease at which the Germans overran the Low Countries astonished the world. By 14 June, the mighty German armies were already at the doorsteps of Paris. And on 22 June, just six weeks after the invasion, Marshal Pétain, on behalf of France, signed the armistice with the jubilant Germans.3

The German conquest of the Low Countries and France was hailed as a splendid example of blitzkrieg in modern military history. Even the Germans were amazed at the ease at which they had shattered the Allied defences. What were the reasons behind Germany's "miraculous" victory? Why had the French military, previously regarded among the world's best-prepared forces, collapsed so rapidly? This paper aims to address these questions, specifically, the reasons4 behind the rapid fall of France in 1940.

This paper will briefly compare the military strategies adopted by both France and Germany in the 1940 Campaign and shed some light on some of the fundamental flaws in the French strategy, which ultimately led to her defeat at the hands of the Germans.

All military strategies are influenced to a certain extent by doctrinal considerations. The strategies adopted by France and Germany in 1940 were no exception.5 The paper will also look at some of the French doctrines and how poor military leadership and the WW I experience had influenced the development (or rather stagnation) of these doctrines during the inter-war period.

The Shield

Throughout the inter-war period, the French military leadership had held strongly to the conclusion that Belgium would remain Germany's main invasion route in the next war. The French had believed that with the construction of the Maginot Line6 along their north-eastern frontier, the Germans would be encouraged to divert their main attack through Belgium, and thus attempt a repeat of their 1914 Schlieffen Plan. The French had also erroneously ruled out the possibility of an invasion through the Ardennes. The French pre-war assessment was that the Ardennes region, with its heavy forests and steep hills, would pose a significant hindrance to the rapid movement of large motorised forces. This assessment remained unchanged throughout the inter-war period. These flawed conclusions consequently shaped France's strategy in the 1940 Campaign.

The goal in the French strategy in the 1940 Campaign was to avoid defeat, rather than achieve immediate victory. The French planned to rush the bulk of their most modern and mobile forces into Belgium to establish a forward defence along the Dyle River, while placing only minimum forces along the Ardennes and their north-eastern frontier. By occupying prepared entrenched positions along the Dyle line, the French believed that they could half the German advance. Subsequently, after having sufficiently weakened the Germans, the French intended to launch the counter-offensive to drive back the invaders. This plan came to be known as the Dyle Plan.7

The Sword

While the French intent was to avoid defeat initially, the German strategy in 1940 sought to achieve a swift and decisive victory over the Allies. The German High Command emphasised a preference for a short war and the importance of annihilating the Allied forces.8 After much deliberation, the Germans rationalised that the annihilation of the Allied forces could only be achieved by an outflanking manoeuvre to bypass their main defences in Belgium. This fundamental conclusion formed the basis for the German invasion plan in 1940.

The German strategy in the 1940 Campaign was to launch a secondary effort to seize Belgium and Holland, so as to deceive the Allies into believing that the main offensive was coming through Belgium. In doing so, the Germans hoped to entice the Allied forces to move forward into Belgium. In the meantime, a massive force comprising five field armies, spearheaded by three panzer corps, would rapidly traverse the bulk of the Allied forces that had been sent forward into Belgium. This plan became known as the Manstein Plan, named after its chief architect - General Erich von Manstein.

Cracks in the Shield?

Tragically, France's strategy of sending forces into Belgium played directly into the hands of the Germans. The tactical weakness of her strategy was further magnified when the French Commander-in-Chief, General Gamelin, decided to throw his entire reserves into Holland to link up with the Dutch forces there. With the bulk of her forces forward in Belgium and without any operational reserves, the French were unable to contain the main German offensive pouring through the lightly-defended Ardennes region. By the evening of 15 May, the Germans had ruptured the Allied front completely. By 20 May, the German panzer corps had reached the English Channel and had successfully entrapped the Allied armies in Belgium. After the frantic withdrawal of the Allied forces through Dunkirk, the rest of the campaign was a stroll for the Germans. Although there were some initial tenacious resistance, the French defences soon collapsed. On 22 June 1940, just six weeks after the invasion, France capitulated.9

From this brief review of the opposing strategies, it is evident that there were at least two fundamental flaws in the French strategy that had directly contributed to France's defeat in 1940. The first was the fallacious assumption that the Germans would again invade through Belgium à la Schlieffen in 1914. Throughout the inter-war years, the French military leaders were misguided by the belief that the Ardennes was impenetrable to motorised forces. "This sector is not dangerous", Marshall Pétain had declared confidently in 1934.10

The second, and more important flaw was the lack of reserves in the French defence. This constituted a grave violation of a fundamental principle of defence - maintenance of reserve. If only the French had sufficient reserves to disrupt the German crossing of the Meuse at Sedan, the entire course of the war might have been very different.11 At this juncture, it is important to note that the French 1940 doctrines on defence actually dictated that reserves must be maintained to meet enemy penetration into their defence lines.12 Therefore, the decision to commit the entire French reserves into Holland represented a failure of judgement on the part of the French military leaders, and not a weakness of the French doctrines.

With obvious weaknesses in the French strategy, it is probably very tempting to conclude that the 1940 Campaign was lost due to these strategic flaws. However, a glimpse at the tomes of literature on the 1940 Campaign would suggest otherwise. France's defeat in 1940 has been attributed to many other factors.

Leadership Failure

"What we lack in numbers, we will make up for in quality: in the standards of discipline, dedication and leadership."

SM Lee Kuan Yew13

This is exactly what the French failed to do in 1940. Indeed, the inter-war period witnessed the steady decline of the mighty French Army. The French Army was withering awaym not just because of dwindling manpower and a shrinking budget, but more significantly, because of its atrocious leadership14 and the poor quality of its soldiers.

During the inter-war period, the French military was basically run by veterans of the Great War, who were made generals during the war when advancement was inevitably rapid. Unfortunately after the war, these generals continued to cling on to their posts instead of passing on the younger, more vigorous officers. One such veteran was Marshal Pétain who held the post of Commander-in-Chief for 13 years after the war until his retirement in 1931, at a ripe age of 75. Even then, he remained on the War Council and continued to dominate French military thoughts and policies right up to the eve of WW II. Likewise, General Weygand, who succeeded Pétain in 1931, and General Gamelin, who held the post of Commander-in-Chief from 1935 to 1940, were all veterans who had fought in the Great War.15

With veterans of the previous war remaining at the helm of the French military, it was hardly surprising that the development of post-war French military doctrines were greatly influenced by their experiences in the Great War. Sadly, many of these veteran leaders continued to stubbornly hold on to ideas and doctrines that had brought them success during the previous war. This eventually led to a serious stagnation of ideas and complacency within the French military.16

In essence, the French military degenerated into a tragic state of inertia after the Great War. In this state of inertia, the French military minds were closed to new innovations and new tactics. Technological advances, which had made possible faster planes, heavily armoured tanks and radio communication, were received with much scepticism. Other than the conversion of five infantry divisions and a cavalry division into light mechanised divisions, the French military of 1940 had virtually shown no progress since the last war.17

With the dark clouds of war looming over the horizon, it was not difficult to discern the growing uneasiness over the fighting capabilities of the French soldiers. Unfortunately, the quality of the French soldiers in 1940 was a far cry from that of their forefathers who had died willingly by the thousands in the infernos of the Great War. Poor training, inadequate battle preparation, inept leadership and complacency resulting from the "Maginot Line complex" had adversely drained the morale, cohesion and discipline of the troops. Why then had the French High Command done practically nothing to improve the pathetic state of the army? General Gamelin, in a subsequent apology, confessed: "...I spent my time exclusively with staff officers, I was not in sufficiently close touch with the spirit of the country and the troops."18

French Doctrines - Progression or Regression?

As explained in the preceding section, the development of French military doctrines almost came to a grinding halt after the Great War. The few advances and changes that were made to the French doctrines during the inter-war period were either insufficient or in the wrong direction. When promulgated in 1936, the new Manual of Instruction, although containing some doctrinal improvements over the 1921 edition, proclaimed that despite the technological advances made in weaponry "...the doctrine objectively fixed at the end of the war (1918) by the eminent chiefs who had held high commands must remain the charter for the tactical employment of large units".19 This was a shocking confession that France was prepared to go to war with doctrines formulated based on her WW I experience, In short, the FRench military in 1940 was organised, equipped and trained to fight a war similar to that of the western front in 1918.20

Unfortunately for France, this was precisely the type of war that Germany wanted to avoid in 1940. In the 1940 Campaign, the Germans revolutionised warfare with their blitzkrieg concept of fighting by exploiting the speed and firepower of tanks, mobile artillery and airplanes to achieve a short, violent lightning war - a complete opposite of what the French had envisaged. Naturally, the French doctrines, which emphasised static defence and "methodical battle", were ill-suited and too rigid for the paid and often intense pace of mobile warfare that the germans unleashed upon them in 1940.21

Obsession with Defence

French and the German doctrines in 1940 differed sharply in several key aspects. While the French doctrines strongly emphasised the defensive and the strength of firepower, the German doctrines emphasised the offensive and the importance of mobility and flexibility.22

France's obsession with defence and firepower can be explained by her bitter experience in the Great War. For France, the Great War was practically a brutal demonstration on the effectiveness of modern firepower. In that war, France lost 1.4 million soldiers. Another 4.2 million were seriously maimed.23 Following these terrible losses, post-war France was bent on abandoning the philosophy of offensive à outrance24 in favour of a more balanced emphasis on defence. The French were determined that the holocaust of 1914 to 1918 caused by excessive emphasis on the offensive should never again be repeated in future wars. Moreover, the 10-month battle at Verdun in 1916 had convinced the French that a continuous line of trenches and an immense amount of firepower could hold out against any attack. These lessons had convinced post-war France that defence was the only feasible strategy, not only to win the next war, but also to prevent the mindless slaughter of her youths.25

Another major impetus for France to revert to the defensive was the reduction in the terms of military service during the inter-war period. Since the French Revolution, the French system of national defence rested upon the philosophy of the nation in arms, whereby the bulk of her soldiers are mobilised only in times of national peril. It was therefore, politically impossible for France to justify a large standing peacetime army. Consequently, the terms of military service were reduced in 1921, 1923 and 1928 to two years, 19 months and one year respectively. This effectively halved France's standing army from 41 divisions in 192 to only 20 divisions in 1928. With only a small standing army, the French army could only hope to hold back any surprise German invasion while awaiting the mobilisation of its reservists.26

The construction of the Maginot Line along France's north-eastern border was a physical manifestation of her obsession with defence and the "continuous front".27 Unfortunately, after siphoning off a disproportionate share from the military's coffers during the lean depression years of the 1930s, the Maginot Line turned out to be no more than an engineering fear of questionable military value in the 1940 Campaign. The trouble with the Maginot Line was that it was in the wrong place. In the 1940 Campaign, nearly half the French Army was deployed in support of the Line, and they remained there only to be bypassed by the Germans attacking through the Ardennes. These forces could otherwise have been employed as reserves that were grossly lacking in France's defence.28

Moreover, the French doctrines of static defence and the "continuous front" were already tactically obsolete even before the Maginot Line was completed in 1935. By 1918, both the Germans and the Allies had already mastered the techniques of breaking through so-called "impenetrable" trench-lines and fixed defences.29 The German establishment of the panzer divisions in the 1930s and the ease at which the panzers had ruptured Austria's and Czechoslovakia's defences in early 1939 should have convinced France to rethink her defensive doctrines. Unfortunately for France, this was not the case. In March 1935, in a heated debate over the establishment of an armoured force for offensive roles, General Maurin, the Minister of War retorted: "How can anyone believe that we are still thinking of the offensive when we have spent so many billions to establish a fortified front!"30

Employment of Tanks and Airplanes

Contrary to popular beliefs, the Allies and the Germans possessed roughly the same number of tanks in May 1940.31 In fact, the French SOMUA S-35 tank was widely regarded as the best tank on the battlefield of May 1940. The key difference between the two countries was not in the quantity or the quality of their tanks, but rather, the tactical employment of these tanks.32

Although the French recognised the tank as one of the most important weapons indroduced since WW I, they firmly believed that the primary function of the tank was to augment the firepower of the infantry. The employment of tanks in the French Army during the inter-war period was mostly aptly described in the following extract from the French Military Review (December 1938):

"Not even the most modern tanks can ever lead the fighting by themselves and for themselves. Their mission must always to be to participate along with the fire of the artillery and heavy infantry arms in the protection and the support of attacks..."33

It was only during the Polish Campaign in September 1939, when the awesome might of the German panzer divisions finally convinced France of the need to establish her own independent armoured divisions. The first two divisions were created in January 1940, while a third was only added in April 1940. Unfortunately, these hastily formed divisions suffered a lack of equipment and training, and were simply no match for the well-organised panzer divisions.34

As with the tanks, the French failed to develop a viable doctrine for the deployment of airplanes. Little thought had been given to air co-operation with the ground forces.35 Probably, the most serious fault with the French air doctrine during the inter-war period was its failure to appreciate the importance of dive-bombers despite the lessons from the Polish Campaign. As at May 1940, France possessed a mere 50 dive-bombers.36

In terms of equipment, the French Air Force was also inferior to the Luftwaffe, in both quantity and quality. The French Air Force entered the 1940 Campaign with only 1,200 aircraft against the German total of 3,200 aircraft. Moreover, the bulk of France's aircraft were obsolete equipment, accumulated from the 1920s and early 1930s, and were inferior in both speed and range to those manufactured in Germany. Unlike the German aircraft, the bulk of the French aircraft were not equipped with radio communication: once the aircraft were air-borne, they were beyond contact.37

Centralisation and the "Methodical Battle"

An indispensable part of the French doctrine was its step-by-step approach to battle, termed the "methodical battle". The "methodical battle" closely resembled the WW I procedures. Under this method, all units and weapons were carefully marshalled and then employed in combat according to strictly schedules timetables and phase lines. Under the "methodical battle", decision-making was centralised at higher level command so as to co-ordinate the actions of the numerous subordinate units, There was little need for decentralisation and lower-level officers were expected to display obedience rather than initiative and flexibility.38

The rapid collapse of France in 1940 was a clear indication that the French centrally controlled operation were too rigid for the mobile battlefield of 1940. The French emphasis on obedience and centralisation had also fostered a military leadership that lacked the proper flexibility and responsiveness to counter the unexpected German penetration through the Ardennes.39

Conclusion

Having examined some of the key aspects of the French doctrines, it is apparent that the French doctrines of 1940 were influenced to a large extent by their experiences in WW I. To attribute France's humiliating defeat in 1940 solely to her employment of obsolete doctrines and equipment would be overly simplistic: the use of outdated doctrines and equipment certainly played an important part in explaining the 1940 collapse of France.

Ultimately, the French defeat in the 1940 Campaign is attributed to her ill-conceived strategy which was based on fallacious assumptions, her poorly-led military forces, and her obsolete tactical and operational-level doctrines which were inadequate for the mobile war Germany thrust upon her in 1940.40

[Para]

As mentioned the French poured money into fixed defences, but left great holes in their line. They ignored air power and had failed to build up a modern Air Force, they had just 200 brand new fighters which could have made there mark had there been more of them. As also stated the French had totally ignored the tank and many other more modern weapons.

[AROUETLJ]

I think Saint-Exupery just about sums it up: How could 40 million famers fight against 80 million industrialists?

Now can we move on? This forum seems to be stuck somewhere around 1940.

[David Lehmann]

Reasons of the quick fall of France ?

1) Political :

The French government was clearly weak.
From 1931 to 1939 Gamelin modelled a new army and made several errors :
• instead of unifying the command he diluted it in several intermediate command, what complicated the chain of command
• on the eve of war he created two TO : North East and the Alps
• he planned operation Dyle/Breda but against the opinion of general Georges in charge of it on the field
• he did not understand the role of aviation in a modern war and was opposed to the creation of big armored formations
• in 1939 his collaborators and the army and no trust and no respect for him
• entrenched in the Vincennes castle he communicated only by phone and didn't want to use modern radio equipment.

2) Strategically / Military :

• The French army was not able to lead a modern movement war, it relied on the older doctrine of the continuous front at the outbreak of the war (it changed alredy in June)
• Bad coordination between the infantry/tanks/artillery/aviation in comparison to the Germans who trained in that way.
• The French infantry / artillery couple was opposed to the German tanks / aviation couple and purely on the battlefield it did very well when led by good commanders, for example during the battle of Gembloux in Belgium. READ THE ARTICLES BY JEFFERY GUNSBURG for example ...
• Grossly no reserves
• The continuation of the war from the colonies alone against Germany is a myth, there were only several days of ammunition, fuel etc. supply … no industrial power in the colonies.
• No serious counter-attack could be launched except operation in the Warndt (Sarre area) in 1939 but this is mainly due to High Command and political reasons. In May / June 1940 the single important counter-attacks took place in Abbeville and in Arras. Montcornet and Crécy-sur-Serre were rather probes.
• Lack in radio sets, most of the communication means were telephones, flags or men on motorcycles ... very slow when you have to make a quick decision against a quick advancing foe.
• A very important point is the lack in AA artillery compared to the German one (not enough pieces but also not enough AA ammunition). The Stukas and Hs-123s had it easy while most of the French aircrafts were not destroyed by German fighters but by the very dense Flak the German had.
• The French soldier was also not at all prepared psychologically to the war which is an important point generally forgotten. Unlike some German soldiers he didn't fought fanatically for his country or his Führer but simply for his comrades, unit, platoon or company commander. In Germany in the 30's there was a stong militarization of the society and of the youth with many para-military and armed political movements.
• The communists often claimed that there were numerous in the resistance but they forgot to mention that it is because they were already well organized since the dissolution of their political movement in September 1939. Because of the German-Soviet agreement they were in favor of the Germans and were responsible for many strikes and sabotages. Farman factory had been damaged by a bomb in June and it is well known that many tanks/armament coming out from the Satory factory were sabotaged and that some tanks had mechanical breakdowns due to that. That does not explain at all the total defeat but it puts into light the general atmosphere in the country. Already before WW2 they led a subversive pacifist/internationalist campaign in the country and hindered the French armament program.

3) Psychological :

• France declared war to Germany with a civil population deeply pacifist after the WWI slaughter (France had about 6 millions losses that meant 10% of the active male population of the country - 1,400,000 KIA - and only in the late 50's the French population could reach again the number of before WW1).
• Communists' strikes and sabotages in the armament industries (because of the pact between Germany and Russia).
• The political power was weak.
• The defeat was already there, no real will to fight in the high spheres of decision.

The western campaign of 1940 can be seen as the best example of Blitzkrieg carried out, also later against Greece and Yugoslavia but it couldn't work anymore in Russia which was too big. In Poland it was much more a classical Kesselschlacht and the too weak Leichten-Divisionen where after that transformed in Panzer-Divisionen. A large faked attack was undertaken in Belgium and in the Netherlands where paratroopers and airborne troops were used to secure important points. France and United-Kingdom sent their best forces in Belgium and in the Netherlands. Later, the main forces attacked in an unexpected place where only second-rate divisions resisted them. Here the German Panzer Divisionen pushed on almost without concern for their flanks, leaving the cleaning up to the infantry. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe attacked as support for the Panzers and the infantry.

The French fought very well as companies, battalions and often as divisions but generally horribly as armies when facing the Panzerwaffe because it was too fast but they were not worse than the German infantry divisions ... doctrine (conception and use of tanks), communication issues etc. The French Army didn't loose because of a lack of material (though a high lack of radios, modern fighters, bombers, especially AA weapons and AA ammunitions) and its armament was as good as the German one (sometimes better), the reasons are both the doctrine at the military level and several political decisions as well as the German innovations.

The Germans had always armor superiority because they concentrated it and French did that only in several battles. France and Great Britain used tank tactics that were very different from Germany's ones. Where Germany deployed their Panzers in concentration, France and Great Britain deployed their tanks spread out among the infantry or sometimes concentrated but only as a shock element working for the infantry, never as a decisive weapon by itself, they had nothing really comparable to the Panzer Divisionen, the closest was the French DLM which had been in fact copied to give rise to the Leichten Divisionen (transformed in Panzer Divisionen after Poland). The big allied armored units didn't show as good combined arms efficiency and were all weaker in tank numbers. This meant that it was easy for the German forces to take out the few tanks used at a time and the otherwise superior French tanks (armor and armament) were no real threat towards Germany's superior Blitzkrieg tactics. Except for some battles (Hannut/Gembloux, Abbeville ...) the French tanks were never concentrated and as a French general said, the tanks were used in 1000 groups of 3 instead of 3 groups of 1000.
The British did absolutely no better job in France than the French army. They were beaten the same way and led their battles more or less according to the same tactics. The first attack on Abbeville for example was led by the 1st AD (general Evans) and they lost 120 tanks out of 165, the attack failed in only 2 hours. The second attack led by general De Gaulle (4e DCR), according to his views of the use of tanks lasted 3 days and finally the third attack led by the French 2e DCR (Colonel Perré) supported by French infantry and the Scottish 51st HD failed in 6 hours. Hopefully there was the Channel otherwise Great-Britain would have been crushed as easily the same way.

Crude numbers give about the same number of tanks on each side, but remove all the obsolete FT17 tanks from WW1 and count only what was really on the front line against the enemy and you will see that the modern French tanks really used at the front are only between 1800 and 2000 grossly. The FCM36, Hotchkiss H35, Renault R35 etc. were equipped with a short 37mm SA18 gun which was grossly the same than the 37mm TR16 infantry gun of WW1. Not all the French tanks had a 47mm SA35 gun or even a 37mm SA38 gun. The French tanks were all better armored than the best German tanks, the armament of several tanks (Renault B1bis, Somua S35 etc.) was very good (the 47mm SA35 L/32 gun), but they lacked communication and were slower. The German tanks were lighter and were spreading like water; they poured in every breakthrough and attacked the rear lines, disorganizing the whole defence. Thanks to their more numerous radios they were able to quickly change the direction of a movement/attack and they were continuously supported by attack and reconnaissance aircrafts.
On a strategic level the German tanks were superior but if you consider a small tactical engagement from tank to tank it is absolutely not the case. In several occasions the French tanks gave the Germans a bad licking but the mobility and tactics of the Germans almost systematically resulted in concentration of firepower and local superiority in the objective area. During the Hannut/Gembloux gap battle, the French lost 105 tanks and the Germans 165 tanks.
The French B1bis gave the Germans a bad licking resisting 37mm and even 75mm tank gunners with their superior armor and was nicknamed "Kolosse". The 3.7cm Pak36 was called the "door-knocker" by the Germans because it proved to be too weak against the Matilda II and the B1bis. Even Guderian had not dismissed these concerns in his memories and the up-and-coming officers in the German army would never forget the impression left of fearing enemy heavy armor and the need to counter them, like the infantry battalion destroyed in Huppy. The B1bis resisted sometimes to more than hundred 3.7cm and 7.5cm shells.

It is also wrong to depict the French officers as being not respected; it was not the case in most of the units where these officers were the single reason for the unit not to collapse under the German pressure. If indeed some generals were totally obsolete most of the lieutenants, captains and colonels had the will to fight and were well formed. Many of the officers, especially of ranks higher than captain were WW1 veterans and were used to heavy bombings and bloody fight.

The Germans had light/medium/heavy tanks. In the French army the armored units did not constitute a part of the army by themselves, they were either depending from the infantry (support tanks like the FCM-36 or breakthrough tanks like the B1bis) or from the cavalry (like the Somua S35). They were never created to be an "autonomous" offensive tool, able to pierce and progress deep in enemy territory. The breakthrough tanks had to give the initial push, to destroy the enemy line of resistance, allowing then the infantry to breakthrough and take the ground.

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Note about the AA means :
In 1940, the French army France had 20x 94mm Vickers AA guns beside about 40x Schneider 90mm AA guns (Mle1926/1930 and 1939) and about 135x 105mm Mle1915/1934 AA guns.
From the 1695x 75mm AA guns listed, 876x are based on the 75mm Mle1897 gun and fire the 75x350R shell (75mm Mle1913/34, Mle1915/34 and Mle1915). The other 819x 75mm AA guns are based on the 75mm Mle1928 Schneider gun and fire the 75x837R shell (75mm Mle1917/34, Mle1930, Mle1932, Mle1933 and Mle1928/39). That makes a total of 1890 potentially available heavy AA guns. In comparison at the same time, the Germans had more than 2500 8.8cm and 10.5cm AA guns.
The French army had only about 270 light AA guns (13.2mm) and 1331 medium AA guns (20-40mm) available in May 1940. Further deliveries led to about 1900 medium AA guns available. In comparison, the Wehrmacht on 10th May 1940 had about 6500 2.0cm and 3.7cm AA guns covering the troops advancing in France. These AA guns caused the main losses in the French air force while the Luftwaffe encountered much less AA fire.

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Note about the French air force :
The French air force was largely inferior to the German one, especially the bomber fleet which was really small in comparison.

Operational frontline aircrafts on 10th May 1940 on the western front :
France : 879
UK : 384 (total of 416 : 100 fighter (Hurricane + Gladiator) and 316 attack/bomber (Fairey Battle + Blenheim)
Belgium : 118
Netherlands : 72
Germany : 2589

According to Karl Heinz Frieser, the Luftwaffe lost 1236 planes + 323 damaged ones during the western campaign (Fall Gelb). In his book from 1990, Jean-Gisclon studied the French fighter units. He indicates that the Germans lost between 10th May and 25th June a total of 1471 destroyed and 675 damaged aircrafts, these numbers are higher than the German ones. The German human losses in the Luftwaffe indicated in this book are 1355 KIAs, 1226 WIAs and 715 POWs. Often it is said that the French Air Force fighters destroyed about 800 aircrafts but modern studies indicate that this number is rather 500-600 (actually the fighter groups claim 996 victories, of those 733 "confirmed" in air combat. This last number is too high because several pilots share the same victory. The bomber / reconnaissance aircrafts defensive fire and the anti-aircraft fire from the ground are on their side estimated to be responsible for the loss of 200-300 more aircrafts. To these 700-900 lost aircrafts you can add those destroyed by the RAF in France and for example 250-300 transport aircrafts were lost in the Netherlands and in Belgium during the airborne operations. But already before these May/June losses, between September 1939 and April 1940, several 176 German aircrafts were lost for 82 British and 57 French ones (= 139 aircrafts for the allies). The German aircrafts shot down were later missing above London.

The main French fighters were Morane-Saulnier MS.406, Bloch MB.151/152, Curtiss H-75, Dewoitine D.520 and twin-engine Potez 631. Except the few Dewoitine D.520 the other aircrafts were inferior to the last version of the Me.109 but the French fighters scored nevertheless rather well. The Curtiss H-75 got the most air victories. France lost 892 aircrafts, although only 306 were lost in air to air combat which gives a positive ratio to the French fighters against the German aircrafts. Many aircrafts were lost due to the very dense Flak. The French fighter units lost 204 KIAs, 188 WIAs and 31 POWs according to Jean Gisclon.

The French ace Edmond Marin-la-Meslée collected 20 victories (16 confirmed + 4 probable) in May/June 1940 with a Curtiss H-75A. He was pilot in the GC I/5 which obtained 111 air victories (84 confirmed and 27 probable). The German ace Werner Mölder had been shot down over France and made prisoner like 714 other aircraft crew members during the battle (on 17th June France had still about 400-500 Luftwaffe soldiers kept prisoner).

On 15th June 1940, second-lieutenant Pierre Le Gloan (GC III/6) shot down 5 Italian aircrafts (4 Fiat CR.42 and 1 BR.20) in 40 minutes with his Dewoitine D-520 over Saint-Raphaël. Le Gloan was in formation with captain Assolant when they saw 12 Fiat CR.42. Le Gloan destroyed 2 CR.42 and Assoulant returned to base with his guns jammed. Alone, Le Gloan continued his patrol. Over Hyères Le Gloan attacked 3 CR.42 and destroyed one plane, he broke the combat when 8 other Italian aircrafts arrived. The airbase at Luc called him back because it was attacked by Italian planes. Le Gloan destroyed his fourth CR.42 and one BR.20 from the 172nd strategic reconnaissance Squadriglia. It was one of the very first pilots of WW2 to destroy 5 planes in one sortie.

The French Farman 222.2, 223.3 and 223.4 heavy bombers (about 50 only) were really long range bombers and carried 4200 kg bombs. First they dropped leaflets over Germany and Czechoslovakia but they were also the first allied planes to bomb Berlin (Siemens factory) and other cities (Rostock - Heinkel factories -, Hamburg, Münich and Köln) They also bombed rail-road nests in Aix-La-Chappelle, Maastricht, Flessingue and Middelburg in order to delay the Germans. After Italy declared war against France these bombers dropped leaflets over Roma and bombed fuel refinery in Porto Maghera and Livourne. The Lioré & Olivier 451 also bombed Germany and Italy but France had so few bombers and very few attack planes that it didn't change the strategic outcome.

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Note about the Maginot Line :
The choice of building the Maginot Line had several goals :
• Avoid a surprise attack like in Belgium, Netherlands ... and give alert
• Cover the mobilization (at least 2-3 weeks)
• Economize the French forces (France had only 39 millions citizens against 70 millions for Germany and much less 20-25 year old men in the Army than Germany had)
• Protect Alsace/Lorraine and its industry
• Be the departure line for a counter-attack
• Force the Germans to attack by the flanks (Belgium or Switzerland)

Only after having solved the case of Dunkirk, Hitler decided to attack the Maginot Line. The German crossed the Rhine and destroyed several small bunkers but the big defence works, even attacked by heavy support (420mm Skoda heavy mortars, 1000kg bombs etc) resisted to all assaults and inflicted heavy losses to the enemy. About 22,000 encircled men in Alsace/Lorraine mobilized 240,000 Germans and in the Alps 60,000 frontline alpine troops encountered 312,500 Italians.

Oddly enough, the Maginot line was a success ; it accomplished exactly what it was intended to do. It wasn't designed to fully protect France from an attack from the east, though the Maginot line mentality fostered the idea that it would. It was designed to compensate for France's inferiority in troops, versus Germany, by reducing the area that the field army had to cover, and by freeing up personnel for that field army's manoeuvre divisions. It did exactly that. It wasn't the Maginot line's fault that the French High Command wasn't able to use the field army effectively.

Concerning the Maginot line in Alsace for example, the German did attack across the Rhine in June 40 (operation Kleiner Bär) with the VII. Armee : 25. Armee Korps, 27. Armee Korps, 33. Höh. Kdo, 213.ID, 6.Gebirgsdivision ; more than 5 artillery regiments and strong air support. The French had to fight 1 vs 10 with second line troops and they had less than 10 field howitzers (a few 75mm and several 155mm) for a front of more or less 200 km.The Germans grouped heavy AA guns (8.8cm Fla.K) to fire directly at the bunkers at less than 200m and to destroy them while 3.7cm Fla.K. and 3.7cm Pa.K. had to blind/destroy the weapons crenels and observation means of the same bunker. In front of each French bunker there were about 4 to 6 AA/AT guns. The French fortification on the Rhine were only smaller bunker and due to the ground water they has no underground levels at all, these were surface fortifications with simplified armament. Due to the small size there for example no 37mm/47mm AT guns but only 13.2mm HMGs as AT weapons.

Armistice came in application on 25th June 1940 but many defence works surrendered only one week later. Looking at these facts the Maginot Line did play a good part of its role. It avoided an immediate surprise attack like in Poland, Belgium, Norway etc. It covered the mobilization period and no enemy incursion occurred during this period, it efficiently protected the industries in Alsace/Lorraine and forced Hitler to attack the neutral Belgium where elite troops were send to stop them. Everyone now knows that they did not manage to stop them and that they were in fact only attracted in Belgium. Defeat was not a fatality and the Maginot line was not the reason of that defeat but became often the scapegoat.

---------

Note about the French artillery :According to several field testimonies and battle reports, the French artillery was very efficient in 1940 and it seems to have been often superior to the German artillery : quick reacting, with a high rate of fire and very accurate. On the German side, the logistics and sometimes the mobility were probably better organized. The German artillery has also the advantage of the air superiority, enabling the use of Fi-156 and Hs-126 spotting planes. Nevertheless, the good French troops were skilled in camouflage tactics and the Germans were often too self-confident and caught on their positions by French counter-battery fire. Of course the quick advance of the German troops explains sometimes the lack of the German artillery if the attack was not well prepared. In the French infantry division there are more field guns / howitzers than in a German infantry divisions but the Germans have far more infantry guns and mortars.
The power of the French infantry / artillery couple against the German tanks / aviation couple is well illustrated by the Gembloux battle were many assaults were defeated thanks to artillery concentrations.

Regards,

David

[David Lehmann]

Armored vehicles and tank warfare

The French army had 400,000 motorized vehicles including motorcycles, cars, trucks, tanks, armored cars etc. in 1940 (more or less equivalent to the German army, the small US army for example had 12,000 vehicles at the same time which shows how quickly it increased its size afterwards). On 10th May 1940, there were about 3000 French tanks facing 3000 Germans tanks. Nevertheless the German were schematically organized in 10 Panzer divisionen of 270-300 tanks whereas the French army had only 960 tanks issued to 7 big mechanized/armored division. The remaining 2000+ tanks were spread in all the territory and in all kind of units in small numbers, unable to face any whole German armored unit. French tanks often had to face 4-10 time more numerous German tanks.

• AMR = Automitrailleuse de Reconnaissance = cross-country reconnaissance, light tank with a machine gun (all AMR-33 and AMR-35 – ZT1, ZT2, ZT3 – types).

• AMD = Automitrailleuse de Découverte = distant reconnaissance wheeled vehicles (P178, P165/175, Laffly 80AM, Laffly 50AM, Laffly S15TOE ...).

• AMC = Automitrailleuse de Combat = tracked (or half-tracked) vehicle that has better armament and armor, capable of fighting (AMC P16 Mle29 – used as AMR in 1940 –, AMC-34 and AMC-35).

• DCR = Division Cuirassée de Réserve = Reserve Armored Division (cuirassée means armored). The acronym DCR was chosen in order to differentiate it from the already existing DC (= Division de Cavalerie = Cavalry Division). But it was indeed originally meant as "Division Cuirassée de Réserve". These new units would not be ready until 1940 and were initially assigned to the HQ reserve, thus their name. But once in the field they were simply known as "Divisions Cuirassées", which was technically abbreviated as DCu, yet DCR was often retained (leading to the form DCr).

• DLC = Division Légere de Cavalerie = Light Cavalry Division

• DLM = Division Légere Mécanique = Light Mechanized Division

• BCC = bataillon de char de combat = tank battalion

• RCC = Régiment de Chars de Combat = tank regiment

• CACC = Compagnie Autonome de Chars de Combat = Independent tank company

• RAM = Régiment d’Auto-Mitrailleuses = armored cars regiment

The French army had tanks belonging to the infantry or to the cavalry arm, no separate command (armor arm) like in the German army :

Infantry tanks :
• Renault FT-17BS (light)
• FT-17c (light)
• FT-17m (light)
• FCM-36 (light)
• Renault R35/39/40 (light)
• Hotchkiss H-35/39 (light)
• Renault D1 (medium)
• Renault D2 (medium)
• Renault B1 (heavy)
• Renault B1bis (heavy)
• FCM-2C (very heavy)

Cavalry tanks :
• Hotchkiss H35/39 (light)
• Somua S35 (medium)


The cavalry tanks are organized in "escadrons" (1 escadron = 1 squadron) and in "pelotons" (1 peloton = 1 platoon) and the tanks from the infantry are organized in "compagnies" (1 compagnie = 1 company) and sections (1 section = 1 platoon).

For example in a cavalry unit like the 4e Régiment de Cuirassiers (cavalry) there are : 44 Somua S35 and 43 Hotchkiss H35 (+4 reserve tanks of each model) :
• 1 regiment command tank (1 Somua S35)

• 1 Somua S35 squadron group = 43 Somua S35 :
--o 1 S35 squadron group command tank (1 Somua S35)
--o 1st squadron (21 Somua S35) (one "escadron" with 4 "pelotons")
---- 1 squadron commander tank
---- 4 platoons of 5 tanks
--o 3rd squadron (21 Somua S35s) (one "escadron" with 4 "pelotons")
---- 1 squadron commander tank
---- 4 platoons of 5 tanks

• 1 Hotchkiss squadrons group = 43 Hotchkiss H35 :
--o 1 squadrons group command tank (1 Hotchkiss H35)
--o 2nd squadron (21 Hotchkiss H35) (one "escadron" with 4 "pelotons")
---- 1 squadron commander tank
---- 4 platoons of 5 tanks
--o 4th squadron (21 Hotchkiss H35) (one "escadron" with 4 "pelotons")
---- 1 squadron commander tank
---- 4 platoons of 5 tanks

In the BCC (tank battalion) from the infantry the organization is following for example with Renault B1bis or R35 tanks :

 A Renault B1bis company (compagnie) – heavy tanks - is organized like that :
company commander : 1x B1bis
1st platoon (section) : 3x B1bis
2nd platoon (section) : 3x B1bis
3rd platoon (section) : 3x B1bis
= 10 tanks

For the whole battalion :
3 companies = 30 tanks
+ 1 battalion command tank = 31 tanks
+ 3 reserve tanks in the "compagnie d'échelon" = 34 tanks in a B1bis battalion.

 A Renault R35 company (compagnie) – light tanks – is organized like that :
company commander : 1x R35
1st platoon (section) : 3x R35
2nd platoon (section) : 3x R35
3rd platoon (section) : 3x R35
4th platoon (section) : 3x R35
= 13 tanks

For the whole battalion :
3 company = 39 tanks
+ 1 battalion command tank = 40 tanks
+ 5 reserve tanks in the "compagnie d'échelon" = 45 tanks

1) THE 1- MAN TURRET ISSUE :

On the French side all of the tanks and armored cars had a 1-man turret except :
• FCM-2C (11 men with 3 in the front turret and 1 in a rear turret)
• AMD White (2-men turret)
• AMD Laffly 50AM (2-men turret)
• AMD Panhard 165/175 (2-men turret)
• AMD Panhard 178 (2-men turret)
• Renault AMC-35 (2-men turret)
• And actually the SOMUA S-35's APX1CE turret is sometimes described as a "one-and-a-half-man turret", as the enlarged turret ring (1.130m instead of 1.022m), compared to the APX1/4 found on the B1/B1bis, allowed the radio operator to provide assistance to the commander/gunner/loader. The radio operator could get out of his seat and stand up to function as the "loader" when the tank was in combat.

Germans had 1-man turrets for their PzI and PzII (except the late war model (Luchs) with 2 men). In the PzII like in the Somua S-35 one crew member not sitting in the turret could be the loader. The PzIII and PzIV had 3 men in the turret. The British Matilda I also had a 1-man turret.


2) SPEED AND RANGE COMPARED TO GERMAN TANKS :

Considering the speed of the French/German tanks, the French tanks had grossly a power of 7-10hp/ton and the German 15-20hp/ton. The figures of max speed (km/h) and autonomy (by road, in km) give that :

GERMAN tanks :
PzI : 40 170
PzII : 40 200
PzIII : 40 165
PzIV : 40 165
Pz38(t) : 42 250
Pz35(t) : 35 190

FRENCH tanks :
FT-17 : 7.5 35
AMC-34 : 40 200
AMC-35 : 42 160
R35 : 20 140
R40 : 20 140
H35 : 35 150
H39 : 36.5 150
FCM36 : 24 225
D1 : 18 90
D2 : 23 100
Somua S35 : 45 255
B1 : 28 180
B1bis : 28 160
AMR-33 : 54 200
AMR-35 : 55 200

The autonomy of the French tanks is not that bad at all compared to German tanks but for example the B1bis tanks used much fuel because the engine was not only for advancing but largely used for aiming the 75mm hull gun in combat. Even if not advancing you needed the engine to turn in place and aim the 75mm hull gun towards the enemy. The maximum speed are good for the French tanks but due to lower hp/ton ratio they needed more time than German tanks to reach it.


3) FRENCH GUNSIGHTS AND GUN ACCURACY :

The quality of French tank optics were not at all inferior to the German ones, this is a false statement and an other myth usually spread. In fact they were of similar quality, perhaps a bit more complicated to operate. With the German optics it may have been more easy to determine the range of the target, but only for experienced crew since it was not an easy task. The French optics with their 4x magnification are more suited than German ones to engage targets at long range but the drawback is a smaller field of view which can become an issue during close combat.
In the French tanks, the tank turret gunsight consists of an aiming "v" or "+" and aiming ladders. The telescopic sights have generally a 4x magnification.
The L.762 telescopic sight of the 47mm SA35 gun has a 4x magnification, a 11.81° field of view and consists in a crosshair “+” with three aiming ladders. On the “+” reticle the horizontal line can be adjusted for the elevation. On the horizontal line of the “+” reticle, there are vertical long and short bars. One 2.50m high vehicle covered by a long line is at 500m and the same vehicle covered by a short line is at 1000m range. On the right of the “+” reticle there are two black range ladders : one for the AP shells and one for the HE shells. On the left of the “+” reticle there is one red range ladder for the coaxial MG.
The 75mm SA35 hull gun on the B1bis tank has two L.710 sights (sterescopic telemeter) with a 3.5x magnification, a 11.15° field of view and range ladders (no "v" or "+" reticle). The 75mm SA35 hull gun is a fixed gun with only elevation controls, thus left-right aiming is done via changing the tank's heading with the usual driving system or with the fine-tuned hydrostatic Naeder system.

Another surprising statement is about accuracy of French guns versus German ones. Accuracy is not a matter of nationality, but only a matter of ballistics ... and all the ballistics tests I am aware of proved that the guns were very accurate. The best French tank gun in term of penetration is the 47mm SA35 L/32 which outclasses the German guns except in two cases : the 3.7cm L/45 at short range firing an APCR shell and the 7.5cm L/24 gun at long range with its HEAT shells. The APCR shells of the 3.7cm L/45 gun are able to penetrate the front armor of a Renault B1bis tank at 100m. The 47mm SA35 L/32 gun APC shells are slightly slower than the AP shells of the 3.7cm L/45 gun (680 versus 745 m/s) but much heavier (1.620 versus 0.685 kg) and it is a capped projectile unlike the German one.

Some French tankers scored very well, others not so well. This was due to training, one-man turret etc. but the guns by themselves were totally good ones. About the accuracy of the guns by themselves, here are two examples taken from real 1939-1940 shooting tests with the 47mm SA35 gun (Somua S-35 and B1bis turret gun for example) and with the 75mm SA35 gun (B1bis hull gun), both with anti-tank shells :

For the 47mm SA35 :
• 15 shots at 200m : H+L = 10+20 = 30cm
• 10 shots at 500m : H+L = 55+53 = 108cm

For the 75mm SA35 :
• 10 shots at 400m : H+L = 30+28 = 58cm


4) Rate of fire :

Typical early WW2 ammunitions like the French 25mm, 37mm and 47mm were rather small and easy to handle, much lighter in weight compared to later bigger shells (the German 8.8cm shell for example). Big shells are more heavy and difficult to handle inside a tank. Practical rate of fire in tanks is about 4-12 rpm.

The French tank guns had a semi-automatic system on the breech (SA = semi-automatique = semi-automatic) : block opening, ejecting case and drawing a firing pin were automatic. The gunner had just to introduce the shell and to fire. After firing, the recoil opened the breech and the shell case was automatically ejected. This semi-automatic breech allowed winning precious time.

Not only caliber and ammo type used had an effect on rate of fire, also crew ergonomy and number and how their tasks were arranged played great role, especially in combat. In the APX4 turret of the B1bis tank, the practical rate of fire of the 47mm SA35 gun was 6 rpm in accurate aiming/firing but it could drop to 2-3 rpm in combat. The rate of fire of the 47mm turret gun in the B1bis is probably slightly lower than in the Somua S35 turret which had a larger one (APX1CE, CE means 'chemin élargie', enlarged turret ring), enabling a crewman to provide direct help to the tank commander / gunner. Nevertheless the B1bis crew was often increased from 4 to 5 men, one additional man assisting the commander.

And last but not least factor, the training of the crew had obviously also an effect on rate of fire.

After firing many rounds the spent cases will be in the gunner's way on the floor of tank, stuck in the turret mechanism. The crew had to throw them out to avoid interfering with the movement of the turret and gun and dangerous. The B1bis and Somua S35 tanks for example had several little traps to get rid of ammunition cases.


5) Smoke shells and smoke dischargers :

The French 37mm and 47mm tank guns had no smoke shells, only the 75mm guns (B1, B1bis, FCM-2C, FT-17BS, SAu40) were theoretically able to fire smoke shells but were probably never equipped with this kind of shells. The 75mm smoke shells like many other shells (canister shells, incendiary shells etc.) were probably restricted to the 75mm Mle1897 field guns, the 75mm Mle1897/33 AT guns and/or various 75mm AA guns. In the French army, smoke shells were apparently fired by the supporting mortars, field guns or howitzers, not by the tanks themselves.
Smoke dischargers were tested as prototypes on the Panhard 178 armored car for example and on the Renault AMC-35, which is the single French tank which probably used them on battlefield in few cases.

The Pz.IV Ausf.A/B/C/D and the StuG III Ausf.A in France in 1940 could fire a smoke shell with the 7.5cm L/24. The German tanks were not equipped with smoke dischargers prior to 1941. The use of smoke dischargers was more generalized in the following battles in Russia and North Africa. They were mounted on the rear portions of the mudguards, facing forwards, or on the sides of the turret. For instance, on a Pz38(t), they would mount a 1/2 cylindrical shaped cylinder propped up by a piece of steel that would contain 3 smoke projectiles per side.
Nevertheless, beside the smoke shells fired by the artillery or by the Pz.IV or StuG III, the Germans modified several tanks by mounting a kind of smoke dispenser on the rear of the tank. It was a rack with German infantry smoke candles ("Nebelkerzen"). These candles just "burned" and made smoke on the rear of the tank instead of real smoke dischargers making a smoke screen in front of the tank. It is not sure that there was a triggering system from inside the tank. This system was already used in Poland in 1939.

In France in 1940, only the British (light tanks, infantry tanks as well as cruisers) could have smoke dischargers on their tanks but mostly on their CS (close support) variants. British had special CS variants of their tanks, which had nothing but smoke and HE shells. The cruiser tanks did not have on them anything other than AP shells. Four smoke dischargers (2 on each side of the turret) were usually mounted on tanks like the Matilda II or the cruiser A13 but only two smoke dischargers on tanks like the Matilda I or the Vickers MkIVb.


6) Differential steering :

The Somua S35 and the Renault B1/B1bis have a double differential steering. One track could go in one direction while the other could go in the opposite direction - allowing the tank to "turn on the spot". On the 1940 battlefield, only these French tanks posses this ability. All other tanks had to move forward/backward in some fashion for the ability to turn, and this could cause, in situations such as hull-down or good camouflaged position, to loose that advantage since you did have to move. In some extent there are therefore able to turn the hull faster than most other tanks in 1940, the differential steering allowed a better turn radius "on the spot".
The German tanks in 1940 did not have that feature, thus the two tracks could not rotate in different directions. One track was blocked to turn but this could be bad considering that you could possibly throw a track if your opposite track wasn't on the correct type of ground. The later Panther (and perhaps Tiger) tanks did have a kind of differential steering.

7) Notes concerning French tanks vs German tanks battles

For example, a combat involving a Somua S35 tank : the commander / gunner is standing in its turret and observes the horizon with the copula and its means of observation : periscopic binocular, PPL RX 160 episcope and Estienne slit.

Turret rotation speed of the Somua S35's APX1CE turret :
• electric powering for a 360° rotation in 20-28 seconds
• hand cranked for precise aiming
Of course the hull could also be rotated towards the enemy.

The tank commander / gunner spots the target in the copula and then brings the turret in the direction of the target thanks to the electric powering of the turret. A mark in the turret indicates when the gun is towards the spotted target. The APX1 (CE) and APX4 turrets were operated this way :
• 1 lever to block / unblock the turret
• 1 lever set right or left for the electric rotation ( Ragonot engine : 1/4th hp, 12V - when not powered by the main engine), if the lever is neutral (central position) the rotation is automatically manual
• 1 wheel to rotate the turret by hand more precisely (about 2° per wheel turn)
Concerning the turret rotation speed, the widest arc it would usually be needed to turn a turret is 180° (if it's 181°, you might as well move it 179° to the other side, unless something is hampering the rotation). A Somua S35 could achieve a 180° rotation in 10-14 seconds.

The commander sits in his strap. He is rather blinded due to the modification of the light condition (relative darkness inside the turret versus light from the exterior through the optics) and then he puts one eye on the gunsight (L.762 sight, magnification 4x, field of view 11.81°, reticle +). He searches the target (again modification of the light condition) which is not easy due to the 4x magnification. This magnification is an advantage if engaging the enemy at long range. He aims precisely, with the manual rotation of the turret this time.
On the + reticle the horizontal line can be adjusted for the elevation. The + reticle was prefered to the V reticle to materialize the horizontal. On the horizontal line there are vertical long and short bars. One 2.50m high vehicle covered by a long line is at 500m and the same vehicle covered by a short line is at 1000m range.
On the right of the + reticle there are two black range ladders : one for the AP shells and one for the HE shells. On the left of the + reticle there is one red range ladder for the coaxial MG.

In the APX1 and APX4 turrets the left hand of the gunner is handling the wheel for the manual rotation of the turret (or the lever for the electric rotation), the right hand is firing the gun or handling the lever for the blocking/unblocking of the turret and the elevation is set with the shoulder.

From the tests (not in a combat situation) of the APX4 turret (which is smaller than the APX1CE of the Somua S35 but with the same copula) :
• Rotation of the copula, always by hand : 12 seconds for a rotation of 360°
• Time to look all around with the 3 means of observation (periscopic binocular, episcope, Estienne slit) and to return to the weapons : 5 seconds
• Time to find a target in the gunsight that has been first spotted in the copula's episcope : 3 seconds

Data from other APX4 turret tests with the coaxial machinegun :
• if the target is 5° away from the field of view of the gunsight, the overall time before opening fire is about 15 seconds.
• if the target is up to 90° away from the field of view of the gunsight, the overall time before opening fire could reach 28 seconds.

The commander has the target in his gunsight this time. He estimates the range and fires. Despite the smoke of the first shoot he has to observe the point that has been hit to correct the range if needed. This is more difficult for French tankers because of the absence of tracer shells (only available for the machineguns and for the 25mm gun). That's why the first shot, if not a direct hit, was often short, it was easier to spot the impact on the ground.

In the time frame of 15-30 seconds the commander/gunner would be able to fire 1-2 47mm APC shells against the target before being fired upon. This is after it has been discovered, which would most likely not be until the first round had hit (in the case of multiple incoming targets). Any German tank taking 1-2 hits from a 47mm L/32 SA35 gun in a range of 0 to 1000m, at least one of which is carefully aimed at, has a very high probability to be penetrated and destroyed.

The French tank guns are semi-automatic, the shell case is automatically ejected, the introduction of a new shell closes the breech.

The German tanks have an advantage in the sense that :
• in PzIII and PzIV one crew member can continue to observe and spot while the gunner fires
• the PzII also have a 1-man turret but it has tracer shells and higher rate of fire (magazine feed)

The Somua S35 crew could use the advantage of its powerful 47mm SA35 L/32 gun coupled to the 4x sight to engage safely the German tanks already at 800-1000m while the enemy has generally to get closer to about 400-500m to have a good chance of destroying the Somua. The Somua has a good cast armor (47mm/round and 20° front hull armor and 42mm/0° front turret armor + (42mm) round gun mantlet on about 30% of the front turret surface). If a German tank engaged at 1000m is driving straight forward to be at 500m of the Somua, at a speed of 25 km/h he will need about 60 seconds. But he will probably not behave that way and of course this tank is not alone ... but the French tank probably also not.

At 800-1000m the real threats could only be a PzIV firing a 7.5cm Gr.38 HL/1 (HEAT) shell (penetration of 52mm/0° and 45mm/30° - but at this range an embossed Somua S35 is offering a small target) or supporting guns (8.8cm FlaK or 10.5cm leFH guns). Nevertheless their tactical regulation and their usual numerical local superiority would probably allow the Germans to outflank the Somua S35 tank if it doesn't move (supposing the French tank is alone), perhaps even without that the crew of the French tank could notice the manoeuvre, being too busy engaging the frontal targets). In the battle of Hannut / Gembloux for example, the Somua S35 tanks could spread havoc among the German tanks, which often had to face a second Somua S35 squadron while trying to outflank the first squadron. In this battle, the French tactical regulation proved to be at level, the German tank formations being often attacked on their flanks or rear.

More numerous German tanks as it was generally the case (often 1 vs 4 or more) could nevertheless be able to get close enough to the French tank to destroy it. In the 400m to 100m range, a Panzer III firing a 3.7cm APCR shell had a good to very good probability to penetrate the frontal armor of a Somua S35 (penetration of 48mm/0° at 500m, 71mm/0° at 250m and 90mm/0° at 100m) and to knock it out. The Panzer II gun could penetrate 63mm/0° at 100m with APCR shells but the Pzgr.40 were not available in France in 1940 and with the standard AP shell the penetration was reduced to 45mm/0° at 100m. The Panzer II can be deadly for a Somua but at point blank, in an ambush in a town for example. A somewhat higher German rate of fire (the Somua has a 1 ½ man turret) and combined suppressive fire of multiple (tracer) shells (especially the 2.0cm shells of the Panzer II at 150 rpm which could damage the episcopes, binoculars and gunsights) or the use of smoke shells (both tracer and smoke shells were not available in the Somua S35) to hide German moves increased the chance for the German tanks to get closer to the French ones and to overrun the French position. That would probably force the French tanks to move. In a pure movement battle the French squadron will probably loose tactical cohesion more rapidly than the German formation because of the lack of radio sets (often only radios for the platoon commander who will have to communicate with the other tanks of his platoons with flags ... which is very difficult during a combat). Therefore once in a melee style battle each French tank will often act rather on its own or with the tanks of its platoon which are directly next to its position. This is the main drawback of all the French tanks. Generally very courageous tankers doing their best but being not enough aware of the general tactical situation while the German tanks were more mobile and could find the weak points of the French deployments.

One must add that the German doctrine for the Panzerwaffe was very often to avoid combat against the French tanks. They engaged anti-tank guns, 8.8cm Flak and 10.5cm field guns in direct fire against the tanks while the German tanks went deeper in the French lines. The Germans had also the advantage of having omnipresent observation aircrafts and very numerous close air support aircrafts to support them.

French tanks had less radio sets than their German opponents but it was not because of an inherent French bad design, it is all a matter of doctrine. The German Panzerdivisionen were used as an arm by itself, they needed speed and good and continuous inter-arm cooperation with the aviation and the artillery. The French armored units were not a separate arm ; they were depending from the infantry or the cavalry in 1940. The French tanks were intended to work closely with the infantry, allowing it to advance from one specific target to an other. The French tanks favored better armor (and armament) rather than communications and speed (this point is not completely true for cavalry tanks like the Somua S35). Nevertheless the French radio sets were also good ones compared to the German radio sets. The more common radio in the PzIII and PzIV was the FuG 5 SE 10 U and the PzI had no radio. This radio set had a range morse / voice of 6 km / 4 km (4 km / 2 km only when moving, without stationary antenna). The French radio set characteristics were as good or better for the time. But of course the German had more radio sets and knew how to operate them to have a tactical / operational advantage

Nevertheless on 10th May 1940, only 515 French tanks had a 47mm SA35 and about 350 had a 37mm SA38 gun = 865 tanks. The huge majority of the French tanks had the 37mm SA18 gun which could be used at 400m against the Panzer I and Panzer II but to knock out a Panzer III Ausf.E/F (the previous models were far less armored and were easier to destroy) or a Panzer IV Ausf.C/D they had to get as close as < 100m whereas the enemy could destroy them at 300m (3.7cm KwK) to 500m (7.5cm KwK).

The French tanks due to their 1-man turret were probably a bit more intricate to use. For rookie tank crews that has proven to be very hard, a rookie crew will probably be more effective in a German tank than in a French one. Lieutenant-colonel Baillou who was tank commander in the 3e DLM in 1940, officer in the 2nd French armored division in North Africa and France and instructor from 1945 to 1950 described well the issue of the 1-man turret. He also explained that contrary to the 1e DLM and 2e DLM who had well trained crews, the 3e DLM (except some officers from the other DLMs) had only reservists who did their military service on horse and some of them discovered their tank a short time before being engaged. To worsen the situation, most of the Somua of the 3e DLM went to combat with 2 crew members instead of 3, many tankers were in permission at the beginning of the combats and therefore nobody was there to help the commander to reload. In these tanks the Somua had really a 1-man turret instead of a 1 ½ one. This can explain why *one* German source (even not specified) is quoted in Gunsburg's article "battle of the Belgian plain" about the bad gunnery skills of the French tankers. The 3e DLM in Hannut / Gembloux which had a very high proportion of reservists sustained heavy losses while the more experienced crews of the 2e DLM in the same battle had only light losses. Nevertheless the 3e DLM reservists inflicted significant losses to the elite of the Panzerwaffe. Each counter-attack made by a small formation of Somua S35s was seen as critical by the Germans. For this division, there was of course the absence of tracer and the fact that grossly all the Hotchkiss tanks of the 3e DLM had 37mm SA18 L/21 guns with poor anti-tank efficiency. It is a miracle that they could fight so well against the elite Panzerwaffe in Hannut. They had better tanks (considering the Somua S35 tanks of the 3e DLM) than most of the Germans but with mostly rookies. In 1940 the French tanks like the Somua S35 had better armor and main gun than the German tanks but the crews of the 3e DLM were less experienced than their enemy. Other units had experienced crews. One can absolutely not generalize about bad French tankers as it is often said in a typical French bashing spirit.

In 1940, when the French crews were experienced with their tanks they were at the level of the German tankers. They knew how to operate their tanks, even if it was a bit different than for a German crew. The 2e DLM in Hannut / Gembloux had rather light losses and proved to be a dangerous opponent. Many German tanks were knocked out but as the ground was later controlled by the Germans they could recover/repair the damaged ones unlike the French which had also to abandon several tanks due to mechanical breakdowns. A French tank is more intricate and becomes really a deadly and efficient weapon only with experienced crews. A rookie crew will have several drawbacks. History has shown that the experienced French crews were at level with their German opponents. An other example of that is the engagement of 10 Somua S35 tanks of the 4e regiment de cuirassiers (1e DLM) in the town of Jolimetz on 18th May 1940 against half of the 5. Panzerdivision. In 10 vs 1 odd, the French lost 10 tanks (destroyed or abandoned) and the Germans 26 tanks, including many PzIVs. That is a perfect example of what well-trained French crews were able to do.

Baillou explained that in 1943-1945 the situation was inverted : they were more experienced than most of the German crews they met which on their side had better tanks (Panthers in his explanation). They also took advantage of a drawback of the Panther : when the slope was to important in a hilly countryside, the turret became too heavy to be rotated for the Panther, they had to turn all the tank. The French transposed the cavalry spirit to the French armored division of the liberation, and many officers were veterans from the DLMs, applying the cavalry speed and tactics but this time with the Sherman which had an intercom system and a radio. Often they checked the range of a target by firing tracer rounds with the coaxial machinegun. They had observed that until range X it corresponded grossly to the ballistics of the main gun. Many French tankers and commanders who were defeated in 1940 were again in armoured units for the liberation and drew their tanks in the heart of Germany and Austria.


8) Survivability in the French tanks ?

Unusual for the time feature concerning at least the Somua S35 and the B1/B1bis tanks is the automatic fire extinguishing system. Made by "Telecamit", it is made of 3 pressurized tanks containing each a litre of methyl bromide. This extinguishing system was probably found in the other French tanks and for sure it was standard in the Panhard 178 armored cars. Situated between the access hatch and the firewall and near the driver, the extinguisher tanks are connected to sprinklers set around "hot "spots" (carburettors, fuel dump, fuel tanks, etc.). As a plus, the fuel tanks have a valve to prevent overfill and are self-sealing.

9) Crew armament ?

Each tank or armored car crew was armed with miscellaneous small arms, mainly pistols and revolvers. But according to a French cavalry officer manual from 1939 there were also hand grenades and explosives.
In the AMR-33 and AMR-35 armored cars and in the Hotchkiss H35 tanks, the crew had 5 F1 hand grenades (defensive).
In the Laffly 50AM, Laffly 80AM, Panhard TOE, Panhard 178, Schneider-Kégresse P16 Mle1929, Renault AMC-34, Renault AMC-35 etc. each crew had 10 F1 hand grenades (defensive) and 2 incendiary grenades.
In each cavalry vehicle (including armored cars and tanks) there were also 4x 200g explosive charges (150g explosive) = "pétard de cavalerie", for various destruction tasks.

10) The radio sets

The light tanks like the Renault R35/39/40 and the Hotchkiss H35/39 tanks only rarely had radio sets if they were not command tanks (platoon or company commander). Fot the Somua S35s it is grossly the same with only 1/5th of the tanks being equipped with a radio set. The first radio set in the B1/B1bis tanks was the ER53 Mle1932 (ER is Emetteur-Récepteur, or transmitter-receiver), with a 15km range. It was operated by morse key, broadcast on a frequency range of 40-100m, and weighted around 80kg. Only 100 of this radio were produced. It was then replaced by the ER51 Mle1938, weighting 50kg only and operated by voice (3km range) and/or morse key (15-20km range) on the same frequencies. The communications had usually to be coded before being emitted. A tank or a unit was ordered to go to a precise location for example. During offensive operations messages were sometimes send clearly and by voice to coordinate two companies for example. Nevertheless in the heat of a combat and with all the noise, the radio was often not used at all and each tank manoeuvred grossly alone, keeping a view on the 2 other tanks of the platoon and if possible on other platoons.
The range of the radio set seems rather small for today tank warfare requirements but when you compare it to the the German radio sets of the same period it is not worse. The PzIII for example was equipped with the FuG 5 SE 10u radio set which had a range key / voice of 6 km / 4 km (4 km / 2 km only when moving, without stationary antenna). When compared to the ER51 Mle1938, the voice range is similar and the French radio set has a much bigger range in morse key. But of course the German had more radios and were trained to operate them in order to gain a tactical / operational advantage.

Regards,

David

[David Lehmann]

Notes about ANTI-TANK GUNS

In a classical French infantry division there are theoretically up to 61-64x AT guns :

• 12x 25mm SA34/SA37 AT guns in each of the 3 infantry regiments :
--o 2 in each of the 3 infantry battalions
--o 6 in the regimental heavy company
• 12x 25mm SA34/SA37 AT guns in the divisional AT company (CDAC)
• 2x 25mm SA34/SA37 AT guns in the divisional training centre (CID)
• 3-6x 25mm SA34/SA37 AT guns in the reconnaissance battalion (GRDI)
• 8x 47mm Mle1937 or 75mm Mle1897/33 AT guns in the BDAC (AT divisional battery)

Many divisions had no CDAC or CID and many had not the theoretical numbers of AT guns, some had only a dozen. Several divisions had also no 25mm AT guns but used instead the 37mm TR16 infantry gun in AT role.

Canon de 25mm SA Mle1934 (Hotchkiss) and SA-L Mle1937 (Puteaux) L/72
Caliber : 25x194R mm
Crew : 1 NCO + 5 men (+ 1 driver)
Weight : 480kg (SA34 carriage) or 300kg (SA37 carriage, L = light)
Length : 3.71m
Width : 1.05m
Height : 1.10m (at the shield)
Protection : the shield is 7mm thick
Barrel length : 1.80m
Rate of fire : 25 rpm against fixed target and 15 rpm against moving target
Traverse : 60°
Elevation : -5° to +15°
Telescopic sight : 4x (L.711 telescopic sight, with a 3450m range drum, field of view 10.13°, V reticle)
V° : 920 m/s
Practical range : 800m (heavy armored vehicles), 1000m (medium armored vehicles) and 1500m (light armoured vehicles and softskins)
Penetration : 40mm/0° at 500m; 32mm/35° at 200m
Accuracy : at 800m H+L = 80+80 = 160cm

The French 25mm AT guns were very modern in 1934. About 4500 of these guns were in service in May 1940. They were especially known as being very discreet, the flash hider used on them made them difficult to spot according to both French and German AARs. They proved to be very accurate guns, and able to destroy all the German tanks up to 800m if the impact angle was good enough. Only the PzIV Ausf.D at long range was tricky to be engaged by the 25mm AT gun in May/June 1940 if not at close range. In the first 500m the penetration efficiency was equal to the penetration of the 3.7cm L/45 Pak36 and at longer range the KE felt slightly more rapidly due to the lightweight projectile. The Germans captured such guns in large numbers in 1940 and used them in secondary roles as coastal defence and in some garrisons. Finland used also about 240 of these AT guns.
There were theoretically 12 of these AT guns in each French infantry regiment in 1940 but several regiments had only 4 or no AT gun at all. For example the 55th infantry B series division at Sedan had no AT guns in its infantry regiments, 12 AT guns in divisional AT company and 4 AT guns in the 4th GRDI, a total of 16 AT guns for the whole division on a large front (26% of the number of the paper). It was also deployed on an over-stretched front whereas a division should defend a 5-7 kilometers wide front. The 37mm TR infantry gun was often still in service even in AT role. The 25mm AT gun was lacking HE shells to neutralize human/soft targets and therefore the 37mm TR infantry gun was still liked since it could fire HE shells. About 220 25mm AT guns were also given to the British Expeditionnary Force (BEF) to increase its firepower, in exchange the British gave the French some Boys AT rifles which were not efficient and had a weaker penetrating power than the Hotchkiss 13.2mm HMG. The two ‘infanterie de l’air’ companies and several reconnaissance groups used some of these AT rifles. Each 25mm AT gun crew had 72 AP/APT shells immediately available and a total of 156 AP/APT shells per AT gun in a French 1940 infantry regiment. In typical infantry or cavalry units the 25mm AT guns were generally towed behind a Mle1937 infantry or cavalry trailer with horses. On the front the Renault UE tractor generally towed them. In motorized infantry regiments the towing vehicle was also often the Renault UE tractor and for long-range movements various halftracks and trucks were used. The AT guns could also be directly transported on a truck or towed on additional "wheels" (train rouleur). In the divisional AT company/squadron of motorized units the official towing vehicle could be the Laffly V15T in cavalry units or the Latil M7 T1 in infantry units. The Unic TU1 was also used for that task.

Canon de 47mm Mle1937 L/53 (SA37 APX)
Caliber : 47x380R mm
Weight : 1070kg
Length : 4.10m
Width : 1.62m
Height : 1.10m
Barrel length : 2497mm (2350mm rifling)
Rate of fire : 15-20 rpm
Traverse : 68°
Elevation : -13° to +16.50°
Telescopic sight : 4x (field of view 10.13°, + reticle, adjustable drum up to 3500m)
V° : 855 m/s
Practical AT range : 1000m
Penetration : 110mm/0° at 0m, 106mm/0° at 100m, 89mm /0° at 500m, 72mm /0° at 1000m with 1936 APCBC shell (French data)

The French AT gun was the best AT gun on the French battlefield in 1940, after the 8.8cm Flak18 used in AT role and perhaps the best one before the arrival of the 5.0cm Pak38. It exceeded widely the German 3.7cm Pak36 in terms of penetration. The French army had about 1200 of them in service in May 1940, they were depending from the artillery regiments and not all came into service. Initially a BDAC should have included 12 47mm AT guns but due to the lack of guns this number was reduced to 6 or 8. The Citroën-Kégresse P17, Unic P107, Laffly S15T or Laffly W15T generally towed the 47mm Mle1937 AT gun.
An example of report concerning the 47mm Mle1937 AT gun : the French 18th infantry division on the Aisne river on 9-10th June 1940 faced the 10.ID, 26.ID, the SS "Polizei" and elements of the 6.PzD. First they stopped all the German assaults in part thanks to their good supporting artillery and took about 800 German POWs, then they had to pull back because of the collapse of the 2nd infantry division facing two Panzerdivisionen more west. During the retreat, one 47mm SA37 gun destroyed successively 3 moving German tanks at 1500m. Of course that gives not much info in terms of penetration, these tanks could be PzIs as well as PzIVs but the gunsight, accuracy and crew of this gun seem to be rather good ones.
About 823 4.7cm Pak181/182(f) (captured on the front or in factories / repaired / newly built) were used after the campaign of France by the Germans. The Germans produced also a dedicated 4.7cm APCR shell for this gun. But already in May/June 1940 some of the captured guns were immediately used against French tanks, especially the dreaded Renault B1bis. The German reports indicate that 1226 shells were fired with these booty guns furing the battle of France. General Heinz Guderian himself in his memories ("Achtung Panzer !") indicates that he led the fire of a captured French 47mm AT gun against a Renault B1bis.

Canon de 75mm L/36.3 Mle1897/33
Caliber : 75x350R mm
Length : 4.98m
Barrel length : 2721 mm (2229 mm rifling)
Width : 1.51m
Weight in action : 1500 kg
Weight in travel : 1550 kg
Elevation : -6° to +50°
Traverse : 58°
Practical AT range : 800m (maximum range 11100m)
Rate of fire : up to 28 rpm (10-12 rpm in sustained fire)
Crew : 1 NCO + 6 men
Penetration : 50mm /30° at 400m with obus de rupture Mle1910M (APHE) (V° = 580 m/s)

The 75mm Mle1897/33 had a new split-trail carriage and entered in service around 1935. It was present in the BDAC (= Batterie Divisionaire anti-char = AT divisional battery) for the protection of the light artillery regiment. Initially there should have been 12 guns in the BDAC but only batteries with 8 guns were constituted. All the 75mm Mle1897/33 guns were intended to be replaced by the better 47mm Mle1937 gun but not enough were available and in May / June 1940 several BDAC were still equipped with 75mm Mle1897/33 AT guns. Standard 75mm Mle1897 field guns were also used in AT tank role, either when integrated in defensive positions or simply to defend the artillery battery being overrun. Large numbers were sold from Army stocks to Brazil but enough remained for the Germans to take over in 1940.
The standard 75mm Mle1897 guns were also used in AT role and sometimes on Arbel platforms to have a 360° traverse.

Canon de 75mm L/53 Mle1939 (Schneider)
Caliber : 75x518R mm
Barrel length : 4000 mm (3250 mm rifling)
Battle-station weight : 2090 kg
Rate of fire : 20 rpm
Muzzle velocity : 700 m/s (more with the planned sub-calibrated 75/57mm shells and introduction of HEAT shells)
Traverse : 360°
Elevation : 40°
Maximum range : 13000 m

The 75mm Mle1939 had a new 3-trails carriage for all around firing and should have replaced all the 75mm AT guns (75mm Mle1897 and Mle1897/33 used in AT role, 75x350R mm) (and part of the 47mm AT guns) at the divisional level but it did not enter in service before the armistice.


.... I can discuss about evry kind of 1940 French armament. I totally disagree that French armament was bad, it cannot explain the defeat.

David

[David Lehmann]

NOTES :

1) TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS

In 1937/1940 several French companies initiated interesting technical developments in the armament field :

● Brandt 120 mm mortar Mle1935
The French Army had adopted this heavy mortar and a squad of 2 mortars should have been issued in each regiment in 1940 but very few had been delivered before the armistice. This mortar was also manufactured in Russia under the name "120mm Polkovoy Minomyot Obr.1938g". The Russians also modified it and later produced their totally own mortars (that's why it is often thought that this 120mm mortar is a Soviet conception) and it has later been copied by the Germans for their "120 mm Granatewerfer 1942". The KNIL, the Dutch East Indies Army, ordered 30 120 mm mortars but it seems none were delivered before the fall of France.
Brandt sold the Kuomintang regime two 120mm Mle1935 mortars and 275 rounds of ammunition in 1938, and these were delivered in March 1939 via Rangoon and the Burma Road. With the fall of France further purchases became impossible and the weapons were turned over to the 21st Arsenal for reverse engineering. In the meantime, the 50th Arsenal was working on their own design and a competition between the two was held in 1943/44. The 21st Arsenal (Brandt-derived) mortar was chosen in 1944 (hence the designation 33 = 33rd year of the Republic). In any event, none were actually built until 1945. Production appears to have ceased around 1946, with probably about a hundred built. The main differences between the Brandt version delivered to China and the Type 33 was that the 21st Arsenal shorted the tube slightly to reduce weight and replaced the spring-carried pneumatic tires with simple wooden spoke wheels.

● Larsen 29/20mm taper-bore AT gun
The 25x194R shell used in the 25mm Puteaux Mle1937 and 25mm Hotchkiss Mle1934 AT guns was taken as the basis for the taper-bore experiments conducted in 1939/1940 by the Danish Larsen company for the French Army, utilizing also the first German trials of Gerlich. Larsen developed a 29/20 mm AT gun that should have replaced the French 25mm AT guns at first in the mountain infantry units and give a could AT capacity to the French airborne companies. The French army had tested different prototypes and the French company Manhurin manufactured the 29/20mm shell. In May 1940, about 50 Larsen 29/20mm AT guns on Puteaux Mle1937 carriage were delivered and tested. The 90g tungsten projectile (V° = 1400 m/s) was able to penetrate 56mm/30° at 400m. Perhaps very few of them even saw combat in May/June 1940.
These studies were then followed up by the Germans to create different taper-bore AT guns : the Gerlich 28/20mm is a copy of the French gun based on the Larsen patent, the 2.8cm sPzB 41 (whish used a projectile based on the French 25mm AT round), the 4.2cm lePak 41 and the 7,5cm Pak 41. They worked very well, but suffered from a shortage of tungsten needed in the projectile.

● Brandt new generation shells
The studies led by Brandt in the 30's aimed to increase the initial velocity of the shells (without increasing of the chamber pressure) and also more generally to increase the penetration power of the shells. The French company Brandt developed series of sub-calibrated HVAP/APCR/APHC shells : 37/25mm, 75/57mm and also sub-calibrated projectiles for the 155mm and 203mm guns of the French navy. The other nations did not develop similar or equivalent systems before 1941/1942.
The 37/25mm subcalibrated shell with a 20mm core was tested but could not enter in service before the armistice. The V° was 850 m/s and it had the same penetration capacity than the 25mm SA34/37 AT gun. The same 37/25mm subcalibrated shell was also planned to be used in the 25mm SA34/37 AT gun, reaching in that case a V° of 1150 m/s, but the barrels had to be modified.
The most outstanding realization is probably the 75/57mm shell with a muzzle velocity of 900 m/s and a penetration of 90mm armor at 1000m at an impact angle of 35° ... The 75mm Mle1897 and Mle1897/33 guns could have engaged and destroyed the German Panzer IVs at 2500m if such shells would have been available !
Beside the sub-calibrated shells, Brandt also developed a 75mm HEAT shell at this time, using the patent of the Swiss Mohaupt. The tests took place in Bourges in 1940 and the results were that impressive that they were put in the secret immediately in order to avoid German capture.
On 14th June 1940, the French war ministry authorized Brandt to give all these info to the USA and the United Kingdom, including the exploitation licence for the Mohaupt patent. The inventor, Henry Mohaupt, by the intermediary of the Brandt company filed for US patent on 10th February 1941 and it is kept secret on 7th March 1941. The sub-calibrated shells were used in the UK as basis to develop the APDS shells (armored piercing discarded sabot) issued from 1942/1943. The first AT guns using them were the 6 Pdr and 17 Pdr AT guns.

● French Brandt HEAT AT rifle grenade developpments
At the end of 1939 Brandt developed also a 50mm HEAT rifle grenade. It had a range of about 100m and an armor penetration of 40mm. It entered in production during May 1940 and was successfully tested at the Satory test range on 10th June 1940 but they could not be issued to the combat units before the armistice. The documents related to these works were sent to the USA in June 1940 and were in some extend used as basis to develop the M9 AT rifle grenade and the HEAT rocket of the Bazookas. The Brandt HEAT rifle grenade was also secretly produced in France at 300,000 pieces in the free area and issued to Vichy forces. Several partisans groups used them in 1944.

● Remote-controlled breaching vehicles
The French army developed radio-guided or wire-guided vehicles transporting a destruction charge before the Germans had their Goliath, Springer or Borgward B.IV dedicated to that function.
In 1937-1940 the French army developed :
• The "véhicule P" (P for Pommellet, the captain who invented it) : constructed by Lorraine, 2000 ordered but only 11 constructed before the armistice
• The "engin K" (K for Alphonse Kégresse, the constructor) : 12000 vehicles ordered (6000 in April 1940, 6000 in May 1940), precursor of the Goliath which was build based on this vehicle.
• In April 1940, 300 FT-17 tanks are also destined to be transformed in guided demolition tanks (guided from a ground post or from a R-35 command tank, like later the Borgward and the StuG(Fkl) for example)

The very first prototypes, remote-controlled breaching vehicles for cutting wire obstacles were developed in Germany and France during World War I. The Germans were the first to produce and deploy remote-controlled minefield breaching vehicles by using both an expendable charge-carrying vehicle (the "Goliath") and a nonexpendable vehicle (the B-IV) that was intended to drop its charge and withdraw before the charge detonated. Although these vehicles were used with some success at Sevastopol in 1942 and Kursk in 1943, they were generally considered failures.

● Some tank construction technology
The different G1 tank studies/prototypes during 1937-1940 led to the G1R and G1P tank thought for a 75mm (and later a 105mm) turret gun and a modern general design. The Somua S35 was intended to be produced in the USA but due to WW2 that never happened. All what the French learned about casting technology was transferred to the USA and that inspired more or less the turret of the Lee, the hull of the M3A1 and the Sherman general design. The conception/design of the future M4 Sherman is in fact partly inspired by these studies and French engineers were present in the US "Ordnance" during debriefing meetings in Washington beginning July 1940. But what is sometimes heard about the Sherman being directly linked to the Somua S35 is an urban myth.

● The MAS40 semi-automatic rifle
The MAS40 should have been delivered in 1941, it was a modern semi-automatic rifle, equivalent to the M1 Garand but even with 10 and 25 rounds magazines.
Type : semi-automatic rifle
Total length : 1065 mm
Weight (empty) : 3.94kg
Barrel Length : 580 mm
Caliber : 7.5x54 mm
Magazine : 5 rounds clips, 10 rounds magazine or an other version with a 25 rounds magazine
V° : 840 m/s

● Mine Plows, Rakes, and Detectors
In 1918, the French developed the first plow-equipped tank, which was based on a Renault FT-17 tank. In 1939 and February/March 1940, the French army tested also various plow and other advanced mince-clearing system on the Renault R35 but they were only few at the testing level and saw no operational use. The Germans and the British armies later used these prototypes. After WW2, the former mine-clearing systems were tested again on a B1bis tank. However, plow tanks were not used in combat until D-Day in 1944, when the British 79th Armored Division employed a "Bullshorn" plow on a Churchill tank at Sword Beach.
The Germans, French, Russians, and Italians entered WWII with metallic mine detectors, but information on the details of their origin is lacking. During the interwar years, the French developed the first vehicle-mounted electronic mine detector on an R-35 tank.

● Bridge layers
Already in 1917 and in the 20's, crossing systems and engineer vehicles based on the FT-17 were tested. In 1938 a bridge layer vehicle is studied and the manufacturer FCM produced 4 'tracteur de franchissement M1' (M1 crossing tractors) but they were too heavy (25.5t) and intricate to use. In 1937 Somua and Coder began to work together to produce a bridge layer vehicle. The first prototype is based on the Somua MCL5 halftracked vehicle with additional armor. The equipement was tested in September and October 1939 : a 100km road stage and a 50km cross country stage are realized followed by 15 bridge laying tests with 20 crossings of Renault D2 tanks. The tests are rather satisfying and after slight modifications, the prototype is again tested in February/March 1940 with the successful crossing of Somua S-35 and Renault B1bis tanks (32 t). The experiments are cancelled by the defeat of 1940.



2) IF FRANCE HAD NOT FALLEN

France expected not to have to fight the decisive battles before 1941. At this time you would have had many improvements in the French equipments, including all the developments detailed previously.

Anti-tank guns :
Much more 47mm SA37 L/53 AT guns would have been in service in the infantry units and at the divisional level the 75mm L/53 Mle1939 AT/AA gun would have replaced all the 75mm AT guns and part of the 47mm AT guns. New HEAT and subcalibrated would have been introduced for many guns.

Fighters :
• Dewoitine D.520. It was already operational in 1940. This aircraft was slower than the Messerschmitt Bf.109E but clearly superior in maneuverability. A comparison was made on April 21, 1940, with an intact captured Bf.109E-3 that had been brought down in French territory. This comparison highlighted the fine qualities of the best French fighter of WW2. Had France not surrendered in June 1940, the Dewoitine D.520's career might have been comparable to that of British and German fighters.

• Dewoitine 551 (would have been a kind of French "Mustang". The Dewoitine D.551 was expected to reach 650 km/h. Armament would have been one 20mm gun in the nose and six 7.5mm MGs in the wings or one 20mm gun in the nose and two 20mm guns + four 7.5mm MGs in the wings.

• Arsenal VG33, VG36 and VG39. The Arsenal VG33 was already produced at the prototype level in 1940. It had a speed of about 558 km/h and was armed with a 20mm gun and 4 MGs. At the armistice, 10 Arsenal VG33 had been completed and 200 were in construction at various stages. It was 30 km/h faster than the Dewoitine D520 but with an older engine, it could therefore have achieved more. It arrived too late and no operationnal fighter squadron was really issued with it. The VG36 was just an other evolution, with a speed of 590 km/h and the VG39, which flew in May 1940 reached 625 km/h.

• Bloch 157 (close to a Fw190). The MB.157 was the last development of the MB.150 series (Bloch 152 and 155 issued to the French 1940 air force). The MB.157 had a speed of 710 km/h at 7850m with its Gnôme & Rhône 14R of 1700 hp !

Note : in 1940 the Bf-109E reached 556 km/h and the Spitfire MkI 580 km/h.

Armored fighting vehicles :

• B1ter heavy tank

• Somua S40 medium tank

• SAu40 self propelled gun

• ARL40 self propelled gun

• Renault G1 tank. The G1 tank studied since 1936 was in fact rather a tank intended to replace the Renault D1 and D2 tanks. In 1936 the prototype had 20 tons and in 1939 it had 32 tons. There were several prototypes from several manufacturers but in 1939 only the G1R (Renault) was retained. It was equipped with a high velocity 75mm gun and a version with a 105mm gun was planned. This tank would probably have exploited the last developments in the ammunition field and its 75mm or 105mm gun would probably have been very efficient against German tanks in 1941/1942. In 1940 the Germans captured some chassis prototypes of the G1.

• Lots of tank destroyers like the Laffly W15TCC (already used in 1940) in its armored version and the Lorraine 37L tractor armed with the 47mm L/53 AT gun.

Aircraft carriers :
In 1939/1940 there were already the "Bearn" aircraft carrier and the "Commandant Teste" seaplane carrier but they were obsolete. Concerning the carrier capable aircrafts, the Loire Nieuport LN.411 and the Vought V156F (dive bombers and torpedo aircrafts) from the French fleet air arm were available.
Two new aircraft carriers for the navy should have been available in 1941 ("Joffre" and "Painlevé") :
• 18,000t
• 236m long
• 34m wide
• Speed 33 knots
• Embarking 40 aircrafts (15 fighters and 25 attack aircrafts)
• Armament : 8x 130mm AA guns, 8x 37mm AA guns, 28x 13.2mm AAMGs
• Crew : 70 officers, 1180 NCOs and men

The "Joffre" construction started in March 1940 but reached only 20% before the armistice. The "Painlevé" was never started.
The aircrafts intended for these new aircraft carriers were :
• Fighters :
---o Dewoitine D.790 (navalized version of the Dewoitine D.520)
• Several twin-engined attack aircrafts (which is new on an aircraft carrier at the moment) :
---o CAO 600 (Constructions Aéronautiques de l’Ouest) (380 km/h)
---o Dewoitine D.750 (360 km/h)
---o Bréguet 810 (derived from the Bréguet 693 attack aircraft)
• Other single engined attack aircrafts :
---o Latécoère 299 (350 km/h) (derived from the Latécoère 298 seaplane)

Radar :
Here is some information on French radar development, taken from Louis Brown's "A radar history of World War Two : technical and military imperatives", Institute of Physics Pub., 1999. His account draws heavily on papers presented at a IEE Conference and expanded for publication in Robert Burns' "Radar development to 1945", London, Peter Peregrinus, 1988 as well as some articles in French Magazines.

The pioneers were :
• Pierre David, at the Laboratoire National de Radioelectricité, who, by 1934, had created a radio "barrier" ("barrage" in French), consisting of a transmitter and a widely separated receiver, which sensed a disturbance when a plane passed between them. These barriers were soon installed at the ports of Cherbourg, Brest, Toulon and Bizerte, on a ship- and aircraft-detection role, but observations were difficult to interpret
• Camille Gutton, at the Societé Française Radio-Electrique (SFR), who created a very low-powered continous-wave 16-cm set (less than 1W), tried unsuccessfully on aircraft in 1934 and installed aboard a French liner in 1935, also not very successfully.

As a second step, David devised a method of using multiple stations to determine direction and speed, by using observed Doppler shift on each station. The system could easily be confused by multiple aircraft or formations in the observed area. Nevertheless, both the Army and the Navy ordered sets (12 stations (fixed) along two lines around Reims and in the Argonneand 20 mobile for the Army, at least two stations built and 4 more planned for the Navy). In October 1938, he proposed, without much of a favourable reception, a pulse-echo system, which would in theory allow for direct ranging. Gutton, on his turn, developed a 16 cm pulsed set, installed at Brest, but the lack of a suitably-powered transmitter at such small wavelengths did not enable aircraft detection, only short range ship detection and ranging.

Finally, on April 1939, the British disclosed their work on radar, which led to orders for pulse radars with a 6 meters, 12 kW transmitter produced by SADIR in October 1939, with a detection range of 60 km. The British air-defence radar grew out of a public debate in the British Parliament in 1935 about protection from bombers in case of a war. The RAF believed that the air war would be a strategic bombing duel. As a result, its performance was poor when it was fighting in France, and of course as a strategic bombing force it was hopeless, but when as a result of entirely unplanned circumstances (i.e. utter defeat resulting in the fall of France) it found itself in the situation that it had planned for, i.e. fighting a strategic bombing offensive, then it performed well.

As an aside regarding Gutton's work, virtually every country started research using cm-wave, but gave up after a while, because of low power. Only the discovery of the magnetron enabled functional cm-vave sets to be created. As can be seen, initial interest was naval, a pattern repeated in Germany and, IIRC, in the USA, perfectly reasonable considering the huge advantages accruing to the possession of radar. The Air Force, apparently, never got involved with radar at the beginning. This is probably an important clue as to why the British had a better system : they developed radar from the outset to be part of an air defence command structure, and not as a technological tool that had to be integrated afterwards in the existing system. Having discovered early the advantages of integration [considering weapons as a system, to put it another way] they remained in the lead throughout the war, even when their equipment was technically inferior (something true as regards Germany until the introduction of cm-wave radar, in 1942-1943).

If the French have had fully operational radar systems in June 1940. German losses could have been higher, true, but the range were shorter than at the English Channel (less warning time). Nevertheless the British planned to deploy radars on French ground during 1940 which could have played a key role during a German attack launched in 1941 rather than in May 1940.

Atomic bomb :
Several French scientifics were already working on the basis of the development of an atomic bomb in 1939-1940. At the time of the German invasion, France did not just own the biggest amount of uraniumoxyde than any other country on earth, but also all heavy water available in Europe : 185 kg was what the French special envoy Jacques Allier (French military intelligence service) did buy in March 1940 from the Norwegian company Nosk Hydro and had sent in 12 sealed alumium containers to France. During the 16-17th June night, the heavy water was shipped to Great Britain on the order of the ministry of armament (order signed by Bichelonne) to continue the researches.
On Mai 16th 1940 did the telephone ring in Henri Moreut's office, the deputy director of the laboratory of nuclear chemistry at the "Collège de France". Joliot-Curie was calling and ordered his subordinate to him. Visibly agitated he told him : "The front at Sedan has collapsed. Dautry just rang me. We have to secure the heavy water!". During the same night the containers containing the valuable "Product Z" (as it was called) were moved to central France, where they were temporarely stored in the vaults in a branch of the Bank of France in Clermont-Ferrand. On June 10th, Joliot and his coworkers started to burn all documents giving information about the status of his nuclear research, to prevent the Germans, who were already close to Paris, from getting any knowledge about his research. This was completely in vain, because a few days later German troops captured a copy of this file, together with lots of other documents of the French Ministry of Defense.
Joliot stayed alone in Paris, because he didn´t want to leave his valuable laboratory equipment, among it the just completed first Cyclotron in western and central Europe. He ordered his subordinates Hans-Heinrich Halban and Lew Kowarski, who were running a temporary branch of the Centre of nuclear chemistry and nuclear physics in the villa "Clair Logis" to bring the heavy water to England via Bordeaux. Halban explains:" During one night we left our valuable cargo in the jail of Riom which was the most secure place. The heavy water was finally loaded on the British transport ship "Broompark" in Bordeaux. Lord Suffolk and Berkshire, the scientific attache of the British embassy in Paris accompanied the valuable freight. This adventurous British aristocrat had once in his youth run away from home and joined a ship´s crew. During his time as a sailor he learned some carpentry, which was now very usefull. In hurry he built a seaworthy raft on which the aluminium jerry cans containing the "Product Z" and industrial diamonds with the value of 2 1/2 million Sterling pounds were sored. Halban and Kowarski had to swear to the Earl of Suffolk that in case of the ship getting damaged, e.g. through being torpedoed or striking a mine, they would help getting the raft out of the cargo compartment and would stay with it. These precautions proved to be unnecessary. The ship with the strategically important cargo reached England safely. A ship, which left Bordeaux at the same time was sunk by the Germany and Joliot managed to pass the wrong information to the Germans that the heavy water was on this ship

Regards,

David

[Tim Nice But Dim]

A long read, but very interesting.

Thank You.

[Kitsune]

AROUETLJ wrote:
I think Saint-Exupery just about sums it up: How could 40 million famers fight against 80 million industrialists?

Nazi Germany in the thirties had about 66 million inhabitants. And then there were the French colonies, which also could supply France with manpower. So the difference may not be as dire as you suggest.

[foxtrot023]

The fall of france in 1940 had everything to do with the quality of the german command than anything else the allies might have done.

In esence, the allied command (French, Brit and belgian) planned to refight WW1 while the germans innovated on theirs. The allied plan was to use the maginot as a shield and in the even of a german move through Belgium (as in 1914) the best allied troops, the BEF and several french motorised and armoured divisons, would hinge northward to join the belgians, which also had formidable defenses, to create a single front. The hinge over which the allied armies would rotate was the ardennes forest, which was deemed inpassable specially to armour and motorized troops, and thereby left lightly guarded. It was through the Ardennes that the germans massed their armored divisions and cut the bulk of the mobile allied troops from the french main army bodies.

In 1940-41 there was no army that could have stand to the german Heer. It had excelent tactical leadership, and in 1940 excelent strategic leadership. The german troops had the best training and the best air force (1940).

If either the UK or Russia and the US would have been in the same gegraphic position of France, they would have fallen as well. For further reading, there is Albert Seaton (a brit) book: The Russo German war, but it also covers in great detail the events of 1940.

[roland]

For what I know the article ogukuo posted is a good one.
A little too pessimistic, doesn't gives much explainations for the reasons of the mistakes and don't speak about the British doctrine, but that is not the point.
Now I have to read David's posts :)

[Lokos]

Kitsune:

Does your total take into account Nazi Austria's manpower? Or the German inhabitants of Poland and Czechoslovakia?

Lokos

[AROUETLJ]

It wasn't I who suggested it, but Saint-Ex. And you have to add Austria, Czechoslovakia, etc, and Italy, and other allies to Germany. But enough of this. It's getting very boring and it doesn't get us anywhere.

Anyway the two sides soon realized their mistake and now we have the EU. Yeah, kicking ass together instead of each other's.

[roland]

Anyway the two sides soon realized their mistake and now we have the EU. Yeah, kicking ass together instead of each other's.
woot
it's not St Exupery,
it's AROUTLJ
kicking ass together
instead of each other
yo p-)

[AROUETLJ]

I'm not sure I understand you Roland, but whatever you meant, yeah I agree.

How many threads have we had analysing France's defeat? It's getting boring. And anyway the Second World War wasn't cool. No one wore shades then.

[Musashi]

Another night wasted because of reading David Lehmann's posts.
The most funny thing was 1,5-man turret of Somua S-35 :)