2RHPZ
04-19-2005, 05:27 AM
Was Japan a Mahanian Sea Power in WWII ?
by MAJ Andrew Teo
When Japan emerged from its feudal isolation to join the comity of nations in 1868, its influence had counted for nought. However, in less than 30 years, Japan had defeated China1 to become the leading Asian nation. A decade later, Japan had defeated Russia2 to become a world power. By 1922, the Japanese empire had included Taiwan, Korea, southern Manchuria and southern Sakhalin, island territories in Micronesia, and numerous concessions along China's coasts and rivers.
Fuelled by imperialistic ambitions, the expanding Japanese empire threatened to engulf China and the western colonial territories in Southeast Asia; which in 1941, ultimately brought Japan into collision with the West. In the seventy-three years since she discarded her agrarian feudal past, Japan had risen to confront the United States, the foremost industrial power in the world; culminating in the Pacific War of WWII and the subsequent annihilation of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) by the US Navy.
This paper looks at Japan's role as a sea power in WWII and more specifically evaluates Japan against Mahan's concept of sea power.
Mahan's theory of Sea Power
Before Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1600 1783 3 was published in 1890, war at sea was perceived to be "merely a situation in which great numbers of men or of ships fought one another" 4. The perception that war at sea was a political act, whose occurrence, shape and rhythm should be determined by national policy was almost unheard of. It was Mahan who first introduced the idea that war at sea was always part of a broader conflict of purpose and ideas; and fighting is merely an instrument to achieve a particular purpose.
Mahan's theory that control of the sea insured control of the land was subsequently verified by the results of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), the Spanish-American War (1898), and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). Thereafter, leading navies of the world based their strategy and for many years, their tactics on the doctrines of Mahan, while the statesmen of Japan and much of Europe accepted his evaluation of sea power.5
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History is about a hierarchy of three different but interrelated concepts, explained and illustrated using history. At the top of the Mahanian hierarchy is the concept of sea power. Sea power consists of a series of interlocking factors, which includes the size and strength of the naval fleet, and the combined size of a country's commercial and naval resources. Possession of a powerful navy allows a country to acquire colonies and overseas possessions, which in turn strengthens and expands its commerce, generating more wealth; which consequently increases its strength and capacity. Six critical elements make a country into a sea power : geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, population, national character and character of government. Using the historical example of Britain, Mahan concluded that being a great power meant being a sea power and that sea power meant commercial and naval strength.
Next in importance to sea power is naval power, which Mahan defines as fighting power at sea. Three vital factors form the basis of naval power : position, bases and the fleet. The country possessing superior naval power will be able to exercise command of the sea, which Mahan defines as "the possession of that overpowering power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which by controlling the great common, closes the highway by which commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores."
The final element of Mahanian hierarchy is naval strategy, which determines how naval power must be used in order to achieve the goal of command of the sea. Mahan proposed that battle was the central act of war at sea and "the enemy's ships and fleets are the true objects to be assailed on all occasions". The fleet is an offensive weapon and "War, once declared, must be waged offensively, aggressively. The enemy must not be fended off, but smitten down." Mahan's naval strategy could thus be reduced to a matter of fighting a single cataclysmic and decisive battle in which the victor would be conferred command of the sea.
However, Mahan qualified that in the absence of a decisive battle, an opponent could still be defeated by exhaustion and strangulation through commerce destruction. Mahan believed that the fundamental aim of naval strategy was the destruction of commerce to break the enemy's economic strength and deprive him of his power to continue resistance; navies should deprive their enemy of commerce through blockade and the capture of commerce. Ironically, Mahan was critical of commerce raiding as he did not believe that the destruction of individual ships of convoys was decisive enough to constitute a threat to the economic power of a nation.
The final principle of Mahanian strategy was concentration, which was essential if the mass of one's own fleet was to be directed against fractions of the enemy's at the decisive point. Concentration results from the interplay of two factors : Geography and decisions. Geography might confer a natural advantage or disadvantage in the deployment and concentration of own forces; while decisions involve making the necessary hard choices in both the tactical and strategic dimensions on a scale of defensive and offensive priorities.6
Link (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2001/Vol27_4/7.htm)
by MAJ Andrew Teo
When Japan emerged from its feudal isolation to join the comity of nations in 1868, its influence had counted for nought. However, in less than 30 years, Japan had defeated China1 to become the leading Asian nation. A decade later, Japan had defeated Russia2 to become a world power. By 1922, the Japanese empire had included Taiwan, Korea, southern Manchuria and southern Sakhalin, island territories in Micronesia, and numerous concessions along China's coasts and rivers.
Fuelled by imperialistic ambitions, the expanding Japanese empire threatened to engulf China and the western colonial territories in Southeast Asia; which in 1941, ultimately brought Japan into collision with the West. In the seventy-three years since she discarded her agrarian feudal past, Japan had risen to confront the United States, the foremost industrial power in the world; culminating in the Pacific War of WWII and the subsequent annihilation of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) by the US Navy.
This paper looks at Japan's role as a sea power in WWII and more specifically evaluates Japan against Mahan's concept of sea power.
Mahan's theory of Sea Power
Before Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1600 1783 3 was published in 1890, war at sea was perceived to be "merely a situation in which great numbers of men or of ships fought one another" 4. The perception that war at sea was a political act, whose occurrence, shape and rhythm should be determined by national policy was almost unheard of. It was Mahan who first introduced the idea that war at sea was always part of a broader conflict of purpose and ideas; and fighting is merely an instrument to achieve a particular purpose.
Mahan's theory that control of the sea insured control of the land was subsequently verified by the results of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), the Spanish-American War (1898), and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). Thereafter, leading navies of the world based their strategy and for many years, their tactics on the doctrines of Mahan, while the statesmen of Japan and much of Europe accepted his evaluation of sea power.5
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History is about a hierarchy of three different but interrelated concepts, explained and illustrated using history. At the top of the Mahanian hierarchy is the concept of sea power. Sea power consists of a series of interlocking factors, which includes the size and strength of the naval fleet, and the combined size of a country's commercial and naval resources. Possession of a powerful navy allows a country to acquire colonies and overseas possessions, which in turn strengthens and expands its commerce, generating more wealth; which consequently increases its strength and capacity. Six critical elements make a country into a sea power : geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, population, national character and character of government. Using the historical example of Britain, Mahan concluded that being a great power meant being a sea power and that sea power meant commercial and naval strength.
Next in importance to sea power is naval power, which Mahan defines as fighting power at sea. Three vital factors form the basis of naval power : position, bases and the fleet. The country possessing superior naval power will be able to exercise command of the sea, which Mahan defines as "the possession of that overpowering power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which by controlling the great common, closes the highway by which commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores."
The final element of Mahanian hierarchy is naval strategy, which determines how naval power must be used in order to achieve the goal of command of the sea. Mahan proposed that battle was the central act of war at sea and "the enemy's ships and fleets are the true objects to be assailed on all occasions". The fleet is an offensive weapon and "War, once declared, must be waged offensively, aggressively. The enemy must not be fended off, but smitten down." Mahan's naval strategy could thus be reduced to a matter of fighting a single cataclysmic and decisive battle in which the victor would be conferred command of the sea.
However, Mahan qualified that in the absence of a decisive battle, an opponent could still be defeated by exhaustion and strangulation through commerce destruction. Mahan believed that the fundamental aim of naval strategy was the destruction of commerce to break the enemy's economic strength and deprive him of his power to continue resistance; navies should deprive their enemy of commerce through blockade and the capture of commerce. Ironically, Mahan was critical of commerce raiding as he did not believe that the destruction of individual ships of convoys was decisive enough to constitute a threat to the economic power of a nation.
The final principle of Mahanian strategy was concentration, which was essential if the mass of one's own fleet was to be directed against fractions of the enemy's at the decisive point. Concentration results from the interplay of two factors : Geography and decisions. Geography might confer a natural advantage or disadvantage in the deployment and concentration of own forces; while decisions involve making the necessary hard choices in both the tactical and strategic dimensions on a scale of defensive and offensive priorities.6
Link (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2001/Vol27_4/7.htm)