Why haven't we "gone native" in Iraq?

[StarvingStudent47]

In Afghanistan, it seemed like a major emphasis was put on "blending in" with the locals--growing facial hair, wearing local civilian clothes instead of BDUs, etc. Overall, our occupation of Afghanistan has been much more successful than our occupation of Iraq. Now, there's obviously many differences between the two situations. But in terms of the tactics we've used, this is a major thing. We tried it in Afghanistan; it worked. We then DIDN'T use it in Iraq.

What gives? What am I missing here?

[ßå$tĮТHÏ¿ð]

Please differentiate from what tactics were used in Iraq compared to what tactics the US and Collaition *spelling?* used in Afghanistan. Explain what was done differently?

[Mr Gently Benevolent]

Good point StarvingStudent there could be areas of Iraq where troops could go a little more native, but most of the trouble seems to be in the Suni Triangle where they may be nationalistic but have always been a little more in touch with western trends so it may not be any help there. The UK forces in southern Iraq apparently have a charm school or so it was quoted in the media where coalition troops learn Iraqi customs and taboos.

[Javehn]

Well , first of all , i don't think it's really that matters how the soldiers looks.Remember that the fighting part is over , now it's mostly about deterring , and for that the soldiers do need the proper uniforms.
Second , i am shure that even in the afganistan , those tactics used only by special forces.Used by conventionally troops , it's making friendly fire accidents happend. In urban warfare and small scale conflicts , friendly fire is very common.

[One?]

Aghanistan = literlay a desert.
Iraq = Civilized country

Afghanistan = Grow a beard ride a horse
Iraq = Growing a bear and riding a horse on a highway will make you noticable if you have 6 SF operators on horses.

[StarvingStudent47]

In retrospect, I had been thinking about what Special Forces had done (you see a lot of photos of guys in vests and scarves and those beret-like Afghan hats in the photos section), forgetting that the regular soldiers in Afghanistan didn't do that. One's point that Iraq is more modernized, so ordinary Iraqis are running around in Coca-Cola tee-shirts instead of tribal garb is also valid.

So basically what I'm saying here is "never mind, I'm dumb" ;)

[martinexsquaddie]

the average iraqi would laugh themselves stupid if US special forces turned up on horseback :lol:

[usa320]

The difrence is IRaqis are far more brainwashed than most afghans.

[The Walrus]

I saw a programme about SF in Afghanistan, it was quite amusing the way they grew beards to 'blend in', but in any case the principle is right, when occupying, especially in Iraq with the growing guerilla threat, local support is essential and so far to the locals, the US soldiers look like storm-troopers with their armour and helmets, and I think that the resistance is playing to that and fostering an 'us against them alien invaders' attitude.

[budanski]

Keep in mind the war in Afghanistan was fought mostly with SF and in Iraq mostly with conventional forces.

[California Joe]

The beards are also a cultural thing in Afghanistan. Real men worthy of respect wear beards there. Like a "machismo" kinda thing. I remember reading about how the Afghans would goof on clean shaved operators by calling them a slang term that translates to "pleasure boys" Punks if you will....

[Royal]

Keep in mind the war in Afghanistan was fought mostly with SF and in Iraq mostly with conventional forces.

In numerical terms I've gotta disagree. Can't speak for US force numbers but the ratio on Op Veritas was at least 12:1 for UK ground forces. The ratio is lower now, but still overwhelmingly conventional.

I'm sure Stoli or B will back me up from the US point of view ;)

[Nawlins]

If I'm not mistaken, in Afghanistan, the conventional forces stick pretty much to on or around US-controlled bases, and wear regular uniforms, while SOF (not just SF) mix more with the local population and dress appropriately.

Seems like the conventional forces are more spread out in Iraq, but I don't know as much about it.

[NcDeuce]

I have seen photos of Special Forces troops with goatees...I cannot recall seeing beards though.


The A team can be deceiving in its appearance. SF soldiers are notorious for their long hair and unkempt beards. When they’re off assignment, they’re likely to sun themselves on the patio in shorts and flip-flops. But when they’re on, they’re portraits of brow-furrowed intensity. They barrel their Humvees through neighborhoods at breakneck speed, blasting music ranging from Black Sabbath to Madonna and riding in such tight formation that their bumpers almost kiss. The vehicles bristle with weaponry: .50-caliber machine guns, Mark-19 grenade launchers, Javelin missiles, antitank rounds, sniper rifles, shotguns. When they dismount to clear a building or conduct a raid, they’re a marvel of feline agility and balletic synchronicity.
They are also savvy cultural brokers. Consider the April 24 mission of a group of SF officers in the battalion that this A team belongs to. The officers set out to deliver a delicate message to the man known as Abu Tabai (real name: Harth El-Sammary), head of the Baghdad company of the Free Iraqi Forces. The FIF, backed by Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress and functioning under the tutelage of the U.S. Army, had recently begun working in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. But the group’s ties to Chalabi, who hasn’t exactly received a warm welcome in Iraq, were potentially problematic. The SF men went to clarify to the FIF that they worked for the United States, not Chalabi.
They were greeted by Tabai in a dim room at FIF headquarters in the wealthy Mansour district of Baghdad. Over the next hour—filled with cordial chatter, a heaping feast of lamb and rice, and a digestif of sweet tea and cigarettes—the SF battalion commander, a smooth-talking Southerner, gradually tiptoed his way to his point: “My real concern—and I’m being honest here—is the linkage the Free Iraqi Forces have with Chalabi,” he said. The FIF had to adhere to its security mission rather than advance Chalabi’s political ambitions, the commander stressed. “You can’t try to do both.” Tabai made it clear he understood the message. “I am INC with my political thinking,” he replied. But, “I am really careful. I am an officer before I am” a Chalabi supporter. Once the meeting was concluded, the SF team went around the corner to the Baghdad Hunting Club to deliver a similar message about the FIF’s future to Chalabi himself, as well as to huddle with the U.S. Central Command’s liaison to the FIF.
“Today was a classic SF mission,” the SF commander said afterward. “Working in a gray area.” Pursuing a rather imprecise mission—trying to insulate U.S. military objectives from the jockeying of Iraqi power-brokers—he visited the relevant parties, scrutinized their intentions and ensured they understood the American forces’ position. Such work is typical SF fare—”very interpersonal, very culturally aware,” said the commander. “We’re more coaches and mentors in many ways than we are shooters.”



Only since the war’s end have such SF teams drawn on these skill sets. The soldiers in the A team tracked by NEWSWEEK say their role during the war was circumscribed by how events unfolded. Afghanistan was a perfect war for the SF, requiring the organization of foreign opposition armies, moving stealthily through inhospitable terrain to call in airstrikes and rooting out Al Qaeda and Taliban members from their mountain redoubts. The Iraq conflict, by contrast, was essentially won through two heavy punches delivered by the Third Infantry Division and the First Marine Expeditionary Force. The SF teams found no uprising to abet and guide, and in any case, Saddam’s regime fell quickly. Before the war’s start, some military analysts suggested that commandos would lay the groundwork by bribing and bullying Republican Guard officers into submission or minimizing the threat of Scud launchers in western Iraq that could target Israel. But if that happened, this A team says it wasn’t part of those efforts. “We had enabling effects on the conventional fight,” says the battalion commander. “But it was a conventional fight.”


http://www.msnbc.com/news/913629.asp?0cv=KB10&cp1=1

After the assassination attempt of Hamid Karzai was televised on national television, Army brass did not approve of the beards and lack of shirts on the SF operators. This might be why things have changed...

[StarvingStudent47]

I have seen photos of Special Forces troops with goatees...I cannot recall seeing beards though.

http://media.militaryphotos.net/photos/albums/special_forces-afghanistan/z_sfa01.jpg

http://media.militaryphotos.net/photos/albums/special_forces-afghanistan/z_sfa03.jpg

From this site, Operation Enduring Freedom gallery --> American forces --> Special Forces Afghanistan.

[He219]

That is a very good question, StarvingStudent47.

Indeed, Afghanistan is unique because local warlords and a new regieme are tending to security affairs with support of the anti-Taliban coalition. In Iraq, we are attempting to overhaul Iraqi institutions through conventional occupation.

Throughout Cold War foreign policy, the United States wrote the book on orchestrating regieme change through perpetuation of existing military institutions under anti-communist regieme leadership. Pro-American military regiemes or despots with dubious human rights records were favored over propagation of the Red tide.

In Iraq, society revolved around the perpetuation of British Colonial era established institutions that have thrived and given rise to a culture more progressive than other Middle Eastern nations.

I have often wondered why Iraqi regulars were not immediately assimilated into Iraq's new governance by continuing their military institution for pay with disciplined service to Iraq's national identity under new leadership.

Instead, Millions of Iraqi soldiers become outcast without pay while the coalition hand selects and builds small indiginous security forces as traditional security cohesion by Iraq's military institution breaks down in favor of lawless extremists and marauding Baathist loyalists.

Cold War Era tactics, even under scrutiny for human rights abuses, applied techniques that rewarded allegiance and continued service to new regiemes. In Iraq, as well as in most of the Middle East, tribal culture favors the patronage of centralized governance in exchange for security and personal gain. The military institution seemed to be the obvious candidate for securing Iraq's discipline and pride. The energy expended in regaining Iraq's domestic security will exceed any payoff to the Iraqi military institution for maintaining order in the first place.

Just my .02

[NcDeuce]

I have seen photos of Special Forces troops with goatees...I cannot recall seeing beards though.

http://media.militaryphotos.net/photos/albums/special_forces-afghanistan/z_sfa01.jpg

http://media.militaryphotos.net/photos/albums/special_forces-afghanistan/z_sfa03.jpg

From this site, Operation Enduring Freedom gallery --> American forces --> Special Forces Afghanistan.

No, I knew the SF teams and 160th SOAR guys grew facial hair in Afghanistan...I'm talking about Iraq.

[StarvingStudent47]

No, I knew the SF teams and 160th SOAR guys grew facial hair in Afghanistan...I'm talking about Iraq.

Whoops! Never mind then ;)

[NcDeuce]

http://media.militaryphotos.net/photos/albums/special_forces-afghanistan/SF_Cowboy2.jpg

:lol:

[Nawlins]

Whoa. I didn't know Grizzly Adams was SF.

[StarvingStudent47]

http://media.militaryphotos.net/photos/albums/special_forces-afghanistan/SF_Cowboy2.jpg

Having just learned what the word "metro******" means, I can now confirm that this dude is NOT metro******.

Isn't vocabulary-building great?

[mocking_loudly_died]

Now thats a real mans beard!