A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism

[Oddball]

A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism

Edited by Adam Garfinkle

Why winning the war on terrorism requires more than military might

The military side of the war on terrorism, says Adam Garfinkle, is a necessary but not sufficient aspect of the solution. Weapons of mass destruction are activated by ideas of mass destruction, and these ideas arise from complex historical and social factors. A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism offers concrete steps for undermining the very notion that terrorism is a legitimate method of political struggle—and for changing the conditions that lead people to embrace it.

Adam Garfinkle and his expert contributors—all intimately familiar with Middle Eastern social settings and political cultures—examine the diplomatic, educational, and religious aspects of the problem. They show how we can—and must—stigmatize the idea of murdering civilians for any political cause, identify and stop the flow of money and other resources to those who carry out terrorism, refute the distortions of U.S. motivations that are promulgated by Islamic propagandists, and work patiently at social, economic, and political reform in Muslim countries.

Adam Garfinkle has written widely on U.S. foreign policy and Middle Eastern subjects. A research fellow at the Hoover Institution during 2003, Dr. Garfinkle has served as editor of The National Interest and as a staff member of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission). He has taught U.S. foreign policy and Middle East politics at the University of Pennsylvania and at the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University.

Contributors: Lisa Anderson, Stephen Philip Cohen, Michele Durocher Dunne, Dale F. Eickelman, Graham E. Fuller, Adam Garfinkle, F. Gregory Gause III, HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal, M. A. Muqtedar Khan, Martin Kramer, Daoud Kuttab, Ellen Laipson, Olivier Roy, William A. Rugh, Robert Satloff, Amir Taheri

http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/books/fulltext/practical/cover.gif (http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/books/practical.html)

[Galileo]

War on terrorism is not only fight against "islamic", this book is a bit oriented on middle east terrorism, not a word on "pseduo independentist group" in europe (IRA, ETA, FLNC, ....) or in south america, these wars ar fought since 40-30 years by most european country and have more expeirence than american.

[NicNZ]

...refute the distortions of U.S. motivations that are promulgated by Islamic propagandists, and work patiently at social, economic, and political reform in Muslim countries.

:roll: The incredible cure for terrorism: blame them, change them, make them like us.

[roland]

looks clever.
I just hope the US right is not going to say they discovered that while it is what we European are telling them for years :roll:
Anyway, finally, as long as they see the light, who care.

I found this section specially interesting (to be fair didn't really read the other sections)
http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/books/fulltext/practical/77.pdf


Counterterrorism in Europe

Hoover Press : Garfinkle/Terrorism DP0 HGARWT0700 rev1
Olivier Roy

Whatever the differences among the European countries,
including their appraisal of U.S. policy, EU members share
many elements in common.
First, all European governments are reluctant to drastically
alter their legal systems and basic political approaches to terrorism.
The reason is that the issue of homeland security was
raised and essentially settled a long time ago due to a more
“indigenous” terrorism (ETA, IRA, Baader-Meinhof, Action
Directe, Brigadi Rossi, and so on). In this sense, the Europeans
have a more seasoned and experienced counterterrorism
homeland apparatus than do the Americans. In countries
where the “Islamic” threat had been identified at least a
decade ago (as in France), the security apparatus is rather effi-
cient. The recent crisis has engendered greater cooperation
among the different countries, as well as with the United
States, in most cases. But this cooperation has not led to the
importation of political differences among governments into
the security function, partly because procedures are institutionalized
and partly because this is not a new concern. This
has remained much the case even after the March 2004 train
bombings in Madrid.
Second, as far as European countries are concerned,
the fight against terrorism is a matter of police and intelligence,
not military action. These tools are efficient to the
extent that transnational cooperation works. In this sense, the
new terrorist threat has accelerated a trend already in existence.
The growing isolation of Islamic radicals in Europe should
allow the Europeans to continue with this “soft” approach:
police and intelligence services are efficient and will probably
be sufficient tools of counterterrorism for Europe. However,
such a policy will never totally eradicate terrorism. The European
tradition of terrorism and political violence that has
forged the experience of the counterterrorist institutions
makes it easier for young activists to become violent. Put a
little differently, the stigma attached to doing such violent
things is relatively weaker. Young guys who want to become
radical and seek out some sort of spectacular action to validate
their confused and injured manhood will not be stopped by
this soft approach. Even concentrating on root causes—on the
sociology and motivations of the radicals—while important for
understanding the radicals’ mode of recruitment, will be of little
use in drying up the ground on which these radicals prosper.
The aim of European policy is not eradication; it is making
terrorism a residual factor that can be lived with.
Such a “soft” approach is sustainable in Europe only under
one condition: that Islamic radicalism remains a fringe movement.
The real danger is in Islamic radicalism enlarging its
social base or connecting with other potentially radical movements
or governments. The challenge is not to go at the roots
of terrorism, as European government spokespeople never tire
of saying, for that is well-nigh impossible and will not eradicate
terrorism in any case. The challenge is to prevent the radical
fringe from finding a broad political base among the local
Muslim population.
To regain their momentum and create that base, Euro-
Islamic radicals will have to achieve two strategic goals: mobilize
other Muslims and link up with non-Muslim radicals.
Eventually, Euro-Islamic leaders will try to mobilize a suf-
ficient part of the Muslim community to provide shelter, logistics,
recruits, reliable communications, and so on. To do that,
the activists will have to change their patterns of recruitment,
which are currently based on spotting some individuals and
taking them out of their social milieu. They will have to
engage in a more collective dawa (“proselytizing”), which
would put them on the same path as many nonpolitical conservative
and even fundamentalist organizations (like the
Tabligh or the Salafis). Interestingly enough, many radical
groups (like the London-based Hizb ul-Tahrir) share the views
of al Qaeda but think the latter has been premature to launch
jihad. They believe that one should first mobilize the Muslim
community through intensive proselytizing and political
activity.
Eventually, too, Islamist leaders will probably try to establish
some sort of joint venture with the remnants of the European
extreme Left who share the same hatred for
“imperialism.” Converts may play a particularly significant
role here. Let us not forget that Carlos the Jackal himself converted
to Islam in jail and is now praising Osama bin Laden to
the hilt.
Pushing for a “Western” Islam
The key issue is thus the attitude of the Muslim population in
Europe toward radicalism and terrorism. And for three main
reasons, the Muslim population in Europe is a far larger political
stake, and plays a far greater political role, than the Muslim
population in the United States.
First, unlike the United States, Muslim migrants are the
main source of immigration in Europe. Second, that migration
originates from the close neighboring southern countries.
Legal immigration to the United States is far more diverse in
its origins. Third, that migration has created the bulk of the
underclass and jobless youth. (In the United States, migrants
want to find, and generally do find, jobs that make them
quickly upwardly mobile.)
The social, geographic, political, and strategic implications
of Muslim immigration to Europe are intertwined. In that
light, European countries should pursue a double objective:
isolate the Islamic radicals with the support of their own Muslim
population, and seek out at least the neutrality of the nonviolent
conservative fundamentalists among them. Two
different approaches have been in competition in Europe in
this regard. The multiculturalist approach, tried mainly in Great
Britain, treats Muslims as a minority group that should be
addressed collectively and that should possibly benefit from a
specific status. The integrationist approach, which describes
that of France, seeks to grant full citizenship to Muslims as
individuals but not to consider them as a separate community
under any ethnic, cultural, or religious paradigm.
Neither approach seems to be working all that well. The
multicultural approach tends to create ghettos. In Great Britain,
the Dobson Report (2001) advised the government to stop
pushing in this direction and to adapt a more integrative
approach. The integrationist approach, however, ignores the
quest for a new identity among uprooted Muslims. In France,
amid an ongoing debate, the government has decided to
establish an official representation of Muslims as a faith group,
but not as a cultural or ethnic minority.
However awkwardly, a common approach is slowly
emerging in Europe—dealing with the Muslim population in
purely religious terms. Encouraging the emergence of a European
Islam will help integrate the Muslims, weaken links with
foreign countries, and provide a Western-compatible religious
identity. The problem thus far is that some governments (like
that of France), as well as the bulk of public opinion, equate
European Islam with “liberal” Islam. Calling on the Muslims
to adapt the basic tenets of Islam to the Western concept of a
religion is a mistake.
For example, to officially sponsor “good and liberal” Mus-
lims would be a sort of kiss of death. It would deprive such
liberal organizations and leaders of any legitimacy. Besides,
the main motivation for youth radicalization is not theological,
because youth is not interested in a theological debate.
Instead, political radicalization is the main driving force.
Moreover, modern secular states should not regulate theology
as a matter of policy.
Is there a better approach? Yes. Genuine pluralism is the
best way to avoid confrontation with a tight-knit Muslim community.
Conservative and even fundamentalist views of religion
are manageable in a plural environment, as shown by a
host of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish cases. A pluralistic
approach allows civil society to reach the cadres of youth who
could be ideal targets for radicals and neofundamentalist
groups.
State policy should be based on integration and even
“notabilization” of Muslims and community leaders on a pluralistic
basis. The priority should be to weaken the links with
foreign elements by pushing for the “nativization” of Islam
and for preventing the deepening of the ghetto syndrome.
Transparency should be the aim.
If that general proposition is accepted, then certain proposals
seem to follow logically. First, there should be much tighter
control on fund-raising and subsidizing from abroad, which
also means better access to open domestic fund-raising and
subsidies (for building mosques, for example). Second, governments
should establish more links between Islamic religious
teaching institutions and the university and academe.
Third, religious representation should be encouraged without
monopoly. Fourth, mainstream political parties should court
and enlist Muslim leaders. Fifth, social policy must avoid confronting
Muslims with black-and-white choices. It must,
instead, work to let Muslim youth experience a diversity of
opinions in line with the spectrum of political diversity in the
West.
In this sense, the debate on the issue of supporting or not
supporting the U.S. military campaign in Iraq has had a positive
impact. In Great Britain, as well in France and elsewhere
in Europe, Muslims did not feel isolated or targeted; rather,
they felt as though they belonged to mainstream public opinion.
In this sense at least, in the European context, the debate
between so-called old and new Europe has superseded the
debate on the “clash of civilizations.”
Such a policy of encouraging pluralism will meet the aspirations
of mainstream Muslims in Europe—Islam recognized
as a Western religion, Muslims as full citizens—while avoiding
the creation of a closed community, ghettos, and minority
status. This policy will contribute to the isolation of the terrorists
and prevent them from building a dangerous political constituency.
Approaches that by design or error drive Muslim
communities inward and into themselves will backfire, to the
regret of all concerned.

[Nordic Fire]

:roll: The incredible cure for terrorism: blame them, change them, make them like us.

Well, that mentality is the centerpiece of the Project for the New American Century (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_for_the_New_American_Century), which s the ideological foundation and the motivation behind the imperial ambitions of the present US administration.

[Vorster]

For the guys fighting the actual war the following steps are the best to follow.

1. Intelligence, Intelligence and Intelligence (find them and fix them)
2. Strike the leaders hard and fast any were in the world (with no safe place they will have to stand and make a fight on the ground of our chosing)
3. Mop up the remnants