pinkeye
12-16-2003, 05:26 PM
interesting article, posted on the center for defense information website (www.cdi.org):
http://www.cdi.org/blair/intelligence.cfm
here is the conclusion for the lazy members:
This perspective on the intelligence process leads to an exonerating statement and a cautionary note. The exonerating point is that people who clung to their belief that Iraq possessed mass-destruction weapons in spite of the inability of intelligence efforts and inspectors to find them during the run up to the 2003 invasion, and even people who still believe today that mass-destruction weapons remain hidden in Iraq, have had a strong ally in logical reasoning for a lengthy period of time. A case can be made that their view has been intellectually the most coherent and consistent view of the threat. However, logical minds open to fresh intelligence reports should by now harbor serious doubt. The facts on the ground are speaking loudly for themselves in challenging the presumption used to justify the war with Iraq.
The cautionary note is that Bayesian math points to a fairly slow learning curve that also challenges the wisdom of making preemption a cornerstone of U.S. security strategy. The intelligence burden of this strategy is generally very heavy, too heavy for any leader to consistently shoulder. In all likelihood, a prudent interpretation of intelligence would fail to clarify the actual threat, the appropriate targets, and other contours of a preemptive strike. The strategy is not a feasible or sensible approach to U.S. national security.
http://www.cdi.org/blair/intelligence.cfm
here is the conclusion for the lazy members:
This perspective on the intelligence process leads to an exonerating statement and a cautionary note. The exonerating point is that people who clung to their belief that Iraq possessed mass-destruction weapons in spite of the inability of intelligence efforts and inspectors to find them during the run up to the 2003 invasion, and even people who still believe today that mass-destruction weapons remain hidden in Iraq, have had a strong ally in logical reasoning for a lengthy period of time. A case can be made that their view has been intellectually the most coherent and consistent view of the threat. However, logical minds open to fresh intelligence reports should by now harbor serious doubt. The facts on the ground are speaking loudly for themselves in challenging the presumption used to justify the war with Iraq.
The cautionary note is that Bayesian math points to a fairly slow learning curve that also challenges the wisdom of making preemption a cornerstone of U.S. security strategy. The intelligence burden of this strategy is generally very heavy, too heavy for any leader to consistently shoulder. In all likelihood, a prudent interpretation of intelligence would fail to clarify the actual threat, the appropriate targets, and other contours of a preemptive strike. The strategy is not a feasible or sensible approach to U.S. national security.