Bluezoo
04-12-2005, 12:42 PM
Focus on Cruise Threat
Proliferation Grows, Defense Unavailable
By SCOTT JONES
Two recent events should rouse the international community from its somnolence concerning cruise missile proliferation: the successful testing of the Indo-Russian BrahMos anti-ship cruise missile and disclosure that Ukraine exported long-range, nuclear-capable cruise missiles to China and Iran.
One of the first foreign policy tasks of the newly elected Yushchenko administration was to admit that Ukraine exported more than a dozen long-range cruise missiles, Kh-55s, to China and Iran. A Ukrainian government investigation into illicit weapons sales by officials loyal to former President Leonid Kuchma had led to secret indictments or arrests of at least six arms dealers.
The Kh-55 cruise missile (NATO designation AS-15 Kent) was the Soviet Union’s response to the first generation of modern U.S. cruise missiles, the Tomahawk and the air-launched cruise missile. Like its American counterparts, the Kent was designed to carry nuclear and conventional warheads at subsonic speeds to targets 2,000-3,000 kilometers distant, with high precision. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited an undisclosed number of Kh-55s, shorn of their nuclear payloads.
The exports, approximately six each, represent a more serious threat than their potential [immediate] use would suggest. The air-launched version of the Kent is designed for deployment from rotary launchers inside the bomb bays of two Soviet-era bombers, neither of which is in operation in China or Iran. While such a limited number of missiles do not an arsenal make, they represent new access to a level of technological sophistication previously absent from Chinese and Iranian cruise missile development efforts.
At the first of the year, India completed its testing cycle and began serial production of the BrahMos (PJ-10) supersonic anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), jointly developed by India and Russia. The weapon is ramjet-powered and builds on the technology of earlier Russian anti-ship missiles, such as the Yakhont.
The PJ-10 has a range of almost 300 kilometers and an identical configuration for land, sea and sub-sea launching platforms. Its developers say the PJ-10 will be more effective at penetrating ship defenses than earlier missiles. It will be almost impossible to stop and could easily be modified for land-attack use.
To offset design and production costs, both Russia and India plan to market the missile, albeit only to “friendly” countries. Russia, a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) member, ensured that the missile’s range would be kept to less than 300 kilometers, the MTCR-designated range limit. However, range for a cruise missile can be altered by modifying trajectory and altitude, a problem yet to be resolved.
Advanced cruise missiles pose the most technologically sophisticated danger to the United States, but even ordinary anti-ship cruise missiles are a threat worthy of attention, especially those whose range and payload can be enhanced to achieve limited land-attack capabilities. There are an estimated 75,000 ASCMs worldwide. At least 75 countries produce ASCMs; even more possess the capability of converting them into land-attack versions.
With speed, stealth, platform and payload-variability, cruise missiles are potential force equalizers that could, for example, cripple U.S. warships in the Strait of Hormuz or the Taiwan Strait. Their adaptability to unconventional warheads makes them attractive weapons for terrorist use.
Ukraine’s illicit exports and Russia’s decision to market the highly sophisticated BrahMos suggest that cruise missile proliferation is continuing unabated, despite national and multilateral control efforts. The enduring nature of cruise missile proliferation is due to several factors, the foremost being the conventional applicability of such weapons — at least those with ranges below MTCR thresholds.
The MTCR, a voluntary, informal consortium of supplier countries, is wary of committing to control levels that would hamper legitimate trade, especially in light of industry forecasts for increased demand for stand-off attack missile systems.
As with earlier U.S.-led military campaigns, international demand for cruise-type weapons has been whetted by their use in Iraq. For example, nearly 20,000 precision-guided munitions were used during the opening phase in Iraq, of which 802 were Tomahawks.
France recently announced it would expand its stand-off attack capability and may develop a new cruise missile based on the Scalp-EG design. Sweden plans to test a land-attack version of the RBS15 in 2007. China and Taiwan are expanding their stand-off strike missile inventories. Taiwan’s state-run Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology is working on a missile with a 900-kilometer range, which could hit the Chinese city of Shanghai.
China’s newest cruise missile, the Donghai-10, is thought by some experts to be another name for the extant Hong Niao-2. Regardless, Beijing is using its ballistic and cruise missile fleets to threaten Taiwan into hastening unification talks.
The MTCR and many national export control systems are inadequate to address the increasing demand for cruise missiles. Cruise missiles are a threat that cannot, at this time, be countered by missile defense systems or supply-side restraint....
For the full version of the article, please go to:
http://defensenews.com/story.php?F=780740&C=commentary
Proliferation Grows, Defense Unavailable
By SCOTT JONES
Two recent events should rouse the international community from its somnolence concerning cruise missile proliferation: the successful testing of the Indo-Russian BrahMos anti-ship cruise missile and disclosure that Ukraine exported long-range, nuclear-capable cruise missiles to China and Iran.
One of the first foreign policy tasks of the newly elected Yushchenko administration was to admit that Ukraine exported more than a dozen long-range cruise missiles, Kh-55s, to China and Iran. A Ukrainian government investigation into illicit weapons sales by officials loyal to former President Leonid Kuchma had led to secret indictments or arrests of at least six arms dealers.
The Kh-55 cruise missile (NATO designation AS-15 Kent) was the Soviet Union’s response to the first generation of modern U.S. cruise missiles, the Tomahawk and the air-launched cruise missile. Like its American counterparts, the Kent was designed to carry nuclear and conventional warheads at subsonic speeds to targets 2,000-3,000 kilometers distant, with high precision. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited an undisclosed number of Kh-55s, shorn of their nuclear payloads.
The exports, approximately six each, represent a more serious threat than their potential [immediate] use would suggest. The air-launched version of the Kent is designed for deployment from rotary launchers inside the bomb bays of two Soviet-era bombers, neither of which is in operation in China or Iran. While such a limited number of missiles do not an arsenal make, they represent new access to a level of technological sophistication previously absent from Chinese and Iranian cruise missile development efforts.
At the first of the year, India completed its testing cycle and began serial production of the BrahMos (PJ-10) supersonic anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), jointly developed by India and Russia. The weapon is ramjet-powered and builds on the technology of earlier Russian anti-ship missiles, such as the Yakhont.
The PJ-10 has a range of almost 300 kilometers and an identical configuration for land, sea and sub-sea launching platforms. Its developers say the PJ-10 will be more effective at penetrating ship defenses than earlier missiles. It will be almost impossible to stop and could easily be modified for land-attack use.
To offset design and production costs, both Russia and India plan to market the missile, albeit only to “friendly” countries. Russia, a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) member, ensured that the missile’s range would be kept to less than 300 kilometers, the MTCR-designated range limit. However, range for a cruise missile can be altered by modifying trajectory and altitude, a problem yet to be resolved.
Advanced cruise missiles pose the most technologically sophisticated danger to the United States, but even ordinary anti-ship cruise missiles are a threat worthy of attention, especially those whose range and payload can be enhanced to achieve limited land-attack capabilities. There are an estimated 75,000 ASCMs worldwide. At least 75 countries produce ASCMs; even more possess the capability of converting them into land-attack versions.
With speed, stealth, platform and payload-variability, cruise missiles are potential force equalizers that could, for example, cripple U.S. warships in the Strait of Hormuz or the Taiwan Strait. Their adaptability to unconventional warheads makes them attractive weapons for terrorist use.
Ukraine’s illicit exports and Russia’s decision to market the highly sophisticated BrahMos suggest that cruise missile proliferation is continuing unabated, despite national and multilateral control efforts. The enduring nature of cruise missile proliferation is due to several factors, the foremost being the conventional applicability of such weapons — at least those with ranges below MTCR thresholds.
The MTCR, a voluntary, informal consortium of supplier countries, is wary of committing to control levels that would hamper legitimate trade, especially in light of industry forecasts for increased demand for stand-off attack missile systems.
As with earlier U.S.-led military campaigns, international demand for cruise-type weapons has been whetted by their use in Iraq. For example, nearly 20,000 precision-guided munitions were used during the opening phase in Iraq, of which 802 were Tomahawks.
France recently announced it would expand its stand-off attack capability and may develop a new cruise missile based on the Scalp-EG design. Sweden plans to test a land-attack version of the RBS15 in 2007. China and Taiwan are expanding their stand-off strike missile inventories. Taiwan’s state-run Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology is working on a missile with a 900-kilometer range, which could hit the Chinese city of Shanghai.
China’s newest cruise missile, the Donghai-10, is thought by some experts to be another name for the extant Hong Niao-2. Regardless, Beijing is using its ballistic and cruise missile fleets to threaten Taiwan into hastening unification talks.
The MTCR and many national export control systems are inadequate to address the increasing demand for cruise missiles. Cruise missiles are a threat that cannot, at this time, be countered by missile defense systems or supply-side restraint....
For the full version of the article, please go to:
http://defensenews.com/story.php?F=780740&C=commentary