DPRK Guerrilla and UW Units

[2RHPZ]

Korean People's Army - Guerrilla and UW Units

Korean People's Army Guerrilla and Unconventional Warfare Units, June 1950 -
September 1950 [1]

by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.


Background

Immediately prior to onset of the Fatherland Liberation War DPRK guerrilla
activity within the Republic of Korea (ROK) declined to almost zero, and
contrary to expectations continued to be infrequent during the first days of
the war. On the other hand, Korean People's Army (KPA) unconventional
warfare operations were intensive from the very first hours of the war and
played a significant role in most operations. These operations initially
displayed a considerable degree of cooperation between various units and
controlling headquarters. This, however, would quickly change as units
sustained casualties and advanced further from their supply centers. By
August, the majority of the highly trained independent army-level and
divisional guerrilla units which enjoyed considerable success during the
early stages of the war were absorbed into regular KPA combat divisions as
individual or unit replacements. Most notable were the operations of the
766th Independent Unit which made a significant contribution to the
successes of KPA operations on the east coast (see below).

Guerrilla Activity June - September 1950

For all the effort expended in training, supporting or infiltrating the
multitude of independent guerrilla units operational in the ROK prior to the
war, they served a relatively minor role during the initial fighting. This
was probably the result of the rapid KPA advance, their inability to sustain
combat operations against regular United Nations Command (UNC) troops, and
their inability to secure sufficient quantities of food, arms and
ammunition. When the war later turned against the DPRK, Kim Il-song would
blame Pak Hon-yong for a lack of guerrilla support, since Pak had stated
that 200,000 Communist would rise up in revolt when the KPA attacked. One
role in which the independent guerrilla units proved to be of considerable
value was that of acting as local guides for advancing regular KPA units.[2]
Interestingly, there was a gradual increase in guerrilla strength during
July and August as a result of both "victory enthusiasm" and pragmatic
survivalism by essentially neutral civilians who joined the Communist cause.

As the KPA advance compressed UNC forces into the Pusan perimeter there was
a noticeable increase in guerrilla activities. These activities were
primarily the work of divisional guerrilla units and the survivors of the
766th Independent Unit, however, independent guerrilla units were also
evident in many operations. Despite a desperate front-line situation, this
increased guerrilla activity forced the UNC Command into action to protect
its rear areas. On 19 July 1950, the office of Coordinator, Protection of
Lines of Communication, Rear Areas, was set up by the Eight United States
Army Korea. Its mission was to coordinate ROK and U.S. efforts to protect
railroads, highways, and bridges. It also protected UNC signal communication
units against sabotage and guerrilla operations. One of the first steps
taken by this office was to form Korean Police Battalions. At first, one
provisional ROK police company was assigned to the 24th and 25th U.S.
Infantry Divisions with the mission of procuring local guides, securing
information on guerrillas, and familiarizing the respective commanding
generals with local terrain conditions and road nets. After approximately
two months, the ROK police companies were returned to the ROK National
Police. [3] Guerrilla activities within the UNC rear areas continued until
the 15 September 1950 Inch'on landing and subsequent breakout from the Pusan
perimeter. At which point the character of guerrilla warfare changed.

Unconventional Warfare Chain-of-Command, 1950

At the beginning of the war guerrilla and unconventional warfare operations
were controlled through five distinct yet inter-related chains of commands.
The Korean Workers¹ Party (KWP) Central Committee controlled all guerrilla
units and Communist sympathizers through its' Liaison Department. This
department was responsible for all subversion operations against the ROK,
including the collection of political intelligence. The personnel who manned
this department were drawn primarily from former members of the Workers¹
Party of South Korea (WPSK). The Liaison Department exercised its control
through two subordinate sections - Guerrilla and Military. The Guerrilla
Section (a.k.a., People's Guerrilla Command) was responsible for all
political aspects of the guerrillas and KWP within the ROK, including:
establishing overall political objectives, indoctrination and propaganda,
training, ensuring the development and expansion of the KWP within the ROK,
etc. The Military Section was operationally subordinate to the KPA's General
Staff Department and was responsible the military and operational aspects of
the guerrillas and KWP within the ROK, including: training and infiltration
of agents, couriers and guerrillas for operations within the ROK,
communications with personnel and units dispatch to the ROK, and
miscellaneous support functions. [4] The KPA's Reconnaissance Bureau
(a.k.a., the 560th Army Unit) was responsible for military reconnaissance
operations and espionage activities concerned with the collection of
military intelligence. It controlled a small number of specially trained
reconnaissance battalions and agent teams. The reconnaissance battalions did
not operate as tactical formations, but rather detached companies to forward
divisions. Next, a majority of the KPA's infantry divisions formed organic
guerrilla units. These units operated primarily as reconnaissance or ranger
units rather than as traditional guerrillas and were seldom divorced from
the parent unit. Finally, there were at least three units which were
specially trained in unconventional warfare operations and directly
subordinate to the General Staff Department - the 766th Independent Unit and
the 945th and 956th Independent Naval Infantry Regiments. [5] These units
and their operational experiences during the Fatherland Liberation War
formed the foundation upon which the KPA's present day Special Purpose
Forces were built.

[2RHPZ]

Korean People's Army - 766th Independent Unit - Revision

Korean People's Army - 766th Independent Unit - Revision

[Author's note: This revision is a rewrite of the paragraphs concerning the
ROKN Paektusan's sinking of the armed trawler carrying the 3rd Battalion of
the 766th. It also adds a end note and updates another.]


766th Independent Unit [8]

With the failure of the 1949 "September Offensive" the Kangdong Political
Institute was disbanded. It was replaced by the establishment of a special
guerrilla warfare training school in Hoeryong, known as the Hoeryong Cadres
School. This school was under the direction of O Chin-u, a veteran of the
88th Special Independent Sniper Brigade. The mission of the school was to
train personnel for a new special unit in the tradition of the 88th Brigade.
[9]

The 766th Independent Unit (a.k.a., 766th Infantry Regiment, 766th
Independent Infantry Regiment and 766th Guerrilla Unit) is believed to have
been formed in July 1949 at Wonsan. The core personnel for the unit were
obtained by reorganizing an entire infantry officers class from the Hoeryong
Cadres School, including instructors and students. From July 1949 until 12
June 1950 the unit, which was organized into 3 battalions (1st, 2nd and
3rd), conducted basic and advanced training at Hoeryong. On 12 June the
766th moved by rail to Munp'yong (5 kilometers north of Wonsan) where they
were engaged in amphibious training under Soviet supervision until 22 June.
The unit then moved by rail to the area north of the port town of Yangyang.
Here the 766th was augmented by a number of independent guerrilla units
including the 15th Guerrilla Unit, 27th Guerrilla Unit, Nam Don Ue Guerrilla
Unit, and the Namdo Guerrilla Unit. [10] These attachments expanded the
766th to six "battalions" with a personnel strength of approximately
1,200-1,500. [11]

The 766th and attached units had the mission of establishing beachheads
along the east coast in the rear of the ROKA in order to disrupt rear area
communications and defenses (e.g., destruction of railroad tracks at
crossings, bridges, tunnels, curves and switches, and the disruption of
telephone and telegraph service) and provide intelligence. When this initial
mission had been accomplished, and contact had been established with the
main body of the 5th Infantry Division, units of the 766th were assigned two
additional missions. First they were to function in the reconnaissance and
ranger roles to assist the advance of the 5th Infantry Divisions. Second,
elements were to infiltrate west and south through the mountains in the
general directions of Pusan and Taegu as an ordinary partisan force and join
other elements of the unit landed there.

Prior to its commitment the 766th and its attached units operated under the
direct control of the KPA's General Staff Department headquarters in
P'yongyang with which it maintained contact by radio. Available evidence
suggests that once the war began that the 1st and 2nd Battalions maintained
this subordination until the 766th was disbanded in mid-August. These two
battalions, however, also maintained close contact with the 5th Infantry
Division. The 3rd Battalion of the 766th was apparently subordinated to the
5th Infantry Division at the beginning of the war. Little is known
concerning the control of the various guerrilla units attached to the 766th.
It possibly mimicked that of the 1st and 2nd Battalions.

During June 23-26, the 1st and 2nd Battalions boarded small merchant ships
manned by the Korean People's Navy (KPN) and conducted at least two
amphibious landings in the ROK. The first landing area was near Nakp'ung-ni
(10 kilometers south of Kangnung). From here the force moved inland after
being attacked by ROKA units. This force subsequently moved north to support
the attack on Kangnung. The second landing area was immediately south of the
town of Chumunjin. Although there is some confusion over the operations of
the 3rd battalion during this time period, it boarded ships and set sail for
a landing in the Pusan area. [12]

The independent guerrilla units attached to the 766th had a more convoluted
experience. The Nam Don Ue Guerrilla Force arrived in the Yangyang area in
early June where it was combined with the 15th Guerrilla unit. On 21 June
the combined force of 400-500 personnel left the Yangyang area for the port
of Changjon (70 km north of Yangyang). Two days later, on 23 June, the force
boarded small ships for landings in the ROK. On 25 June the force landed at
Imwonjin (28 km north of Ulchin) and reorganized itself into two units. It
then proceeded southwest into the mountains towards Andong. The 27th
Guerrilla Unit arrived in the Wonsan area on 21 June. The following day it
boarded eight boats and sailed south to land at Mukko, near Kangnung. During
the next two weeks it proceeded south towards Ulchin, where it arrived on 5
July. The Namdo Guerrilla Unit was formed at Yangyang on or about 18 June.
On 23 June the unit consisting of approximately 200 troops moved north to
the port of Kosong. Here the unit was augmented by the addition of 400
troops. On, or about, 24 June the unit embarked on four diesel steamers and
landed in the Samch'ok area on the 25th. The unit proceeded south along the
coast arriving at Yonhae (14 km north of Yongdok) on 1 July. [13]

The seaborne phase of these operations were relatively crude. Elements
embarked upon small coastal freighters (some of which were lightly armed)
manned by the KPN. They then sail south under the cover of darkness,
sometimes with an escort of P-4 class motor torpedo boats from the 2nd Naval
Squadron based at Wonsan. Once they arrived at their destination the actual
amphibious landings were generally conducted in company sized units (80-120
troops each), using small power boats, fishing craft, etc. Apparently, some
troops even waded ashore or landed at fishing piers at small villages.

In general the amphibious landings of the 766th and attached units proceeded
smoothly and successfully. There was, however, one significant setback. On
the evening of the 25 June the ROKN submarine chaser Paektusan (PC-701),
under the command of Commander Nam Choi Yong, intercepted a KPN 1,000 ton
armed transport a short distance to the northeast of the port of Pusan. The
armed transport was carrying an estimated 600 troops of the 766th¹s 3rd
Battalion as well as ammunition and equipment. [14] After a running battle
the Paektusan sunk the armed transport. This was the first naval engagement
of the war and possibly one of the most far reaching. Since Pusan, already
Korea¹s largest port, would become the primary point of entry for supplies
and reinforcements to the ROK during the war. It was also essentially
defenseless since the majority of the ROKA¹s combat units were deployed
elsewhere. The mission of the 3rd Battalion was to interdict the port of
Pusan, prevent the landing of supplies and reinforcements, and prepare the
advance of the 5th Division and the remainder of the 766th. Had the 3rd
Battalion been successful, and the port of Pusan interdicted even for a
short period of time, the course of the conflict would have been
significantly different. [15]

At approximately 0500 hours on 25 June 1950, the 5th Division attacked
across the 38th Parallel down the main road that parallels the ROK's rugged
east coast. This attack was supported not only by the amphibious landings of
1st and 2nd Battalions of the 766th Independent Unit, but apparently with
ground operations by elements of the 766th. With the 766th leading, the 5th
Infantry Division crossed the 38th Parallel and entered Chumunjin, without
incident, shortly before noon on 25 June 1950. Continuing the drive south,
both units entered Kangnung on 26 June 1950, after an all-night battle. With
the 766th still leading the attack, both units continued south until they
reached the approaches to Samch'ok. Here the 766th was joined by elements
which had made an amphibious landing near the town. The reconstituted unit
then proceeded into the hills, from where the troops, after changing into
civilian clothes, infiltrated into Samch'ok, in order to gather
intelligence. The division entered Samch'ok on about 5 July 1950. On 9 July
1950, after a large-scale engagement which involved the 766th only, the
division and the 766th occupied Ulchin.

The 766th Unit, after undergoing a reorganization at Ulchin, infiltrated
small units westward into the mountains with the mission of cutting
communications between Pusan and Taegu, and P'ohang-dang. It continued to
operate as the spearhead for the 5th, and later 12th infantry Division, in
the P'ohang-dang area for 2 months of intensive and costly fighting. During
17-19 August 1950 both the 12th and the 766th, after having suffered serious
losses, were reorganized. During this reorganization, the 766th was
disbanded and its personnel absorbed by the 12th Division.

The view of these operations from the "other side of the fence" is
interesting. In his letter to Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the Soviet Armed
Forces General M.V. Zakharov, dated 26 June 1950, Soviet Ambassador to the
DPRK T.F. Shtykov states the following, [16]

"On the very first day the DPRK navy made two landings on the coast of
the Sea of Japan. The first landing party was in the Korio [Kangnung ?] area
and consisted of two battalions of naval infantry and around a thousand
partisans. The second landing group was in the region of Urutsyn [Ulchin]
and consisted of 600 partisans."

"The landings took place at 5 hours 25 minutes and were carried out
successfully."

"The group of partisans took the city of Urutsyn [Ulchin] and a number
of districts adjoining It."

"The landings were carried out with a battle between warships of the
People's Army and ships of the South Korean army. As a result of the battle
one Southern trawler was sunk and one was damaged. The DPRK fleet had no
losses.""


--------------------------

End Notes

8 "North Korean Guerrilla Operations," pp. 18-20; U.S. Army. "North
Korean 5th Infantry Division," GHQ, FEC, MIS, GS, Allied Translator and
Interpreter Section, Research Supplement, Interrogation Reports, Issue #96,
28 February 1951, pp. 37-45; U.S. Army 500th MISG. Full Translation of
Military History in Korea, Translation date 5 September 1952, p. 48; U.S.
Army. History of the North Korean Army, HQ, FEC, MIS, G2, 31 July 1952, pp.
80-83; U.S. Army. Handbook on the North Korean Armed Forces, DAPam 30-52, 11
July 1962, pp. 33-34; Enemy Tactics, p. 120; and Thompson, Royce L.
Intelligence Factors Underlying Operation Chromite of 15 September 1950,
U.S. Army OCMH, 30 January 1956, pp. 10-11.
9 Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, pp. 103-104. Some sources
indicate that O Chin-u was the commander of the 766th, while others state
that he was the commanding officer the 3rd Infantry Division. He may have
been both. "Choe Kwang's Biographic Data Detailed," Pukhan, July 1990, pp.
102-112, as cited in FBIS-EAS-90-187, 26 September 1990, pp. 37-42.
10 One source suggests that in mid-June 1950 the Hoeryong Cadres School
was ordered to concentrate its forces in the vicinity of Yangyang, and that
at the time of the war these forces were designated the 766th Unit. See:
Full Translation of Military History in Korea, p. 48.
11 U.S. Army. "Documentary Evidence of North Korean Aggression," Allied
Translator and Interpreter Section, Research Supplement, Interrogation
Reports, GHQ, FEC, MIS, GS, 30 October 1950, pp. 46-48.
12 Most intelligence reports indicate that 3rd Battalion supported the
5th Infantry Division's attack along the coast (see below). One
interrogation report suggests, however, that at least some elements of the
766th remained in the Yangyang area until 29 June and then departed by
truck.
13 "Documentary Evidence of North Korean Aggression," Allied Translator
and Interpreter Section, Research Supplement, Interrogation Reports, pp.
48-50.
14 "ROK Navy Operations Chief Interviewed," Wolgan Choson, January 1,
2000, pp. 499-507; and Field Jr., James A. History of United States Naval
Operations: Korea, GPO, 1962, p. 51. The figure of 600 troops appears to be
excessive. Regardless, the landing of any KPA troops in the Pusan area would
have had a significant effect upon the course of the war.
15 Ibid., The Paektusan was purchased for the ROK Navy with donations
from navy personnel and civilians. Since its retirement its mast has been on
display at the ROK Naval Academy.
16 See document No. 14 in, Weathersby, Kathryn. "New Russian Documents
on the Korean War," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues
6-7, Winter 1995/1996, pp. 30-84.

[2RHPZ]

20th Infantry Brigade

The origins of this brigade are obscure since there are no reports
concerning this unit until mid-1953. It is possible, however, that with the
reorganization of the mechanized artillery brigades in mid-1952, the KPA
activated this brigade. In August 1953 the 20th Brigade was attached to V
Corps, and deployed in the Ch¹ongjin area, with the mission of coastal
defense. During July-August 1955 the 20th Brigade underwent a major
reorganization and reequipment. By January 1956 V Corps had displaced
forward, and its place taken by II Corps/III Army Group. During this
redeployment the 20th Brigade remained behind and was attached to the II
Corps. It remained deployed within the Ch¹ongjin area and was responsible
for the defense of the coast from Songjin - USSR border. Its commander
during this period was Major General Kang Tae Mu.



21st Infantry Brigade

A reorganization of the 23rd Mechanized Artillery Brigade into an ordinary
infantry brigade in June 1952 resulted in the activation of the 21st
Brigade. By the end of 1952 this brigade was deployed on a defense mission
in the Hwanghae Province. It was composed of three infantry battalions, one
artillery battalion, and one transportation battalion. During
August-September 1955 the brigade underwent a major reorganization and
reequipment. By January 1956 the brigade was attached to IV Corps/II Army
Group and remained in Hwanghae Province. It was responsible for coastal
defense from Haeju - Changyon, with its HQ near Ongjin. During this period
it was commanded by Senior Colonel Tae Kil.



22nd Infantry Brigade

The origins of this brigade, also, are obscure since there are no reports
concerning this unit until mid-1953. It is possible, however, that with the
reorganization of the mechanized artillery brigades in mid-1952, the KPA
activated this brigade. In August 1953 the 22nd Brigade was attached to V
Corps and deployed along the eastern coast near Tanch'on. During
August-September 1955 the brigade underwent a major reorganization and
reequipment. By January 1956 the brigade had been redeployed forward and
attached to VII Corps/I Army Group. Where it was responsible for coastal
defense from Changyon - Songjin-ni, with its HQ at T¹ongch¹on. Its commander
during this period was Major General Cho Kwan.



23rd Infantry Brigade

This unit was established in August 1950 by redesignating the remnants of
the 956th Independent Naval Infantry Regiment as the 23rd (239th) Naval
Infantry Brigade at Chinnamp'o. At this time, battalions of the brigade were
sent to the Ongjin, Haeju, Kunsan, and Kwangju areas. Following the UNC
advance in September 1950, remnants of the brigade withdrew to North Korea
and began reorganizing and training in the Yongwon area northeast of
Tokch¹on.

In mid-December 1950 the brigade, still under strength and poorly equipped,
began moving south through Maengsan, Yangdok, Koksan, Singye, Sariwon, and
arrived in the Haeju area in mid-January 1951. Battalion elements of the
brigade then took up positions in the southwestern coastal areas of Hwanghae
Province from Chongdan south through Ongjin and east through Haeju to the
vicinity of Changyon. Here the brigade began preparing beach defenses, while
also training and adding personnel and equipment. In February 1951 the
brigade was placed under the command of VI Corps, which had then arrived in
the area.

In April 1951 the 23rd Brigade extended its zone of responsibility further
to the north to the vicinity of Ullyul. In late May 1951 the 36th
Division/VI Corps, which was located in the Haeju area, was inactivated and
the 63rd Regiment of the division was integrated into the brigade. At this
time, the brigade was apparently redesignated a division, at least for a
short period.

When VI Corps displaced to the east in August 1951, the brigade remained
behind and was attached to I Corps which had assumed responsibility for the
area. Then in late November 1951 when I Corps also moved east, the brigade
again remained in the area and was subordinated IV Corps which, although
located north of the Taedong River, was now apparently also responsible for
the southwest coast of Hwanghae Province.

Although the brigade may have been redesignated a division in May of 1951,
it was again redesignated as a brigade and underwent some reorganization
during the summer of 1951. At this time the brigade was commanded by Major
General Oh Pack Yong, former commander of 8th Division. Although the brigade
was redesignated as the 23rd Mechanized Artillery Brigade in October 1951,
it retained its mission of coastal defense. The brigade was extremely active
during October 1951-March 1952, in the KPA west coast "island hopping
campaign."

This "island hopping campaign" consisted of a number of amphibious and
shore-to-shore (i.e. movement across the mud flats at low tide) assaults on
west coast islands held by UNC forces. The first major assault came on 9
October, when approximately 600 troops conducted an amphibious assault on
the Korea Bay island of Sinmi Do, using sampans and other small craft. This
initial assault force was later reinforced by troops arriving across the mud
flats. As a result of these actions, the island was evacuated by UNC forces
three days later, on 12 October. On the evening of 6 November, KPA units
attacked and capture the small islands of Ka-do and Tan-do by amphibious
assault. These islands were subsequently employed to provide artillery
support and 'jump-off' points for the successful 30 November amphibious
assault on the island of Taehwa-do. These actions were accompanied by
further shore-to-shore assaults which seized six small coastal islands in
Haeju Man. In mid-December, between the 16th and 18th, a force of 600
troops, believed to be from the 23rd, assaulted and captured two small
islands inboard of Sok To Island, at the mouth of the Tae-dong River.
Following this last assault UNC naval forces made a concerted effort to
prevent any other such occurrences, and as a result of these efforts there
were no further assaults for several months. During March 1952 the 23rd
attempted a number of assaults across the mud flats of Haeju Man against
Yongmae Do. All these raids, however, were unsuccessful due to overwhelming
UNC naval firepower. With the failure of these assaults, the west coast
"island hopping campaign" came to a close and the 23rd concerned itself
primarily with coastal defense, and only occasionally conducted small island
raids. [1]

In June 1952 it was redesignated once again as the 23rd Brigade after
supplying organic elements to the newly formed 21st Brigade. It continued in
its coastal defense mission of southwest Hwanghae Province at least until
the end of August 1953. However, by January 1956, it had been displaced by
the 26th Brigade, and was redeployed further south. It was now attached to I
Corps/II Army Group, and was responsible for coastal defense from Yesong
River - Haeju. Its headquarters was located near Haeju, and its commander
during this period was Senior Colonel Choe Hyck (1956).


24th Infantry Brigade

The 24th Naval Infantry Brigade (a.k.a., 249th) was organized at Wonsan in
August 1950, simultaneously with the organization of the 23rd Naval Infantry
Brigade at Chinnamp'o. At this time elements of units subordinate to the
Naval Headquarters (a.k.a., 599th Unit) at Wonsan, including the 945th
Regiment (which had participated in the KPA amphibious landings on the east
coast), were integrated into this newly constituted unit.

The mission of the brigade was to defend the Wonsan area. The brigade,
however, was quickly dispersed upon the arrival of elements of the I ROK
Corps in the area in early October 1950. The brigade then withdrew northward
with elements being scattered in two directions. The majority of the brigade
elements withdrew due north from Hamhung towards Kanggye, while the
remainder withdrew to the north east up the coast towards Nanam and also to
Hyesanjin. Following the evacuation of UNC units from northeastern Korea the
brigade was able to consolidate its forces with stragglers and remnants of
other units and was redesignated as the 24th Division under the IV Corps. It
now moved towards the Hungnam Perimeter. Following the UNC evacuation of the
Hungnam area the division proceeded to the Wonsan area where it again took
up coastal defense positions. In February 1951 the division was placed under
VII Corps which had then arrived in the area.

During 1951 the 24th Division under the command of Major General Chae Mun
Chol remained in the Wonsan area. Here it was deployed from the vicinity of
Kojo north to Hodo Peninsula; and while receiving additional equipment and
personnel, prepared defenses against possible UNC amphibious landings. In
June 1951 the 24th Division added a tank battalion from the 105th Tank
Division to its three infantry regiments. Then in October 1951, the 24th
Division was again reorganized as a brigade and redesignated as the 24th
Mechanized Artillery Brigade. It remained, however, a coastal defense unit
with the only mechanized unit of the brigade being the tank battalion. By
mid-1952 the brigade was organized with six motorized artillery battalions
and two battalions of infantry.

During January 1956 the brigade, under the command of Senior Colonel Kim
Song Kuk, continued to defend the coast in the Wonsan area, from Songjon-ni
- Kowon, with its headquarters at Wonsan. At this time it was attached to II
Corps/III Army Group which had displaced VII Corps.

It is one of the forerunners of the present day mechanized corps.



25th Infantry Brigade

The origins of this brigade are obscure since there are no reports emanating
directly from the unit. A 25th Coastal Defense Brigade, however, was
activated at Chinnamp'o in July 1950 and was subsequently organized in the
Ch¹orwon area during August and September 1950. The brigade was initially
committed in the Seoul area during September but was forced to withdraw
before the UNC advance. The brigade was last in contact with UNC forces in
October 1950 in the Northeast sector of the DPRK. After which the brigade
was believed to have been inactivated. In 1952, however, reliable reports
placed the brigade in the area formerly occupied by the 63rd (507th) Brigade
from Hodo Peninsula on the east coast, north to the vicinity of Hungnam. It
was reorganized as a mechanized artillery brigade in October 1951, similarly
to the 24th and 26th Mechanized Artillery Brigades. In August 1953 the
brigade was attached to the V Corps and under the command of Kim Yo Man. It
was deployed in the area south of Hungnam and around Yonp'o in the coastal
defense mission.

As of January 1956 the brigade, under the command of Major General Chang
Pom, continued to defend the coast in the Hamhung area. It was now, however,
attached to the II Corps/III Army Group which had replaced VII Corps and was
responsible for the extremely long coastline from Kown - Songjin.



26th Infantry Brigade

The 26th Brigade was organized during August 1950 at Namch'onjom. In
September 1950 the brigade moved south but was met by superior UNC forces
and was forced to withdraw to the Yalu River border region. Here remnants of
the brigade and the 571st Regiment were combined with other replacement
troops in order to reconstitute the brigade. In early December 1950 the
brigade departed from the Manpojin area and proceeded south behind the
advancing Chinese Communist Forces. By the end of December 1950 the brigade
had reached the P'yongyang area and began to take up coastal defense
positions west and southwest of P'yongyang. By mid-January 1951 the brigade
was subordinated to IV Corps and its headquarters was located in the
vicinity of P'yongyang.

In October 1951 the brigade was reorganized as the 26th Mechanized Artillery
Brigade together with the 24th and 25th Mechanized Artillery Brigades. The
brigade¹s mission remained coastal defense and it was responsible for the
area from Chinnamp'o north to Hanch¹on. The brigade, under the command of
Song In Sop, continued to hold these positions until at least August 1953.
By January 1956, however, the brigade was moved south displacing the 23rd
Brigade and became responsible for the defense of the area from Changyon -
Sinch'on - Chaeryong (west of the Chaeryong River). Its commander during
this period was Senior Colonel Ho.


Endnotes

1 Field Jr., James A. History of United States Naval Operations: Korea,
GPO, 1962, pp. 423-426, & 432.