Evaluating Iraq

[ogukuo72]

It's probably too near to the conflict for us to give a historical assessment of the Iraq War, but - hey! - I love to stick my neck out, so here goes:

The recent troubles in Iraq has disguised the fact that the US Armed Forces has waged one of the most amazing military campaigns in history. Even given absolute air and armoured superiority, the speed of the campaign and the low casualty rate was truly amazing. It was even more amazing than the Kuwaiti campaign, as the geographical area and terrain complexity was more difficult, and the political objective (nothing less than the conquest of an entire country and the over-throw of an entire regime) much more ambitious. And everything was achieved in 21 days.

The insurgency problem should be treated seperately, but I'll just like to say that it comes down to poor planning based on mistaken assumptions, which has nothing to do with how the war itself was fought.

The Iraqi campaign is the first true manifestation of Liddell Hart's Indirect Approach in the 21st centur. Not even Hart will have envisaged the way it was done. Information from many sources, including UAVs and JSTAR, were almost instanteously accessible to HQ via secure digital links. This rapid access to up-to-date intelligence is combined with the philosophy of Indirect Approach, to channel armoured columns rapidly down lightly defended areas, by-passing heavy enemy concentrations. By the time the enemy could react, they have no choice but to withdraw or be cut-off.

Air support and artillery were linked into this information network, which allowed them to rapidly provide support to the armoured columns, sometimes playing the role of flank guards - roles traditionally played by light calvary units. This is truly revoluntionary. This means that a broad-front approach is no longer necessary.

The 24/7 air recon coverage of the flanks together with rapid download of data allows coalition units to redeploy rapidly against developing threats - which would probably have been broken up by artillery and air strikes which would in turn use the same rapid access to data. Without such support, it will be suicidal for any army to advance using such columns without flank protection by other ground units.

And not since Sherman's march to the sea had a war being fought with such a reliance on dislocating the enemy's ability to respond. The enemy never constituted a threat as they could never concentrate in sufficient strength anywhere to threaten the columns. The columns were simply too mobile and too well-informed, with sufficient self-contained capabilities, to be trapped and destroyed.

The seeming inability of the Iraqis to stop the columns created a powerful dislocating effect throughout the whole Iraqi Army and government. Army units had to constantly retreat without fighting because the Americans had gotten behind them. They become demoralised and fearful, such that when they do meet American units, the battle was concluded swiftly against their favour. The rapid advances and seeming unstoppability of the columns also created fear and panic in the Iraqi high command.

And don't forget that the C3I structures were taken rapidly out by the Coalition in the first few days, leading to information black-out and communication cut-off, which combined with the dislocating effect of the columns, create virtual paralysis amongst Iraqi ground units and high command.

In many ways, it was a perfect campaign. As for the chaotic aftermath and the insurgency problem ... that's another story.

[Royal]

Fair enough to separate the two phases, but I have some big promlems with your contention.

1. Real time Int was not coming down to the Battle Groups on the ground in time for them to make timely and accurate decisions - to break the enemys OODA loop (to use the staff jargon).

2. Iraqi units were not constantly retreating (they had neither the fuel, nor the option of manouvre with Allied air superiority). They were either destroyed in-situ or simply took off their uniforms and melted away into the civilian population.

3. There is nothing revolutionary about the concept of flank guards (either with or without 'cavalry' units. They were always a part of Soviet doctrine and are nothing new in Western doctrine, both the Western Allies and the Germans used them in North Africa and elsewhere in WWII. Our use of them was patchy at best, as can be seen in the casualty figures in A2 Echelon formations (Pte Lynch's unit being a prime example).

4. Conventional C3I structures were generally destroyed in the early stages, but the Ba'athists had learned well from the Serbs and used civilian radio and TV and especially mobile phone networks as C3 assets.

It was a much better example of Guderian's concept of Blitzkrieg.

Oh, and by the way, you may not have noticed while watching Fox, but the British, Australains and Poles were there too :cantbeli:

[marktigger]

the Americans also made the school boy error of out pacing their logistic chain and hadn't the spare capicity to transport stores forward.

Yes there are alot of lessons to be learned espically for UKPLC the comons report on the logistic operation bares no relation to what I saw. Just in time supply doesn't. Carrying bare minimums of stores and spares is a recepie for disaster. Accurate accounting for what is in theatre takes time to establish. Operations of that nature need time to build up to get correct equipment into place and envromental protesters should not be allowed to dictate the speed of deployment.
Basic essential equipment should never have to be bought on SOR it should be in service already.

[ibstolidude]

1. Real time Int was notcoming down to the Battle Groups on the ground in time for them to make timely and accurate decisions - took break the enemys OODA loop (to use the staff jargon).
- interesting assesment....I just gave a brief about what one may percieve as a lack of US ability to utilize strategic IO/PSYOP/CMO to 'shape' the Observations of the enemy and as a result in many cases did not disrupt/influence their OODA Loop at an early enough stage.

[ogukuo72]

Like I said, I liked to stick my neck out. :oops: It gets chopped off quite promptly!

I acknowledge the points that have been raised by Royal. What I wrote above is a draft for a paper I intend to write for a local military journal. Obviously there's still a lot of research to be done.

Just to defend myself a bit, I'm not saying that the system worked perfectly. There will be many instances of screw-ups - e.g. friendly fire, convoys taking the wrong road, civilians getting hit, etc.. But overall, I think I can still stick to my point about the nature of the campaign. It's a very good example of how a third wave campaign is to be fought. (BTW, Alvin Toffler's War and Anti-War is an excellent book - a must read for those into Revolution in Military Affairs.)

And I still think my point about how the armoured columns could afford to leave their flanks empty is a valid one.

Mark.Trigger raised an excellent point. While the way the advanced elements fought was indeed revolutionary, logistical arrangements has yet to catch up, leading to the pause in operational tempo around the second week.

[Royal]

Like I said, I liked to stick my neck out. :oops: It gets chopped off quite promptly!

Sorry :D


And I still think my point about how the armoured columns could afford to leave their flanks empty is a valid one.


Mark.Trigger raised an excellent point. While the way the advanced elements fought was indeed revolutionary, logistical arrangements has yet to catch up, leading to the pause in operational tempo around the second week.

To me (as a non-logistician) your comments above contradict themselves. Any unit, but an armoured one in particular, is only as good as it's logistic supply (especially after first contact with the enemy).

An armoured formation by it's very nature provides it's own flank and rear security, but after that inital period of combat it becomes increasingly combat ineffective without logistic support. Flank protection for the logistic 'tail' then becomes a priority or tempo is lost because the formations integral DOS reduce and the G4 element is attrited.

****, I almost sound like a proper staff officer :oops:

[Va_Dinger]

I certianly would not consider it a "masterpiece" of generalship. This was no Napolean at Jena, Robert E. Lee at Fredricksburg, or Manstien at Kharkov. It was just the most high tech military in the world taking on a ragged third world military. Poor or nonexistant training, Pityfull morale, aged and poorly mantained equipment and last but not least corrupt+appaling officer leadership from the top all the way to be bottom means a very unequal fight.

[hank]

I got to go with Va_Dinger on this. Ogukuo72 makes a lot of good points about the things that the US plan tried and/or wanted to accomplish and Royal makes a lot of good points about things that went wrong. What made everyhing go so fast was that the Iraqis have no centralized command control and simply can't coordinate efforts (for many reasons - some b/c of us and some b/c of them).

Wasn't it Schwarzkopf (maybe he was quoting someone) who said professional soldiers worry about logistics and amateurs worry about strategy?

All in all, gotta take your hat off to the British, US, Aussies, and Poles! :D

hank

[martinexsquaddie]

those enviromental protestors should have been dealt with harshly oh sorry the attack dog i was holding slipped its leash it was an accident :lol:
The real problem was Blair could have go the troops moving before but delayed for political reasons

[ßå$tĮТHÏ¿ð]

Personally I think its too early to start picking apart Iraq gulf war 2 (if you will) just yet, theres many things we dont know about that will be revealed in all due time (once the situation is more stable).

[Mr. Nielsen]

The recent troubles in Iraq has disguised the fact that the US Armed Forces has waged one of the most amazing military campaigns in history.

I suppose what happended in Iraq was what was expected. I guess the victory in the first Gulf war was at the time perceived as a much more spectacular victory. At that time large casualties was feared and it wasn't really known for sure how good western technology and training would work. After a decade of back breaking sanctions I guess nonone would have expected the Iraqis to be a match for the US and british army.

If I was to point out a truely amazing military campaign in history. It would be the germans overunning both the british and french in 1940.

[NcDeuce]

If I was to point out a truely amazing military campaign in history. It would be the germans overunning both the british and french in 1940.

rofl

You just said that a campaign overrunning the French was an amazing event in history. Sorry, it was inevitable.

Yes, Rommel kicked major ass in 1940. France and Britain made the mistake of dispersing their numerically superior tanks throughout their sector of defense (something they continued to do through North Africa) while Germany massed its resources. Together with a super efficient supply system, the Germans conquered.

End of story...well until the Americans showed up.

;)

[Haiw]

Rommel kicked ass in 1940? No offence, but his role in 1940 was a rather small one...

[fantassin]

He was in command of the 7 th Panzer Division...

As for OIF, a quote from a british officer found in the "Jane's Defence Weekly"

"It helps fighting a completely incompetent enemy"

eg, the bridges into Bagdad left intact....

[wreck]

If I was to point out a truely amazing military campaign in history. It would be the germans overunning both the british and french in 1940.
End of story...well until the Americans showed up.

;)
The US was needed to stop the Russians from taking over the entire europe. If there would not have been the east front, Allies would have been chewed into little pieces in the west front.


The invasion of western Europe was not necessary to defeat Germany. It was absolutely necessary to control the USSR. They had already defeated the German army in the east and were steadily advancing on Berlin. They would have conquered Germany in another 18 months by themselves. However, they would not have stopped there. The invasion was necessary to insure they went no further than Berlin.

[Haiw]

He was in command of the 7 th Panzer Division...

As for OIF, a quote from a british officer found in the "Jane's Defence Weekly"

"It helps fighting a completely incompetent enemy"

eg, the bridges into Bagdad left intact....
I know he commanded a Panzer division in France, but still his role was rather minor, and he had hardly anything to do with the whole planning of the invasion.

[NcDeuce]

He was a division commander opposed to being in the German High Command. But last time I checked, you do a lot of planning as a division commander.

His success earned him a promotion to Lieutenant General and command of the Afrika Korps.

[James]

It was even more amazing than the Kuwaiti campaign, as the geographical area and terrain complexity was more difficult, and the political objective (nothing less than the conquest of an entire country and the over-throw of an entire regime) much more ambitious. And everything was achieved in 21 days.

The insurgency problem should be treated seperately, but I'll just like to say that it comes down to poor planning based on mistaken assumptions, which has nothing to do with how the war itself was fought.

In many ways, it was a perfect campaign. As for the chaotic aftermath and the insurgency problem ... that's another story.

A couple of things...

Maybe you should come up with an alternative to "the conquest of an entire country..." That doesn't sound so good.

I disagree with your assertion that the insurgency should be treated seperately - I think the war is still going on in many ways. What were the coalition's objectives? WMD - still looking for those. Regime change - we got rid of The Baath party and Mr. Hussein last April, but the U.S. (and to a far less extent our allies) have been occupiers since then. There is no new government operating yet. Liberation? Probably so, but it's hard for me to convince myself of that when the liberators are routinely targeted for attack by the liberated. Granted, the vast majority of Iraqis are probably happy with the status quo, but, in my mind, the war has not yet ended, and will not end until Iraq has a stable, functioning government of its own, the insurgency is dealt with by the Iraqis, and the coalition forces in Iraq have come home. Operation Iraqi Freedom started with a bang, but there's a lot of work yet to be done. I think defeating the Iraqi army and occupying the country in 21 days was the easy part.

Anyway...

[NcDeuce]

It's a high-profile reconstruction. I wish most of the media would get the **** out.

[Haiw]

He was a division commander opposed to being in the German High Command. But last time I checked, you do a lot of planning as a division commander.

His success earned him a promotion to Lieutenant General and command of the Afrika Korps.
I know, but still his 'role' in the whole campaign was rather minor from a historic perspective; the wole pre-invasion planning was done by other people, and basically he was just following the routes people had plotted out for him far up.